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Abstract 
The participation of private investors in the delivery of public infrastructure is 
known as public-private partnership (PPP) a procurement method that combines 
design, build, finance, operation and infrastructure maintenance, and is generally 
regarded as being an innovative and holistic delivery approach. There are two sets of 
infrastructures procured through PPP, social infrastructure (schools, hospital, prisons, 
and court buildings) and economic infrastructure (airports, railways road transport, 
and seaports), the latter of which uses toll charges for capital costs recovery.  
PPP is attractive to many governments because of the preconceived economic 
benefits it provides, including value for money (VfM), allocation and transfer of 
risks to the private investor, and non-upfront payment of infrastructure procurement 
costs. This is why it has become a preferred procurement option over the many other 
alternative options. The VfM concept is an important factor for consideration in 
public sector infrastructure procurement, relative to efficiency and effectiveness with 
the delivery of projects. However, there have been many previous research studies 
that have both praised and criticised PPP for its value contributions. Analytical tools 
such as the public sector comparator (PSC) and cost benefit analysis (CBA) are used 
for VfM determination, but what actually constitutes VfM remains largely undefined. 
VfM has been viewed in the past as a means of obtaining the maximum 
benefits with available resources, however, this view has been somewhat reversed in 
recent times, as many PPP projects have not been delivered on time and on budget, 
nor has it been proven that they have delivered promised benefits to society.   
The term “benefit” describes the value to society of a good and/or a service and 
its interpretation varies dependant on whether is being perceived by the consumer or 
the investor. Consumer’s perception of benefit is the willingness to pay 
(affordability) the price indicated. The two concepts “willingness” and 
“affordability” are difficult to measure in monetary terms using CBA and PSC as 
they primarily exclude future related benefits, costs, effects, impacts and 
opportunities associated with PPP procurement in relation to infrastructure 
evaluations. According to some points of view, PSC and CBA do not provide an 
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accurate measurement of PPP benefits and costs, which is needed to enable the 
effects and impacts on society to be quantified. 
One of the major problems with PPP, and the issue of most interest in this 
research, is the difficulty associated with the accurate measurement of the benefits 
and costs involved, as they have critical long-term implications on global, national 
and local economies and should be properly and more accurately quantified and 
included as part of a PPP’s overall cost estimate. This therefore raises two important 
questions: 
1. Can PPP benefits and costs be effectively measured through the 
assignment of monetary values?  
2. Are there other alternative measurements that are appropriate and 
socially acceptable relative to establishing the real benefits and costs 
to society of PPP delivery?  
This research aims to critically assess the benefits and costs of PPP road 
transport procurement to society, by investigating the full nature and scope of PPP 
potential benefits and costs (microeconomic, macroeconomic, financial, political, 
social), and the extent to which these benefits and costs are effectively measured, 
along with the scope and viability to improve these measurements. This research uses 
a literature review as a means of substantiating, or refuting current assessment and 
evaluation of PPP procurement, together with case studies (London Underground 
Rehabilitation and Restoration Program and Brisbane Airport Link Tunnel Project), 
and interviews of PPP practitioners, either in their capacity of delivery or financing 
from both public and private sectors. 
To improve the assessment and evaluation of PPP benefits, costs, effects and 
impacts to society, the multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) model, or multi-
criteria analysis (MCA) are suggested for use to supplement the analyses of CBA and 
PSC that until now have provided the basic information required, but are limited in 
their capacity to include future related benefits and costs, or those intangible risks 
that are capable of derailing PPP outcomes. PPP benefits to society are not seen to be 
immediate, and if realised, can only be gauged after the infrastructure construction is 
long finished. The non-upfront payment of PPP procurement by the public sector is 
considered poor public policy and consumption of budgeted revenue, which has 
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failed to address the Fiscal Responsibility Act (1980) of Commonwealth of 
Australia.   
VfM determination through government’s PSC is seen by many to be biased 
and designed to favour PPP procurement, because future economic, social, and other 
intangible risks changes are beyond PSC capacity and that critically affects VfM 
Therefore, this research posits as a conclusion that a more pragmatic approach to 
addressing the current problem of PPP procurement is required, including changes 
from non-upfront payment to availability, shadowing, or tolling systems designed to 
improve PPP performance and success in Australia.   
 
Keywords: PPP, cost benefit analysis, multi-criteria decision making, public sector 
comparator, economic benefits, costs, value for money, risk. 
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 Chapter 1:Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the introduction to this research, which examines public 
and private sector collaboration in the provision of public infrastructure. It presents 
details of private sector collaboration in the delivery of public infrastructure, which is 
referred to as public-private partnership (PPP). Current and existing issues associated 
with PPP delivery of public infrastructure are identified, leading to the statement of 
the research problem and the aims and objectives of the research. Chapter 1 also 
outlines the research methodology and the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
The public sector is a service-oriented industry that provides public goods and 
services to society, which is amongst a government’s main responsibilities, in 
addition to operating market failure regulations (CEDA, 2005; Lal 1996; Smith 
1776). There are a broad range of public goods and services (PG&S) that the 
government provides, covering various programs grouped into services such as toll 
goods and public goods. Public goods and services, such as road transportation, 
energy, communication, sewerage, sanitation, and water, which can be individually 
and collectively consumed by society, are provided by the government as part of its 
societal responsibilities (Lal, 1996, UNIDO, 2008). In contrast, public goods 
provided by the government for the national interest include security, defence, 
recreational parks and other administrative services (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). Lal 
(1996) argued that public goods and services that are collectively consumed are tax 
financed, even when these goods and services are publicly provided (but not 
necessarily publicly produced), and can be privatised or used by individuals to 
provide services to the public. In general, legislation prohibits the government from 
using public goods and services for alternative purposes, such as earning extra 
revenue through the imposition of user charges or as a substitute for taxes. In 
addition, the operation of public goods and services activities adds to the difficulty of 
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managing the economy effectively due to their indivisibility (Ostrom and Ostrom, 
1977). Over recent years, there has been an increased demand for toll goods, which 
are seen as a stimulant to the economy (Fay and Yepes, 2003). 
In the 1980s, following fiscal policy changes based on budget surpluses 
(prudence) and public debt management reductions, it was difficult for state and local 
governments in Australia to borrow and finance public infrastructure demands. 
Therefore, the ability of state and local governments to invest in public infrastructure 
so that their treasuries could generate additional revenue became limited. The 
Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA, 2005) argued that there 
was a decline in revenue from public infrastructure investments and an inability for 
governments to raise additional taxes. There was also a decline in revenue from taxes 
and an absence of funds for the government to continue providing these public goods 
and services. Unfortunately, the decline in tax revenue did nothing to reduce societal 
demands for public infrastructures, as human living conditions continued to improve 
due to the construction of new developments. It became apparent that governments 
needed to look for additional sources of funding, especially as there was a rising 
public demand for improved infrastructure (Infrastructure Australia, 2010). The 
public-private partnership (PPP) procurement methodology, which uses private 
sector firms to provide traditional government services, became an invaluable 
resource for governments to utilise, as it enabled governments to provide needed 
public infrastructure, and at the same time manage their short-term and long-term 
expenditures effectively (Gaffey, 2010). 
In 1992, the United Kingdom, under the conservative government, introduced 
private finance initiatives (PFI), which were used for the construction of the QEII 
Bridge between Dartford and Thurrock (KPMG, 2007). PFIs represent about 14 per 
cent of public investment with projects being undertaken in most of the key 
infrastructure areas such as roads, schools, hospitals, railways (Cangiano et al., 
2004).The UKHCTC (2011, pp 4) stated that over £60 billion of capital investment 
(at 2010 prices) was committed by private investors under signed PFI contracts. The 
terms of PPP/PFI contracts enable the public sector to enter into long-term 
arrangements with private investors to construct new public infrastructures (Serco, 
2002). For such new public infrastructure construction, a PPP is often organised by 
way of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as a consortium of financial institutions and 
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private companies responsible for all of the activities of PPP (including the co-
ordination of finances and services delivery) (Hamming et al., 2008). A PPP can be 
led by the private contractor performing the services (the United Kingdom model) or 
the financial institution responsible for the project’s finance (Australian model) 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; OECD, 2008) bidding for the project.   
The demand for PPP has increased over recent years in Australia, Europe, 
Japan, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America, and 
has become the ultimate method for addressing infrastructure demands and 
challenges (IPA, 2007). In the United States of America (USA), PPP has been used 
for the delivery of both social and economic infrastructures (Indiana East-West Toll 
Road, Chicago Skyway, California SR 91 Express Lanes, Camino Colombia Toll 
Road, JFK Terminal 4, (Baxandall, 2009; CBO, 2007) and in Germany for the 
delivery of highways (DoT, 2007). Other European Union (EU) countries such as 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have invested 
in PPP, although their public investments have remained relatively moderate 
(Cangiano et al., 2004; EIB, 2004). Additionally, reflecting on the need for 
infrastructure investment on a large scale and governments fiscally weak positions, a 
number of developing countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Latin and Caribbean countries (Chile, Mexico), have followed the trend, resulting in 
increased involvement of private sector participation in the delivery of public 
services (Cangiano et al., 2004; The World Bank Database, 2010). In Canada and 
Japan, PPP programs are starting to emerge. Amongst both the developing and in 
some developed countries that have used PPP procurement services, Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) have a combined total PPP investment of U$87 billion 
across the energy, communication, transport, and water sewerage sectors. However, 
it is the energy and communication sectors that have dominated in the developing 
countries; energy commands the lead (electricity, natural gas) with a U$76.8 billion, 
investment while communication takes second position with U$52.4 billion. The 
transport sector (airport, railway, road and seaport) is a close third with a total 
investment of U$ 48.2 billion (The World Bank and PPIAF PPI Database, 2012)  
 
In Australia, the demand for infrastructure that collects revenue from the use of 
toll systems, particularly for road transportation, has been continuously increasing 
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(IPA, 2007). This has been largely attributed to the increase in Australia’s 
population. Infrastructure Partnership Australia (IPA) (2010) stated that Australian 
roads were not adequately maintained or repaired to an appropriate engineering 
standard. This statement was attributed to a lack of funds (budget appropriation) and 
lack of repairs to existing roads, which has affected logistics and transportation of 
goods and services in those areas where they are most needed. In addition, traffic 
congestion on Australian roads imposes significant social costs (e.g., gas emission, 
air pollution) on the economy. It is estimated that these costs will exceed AUD 30 
billion by 2015 (IPA, 2007). In summary, resources are required to maintain and 
repair existing roads, as well to construct new roads to cater for future Australian 
population increases. 
Over the ten year period from 2000–2010, the Australian population increased 
by 3.1 million (or 1.7%) and this has resulted in an overuse of existing public 
infrastructure (ABS, 2011). In this context, IPA (2007) stated that the Pacific 
Highway between Sydney and Brisbane was an under developed road, with only two 
lanes and they argued that restraint in expenditure on public investments had led to 
infrastructure shortages in Australia (IPA, 2007). The Australian Economic Review 
(2005) similarly indicated that a sum of AUD50 billion was required for construction 
of new roads, and an additional AUD40 billion was required to generate energy 
(electricity) and 600 giga litres of water was needed to combat water shortages in 
urban areas (IPA, 2007). In South East Queensland (SEQ), the estimates for 
infrastructure needs are approximately AUD107 billion for economic infrastructure, 
plus an additional AUD12 billion for social infrastructures from 2008–2026 (SEQ 
Regional Plan, 2008). The Australian Council for Infrastructure Development 
(AusCID, 2008) and IPA (2007) have both re-emphasised the shortages of public 
infrastructure and its impact on society (Deloitte, 2008; IPA, 2007). It has been 
stated that this shortage will ultimately seriously affect Australia’s economic growth. 
Similarly, on a sector-by-sector basis (transport, sewerage, energy, communication, 
water, social), CEDA (2005) stated that Australia’s infrastructure challenges required 
urgent action because of the lack of public investment persisting in Australia. 
1.2.1 Decline in public sector revenue 
Following the fiscal policy changes in the 1980s, based on budget surpluses 
(prudence) and public debt management reductions, state and local governments 
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were unable to generate additional revenue or raise taxes for the public sector 
infrastructure investment as the result of increases in budget consumption 
(operational programs) (CEDA, 2005). In addition, the introduction of fiscal policy 
changes in the 1980s directed towards more prudent financial management and 
reduction of public debts, significantly affected public infrastructure investments. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2005) stated that 
the Australian economic objective was to achieve a fiscal balance over the course of 
the economic cycle, to be implemented through the Charter of Budget Honesty 
legislation (1998) framework for the conduct and reporting of government fiscal 
positions. At commonwealth and state levels, both governments have embarked on 
debt reductions, a contributing factor that led to the decline of public sector 
investments, coupled with public asset sales and the shift of the provision of certain 
economic (infrastructure)functions over to the private sector (EBRD, 2005).     
In Australia, the ability of state governments to invest in public infrastructure 
projects, which could have generated additional revenue to the Treasury and also 
supplemented the taxpayers’ revenue, was either deferred or suspended. In addition, 
the introduction and implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in July 
2000 fundamentally changed the funding and assistance arrangements between the 
PG&S activities of commonwealth and state governments, adding to the existing 
difficulty of managing the economy effectively in Australia (CEDA, 2005). At this 
point, state and local governments became responsible for the funding and 
development of public infrastructure; in particular, transportation networks (CEDA, 
2005). For example, the New South Wales Fiscal Responsibility Act (2005) set a 
long-term target for the government to attain financial viability by reducing its 
financial liability to the proportion of the state gross product (GDP) of six per cent or 
less by 30 June 2015. On the other hand, it was noted that such measures by 
Australian state governments, directed at achieving public debt reductions, could also 
lead to non-public infrastructure (capital) investments.  However, the National 
Council for Public Private Partnerships (NCPPP, 2003) stated that PPP opponents 
argue that governments can act alone to meet the demand for public infrastructure 
challenges, regardless of any budgetary constraints. Additionally, advocates for PPP 
stress the importance of the private investor’s participation in adding enormous value 
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to society by driving the economy to prosperity based on the effective use of 
combined resources. 
1.2.2 Need for alternative delivery methods 
To address these Australian public infrastructure challenges, governments 
(commonwealth, local and state) were required to look for alternative resources to 
sustain public infrastructure demands through greater involvement of the private 
sector. Levinson et al., (2006, pp. 285) stated that the confluence arising from 
infrastructure needs and social demands, combined with tight government budgets 
and public resistance to additional tax increases, made it possible for public 
authorities to turn to the innovative qualities and access operating capital possessed 
by the private sector in order to fulfil these responsibilities. With the traditional or 
conventional methods of project procurement and delivery, such as design-build 
(DB), design-construct (DC) and build-transfer (BT) being undertaken in an 
environment of chronic funds shortages, it was evident that public sector projects 
would not only have to seek additional sources of funding, but such funding needed 
to be cost effective and efficient in meeting the increasing demands for new public 
infrastructure (UKHLSCEA, 2010). In addition, BT and DB delivery methods 
demanded other post construction activities by the public sector, such as ongoing 
maintenance of the infrastructure delivered to minimum engineering standards, and 
the magnitude of this often varied from one government agency to another, meaning 
that infrastructure maintenance depended on availability of funds (UKNAO, 2009). 
Another alternative form of conventional delivery system is design-build-
maintain (DBM), where governments contract private sector organisations to design 
and build, and after completion, maintain the delivered infrastructure for a specific 
period. The choice of traditional or non-traditional methods of a public infrastructure 
delivery is dependent on the circumstances, politics and resources (proposed 
infrastructure costs) prevalent at the time of consideration of the asset business case. 
Another criterion that may have impact is the infrastructure affordability based on a 
government’s budget appropriations, without causing undesirable financial pressure 
or limiting its capacity to pursue other investment programs (NPPPG, 2008). In this 
context, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argued that it was the change in responsibility 
between governments and the private sector that led to the delivery of public goods 
and services through the public-private partnerships and that this trend had increased 
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the contracting out of governments’ primary roles to the private sector. One of the 
benefits of using PPP delivery is that it enables the government to provide needed 
public infrastructure, and at the same time manage its short-term and long-term 
expenditures more effectively (Gaffey, 2010). In Australia, the private sector 
collaboration in the delivery of a public infrastructure is referred to as PPP, while in 
the United Kingdom it has more often been known as the private finance initiative 
(PFI). 
1.2.3 PPP definition and collaboration types 
The broad definition of PPP encompasses the collaborations and relationships 
between participating entities, however the basic approach to, and implementation of, 
PPP are respectively a “finance-based approach” and a “service-based approach” 
(Gaffey, 2010). The finance-based approach uses private finance for the funding of 
public infrastructure construction and operation, which relies heavily on user fee 
charges and societal patronage for the capital costs recovery. Finance-based PPPs 
include build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-transfer-operate (BTO), and build-own-
operate (BOO) arrangements. The service-based approach of PPP on the other hand 
depends on the skills and experience contributed by the private sector in the form of 
innovation and management of the public sector infrastructure to provide the 
additional services needed in the public sector in an efficient and effective manner 
(Gaffey, 2010). In the latter form of procurement, the private investor constructs new 
public infrastructure using loans or funds obtained from financial institutions. In 
exchange, the private sector receives payments from the government throughout the 
life of the asset. The service-based approach includes design-build-finance-operate 
(DBFO), design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM), build-own-operate-transfer 
(BOOT), and other similar asset delivery/management arrangements (Gaffey, 2010). 
Figure 1.1 below shows the government’s role and responsibility directed towards 
public infrastructure procurement with various PPP arrangements or options in 
partnership with the private sector. 
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Figure 1.1 shows types of PPP delivery arrangements. 
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Notable Australian examples of DBFO and BOOT arrangements of 
transportation networks are the Sydney Harbour Tunnel, the Sydney City Cross 
Tunnel, Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel, the Western Sydney Orbital (Westlink M4, M7), 
Melbourne Frankston Freeway and the Melbourne Station Redevelopment (Duffield, 
2001). In Queensland, the CLEM7 Tunnel and the Brisbane Airport Tunnel projects 
were delivered through DBFO arrangements (Storr, 2009) that included maintenance 
of the infrastructure for a concessional period. PPP constructed infrastructure that is 
transferred to the government upon completion and subsequently leased back to the 
private investor to provide services with the infrastructure is referred to as an 
“incomplete contract” (Bentz et al., 2004), because the contract extends the property 
rights and ownership to the services provider. 
One of the other major benefits of PPP lies in its ability to combine public 
sector financial issues and infrastructure delivery demand challenges into a source of 
potential competencies (APTC, 2007). PPP promotes collaborative relationships and 
open communication systems amongst project participants, as well as limiting 
bureaucratic processes or hierarchical management styles (the latter being 
predominant in the public sector). In addition, PPP is beneficial to governments, 
assisting them to acquire public assets without the need to resort to short or long-
term loans from any financial institutions (Gaffey, 2010). This creates the 
opportunity for the government to continue to provide public services without 
incurring additional debts or financial obligations. However, Mineta (2006) argued 
that despite PPP benefits in the delivery of public infrastructure and services, the 
private sector’s participation could only partially resolve or remedy infrastructure 
challenges across the globe. For example, Bentz et al., (2004) stated that when 
identifying the benefits associated with PPP delivery, governments failed to 
emphasise the issue of the infrastructure ownership. Whoever actually builds the 
infrastructure (i.e. the public sector) then lives with the consequences in the long run, 
after the lease expiration, or once the infrastructure reverts back to the public. 
However, the benefits that emerge as a result of both PPP delivery and the funding of 
the public infrastructure, are ultimately associated with the resultant long-term 
economic, social, and political implications and costs, particularly the long-term 
affordability of private investor services and their appropriate considerations (OECD, 
2007). Private investment provides the delivery of its services on the basis of non-
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upfront payments, which according to some authors is viewed with scepticism and 
reservations (Boardman and Vining, 2008; Irwin, 2004), as the fiscal effect of 
deferring public sector payments impacts on the net infrastructure value. Reijniers 
(1994) stated that the public sector was partially convinced of the private investor’s 
efficacy of the solution, and hesitant to commit fully to the funding of these projects, 
even when they were considered self-funding projects. Another problem with public 
investments is in fulfilment of electoral campaigns imposed by politicians on society, 
which might not address infrastructural needs of the time or the implementation of a 
desired public policy (TranApex, 2005). As PPP contractual terms and conditions are 
binding on the incumbent and subsequent governments, PPP costs are transferrable 
to the next government coming into office, however, the contract might be 
renegotiated (OECD, 2010). 
1.2.5 PPP Costs 
“Costs” are the expenses related to the purchase of inputs, including capital 
equipment, or the total resources (money, time, etc.) associated with a purchase or 
activity (Ottawa Treasury, 1998). There are costs and risks associated with every 
type of infrastructure delivery, not just the PPP mode of procurement, however, the 
peculiarity of PPP is its holistic approach to managing costs and risks simultaneously 
(construction, financial, legal, operational, and political). This is an important 
consideration, as the private sector will not assume political risk, or intervene to 
stabilise the overall economy, as it is the government’s responsibility to provide an 
environment conducive for business operations (Klein, 1996). Reilly and Brown 
(2004) stated that the private investors’ inexperience of, or lack of exposure to, the 
complexities of public infrastructure projects and the quantum of capital investment 
required was overwhelming, and it was rare in the private sector to deal adequately, 
or at all, with unquantified costs to the investor. To support PPP arrangements, the 
government provides cash grants or initial capital outlay to the private sector, which 
are directed towards reducing the capital costs and interest rates associated with the 
delivery or enhancement of investment returns (Estache et al., 2007). 
Other costs associated with PPP delivery are derived from placing a value on 
the concern for public interest, which is subsumed by the private investor’s desire to 
maximise profit. While PPP depends on the use of the constructed infrastructure to 
recoup capital costs where there is no availability arrangement, this dependency can 
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make public interest secondary. Gaffey (2010) and Cuttaree (2008) argued that 
recoupment of capital costs by the private investor was an escalation process of 
collecting higher user fee charges at a faster rate than when the infrastructure was 
wholly owned and controlled by the government.  In some cases, PPP services are 
not provided where they are needed but concentrated within metropolitan areas, 
while regional areas are neglected (Kuntton, 2005). 
While the argument for greater efficiency in terms of infrastructure 
construction favours the private sector, conversely the use of private finance tends to 
increase project delivery costs (loan interest, intangible risks). Gaffey (2010) argued 
that the use of private finance attracted interest in addition to the principal loaned 
from financial institutions. In other words, the cost of private sector delivery tends to 
consume resources beyond a government’s projected budget. In actuality, generally 
the public sector is capable of obtaining the funding at a substantially lower rate than 
the private sector based on its higher credit ratings. Given the long duration of many 
infrastructure leases, which in Australia are typically between thirty-five to forty-five 
years, the possibility of miscalculating either or both of the future benefits of PPP or 
the ultimate overall costs to society, is high. In this context, the overall infrastructure 
costs (construction, operation, maintenance) and potential user demand on the said 
infrastructure are capable of creating either economic or financial losses to the public 
sector reserves. For instance, with toll roads being associated with long-term leases, 
the private investor might not achieve the profits envisaged for the amount of capital 
investment (DoT, 2007). Alternatively, if infrastructure abandonment results due to 
any unforeseen circumstances, the expected societal benefits planned to arise from 
the infrastructure delivery are denied (Gaffey, 2010; UKNAO, 2009). 
Although some PPP costs are borne by the public sector, the private investor 
faces the most significant risk when participating in a PPP arrangement (Levinson et 
al., 2006). Neither the public sector nor the private sector can predict with certainty 
possible future technological changes that may occur to increase costs or time over 
the contract period (Gaffey, 2010). In addition, changes in the human ‘appetite’ for 
the products and services of PPP are likely to occur over time, which could have a 
devastating effect on the private investor’s capital investment recoupment efforts. 
Coupled with this, most PPP road and transport infrastructure is designed to transfer 
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the demand risk over to the private investor, unless it was specifically stated in the 
contract that demand risk would be shared between the entities (Quiggin, 2004).  
1.2.6 Research problem 
Emanating from the preceding issues, one of the major problems with PPP, and 
the issue of most interest in this research, is the difficulty associated with the 
provision of a more accurate measurement of the benefits and costs involved with 
PPP procurement. For example, PPP is said to confer benefits to society in relation to 
time-savings, improvements to human quality of life, and employment opportunities 
(Coordinator General’s Report, 2008), but how are these benefits actually identified, 
quantified and measured? The same could be said about PPP costs to society as these 
are also largely unmeasured and unassessed. The effects and impacts of public sector 
investments are protracted, whether using conventional or PPP procurement. In other 
words, PPP benefits and costs are only partially identified through cost benefit 
analysis (CBA) and public sector comparator (PSC) and there is an overwhelming 
need for them to be more appropriately identified by both sectors, in particular, the 
public sector as the proponent and purchaser of PPP services. The benefits, costs, 
effects and impacts of PPP have critical long-term implications on global, national 
and local economies and should be properly and more accurately quantified and 
included as part of a PPP’s overall cost estimate (Banister and Berechman, 2000). 
This therefore raises an important question,  
1.2.7 Research question 
The research raises important questions that emanate from the considerations 
and problems identified above and these are:   
1. “Can PPP benefits and costs be effectively measured through 
assignment of monetary values?”  
2. “Are there other alternative measurements that are appropriate and 
socially acceptable to measure the benefits and costs of PPP to 
society”? 
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1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Based on these questions, the main aim of the research becomes to critically 
assess and investigate the benefits and costs of PPP transportation procurement to 
society, and the focus is on road transport infrastructure.    
The objectives of the research were:   
1. To investigate the full nature and scope of all PPP potential benefits and 
costs, including microeconomic, macroeconomic, financial, political 
and social. Additionally, how these benefits and costs, either short-term 
or long-term, arose from PPP? 
2. To assess the extent to which these benefits and costs were being 
effectively measured, along with the scope and viability to improve 
measurement. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This research used an extensive and comprehensive literature review as a 
means of substantiating, or refuting, current PPP procurements practices, together 
with a completed case study (the London Underground Rehabilitation Program) and 
(at the time of the research being undertaken) incomplete (the Airport Link Tunnel) 
projects, and interviews with PPP practitioners from the public and private sectors, 
the ALT data information was collected mostly from Queensland Treasury and 
Department of Infrastructure Planning. (However, it is worth mentioning that the 
Airport Link Tunnel was completed during the course of this research). The choice 
and selection of interviewees were primarily based on involvement with the PPP 
industry, either in the capacity of funding or delivery of PPP infrastructures, with 
extensive experience over 10 years. Figure 1.2 below shows the stages of research 
methodology this thesis adopted that enabled the investigation of the research 
questions. 
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Figure 1.2 Research Methodology stages 
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Ethnographic fieldwork by way of visits to completed and on-going PPP 
construction projects was performed in the areas of Kedron and Lutwyche to observe 
the effects of the PPP CLEM 7 and the Airport Link constructions on properties and 
businesses. The visits provided the opportunity to observe the number of business 
activities that had either closed or were struggling to survive. However, it was 
difficult to establish population migration and emigration figures in the area based on 
the physical attraction or benefits of these infrastructures in the suburbs affected. 
1.4.1 Research significance 
Little research appears to exist that relates to the benefits and costs to society of 
public infrastructure procurement with the delivery of public-private partnership. 
Authors such as Grimsey and Lewis (2007); Kerzner (1995); Edwards and Shaoul 
(2003); Al-Bahar (1998); Raftery (1994); Akintoye and Macleod (1997) Hodge and 
Greve (2005; 2011) have written extensively on PPP risks allocation and transfer and 
other benefits associated with PPP delivery such as value for money (VfM). Value 
for Money (VfM) is the term used to assess whether or not an organisation has 
obtained the maximum benefit from the goods and services it acquires and/or 
provides, within the resources available to it.  VfM not only measures the cost of 
goods and services, but it also takes into account the attributes of quality, cost, and 
resources use, fitness for purpose, timeliness and convenience to judge whether or 
not, when combined, these attributes constitute good value (HM Treasury, 
2006). Achieving VfM may be described in terms of the 'three Es' - economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness (Demirag, 2008). However, limited research exists in 
measuring PPP benefits and costs or ways to improve identification, or 
quantification, as their effects and impacts are protracted. Therefore, research in this 
area may be useful and could lead the way in improving the assessment and 
evaluation of PPP benefits and costs to society. 
A major problem with PPP assessment and evaluation is the reliance on CBA 
and PSC as analytical tools, as they are limited in potential to identify and quantify 
microeconomic effects and impacts of PPP procurement of future events. For 
example, PSC excludes the non-financial costs of PPP to society in calculating its 
VfM (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008), as it is based on insufficient historical data that 
prohibits the comparison of benefits and costs of delivery options, even though it is 
considered as providing a mechanism for accountability (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005),. 
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In addition, CBA and PSC happen to highlight the monetary benefits of PPP, without 
recourse to an alternative measurement of these benefits, such as quality of services, 
consumers’ satisfaction, economic and social influences with the potential to change 
PPP desired outcomes.  
Therefore, this research investigated alternative analytical tools such as multi-
criteria decision making (MCDM), which could complement the efforts of CBA and 
PSC, with the measurement of PPP benefits and costs to society. 
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters: 
 Chapter 1 consists of an introduction, which explains the background of the 
research study. The research question, aims and objectives are provided, together 
with an outline of the research design and methodology. Public sector infrastructure 
procurement and financial risk management is briefly explained, which will help 
with an overall understanding of the mechanism and issues in public sector 
infrastructure procurement and delivery. 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of public sector infrastructure 
procurement and of the financial risks involved in such procurement due to the 
complexity and uncertainty prevalent with infrastructure facilities. The chapter 
initially reviews global infrastructure needs across developed countries (USA, 
Europe, Asia and Australia). A detailed analysis of the transport infrastructure needs 
in Australia, as an economic stimulus and driver of asset growth, leading to policy 
developments at both the state and federal government levels is also provided. The 
chapter then examines the benefits and costs of PPP to society, including allocation 
and transfer of risks within the entities (construction, financial, legal, maintenance, 
operation, political, revenue), which is one of the reasons PPP is a preferred mode of 
delivery compared to conventional methods. Whether identified PPP benefits, costs 
and risks (present, future) are measurable through monetary values, or other 
measurements, which could be satisfactorily acceptable by society is also examined. 
Finally, the chapter discusses transportation network infrastructure projects using 
cost benefit analysis (CBA) as a measure of PPP investment returns to the private 
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investor, also, examines CBA limitations to include future benefits and costs of PPP 
activities to society in terms of those often being too protracted. 
Chapter 3 presents the overall research design and discusses the methodology 
used to undertake the research. It begins with the justification for the methodology 
based on the research problem and the literature review, case studies, interviews and 
data observation of PPP arrangements. The chapter describes the various procedures 
used to collect data, and how the data was analysed and presented, including the use 
of qualitative data analysis software (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 9, 2010) to 
organise and code the data. The validation and consideration of the reliability of the 
data is discussed in detail, as well as the limitations of the methodology mentioned in 
Chapter 1. 
The next two chapters present the case studies; Chapter 4 specifically discusses 
the Airport Link Tunnel and references to the CLEM 7 Tunnel project (Queensland). 
Chapter 5 examines the London Underground Rehabilitation and Restoration project, 
which is a railroad project. These case studies analyse the socio-economic benefits of 
these particular infrastructure projects and evaluate whether value for money (VfM) 
identified during project feasibility studies and business case development was 
achieved with the passage of time. These chapters also examined what were the 
project and service objectives, as well as what ambiguities were detectable in terms 
of contract definitions and concepts and how these affected contract performance.  
Chapter 6 discusses the interview data and the use of QSR NVivo. With 
document observation, interviews, case studies of the Airport Link Tunnel project 
and London Underground Tubelines, and a literature review on PPP arrangements, a 
summary of the PPP environment capable of conferring benefits to society and 
potential is produced. It is the intention and objective of this research to contribute 
towards improved public infrastructure procurements using PPP, which are capable 
of identifying all benefits and costs associated with its activities.  
Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the case studies, the Airport Link Tunnel 
project (Brisbane), the London Underground Rehabilitation and Restoration project 
and the interview data summary. The findings suggest the need for an alternative or 
the inclusion of another evaluative tool which could compliment the analyses of 
CBA and PSC, and SCBA as they are limited in their capacity to provide justification 
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for decision undertaken or include future related events, opportunities, effects and 
impacts of a proposed public infrastructure delivery.  
Chapter 8 presents the research findings from interviews, case studies and 
develops implications and conclusions that are derived from the research and how 
the research objectives align with PPP measurements and evaluations of risks 
allocation and transfer to the private investor. Further research studies in the area of 
traffic volume predictions and collaborative arrangements with demand risk sharing 
and research limitation in economic infrastructure, in particular, road transport 
infrastructure benefits and costs to society are needed. 
1.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This research is limited only to PPP road transport (transport construction) 
using toll charges and is often referred to as capital-intensive investment (social 
overhead) or a structure for economic activities (Jochimsen, 1996). However, the 
research briefly makes reference and comment on other PPP infrastructure 
procurements, which are part of public sector socio-economic developments. The 
research focuses on economic infrastructures, in particular the provision of road 
transport to society and individuals, which is traditionally considered a governments’ 
primary responsibility. 
 
1.7 SUMMARY 
Chapter 1 has discussed the background to the research contained in this thesis, 
which concerns the problems relating to increases in the demand for public 
infrastructure resulting from public infrastructure shortages in Australia. The aim of 
this research was to undertake a closer examination of PPP benefits and costs and 
identify whether those benefits and cost were measurable in monetary values, or 
whether other non-monetary measurements were more appropriate.  
The introduction of the Commonwealth Government of Australia fiscal policy 
changes in the 1980s, directed towards prudent financial management and reduction 
of public debts, significantly affected public infrastructure investments in Australia, 
including the responsibility between governments and the private sector that led to 
the participation and delivery of public goods and services through public-private 
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partnerships (Besley and Ghatak, 2001). PPP is defined as the collaboration and 
relationship between participating entities. The basic approach and implementation 
of PPP activities are either “finance-based” or “service-based” (Gaffey, 2010). The 
services of PPP are provided based on a non-upfront payment, which has a fiscal 
consequence and impact on the net value of the infrastructure when the public sector 
debt is deferred (Boardman and Vining, 2008; Irwin, 2004). One of the benefits of 
PPP is the immediate execution of government policies that provides the needed 
public infrastructure, at the same time, enables the government to manage its short-
term and long-term expenditures more effectively (Gaffey, 2010). There are other 
benefits as the result of using PPP, mostly to governments to acquire public assets 
without the need to resort to short or long-term loans to any financial institutions 
(Gaffey, 2010). The process creates the opportunity for the government to continue 
to provide public services without incurring additional debts or financial obligations 
on its own right. However, PPP is expensive and capital intensive.  
The next chapter discusses the literature review which examines in depth issues 
such as PPP procurement benefits and costs for society, and whether these benefits 
and costs are identifiable, quantifiable and measurable in monetary value or any 
other acceptable value to society, as these benefits and costs are protracted over the 
life-cycle of the public infrastructure. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of public good depends on its ability to confer social benefits 
(directly, or indirectly); including free accessibility to these goods and services by 
society. In addition, public goods and services tend to have a protracted effect when 
it comes to improving human living conditions with minimal cost to society (like 
education, energy, housing developments). There are number of reasons why 
governments are attracted to PPP model. Most often, economic benefits are used and 
highlighted such as PPP potential to confer VfM (UKHCTC, 2011), timely project 
delivery, gains from innovation and removing the need for the government to borrow 
and fund public infrastructure (English, 2004). These are the economic benefits of 
PPPs, which are sound and worth pursuing. However, there are issues with PPP and 
the delivery of public infrastructure, in that the inherent risks associated with the 
delivery are only partially identified, including benefits and costs which are future 
related. Some authors have suggested that to date, PPP, as part of the market product 
system, has not allocated enough resources to identifying and quantifying social 
benefits and effects associated with PPP activities, both of which appear to have a 
protracted effect on society (Loosemore and McCarthy, 2008).  
2.2 THE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION 
The public sector, representing service-oriented government is often involved 
in infrastructure projects of a complex nature with huge capital investments that are 
established to provide socio-economic benefits to the society, which the public sector 
represents. The difference between the private and public sectors is in the type of 
goods and services that the latter offers and its regulatory role in society. For 
example, the public sector as an organisation provides services to promote the 
attainment of human quality of life; the goods and services provided by the private 
sector on the other hand are aimed at rewarding efforts and profit on investments. 
While the public sector has been involved with the delivery of public infrastructure 
and services through conventional methods due to its particular moral responsibilities 
to its taxpayers, the provision and delivery of the government’s primary services by 
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the private sector conceptually originated from commercialisation and privatisation 
of public utilities in the UK in the 1980s (Heald, 2002). The purpose was to fill the 
gap created by the dwindling tax revenues of the UK government at the time. Also, 
PPP satisfied the governments’ political and social agenda by removing the need to 
source additional funding by governments to fund public infrastructure investments 
in its own right.  
In Australia, PPP is becoming the preferred vehicle for the provision of public 
infrastructure and services as the result of ideological shift in thinking and perception 
regarding taxpayers’ ability to pay for these services. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) 
argued that the user pays principle (i.e., benefit principle) would increase the desire 
for the private sector to participate in the delivery and provision of public services in 
the areas of energy generation, water, road transportation and communication. 
Mineta (2006) was of the view that private sector participation in the delivery of 
public infrastructure and services would substantially supplement the taxpayers’ 
diminished revenue that is barely sufficient to maintain the public sector operational 
programs. In Europe, Asia, Australia and the United States of America private sector 
participation is the market-driven solution of choice, backed by its own capital 
investments (Mineta, 2006).  
In the 1980s, Australia witnessed a radical shift in the governance of public 
sector enterprises, as most government establishments were deregulated to enable 
competition in the public sector and goods and services provision (NCP, 2005). The 
government offered incentive packages to lure and retain the services of the private 
investor. Other reasons for the deregulation of public sector enterprises were due to 
the accumulation of public debt, which was running these government enterprises 
into the ground, or delivering reduced service quality. This series of budget deficits 
led to fiscal reforms that focused on more prudent financial management (EBRD, 
2005), and prevented and discouraged subsequent governments from indulging in 
excessive expenditures. With increases in demand for public infrastructure, 
governments were under increasing pressure to seek ways of addressing 
infrastructure challenges and seek alternative funding sources to augment the 
revenue received from taxpayers. The reliance on private sector participation for the 
delivery of public infrastructure and services, which would provide the additional 
resources the government required, arose from these circumstances (UKHLSCEA, 
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2010). The NCPPP (2002) stated that private sector participation in the delivery of 
public infrastructures was the result of increased demand for public infrastructure by 
society. Additionally, the resistance of society towards bearing additional tax 
increases led governments to seek access to operating capital possessed by the 
private sector, to fulfil infrastructure demand challenges (Levinson et al., 2006). 
The use of private sector participation to address public sector infrastructure 
challenges, as well as reducing government budget deficits and implementations of 
public policies, were the primary objectives for the private sector participation. This 
created opportunities for the private sector to develop new investment markets and 
competitively participate within the core services of the public sector as the result of 
Australian Government’s fiscal policy (EBRD, 2005), after deregulating the public 
sector enterprises. Reijniers (1994) stated the private sector participation came in 
various forms and each method leads to the funding of public sector investment or 
managing of public sector services. One of the most popular examples of this is the 
public-private partnership (PPP) procurement model. This arrangement allows for 
the guaranteeing of PPP investment by the government with the provision of comfort 
letter to financial institutions and unconditionally supporting the investment (Vining 
and Boardman, 2008; Shaoul, 2004), which is part of the private sector loans’ 
approval. Reijniers (1994) described public sector investments as projects with 
specific and unique characteristics, such as:  
 Technical (innovation) and organisational changes     
 Complex objectives (entities with different objectives and interests). 
 Limited in terms of time and scope (imbalance between time, cost and 
services quality objectives). 
 Requiring the efforts of a variety of people and funds (professionals, 
institutions, and authorities dedicated towards the project objectives). 
 
While PPP is seen to possess unique characteristics in terms of being an 
innovative procurement mode, there are risks capable of hindering the realisation of 
PPP’s unique potential benefits to society. It could be possible to ensure the 
realisation of PPP benefits with the involvement, management, and sharing of 
responsibilities jointly (Reijniers, 1994), (risks, costs, revenues) in satisfaction of the 
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various entities and fulfil commercial interests (private investor) and governments’ 
social objectives.  
Other unique characteristics of PPP are those relating to infrastructure funding 
and asset ownership during operations and expiration of the lease period (PPIAF, 
2012). These are all fundamental to the survival of the partnership and success and 
are summarised as follows:  
 PPP generates a revenue stream and undertakes recovery of capital costs, 
either with tariffs, user charges, and freight or passenger charges (in the case 
of a railroad concession). For water supply infrastructure, the government 
reaches an agreement with the private investor to purchase the bulk water or 
subsidise the retail price.  
 PPP provides financing, with contractual obligations and responsibilities, 
between the government and the private investor and therefore it is not a joint 
venture where government becomes a financial partner. If PPP were to just 
become a joint venture, it might actually dilute the advantages and benefits of 
using the model and government might end up bearing the entire 
infrastructure risks (construction, financial, and operational), usually passed 
on to the private investor.  
 
 PPP transfers ownership of assets to the private investor and the contractual 
terms are finite with a clear expiration date. The expiration date brings to 
closure the control of the asset by the private investor, which then 
automatically reverts to the public sector. PPP assets created during the 
partnership are thus ultimately paid for by the public sector, by way of a 
fiscal amount that is equal to the value of the asset at the contract expiration 
date and often is specified in the contract. 
 
 PPP is not a process of supporting the private sector development, but rather 
a partnership that enables governments and private investors to contribute 
towards public services improvements. Therefore, public sector investment 
decisions either in the procurement of services or constructions of new asset 
by the private sector seem to be separated from the services funding 
arrangements or repayments strategy of the government. For example, PPIAF 
(2012) stated that political expediency through the introduction of user 
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charges is easier to achieve with PPP than with any other tax imposition 
method, which is one of the beneficial characteristics of PPP to government.  
 
Some PPP activities involve the funding of public infrastructure and 
subsequently use the constructed asset to provide services to the public based on a 
concessional lease period (Katz, 2006). However, the private sector delivery of 
public infrastructure and services is not limited to just the construction and funding 
of these services, but extends to the concept of profit maximisation, and ways of 
generating positive returns to shareholders (Boardman and Vining, 2008). For 
example, Jackson et al., (2005) and Mineta (2006) argued that the decision for the 
private sector to supply infrastructure was not an internal decision, but fell within the 
framework of the commercial environment and the market’s signals of how much 
infrastructure to supply, and at what price. The quantity of infrastructure that the 
private sector can supply is determined through artificial restrictions, i.e., the 
grouping and categorisation of public infrastructure investments into risky (non-
potential) or non-risky (potential) investments, using market allocation of resources 
(perfect market assumptions). In other words, private sector participation comes with 
conditions, in particular, the guarantee of steady revenue either via user charges or 
other mechanisms such as indirect toll charges paid on behalf of the end user by the 
government (Dekker et al., 2003).Whether private sector participation is essential for 
the reduction of the public sector debt, or for financial prudence (budget 
management) remains unclear, because both offer only a short-term strategy for 
fixing public deficit and have long-term implications. Boardman and Vining (2008) 
argued that governments’ rationale for adopting private sector participation was 
poorly articulated; whether it was to minimise public expenditures or to decrease 
public debt levels remained unclear. For example, conventional infrastructure 
projects recognise and record the costs of public investments in a governments 
consolidated statement. PPP procurement payments are delayed and attract interest 
accumulation and are not reducing in nature, therefore the rationale of reducing the 
level of public debt and public expenditure possibly serves as a weak argument for 
its use (Boardman and Vining, 2008).  
Another justification for the use of private sector participation is based on 
providing public infrastructure and services at a lower cost based on the technical 
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efficiency of private investors, which are unavailable in the public sector (Boardman 
and Vining, 2007). This is major argument to the lower costs superiority of private 
sector participation, based on the private investor’s superior scale of economies due 
to specialisation, construction experience, and operation of these projects, which are 
internalised by sub-contractors and not necessarily with the consortium responsible 
for the services provision (Boardman and Vining, 2007). Other reasons for lower 
cost superiority are based purely on the higher incentives on offer to the private 
investor to minimise costs by governments. With new technologies such as computer 
aided design (CAD) software, projects are altered to suit the desired specification of 
governments based on what has previously been built somewhere else, which could 
affect the overall infrastructure costs. Whether the private investor provides projects 
at a lower cost depends on the type of costs being considered, this is to say, whether 
they are related to transactions costs (production, operation) that include other costs 
associated with the investor’s overall delivery cost and exclude intangible costs.  
On the other hand, if the private sector participation in the delivery of public 
goods and services is based on pure microeconomic and social welfare reasons, these 
reasons will likely be accepted and supported by society, and not necessarily reduce 
the public’s debt. For example, Clark et al., (2002) argued that PPP created 
additional financial problems (transactional costs) to society, irrespective of the 
investment’s desirability to society. Often, such desirability, as portrayed by 
politicians, tends to overshadow society’s real appetite for desirable public 
infrastructure investment, even when the fiscal policy prohibits such public capital 
expenditures (EBRD, 2005). Boardman and Vining (2008) argued that the Australian 
fiscal policy and budget prudence of the 1980s, and the NSW Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (2005), which set the level of governments’ debt as a proportion of gross 
domestic product, were somehow circumvented. This argument ensues because using 
private sector participation in the delivery of these desired goods and services does 
not necessarily reduce the level of public debt, or limit the level of public expenses 
incurred by these arrangements.  
2.2.1 Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
A PPP is defined as “a long-term contract between the public and private 
sector”, where the government contracts with the private investor to deliver certain 
related services on behalf of the government, or in support of “broader government 
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initiatives” (NPPPG, 2008, pp. 7). Such a contract enables the private investor to 
assume the responsibility of the conditions and performance of the investment on a 
whole-of-life basis. Some of the principal features of a PPP as summarised by 
Deloitte (2006); Yescombe (2007 are as follows: 
 Provision of services involving the creation of an asset that involves the 
private investor to design, construct, finance, maintain and deliver 
ancillary services for a specific period;  
 A contribution by the government through land, capital works, risk 
sharing, revenue diversion, purchase of the agreed services or other 
supporting mechanisms; and 
 The private investor receiving payments from the government (or users 
in economic infrastructure) once operation of the infrastructure has 
commenced, contingent on the private investor’s performance in 
supplying the services. 
Therefore, PPP is part of a broader spectrum of contracted relationships 
between the public and private sectors to produce an asset or deliver services. In 
distinguishing conventional infrastructure delivery from PPPs, Duffield (2008, pp. 7-
8) defined traditionally delivered public infrastructures as “capital projects financed 
by taxpayers based on designing and constructing on short-term contracts”. 
Infrastructure design, construction, maintenance and operation remain the 
government’s sole responsibility. Most conventional infrastructure deliveries are 
design and build contracts. The contractor receives payment for the services 
performed on the completion of the project. The delivery types are: 
 design and build (DB) contracts; 
 guaranteed maximum price contracts; and 
 lump sum fixed price contracts. 
 
The term PPP is particularly ubiquitous and imprecise. Public sector programs, 
both in the past or at present, have involved some kind of partnership between the 
public and private sector. For example, the Australian Medicare system is a 
partnership between public funding and private medical providers. The same is true 
of transportation networks, where government departments have a tradition of using 
private investors for the provision of public services. Even the private sector utilises 
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the partnership concept, where contract obligations and rights between the sectors are 
defined and enforced. The word “partnership” can mean virtually anything with little 
descriptive value (Baxandall, 2009). The fundamental characteristic of a PPP is the 
engagement of the private sector in the delivery of public infrastructures or services, 
and the private funding of the same infrastructure (PAEC, 2006). The Victorian 
Government Department of Treasury and Finance defines PPPs within the context of 
a service delivery that excludes outsourcing of government services, and where no 
capital investment is required. Daube et al., (2008) stated that PPP was one-stop-shop 
planning, construction, financing, operating and maintenance by virtue of private 
sector participation. In other words, PPP is a contract arrangement, designed to meet 
the government’s expectations of delivery, funding, and maintenance of societal 
demands in the shortest timeframe (Fitzgerald, 2004). Typical PPP delivery involves 
a large initial upfront investment (Engel et al., 2010), which is regarded as a sunk 
cost (Howes and Robinson, 2005), or considered an illiquid investment with little 
alternative use. Sunk costs are past outlays, which are not part of the immediate or 
future decision-making process (Gausch, 2002) for investment decisions. Where 
sunk cost is allowed to influence the decision to progress the investment 
(infrastructure), there is the possibility of choosing the wrong investment or wasting 
resources. Rather, a decision to continue with the proposed investment should be 
based on infrastructure potential benefits and costs to society.  
In its favour, PPP has significant synergies through its protection from other 
competitors and the scope of economies internalised by the contractors and 
subcontractors (construction companies, toll collectors and maintenance contractors). 
Yescombe (2007) argued that the growth and use of PPP as a procurement mode was 
precisely linked to the popularity of private finance, or to a technique that used 
economic self-contained projects (self-funding) to generate cash flow. Whether these 
self-contained projects have actually successfully generated sufficient cash flows is 
arguable, depending on the context and interpretation of self-funding and also 
whether the assumption relates to eventual traffic volumes without government 
subsidy or the combination of both. For example, Engel et al., (2010) argued that the 
residual claims from a financial institution associated with PPP self-funding 
infrastructures should be examined with caution, before committing resources (see 
the Airport Link Tunnel, Chapter 4).  
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However, an argument (Deloitte, 2006) in favour of PPP is that it acts as an 
economic stimulant that generates revenues from the end user perspective, although 
hardly enough to offset the overall infrastructure costs. Others are: 
 PPP social infrastructure costs recovery is possible (hospitals, schools, 
prisons), because there is an established client base that removes 
potential demand risk (Deloitte, 2006; Jagger, 2012). 
 Economic infrastructures that are self-funding, but at the same time 
impose user charges, hardly achieve their objectives and are incapable 
of generating sufficient revenue (demand risk) without government 
subsidies (PAEC, 2006).   
 
PPP is still evolving and will require some time to master, especially in terms 
of the promise of value for money which drives the use of PPP and makes it so 
attractive to governments, based on the non-upfront payment concept but ignoring 
the protracted effects and impacts on society. These protracted effects and impacts 
are hard to quantify, or even to identify in the early stages of infrastructure 
procurement (Dekker et al., 2003). This is crucial as the effects and impacts happen 
to affect the ultimate infrastructure expectations and outcomes. For example, the 
World Bank and PPIAF database on private infrastructure projects from 1990–2012 
showed that 5,783 projects in 394 countries used PPP in the delivery of economic 
and social infrastructures (energy, telecommunications, transport, sewerage and 
water), mostly in developing countries. Within the period from 1990-2007, some 
projects were cancelled, abandoned, or severely financially distressed, as represented 
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
Table 2.1:  Number of project cancelled and distressed by sector 
Sector No of 
projects 
% of total 
projects 
Value of cancelled 
 or  
distressed investment 
% of committed 
investment 
Energy 90 6 30.0 8 
Telecoms 42 5 22.6 4 
Transport 62 6 17.4 8 
Water 53 9 16.4 29 
Total  247  86.4  
Source: World Bank PPI database, 2008 
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Table 2.2: Number of project cancelled or distressed by region 
Region No of 
projects
% of 
total 
projects
Value of cancelled  
or  
distressed investment 
% of 
committed 
investment
East Asia and Pacific 65 5 26.8 10
Europe and Central Asia 21 3 3.8 2
Latin America & Caribbean 117 9 48.9 10
Middle East and North 
Africa 
6 5 1.0 2
South Asia 7 2 3.9 3
Sub-Saharan Africa 31 9 1.9 3
Total  247  86.3  
Source: World Bank PPI database, 2008 
 
There were many reasons for the cancellation of these projects, for example, 
poor risk transfer to the private investor, contract clauses that impeded the contract’s 
execution, lower revenue demand and even bankruptcy. However, Mehta’s (2005) 
analysis of PPP projects between 1999–2004 that either failed, were flawed or 
abandoned in developed countries, showed that PPP failures were not found just in 
developing countries, but were a global occurrence, however, developed countries 
with established guidelines on PPP like Australia, UK, Canada and the USA had a 
reduced number of failed PPP projects. UK PFI’s (HM Treasury, 2003) stated that 
PPP delivering costs savings, compared to traditional procurement, depended largely 
on the original cost assumptions under consideration and by sector. For example, 
Lossa and Martimont (2008) stated that water and sanitation sectors experienced an 
escalation of costs with PPP delivery, which were more significant than when these 
infrastructures were delivered through conventional methods. In  countries with 
higher water charges, such as Australia (Queensland, Victoria, NSW), France, India, 
UK, Latin America and Caribbean countries, PPP or competition would have 
reduced water prices (Dwivedi et al., (2007; Lossa and Mortimont, 2008). There are 
other examples of failed social infrastructures (schools, hospitals) totalling 72 
projects in developed countries between1999–2004 (Australia, Canada, UK). These 
projects include social infrastructures where PPP procurement varied in complexity 
and problems were not isolated to any particular sector. Table 2.3 is a summary of 
these failed projects, and includes social infrastructures that signify PPP procurement 
complexity and problems not isolated to a particular sector. Appendix 1 contains a 
detailed summary of these 100 failed projects and the reasons for such failures (see 
pp 351-364).   
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Table 2.3: Failed, flawed, and abandoned projects 
Sector Australia Canada United 
Kingdom
Number of 
projects 
Transportation 0 5 4 9 
Hospitals 3 8 20 31 
Prisons 0 1 1 2 
Redevelopment 
Facilities 
0 12 0 12 
Schools 0 32 9 41 
Waste Management 
and  Hydro Plants 
0 5 0 5 
Total 3 63 34 100 
Source: Mehra (2005) 
 
In spite of such PPP failures, the growth, demand and performance of PPP has 
continued to be mixed (EBRD, 2005). For example, Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
argued that the decision to use PPP was based on the principle of providing greater 
value for money (VfM), or improved services for the same amount of money. PPP 
providing VfM is the reason governments are attracted to the procurement mode, 
even when VfM is a post construction consideration and other economic activities in 
society (demand, appetite) may prevent the realisation of any VfM. The allocation 
and transfer of risks to the private investor, in particular those infrastructures with 
demand risk (road transport) and having a long-term contractual nature known as 
“self–funding infrastructures,” depends on the management skills of the services 
provider and also government financial incentives and support; these are the core 
determinants of VfM (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). In addition, risk allocation and 
transfer in a PPP environment has not been successful (UKHCTC, 2008). Despite 
this, Reijniers (1994) argued that when entities adopted joint management and 
sharing of PPP activities, there was a possibility of the eventuation of an even spread 
of costs, revenue and equitable risk management (Xu et al., 2012), removing the 
current practice of risks allocation and transfer to the private investor. Other issues 
with PPP are the result of the combination of several projects merging into one single 
project (Media Release, Premier’s Office, 2008) where the Northern Busway, the 
Airport flyover, and the Airport Link Tunnel were delivered as a single project. The 
explanation for this combination of sub-projects provided by Queensland 
Government was based on cost savings and effective resource use (Media Release, 
Premier’s Office, 2008).   
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Howes and Robinson (2005) and OECD (2001) stated that when a project was 
completed, the cost was no longer relevant for future decisions of the investment 
because it was already a sunk cost. Even when a proposed investment is abandoned, 
the feasibility cost has a minute role for consideration and continuation of the 
investment, because the information required through the feasibility study has been 
provided. A feasibility study performed for a proposed public infrastructure 
investment is a project on its own, separate from other phases or continuation of the 
investment. The argument in favour of combining all phases of projects into one 
without sub-division is based on efficiency gains. This theory fails to consider 
infrastructure complexities that hinder actual risk identification, quantification, and 
measurement adequately, because each project is unique and requires special skills 
and expertise for its implementation (PMBOK, 2004). 
2.2.2 What is value for money? 
The VfM concept is an important factor for consideration in public sector 
infrastructure procurement. The concept is relative to PPP efficiency and 
effectiveness with the delivery of projects (Heald, 2003), because it is the measuring 
of value of the public expenditure with some efficacy. UKNAO (2003) defined VfM 
as a means of obtaining the maximum benefits with available resources. Both 
resources and expenditures are paid for from taxpayers’ money, which is somehow 
subjected to a level of uncertainty by virtue of PPP delivery. Cruz and Marques 
(2013) argued that efficiency and effectiveness of other procurement methods 
(alliance, DBC) could provide the same output. Governments after all, do have prior 
knowledge of the services to be acquired, with detailed output specifications that are 
incorporated within the infrastructure service characteristics and quality standards 
(Levinson et al., 2006); therefore, it does not really matter under what procurement 
method (PPP or conventional delivery) they are provided (Heald, 2003).  
In theory, the VfM concept is a presumed benefit, based on PPP’s potential to 
combine various functions, including infrastructure price, services quality, 
uncertainties (risks), and other resources that would lead to VfM determination. 
Therefore, infrastructure services, quality and resources expense to achieve certain 
outcomes are the determinants of VfM, which is then measured against the services 
efficiency and satisfaction derived from using the infrastructure (Erlendsson, 2002). 
In other words, it is the value expended (costs, resources) and efforts applied to 
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achieve a particular outcome that determine VfM. From a social benefit perspective, 
the satisfaction derived from using infrastructure based on efficiency and services 
quality is considered the VfM. Therefore, VfM should be defined in the context of: 
 resources consumed and efforts applied to achieve a particular outcome, 
 or the combination of whole-life costing and benefits that satisfy the 
human requirements, 
 or the measurement of quality in comparison to quantity of resources 
consumed relative to the benefits obtained. 
 
The HM Treasury (2006) stated that VfM was the measurement and 
comparison of costs taking into account quality, resources, fitness for purpose, and 
level of effort applied in achieving the value obtained (English, 2006). Demirag 
(2008) defined VfM within the context of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(3Es), and processes involved in acquiring these services based on quality and cost. 
Literally, efficiency applies to obtaining the maximum output from input resources, 
or from the use of minimum resources, that achieves a higher level of output. 
Moreover, effectiveness ensures that an output from any given activity achieves a 
desired result. For example, when evaluating PPP effectiveness, there are established 
and detailed government guidelines and specifications on public investments (service 
quality, continuity, accessibility) which could be used to measure the output obtained 
from PPP procurement. Thus, the process of estimating VfM is not easy, because 
some factors not prevalent at the time of infrastructure assessment and evaluation 
might surface to impact on the effectiveness of infrastructure delivery (political 
instability, exchange and interest rate increases). Additionally, it is possible to 
identify VfM inaccurately, as events that needed to be considered may be omitted, 
and some details included during the evaluation process might not occur during the 
infrastructure’s lifetime.  
All of this means that VfM is far from an attribution of monetary values, 
numbers or assumptions based on the present economic conditions. One possible 
VfM realisation could be drawn from a consideration of post infrastructure 
construction, when benefits and costs based on quantity of resources consumed and 
outcomes obtained could be evaluated adequately. PPP delivering VfM is possible, 
when costs and risk are managed and controlled efficiently. But the perception of 
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PPP delivering VfM and being a universal panacea to all public infrastructure 
challenges needs rethinking, preferably PPP should be used for specific needs and for 
certain sectors that are able to provide VfM for society (Katz, 2006; Jagger, 2012). 
In other words, the concept for obtaining maximum benefits from PPP is 
becoming a more important consideration than the concept of VfM. Jagger (2012) 
stated that the general rules and principles of PPP were based on the achievement of 
VfM, and it was the elements of the partnership that continued to make PPP 
attractive to governments. Put simply, PPP provides a partner to whom whole or 
partial risk can be transferred and who can share the life-cycle cost burden, which in 
turn can bring considerable cost reductions to the public purse. In addition, VfM is a 
subjective metric, which relies on the analyst assumptions and interpretations. VfM 
is an abstract concept (intangible object), which is misconstrued as a tangible object 
through attribution of monetary values and some benefits, however, costs or potential 
effects to society might be ignored and excluded from an infrastructure evaluation. 
Where it is appropriate to attribute monetary value to VfM, such value must be 
within the confines of brand names under accounting treatment and developed over 
time, or defined along the following benchmarks:  
 aligned with government regulatory policy to define the criteria for 
VfM assessment and evaluation; 
 defined to make explicit what constitutes VfM, attributes, identification 
and measurement; and 
 exhibits an allocation of resources that could enable the measurement of 
VfM’s monetary value. 
 
Harvey and Green (1993), and Campbell and Rozsnyai (2002) referred to VfM 
in terms of quality and sound investment returns which could be achieved at a lower 
cost or with better outcomes. Public infrastructure investment using PPP needs to 
consider all costs of resources used in the infrastructure delivery (financial, non-
financial), and resources and opportunity cost, especially if used for alternative 
purposes, whether the same result or outcome could be achieved. Government’s 
perception that VfM arises from optimal risk allocation and transfer of such risk to 
the private investor tends to ignore other components of VfM, such as services 
quality, innovation, affordability, accessibility, lease duration and infrastructure 
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effects on society. The UK HM Treasury (HM, 2006) emphasised that VfM was not 
necessarily obtained at a lower cost; rather, it provided the overall whole-life benefits 
and costs of the infrastructure to society. Therefore, VfM combines other variables 
based on protracted events (immediate, future) and is difficult to identify during 
feasibility studies and business development, because at that time no resource has 
been committed to the project. In addition, economic changes and human appetite are 
not stationary considerations, thus originally identified VfM may disappear with the 
passage of time and therefore caution must be applied when VfM is allocated a 
monetary value.   
2.2.3 Value for money (VfM) recognition 
A PPP contract award does not constitute VfM, but rather the implementation 
and execution of projects in an efficient and effective manner. Reducing costs and 
minimising waste of resources would more likely lead to VfM realisation.  
English (2006) argued that VfM arose from a bundling of services, or when 
there were sufficient incentives to motivate the private investor to minimise waste of 
resources by adopting efficient strategies based on cost savings. A sufficient 
incentive could be a concessional lease granted to the private investor to use the 
constructed asset to provide services to the public. This type of arrangement could 
compel the private investor to consider cost minimisation throughout the whole-life 
of the infrastructure. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) argued that using PPP allowed for 
risk allocations and transfers from the public sector to the private sector, which 
constituted real VfM in its own right. The notion of transferring risk as a VfM may 
be incorrect, because only construction, maintenance and operational risks or other 
specified risks, such as structural quality and public safety while the infrastructure is 
still under construction, are actually the sole responsibility of the investor. Other 
latent risks, such as infrastructure effects and impacts on society are neither 
transferred nor quantified and this therefore tends to reduce the VfM originally 
identified. For example, the United Kingdom House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs (UKHLSCEA, 2010) stated that construction and maintenance risk 
were usually seen as suitable for transfer to the private investor, and activities which 
the private investor had no control or influence over should be non-transferable. 
However, optimal risk allocation and transfer to the private investor as VfM 
remains vague, because governments are answerable to society in terms of PPP 
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activities, whether beneficial or not (HM Treasury, 2006). The likelihood for 
achieving VfM in a PPP setting occurs when the public sector and the private sector 
adjust for costs differences. UKHLSCEA (2010) stated that VfM analysis of public 
sector investments tended to focus on comparing the cost of financing and 
accounting for the value of risk transfer, and this valuation of risk was in part 
evidence-based and in part subjective and contentious. 
Risks allocated and transferred, including resources committed by each sector 
in the partnership, have not been recognised and accounted for through PPP 
arrangements (English, 2006). In addition, the principles governing a risk transfer 
refer to risk allocated to whoever is best placed to manage the risk efficiently and at 
least cost to the public interest (UKHLSCEA, 2010). In other words, not all risks 
associated with public infrastructure delivery are transferred. However, securing an 
optimal risk transfer requires a significant description and definition of infrastructure 
scope and services objectives (IPA, 2007; Rostiyanti et al., 2013). Therefore, it is a 
combination of how well the private sector manages the PPP contract (Edwards & 
Shaoul, 2004; Levinson et al., 2006; Shaoul, 2005). If a government elects to include 
monitoring and negotiation costs into PPP cost estimates, it might significantly 
reduce VfM to zero, especially where the PPP concession lease lasts for thirty to 
forty years and generates revenue that remains unaccounted for by the private 
investor to the government (GAO and Schachler, 2001).  
Hall (1998) argued that VfM realisation depended on gains from the 
application of efficiency and effective management of resources, which was often 
neutralised by exorbitant infrastructure cost to society. There are ways to improve the 
VfM of PPP public infrastructure delivery that will involve government’s equity 
contribution and restructuring of PPP public investment assessment and evaluation 
methods. VfM recognition during the feasibility studies or business case 
development phases is sometimes based on misleading and deceptive assumptions, 
because there are no benchmarks or criteria for attributing monetary values as part of 
PPP benefits to society (HM Treasury, 2006), unless it is evidence based 
(UKHLSCEA, 2010).  
The early estimates of PPP efficiencies and cost-savings were based on 29 
business cases reviewed by the UK National Audit Office (2000), which stated that 
10-20 per cent of the business cases indicated positive VfM and cost-savings. These 
 36 Chapter 2:Literature Review 
savings were mainly due to the assumed risk transfer from the public sector to the 
private investor. Pollitt (2002) summarised the findings of the National Audit Office 
and reaffirmed that the best deal was probably obtained and value for money 
achieved in 8 out of a sample of 10 PPP projects on the basis of the evaluation 
undertaken.  
While these authors and government organisations were in praise of PPP cost-
savings and VfM, evidence of procurement effectiveness was lacking. For example, 
Pollack et al., (2002) and Shaoul (2004) were critical of PPP arrangements across a 
range of government services (hospitals, roads, and rail transport), and Monbiot 
(2002) attacked PPP arrangements as “public fraud and false accounting, which was 
commissioned and directed by the Treasury.” In the USA, Bloomfield et al.’s (1998) 
investigations of the Massachusetts’s correctional facility reviewed that the project 
was 7.4 per cent more expensive through lease purchasing financing than with 
conventional financing, and actual costs and risk associated with the arrangement 
were hidden from the public. In Europe, Greve (2003) branded the Farum PPP as the 
“most spectacular scandal in history of Danish Public Administration,” resulting into 
tax increases for the community of Farum, higher debt for the local government, and 
the trial of the former mayor in the Law Court. 
However, evidence regarding PPP performance continued to be mixed, Pollitt 
(2005) acknowledged that it was possible that assumed benefits of PPP were 
hypothetically present with a conventional procurement method, and these 
achievements would not have been possible without the learning and leverage 
provided by PPP initiatives. Both McDonald (2002); and NKNAO (2003) somehow 
reversed the earlier statements of PPP projects being delivered on time and on budget 
more often than those using conventional methods.  In contrast to the claims of some 
authors (Macdonald, 2002; Pollitt, 2002, 2005; Allen Consulting Group, 2007) and 
government organisations (UKNAO, Auditor General NSW, 2006), Mehra (2005) 
and Shaoul (2005) publicly listed PPP failed projects and revealed that the VfM 
methodologies used in the appraisal of these projects were designed to favour PPP 
policy expansion and insufficient data was used for the analyses. In terms of risk 
transfer resting on the VfM, the amount of risk transferred was exactly what was 
required to tip the balance in favour of undertaking the PPP procurement mode. 
Shaoul (2005) concluded that at best, PPP had turned out to be a very expensive 
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arrangement that lacked accountability, which could have enabled learning from past 
experiences (Hodge and Greve, 2005).   
 In Australia, Hodge and Greve (2005) investigated 48 projects and stated their 
commercial risks were well managed and the same success could not be claimed for 
the governance of the PPP arrangement. The Fitzgerald Review (2004) investigated 
eight PPP projects in Victoria (Melbourne) and made the following remarks on PPP 
economic superiority and government’s role in society:   
 The economic superiority of the PPP procurement mode over 
conventional methods was dependent on the discount rate adopted by 
the analyst, and contrary calculations were reached when an 8.65 per 
cent discount was used leading to the conclusion that a 9 per cent 
discount rate was better and cheaper than the conventional method. 
However, when compared to an equal discount rate, the PPP 
mechanism was 6 per cent more expensive than the conventional 
delivery method.   
 The other remark regarded the traditional stewardship of the 
government, which has changes to the role of a policy advocate that 
tends to contradict the government’s primary objectives. Hodge and 
Greve (2005) stated that the government was faced with multiple 
conflicts of interests, and decisively acted in the roles of policy 
advocate, economic developer, steward for public funds, elected 
representative for decision-making, regulator of PPP contract, 
commercial signatory to contracts and infrastructure planner. 
As a result, the government has compromised its role and position, leaving the 
publics’ interest no longer protected; in particular, the events and experiences of 
recent times were of concern to society regarding the lack of transparency and 
accountability, which has marred PPP activities, as well as the lack of competition in 
the PPP industry. 
 
2.2.4 Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
In countries like Australia, the UK, and Canada, public infrastructure 
evaluations and assessments are most often undertaken based on the public sector 
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comparator (PSC) and/or a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The main objective of PSC 
is to demonstrate VfM and allow for an economic rationale between PPP and 
traditional procurement. Cruz and Marques (2012) argued that using PSC enabled the 
project sponsor (government) to focus primarily on output specification, risk 
allocation, or stimulate various risk allocations and select the most appropriate with 
higher VfM. For example, Quiggin (2004) stated that the purpose of PSC was to 
estimate the costs of delivering a particular product or service through a miniature 
designed product, based on assumptions of such a product or service being delivered 
by the public sector. If the service is approved through PPP, the cost of the services 
should be less than the estimated PSC cost. While PSC is a tool for the decision-
making process of selecting a particular procurement mode, it requires the expertise 
of government agencies and knowledge of costs and revenues from a life-cycle 
perspective of an infrastructure in identifying all sources of risk, leading to the 
development of the business case, as well as an optimal risk sharing arrangement 
(Cruz and Marques, 2012). Therefore, PSC is not without some problems, as noted 
below: 
 PSC calculation problems: the PSC decision-making process is 
narrowed to the comparison of two numbers, limited in capacity to 
predict and forecast long-term events and is vulnerable to mistakes and 
errors (Cruz and Marques, 2012).  
 Lack of Transparency: PSC calculations are not fully transparent for 
use in audit trails, its process lacks rigor and is incapable of supporting 
investment decisions for millions (Bain 2010).  
 Lack of robustness: In a contemporary world, there are no analysis or 
comparative figures that fully resemble one another (PMBOK, 2004).  
When a decision is narrowed to a choice between single numbers, the 
choice between the numbers might affect the outcome or decision. The 
use of PSC to determine a PPP infrastructure delivery without 
calculating in-depth benefits, costs, and undertaking a detailed risk 
analyses tends to suggest a lack of rigor, especially when the decision to 
use PPP has been made prior to considering all options. Heald (2003) 
stated that the entities involved with PSC evaluation and analysis were 
not neutral, rather interested players. Furthermore, Pollack et al., (2003) 
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argued that project samples used in the cost estimates comparison to 
reach the PSC conclusion were small and unrepresentative of the size of 
the proposed public investment. In other words, PSC is limited in its 
capacity to produce credible and reliable data information.  
 Lack of robust data: PSC uses historical data to estimate future costs 
and this creates a number of problems as follows: 
o An entirely new project with no historical data, such as a 
nuclear plant (where none actually exist in the country), might 
be difficult for PSC analysis and evaluation; 
o Historical data may be inappropriate when projects are non-
comparable for various reasons, i.e., legal and fiscal frameworks 
that may have changed over a period of time and thus have 
influenced infrastructure outcomes, and costs and features of 
past projects significantly; 
o Historical data can reduce analytical rigor, when the source of 
values calculated are unknown or CPI has not been properly  
included for those costs; 
o There are no accounting standards to ensure the consistency and 
comparability of projects;  
o Services quality and delivery patterns can change considerably 
and make it difficult to estimate these changes using PSC. 
 Difficult to estimate efficiency gains: PSC is incapable of estimating 
future efficiency gains of a PPP infrastructure as the result of long-term 
lease concessions. Efficiency gains are those infrastructure performance 
improvements expected over a period of time, or through enhanced 
knowledge (expertise), which is difficult to estimate through PSC. Cruz 
and Marques (2012) stated the difficulty estimating efficiency gains, 
arising from two levels: 
o Identification of the efficiency gains based on the immediate and 
current efficiency level required through comparability of similar 
samples, which was not a feasible proposition;  
o Forecast of future efficiency gains was made much more complex 
due to market economic fluctuations and regulatory reforms 
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within the project’s life-cycle, and those were mostly 
unpredictable.  
 
In addition, when risks are unidentified, PSC still incorporates risk allocation 
and transfer as part of its estimate, which seems inappropriate (Cruz and Marques, 
2012). However, in an alternative view, Pangeran and Wirahadiusumah (2010) stated 
that PSC provided invaluable information, such as additions in financial values by 
setting an early project shadow bid based on life-cycle costing system and a 
performance requirement that guided the public sector towards better bidding 
processes. They stated that the positive attributes of PSC were: 
 benefits of timely PPP delivery; 
 cost savings through advance technology; 
 social benefits in delivery time reductions (technology); 
 identification of economic benefits and VfM ; and 
 risk allocation and transfers (pricing system). 
 
Because PSC is capable of producing this sort of information, it infers that PPP 
is capable of delivering on the result or benefits, but is this really the case when 
conventional delivery has not been given the same opportunity or incentivised like 
PPP? Grimsey and Lewis (2005) used raw PSC to justify PPP comparison to 
conventional delivery based on the PPP benefits and cost savings outlined below: 
 PSC transferring risk to the private sector; 
 PSC competitive neutrality; 
 Raw PSC is the benchmark under the conventional delivery method 
(public sector) that includes capital and operating costs, and is 
equivalent to delivering the same project volume and services 
performance as required of the private investor; and 
 Retention of risks of those not transferrable by the government. 
 
The main criticism of this view is that the actual government operating cost of 
conventional delivery is a sunk cost, mostly made up of employees’ salaries and 
wages, which are budgeted and appropriated to agencies and hardly vary with any 
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extra cost to the public sector. Moreover, it is inappropriate to transfer unquantified 
monetary value and unsubstantiated costs to the private investor based on the 
assumption of unidentified and unquantified risks. Firstly, PSC cost estimation is not 
designed to perform infrastructure risk analysis, but to examine a project’s viability 
based on the feasibility studies conducted. Secondly, what type of risks are 
transferred to the private investor (UKHLSCEA, 2010), when the HM Treasury 
(2006) argued that risk transferred to the private investor still remained the sole 
responsibility of the government?  Lastly, PSC competitive neutrality intends to 
correct biases arising from the public ownership and management. For example, 
public owned organisations are exempt from some type of taxes, construction 
permits or environmental permits and PSC neutrality corrects for the potential 
benefits of such status (Cruz and Marques, 2012). Weingart et al., (2009) stated that 
PSC’s intent was to determine if a PPP approach generated value against 
conventional delivery, when life-cycle costs and risks were quantified. For example, 
the UK HM Treasury no longer requires PSC evaluations for PPP public investments 
and holds the opinion that with audits (UKNAO) and experience, projects with 
appropriate attributes are likely to pass the PSC test of VfM (Weingart, 2009). 
However, PSC is useful when its comparative figures are accurate, and serve as 
costs benchmarks that set the lower and upper limit of infrastructure cost. Pangeran 
and Wirahadiusumah (2010) stated that PSC forced the bidder to lower the 
infrastructure costs or match the PSC cost estimates, so as to remain competitive or 
attractive to the government. Partnerships British Columbia (2003) summarised the 
benefits of PSC as follows: 
 PSC brings financial and costing rigour and discipline 
 Requires a full life-cycle approach 
 Compels consideration for risk management  
 Encourages competitive delivery options 
 
The PSC is a valuation of a project’s life-cycle costs, and accounts for risks. 
Countries like Australia, Canada, Spain, Portugal and the USA still follow the PSC 
structure divided into several components (Cruz and Marques, 2012, Weingart et al., 
2009). In other words, PSC is developed and used to assess the financial aspects of 
VfM, a benchmark which measures the net value of an alternative procurement 
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option, or provides an economic rationale between modes of procurement 
(conventional, PPP). Figure 2.1 illustrates the PSC options that identify financial and 
non-financial components of a proposed infrastructure delivery that actually 
identifies the economic benefits, monetary values, and benefits to the government, as 
well as the results of PSC risk neutrality components.  
Public Sector Comparator Option   
Financial PSC    Non-Financial     
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: PSC analysis of financial and non-financial infrastructure benefits.  
 
 
2.2.5 Public sector comparator to determine VfM controversy 
The PSC objective is to provide a point of reference in the delivery of public 
infrastructure compared to costs of delivery by PPP. Its main objective is to 
demonstrate and highlight the potential of a proposed public infrastructure 
investment in terms of the socio-economic benefits it offers, and the confidence level 
of such an investment (WA Treasury and Finance, 2002). In other words, a proposed 
public infrastructure investment that exhibits better economic benefits or higher VfM 
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should be pursued, regardless of whether that infrastructure is commercially or 
socially viable, i.e., addresses society’s demands for the public infrastructure. By 
contrast, the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC, 2011) stated that using VfM 
that accrued from PPP to compare conventional procurement was wrong, because 
VfM analyses (ex-ante) usually focussed on the financial costs (risk adjusted) of 
providing what was assumed to be an equivalent output. It is likely that social 
benefits accruing from PPP procurement might be greater compared to conventional 
delivery, but there is a danger that perhaps a conventional VfM approach might be 
understated. In addition, PPP arrangements are specifically designed to deliver 
greater benefits to society and are often incentivised (financially, non-financially), in 
comparison to conventional procurement alternatives. Moreover, PSC is based more 
on a quantitative type measurement, a market system used for investments that 
excludes future infrastructure benefits and costs to society (Kristiansen, 2009). Such 
analyses and comparative figures are focused on the immediate outcome, designed to 
achieve the expectations of project sponsors and therefore tend to isolate, or play 
down all infrastructure negatives (effects, impacts) (ADB, 2006). The fact remains 
that the continued use of PSC by many governments as a cost benchmark to compare 
benefits and costs of PPP against conventional procurement does not mean that it is 
wholly accepted. In this vein NPPPG (2008); The Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003); 
and Victoria Partnership (2004) all defined PSC as a hypothetical estimate, a whole-
of-life costing of a public sector projects delivered by a government agency and 
quantitatively based on monetary values such as: 
 Hypothetical forecast; 
 Net Present Value (NPV) number; 
 Based on a life-cycle costing; 
 Risk adjusted; and  
 If the public sector was to deliver (finance, own operate). 
Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) 
Adjusted Shadow Bid 
(ASB) 
Total estimated costs to the public 
sector of delivering an 
infrastructure project using 
traditional procurement process.  
 
Total estimated costs to the 
public sector of delivering the 
same project to the identical 
specification using alternative 
finance procurement (AFP). 
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The comparative cost components will vary slightly in magnitude between the two 
procurement methods (as shown by the coloured segments in the figure above). The 
difference between the estimated total project costs is the VfM and is calculated as: 
 Conventional	delvery	Costs െ Alternative	finance	procurement	costs
Conventional	Delivery	Costs  
 
Total	Costs ൌ Total	PSC െ Total	Adjusted	shadow	bid	costs	Total	PSC ൌ Value	of	money 
 
There are other issues with using PSC as a comparative measure, which 
question its validity. PMBOK (2004) argued on infrastructure size, complexity, risks 
and resources as all being unique, and therefore such factors were not directly 
applicable to any other project. Two projects can never possess the same 
characteristics. In addition, PPP regulatory policies differ from one project to another 
and are specifically developed by a project to attract investors. This serves as a 
protection to the private investor’s investment, but is not the same as, nor is it 
applicable to, conventional delivery methods. PSC assessment and evaluation is 
strictly based on cost-benefit analysis, which fundamentally erodes the public sector 
core values and quality of societal life (UKNAO, 2009). PSC tends to compare the 
unknown to shift the focus from examining the real benefits and values of PPP to 
society, towards a scrutiny of the inabilities of conventional delivery method to 
deliver similar benefits. Hodge and Green (2007) argued that conventional delivery 
was capable of achieving the same benefits and values (VfM) as PPP, given the same 
opportunities, equal resources and the protection provided to the private investor as 
PPP.  
Proponents of PPP argue that the economic benefits and VfM identified 
through PSC exceed the benefits of a public infrastructure delivered through 
conventional methods. One of the benefits of conventional delivery emanates from 
sequential process and service identification that addresses societal needs through 
preliminary assessments of effects and impacts of a proposed infrastructure delivery 
(CEDA, 2007). The process and procedure encompasses infrastructure delivery costs 
and potential consequences of services to society, mitigation and future 
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compensatory claims, which are internalised through conventional delivery cost 
estimates that have eluded PPP practices.  
Another questionable aspect of PSC is how PPP VfM is assigned positive net 
present values (NPV), without in-depth analysis of future market changes being 
considered or the ultimate effects to society (UKNAO, 2009). Unfortunately, there 
are no economic or social theories that suggest VfM identified through PSC is 
enduring or permanent. Using the PSC evaluation process to rationalise VfM is open 
to criticism and strategically unsound and various authors have criticised the use of 
PSC to determine VfM (Shaoul, 2004, 2005; Hodge, 2009; Hodge and Greve, 2011)  
For example, PSC excludes the non-financial costs of PPP to society in 
calculating its VfM (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). The argument of PSC providing 
a mechanism for accountability (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005) provides the beginning 
of an argument without providing proof or solutions. So the question remains, why 
have governments chosen a commercial measurement that seems so limited in 
potential or insufficient historical data, to compare benefits and costs of delivery 
options? 
In summary, PPP assessments and evaluations that have produced VfM using 
PSC have to consider future risks because they are protracted, and difficult to 
identify and quantify in monetary values and are external to PPP operations. PSC 
reconfirms the immediate expectations (benefits, costs) of the service provider and 
project sponsors, which in turn exerts undue financial pressure to the entities. PSC 
assessment and evaluation using cost-benefit analysis tends to focus on infrastructure 
economic benefits, and fails to identify the long-term effects and impacts of PPP 
activities on society. Therefore, PSC’s primary objective is to evaluate both financial 
and non-financial risks, costs, benefits, effects and impacts of a proposed public 
infrastructure delivery, whether it is PPP or conventionally delivered, to produce 
accurate information necessary for investment decisions. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
reversed PSC option that addresses the commercial and social objectives of the 
proponents (the private investor, government). The non-financial component of PSC 
includes the infrastructure benefits and incremental (future) benefits, and processes 
of identifying and quantifying monetary and non-monetary benefits associated with a 
public infrastructure investment. 
 Figure 2.2: Revised PPP comparator Option 
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Source: European PPP Expertise Centre (2011) 
 
2.2.6 Assessment and analyses of infrastructures 
With a proposed infrastructure investment, initial costs and benefits analyses 
are conducted through the use of feasibility studies, a process that is based on 
consideration of political contributions, objectives, and regulatory benefits. However, 
the emphasis on infrastructure economic assessment depends solely on the political 
orientation of a country and outcomes of these analyses are what determine 
investments failure or success. What is assessed and measured relative to 
infrastructure benefits covers a range of fields under varying assumptions, which 
may at the time be tinted with bias (Bain 2010; Reilly et al., 2005). Most assessments 
of a proposed public infrastructure investment are performed in the following areas: 
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 Engineering assessment: This focuses on the technical standard of the 
infrastructure, and is helpful with structural standards, but not sufficient 
for identifying the costs and benefits associated with the proposed 
infrastructure. For example, when assessing a toll road that requires 
traffic volumes (revenue risk) for survival, the engineering assessment 
will identify cost efficiencies and economic benefits to society, without 
identifying future costs associated with the proposed infrastructure.  
 Political assessment: this is based on electoral votes maximisation 
(OECD, 2010), and it is apparent within every democratic country. 
Political assessments of infrastructure economic benefits are more 
short-term because of the duration of the electoral cycle. When political 
assessment is combined with consideration of economic benefits of 
infrastructure to society, an extended cost could be identified.  
 Geographical assessment: this is based on the location of infrastructure 
projects; possible revenue maximisation and patronage are the basic 
considerations for the assessment. The effects of one public 
infrastructure investment in a particular location could be at the expense 
of another state or region (the so-called crowd-out effect). However, 
when infrastructure benefits are geographically driven, there is the 
tendency of high concentration of identical infrastructures in one 
location. However, if unemployment analysis is taken, the economic 
benefits of infrastructure are well served, when dispersed to allow for 
logistics.   
 Economic assessment: based on improved productivity, it is a 
macroeconomic analysis of the benefits of the investment. An economic 
input-output analysis is used to measure productivity growth of a 
particular country or economy, and the results tend to highlight those 
elements of public infrastructure investment and other activities 
(sector), which provide economic benefits. The measurement of 
improvements and impacts on society is the result of macro analyses 
(cost-benefit analysis plus social-cost benefit analysis) and extends to 
the measurement of microeconomic analyses that uses other available 
tools in comparing costs and benefits of a direct and indirect nature 
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associated with the investment (OECD, 2001). This is described in 
detail in the next section. 
2.2.7 Macro and microeconomic investment measurement 
Macroeconomic measurements or analyses are based on changes in gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is compared to changes in stock capital (Jackson et 
al., 1995). Macroeconomic analyses are used to measure productivity improvements 
as the result of public infrastructure investment, as an indicator of economic 
performance. The indicators used in macroeconomic measurement are based on 
employment opportunities, disposable income to households, quantity of goods and 
services produced and consumed, and competitiveness based on economic input and 
output achieved over a period of time (OECD, 2001). However, despite this robust 
set of metrics, macroeconomic analyses are not without problems in terms of data 
interpretations and identification of the casual links between infrastructure 
investment and productivity increases. In this sense, productivity is a subset of 
economic benefits, which are not fully identified with macroeconomic analyses 
measurements (OECD, 2010), but are related to ex-post calculations (microeconomic 
analysis). In other words, additional economic benefits, costs, and the effects of the 
investment, are not fully captured through macroeconomic analyses, but require 
additional analysis to capture any latent effects and impacts on society, which in fact 
forms the basis of a microeconomic analysis.   
2.2.8 Microeconomic measurement approach 
Microeconomic analysis is the measurement of investment effects from CBA 
input based on welfare theory and measurements of benefit availability to society 
(Jackson et al., 1995). It is designed to make the effects and benefits comparable, 
based on the various activities and expressed in monetary value and opportunity 
costs in terms of those who benefited from the investment effects and those who lost 
out as the result of the investment impact. For example, toll road benefit is associated 
with reductions in travel time and vehicle operating costs, which are linked to 
productivity increases (macroeconomic), on the other hand motorists’ willingness to 
continue paying a toll charge might change over time and possibly affect future 
revenue streams, and this is virtually impossible to measure through macroeconomic 
analyses (effects).  
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In theory, macroeconomic and microeconomic evaluations measure different 
economic effects to some extent, but both are core to representing the common 
element under (project) consideration. For example, most infrastructure investment 
effects are included in macroeconomic analyses, except for future benefits and costs, 
which are unidentified and unmeasured, however these are captured in 
microeconomic analyses. In other words, both analyses complement each other 
(macroeconomic and microeconomic), microeconomic analysis using 
macroeconomic historic data to develop its own analysis. The OECD (2001) stated 
that microeconomic analysis was best suited for a public infrastructure investment, 
when optimal benefits, cost efficiencies and quality standards were paramount to 
society. However, macroeconomic analysis is a subset of CBA, measuring economic 
benefits in terms of providing a cost effective solution to society. While 
microeconomic analysis measures future possible changes (effects, impacts) using 
the complementary data derived from macroeconomic analyses to aggregate benefits 
and costs of various kinds, which allows for data comparisons.  
One of the disadvantages of microeconomic analyses (cost, benefits, and 
effects) is the difficulty in allocating an accurate value to those effects identified, and 
this means that microeconomic benefit-cost ratios are not comparable to any other 
analysis. The OECD (2001) stated that the Norwegian Ministry of Finance report on 
transport investment benefit-cost ratios demonstrated them being incomparable in 
any public sector microeconomic analyses. Effects assumptions and interpretations 
differ from one agency to another, which may not be surprising as infrastructure 
effects are intangible objects and difficult to measure. The problem with 
microeconomic analyses is technique application and choice of preference, which are 
not suitable for all effects. For example, environmental effects on society, such as 
deterioration of air quality, are difficulty to express in monetary value and are subject 
to a particular analyst’s opinion and interpretation (OECD, 2001).  
In other words, no matter which analytical and measurement tool is used for 
infrastructure investment benefits and costs, either macroeconomic or 
microeconomic analysis requires the combination of the analyses, as otherwise the 
analysis and data will be incomplete and inaccurate, and therefore, infrastructure 
investment evaluations relative to benefits, costs and effects to society requires 
macro-microeconomic analyses that complement each another. Additionally, 
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investment analysis based on cost effective measure needs to include quantitative and 
qualitative information, as infrastructure benefits, costs and effects are protracted and 
do happen in stages (infrastructure life-cycle).  
2.2.9 Cost benefit analysis measurement 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) in the evaluation and assessments of public 
infrastructure delivery is used to ascertain the return on a capital investment. Donlan 
and Edlin (2002) defined cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the most recognised 
economic evaluation technique that accords the underlying principles of standard 
welfare economic theory. However, there are problems associated with CBA 
technique, in particular is those values or benefits which cannot be allocated with 
monetary values. Watkins (2005) argued that CBA tended to estimate the equivalent 
monetary value of the benefits and costs of public infrastructure investment to 
society and established whether the infrastructure was viable. In Australia, CBA is 
one of the conventional tools used by the decision makers to structure data 
complexity into a manageable form that provides a pattern consistent for choosing 
the best infrastructure investment option (Ding, 1999). CBA is widely used in the 
public and private sector as an appraisal technique for decision-making purposes. 
CBA’s primary objective is to measure and compare benefits and costs of different 
projects competing for the same resources (funding) through an efficient market 
allocation of resources. Ding (1999) argued that possible negative external effects 
and questionable resources distribution of economic developments (economic 
infrastructures) have added to the controversies that undermine CBA’s usefulness. 
Nijkamp et al., (1990) stated that CBA’s potential to evaluate benefits and costs, 
which were external, required a multidimensional approach and one possibility for 
this approach was to consider multi-criteria decision making (MCDM). 
In a CBA, the initial decision is the financial viability of a proposed 
infrastructure delivery expressed in monetary terms, together with the benefits and 
costs (potential) to be incurred for undertaking the delivery. Financial analysis or 
appraisal is an important component of CBA for a developmental project. However, 
data available for such appraisal or analysis are insufficient or incomplete, thus 
making an accurate prediction of the overall benefits and costs at the early stage of 
the infrastructure very difficult. The relationship between infrastructure benefits and 
costs is to determine a viability test, and if infrastructure benefits exceed the costs 
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then the infrastructure is commercially viable. However, where separate development 
proposals exist and compete for the same resource, CBA determination will be based 
on the infrastructure option that exhibits the greater net benefits (Ding, 1990).  
Often CBA assessment of cost efficiencies and investment profitability is 
further rolled into other analyses that are based on a calculation of net present value 
(NPV), and investment internal rate of return (IRR), which negates the social 
analytical aspect. The social aspect of a public investment analysis is based on a 
national interest perspective, and is undertaken purely by application of social costs 
benefit analysis (SCBA) measuring the overall benefits of a public investment to 
society. SCBA analysis comprises the market price system consideration, together 
with cost to society, including the long-term effects and benefits to society (identified 
and unidentified costs). What separates CBA and SCBA are their significantly 
different functions and outcomes.  
Where the consideration of a public investment is approached from a national 
interest perspective, the assessment and evaluation are drawn purely from social cost 
benefit analysis (SCBA) to determine the overall benefits of the infrastructure 
investment to society. For example, CBA accepts all investments with a positive 
NPV and allocates them a discount rate that translates to a greater profit margin of 
IRR to the private investor. Where NPV is negative or IRR is lower than a stipulated 
rate of return (interest), CBA considers such an investment to be non-commercially 
viable, when such an investment confers better social benefit to society. Therefore, it 
may be assumed that the use of a CBA approach within PPP would not satisfactorily 
address the challenges of public infrastructure demands due to its inclusion of a 
selective considering of NPV and IRR, as the benefits of PPP when costs and effects 
to society are excluded from NPV and IRR comparisons.   
Despite the need to capture the information on infrastructure investment 
described above, CBA is not less valuable. Conway (2009) argued that CBA had a 
set of generally accepted methodological rules and could better present economic 
information by categorising the data into preferred and alternative options. Jackson et 
al., (1995) described CBA as helpful in promoting clear thinking about public sector 
investments and useful with highway road construction analyses. Put simply, CBA is 
inclusive of all quantifiable benefits and costs that are significant to a particular 
investment option and that could potentially be measured and represented in 
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monetary terms. TCRP (2002) stated that CBA concentrated mostly on significant 
benefits of public investment, without mentioning infrastructure effects and impacts 
and thus CBA conveyed a portion of the information required for an effective 
investment decision. DoT (2011) and TCRP (2002) stated that government’s policy 
on public infrastructure investments should include the identification and 
measurement of all significant and non-significant benefits and costs over a period of 
time and across geographical locations. Such data would improve the analyses of 
public investment benefits and costs to society and methods of identification and 
measurement.  
However, there is policy guidelines related to CBA evaluations of a public 
transport investment, whether procured conventionally or by PPP (OECD, 2001). 
The problem with the version of CBA operated by government agencies is the 
considerable variation of application from one agency to another, i.e., a particular 
evaluation policy in one agency might be redundant in another. This can render it 
incapable of achieving the CBA’s intended objectives, namely, identifying all 
significant and non-significant benefits and costs with a proposed public 
infrastructure investment. It has been suggested (OECD, 2001) that CBA guidelines 
of government agencies are inadequate to manage the complexities of PPP 
procurement, previously developed for conventional delivery and incapable of 
performing the following functions adequately:   
 Identify and measure all significant impacts in monetary values;  
 Allocate more importance to the relative differences and alternative 
policies than to absolute infrastructure impacts;  
 Regarding distributional effects and impacts as being more important 
than their totals; and  
 Valuing future benefits or costs at less value and insignificant.  
 
While CBA capacity is criticised for failing to identify all significant and non-
significant benefits and costs associated with public sector infrastructure investment, 
it is not entirely redundant, as basic information derived from a CBA is still useful 
for investment decisions. CBA has been criticised for its non-inclusion of all 
significant benefits and costs for appropriate investment decision, particularly the 
development impacts that emerge as a result of transport infrastructure investments 
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(Bekefi et al., 2003). Weisbrod et al., (2001) stated that there were other alternative 
methods for evaluating transport projects, including system efficiency analysis (user 
benefits), simulation modelling, and social welfare analysis. Therefore, road 
transport using CBA as an evaluation and assessment tool, could possibly combine 
other analytical tools that could supplement the efforts of CBA, such as the multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) tool for the analyses of public infrastructure 
effects and impacts to society 
2.2.10 Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) 
The identification of value for money on construction projects is clearly related 
to monetary or investment returns, but other issues are also relevant, for instance the 
consideration of the overall benefits, costs effects and impacts of a wider context to 
society is also important. No single criterion exists that can adequately assess and 
evaluate all issues involved in a complex decision process. Ding (1999) argued that a 
multi-criteria approach offered a considerable advantage to the complex decision-
making process. The European Commission (1996) referred to multi-criteria 
decision-making (MCDM) as a technique that attributed particular weightings of 
values to derive its result with a degree of subjectivity and analyst assumptions. 
While CBA is criticised for shallow analyses, it does use and allocate monetary 
values with its appraisals and analyses by defining certain criteria objectively based 
on ranges of limited factors (TCRP, 2002). The MCDM process involves breaking 
down the decision into different components of criteria that assign weights to the 
criteria, reflecting the importance of the criteria. For example, Partnerships British 
Columbia (2003) stated that MCDM was used by various governments in different 
decision-making processes, such as urban planning, resource allocation, and public 
investment decisions, and was a technique that was particularly useful with the 
evaluation of intangibles. Therefore, MCDM suits consideration of a public 
investment decision as it involves a complex process requiring both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses, including infrastructure selection and criteria, prioritising and 
ranking the best alternative options. PPAIF (2009) argued that MCDM 
measurements and assessments of public investments did not necessarily require 
expression in monetary value, or any other alternative denominators that allowed for 
data comparison. Rather MCDM uses a multitude of criteria that create problems 
with the data interpretations. This view is supported by Partnerships British 
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Columbia (2003) which stated that an MCDM matrix approach was based on a multi-
attribute analysis that included quantitative and qualitative criteria. The MCDM 
technique typically involves the calculation of individual scores through assigned 
criterion, and the subsequent application of weight coefficients to each criterion and 
summing up of the various components to one single score. Table 2.4shows the 
weighted average of MCDM based on important criteria in evaluating infrastructure 
investment benefits, costs and effects.  
 
Table 2.4: Multi Criteria Decision making scoring process 
Example of a Weighting Criteria
Criteria Weighting*
Averages per criterion = 10.0
Financial feasibility/fiscal support 15
Infrastructure readiness and risks 15
Socio-economic benefits (employment and 
poverty alleviation) 
10
Regional development/national integration 
contributions to gross domestic product 
(GDP) 
10
Sector plan and network role importance 12
National security 0
Land acquisition 11
Environmental/resettlement 11
Impact on exporting earnings 10
Safety 11
Infrastructure type/cost 5
Demand capacity and patronage 10
Average Weighting (Total divided by 12) 10
Source: PPIAF (2009). 
*Note: The overall weighting average must be 10 overall. The table indicates that a weighting of less 
than 10 means that a criterion is valued less than the average, and a weighting of more than 10 is 
valued above the average. This can be subjective. 
 
An evaluation of MCDM potentials by Cowan and Mohamed (2002) stated that 
such criteria tended to comprise the financial and non-financial bases that provided 
useful information on public investment benefits, costs, opportunity cost of resources 
and intangibles as below: 
 MCDM compares incremental changes among options across the 
criteria. 
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 MCDM uses a multiple criteria decision rule, for example, a risk 
adjusted NPV estimate as in PSC evaluation. 
 MCDM enables an explicit and transparent trade-off between options 
and criteria. 
 MCDM accommodates more than one sample (comparator benchmark). 
 MCDM uses PSC as a key financial component. 
 
While MCDM is seen as a useful and robust tool that uses multiple criteria to 
reach an investment decision, it is not without problems. PPIAF (2009) stated that 
MCDM was marred with inconsistencies as the result of using weighted criteria; at 
times the weight counts were doubled, but MCDM managed to stay above defects. 
Some criteria are weighted or given more prominence than others due to the 
importance of the criterion and do not assign an even weighting criteria to all objects 
under consideration. The table below indicates the MCDM weighted average of a 
road infrastructure. 
Table 2.5: MCDM evaluation of two projects 
    Example of Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis 
   Project #1 Project #2 
   1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
No Criteria Score in 
words 
 
Score Weight Score    
x 
Weight
/10 
Score 
in 
words 
 
Score  Weight Score      
x 
Weight
/10         
1 Financial 
feasibility 
and fiscal 
support 
Medium 5 15 7.5 High 9 15 13.5 
2 Readiness 
and risk 
Med - 
High 
7 15 10.5 Med-
High 
8 15 12.0 
3 Socio-
economic 
benefits 
(including 
employment 
and poverty 
alleviation) 
High 9 10 9 High 9 10 9.0 
4 Regional 
development 
and national 
integration 
contribution 
Med - 
High 
7 10 7.0 Med-
High 
7 10 7.0 
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Source: PPIAF (2009).  
The formula below represents MCDM calculation, after summing the various 
components into a single score of the project: 
S୨	ୀ ∑ WiCij୬୧ିଵ     (1) 
Where 
S୨ୀ୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୱୡ୭୰ୣ	୤୭୰	୮୰୭୨ୣୡ୲≪୨≫   (2) 
C୧୨ୀୱୡ୭୰ୣ	୭୤	ୡ୰୧୲ୣ୰୧ୟ≪୧≫୤୭୰≪୨≫    (3)  
 
W୧ୀ୵ୣ୧୥୦୲	୭୤	ୡ୰୧୲ୣ୰୧ୟ≪୨≫    (4) 
Source: PPAIF, 2009 
 
2.2.11 Differences between CBA and MCDM 
CBA and MCDM can be seen as two extremes on a continuum, where CBA 
focuses on quantifiable effects and MCDM uses subjective criteria, which are 
provided by analysts and decision makers. Conway (2009) argued that CBA’s role 
was not to provide all necessary investment information for decision-making; rather 
to GDP 
5 Sector plan 
and 
importance 
of network 
High 8 12 9.6 Med-
High 
8 12 9.6 
6 National 
security 
High 9 0 - Low 0 0 - 
7 Land 
acquisition 
Med 5 11 5.5 Mediu
m 
5 11 5.5 
8 Environment 
resettlement 
Medium 5 11 5.5 Mediu
m 
5 11 5.5 
9 Impacts 
repatriating 
earnings 
Medium 5 10 5.0 Mediu
m 
5 10 5.0 
10 Security Medium 5 11 5.5 Mediu
m 
5 11 5.5 
11 Project 
type/cost 
Medium 6 5 3.0 Low 2 5 1.0 
12 Demand 
capacity 
High 9 10 9.0 High 9 10 9.0 
  
Total score 
out of 100 
  80 10 77.1   72 10 82.6 
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it was one source that provided important information, but was not the only source. 
Whether CBA is capable of satisfying all investment decision requirements depends 
very much on the environment and type of information needed for the investment 
decision. However, in the absence of CBA, there is always a possibility that an 
investment decision might be undertaken either on moral ground to protect society 
(legal, cultural, political), or on an economic basis using values and benefits of the 
investment to society, even if the values are not justified in economic terms (OECD, 
2001). Therefore, the importance of CBA as one source of information is to provide 
information on the viability of a proposed infrastructure investment and as a means 
of capturing basic information, even when the information is regarded as imperfect 
(Conway, 2009). In some countries, CBA has been extended to include some of the 
components of MCDM, which are designed to analyse the potential effects of 
infrastructure investment to society. For example, both Belgium and the Netherlands 
currently use MCDM (including a limited CBA input) in public investment 
decisions. In Europe, countries like France, Germany, Italy and the UK use both 
CBA and MCDM in public investments considerations (OECD, 2001, European 
Commission, 1996). The difference between CBA and MCDM is that MCDM 
attributes weights to various objects under consideration based on criterion 
importance, which could be manipulated and politically driven to achieve certain 
infrastructure objectives. Opricovic and Tzeng (2002) argued that MCDM was 
politically driven rather than being a technically superior tool, because the analyst 
guided the decision-maker to categorise the investment effects into important and 
non-important, which had the tendency to compromise the authenticity of the data,  
the same critique is levelled against CBA. 
Where monetary values are assigned to MCDM analyses and measurements, 
the values are subjected to the user’s preference, including those that the CBA has 
already identified with its own analyses. An important aspect of MCDM is in filling 
the gap created by CBA in those areas where monetisation of effects are extremely 
difficult to calculate, a process that has provided alternative solutions that 
consequentially lead to choosing a particular investment option (OECD, 2001). 
MCDM as an optimisation process and a way of determining the best feasible 
solution of various effects is often characterised by conflicting and competing 
interests (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2002). MCDM cannot simultaneously offer a 
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satisfactory solution to all interest groups; rather MCDM happens to satisfy more the 
political agenda than economic benefit objectives.  For example, the MCDM steps 
for which a combined CBA/MCDM measurement is preferable in certain areas are 
shown in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6: Evaluation and assessment methods 
Investment assessment and 
evaluation method 
Analysis 
method 
Analysis 
method 
Comments
Establish evaluation  criteria 
relative to system capabilities and 
goals 
MCDM CBA CBA uses established criteria to 
analyse macroeconomic effects, 
while MCDM expands on the 
criteria in terms of 
microeconomic analysis 
(complementary). 
Develop alternative system to 
achieve the infrastructure 
objectives and goals 
MCDM CBA MCDM uses weights and 
monetary value to analyse 
investment effects, while CBA 
highlights alternative option 
based on NPV, IRR. 
Evaluate alternatives in terms of 
criteria 
MCDM CBA CBA and MCDM use 
established criteria and 
categorise their analysis in 
terms of preference. 
Apply normative multi-criteria 
analysis method 
MCDM N/A MCDM uses normative analysis 
method
Accept one alternative as optimal 
(preferred option) 
MCDM CBA MCDM and CBA perform 
similar analysis. 
If solution unacceptable, gather 
new information and repeat the 
multi-criteria optimisation process 
N/A CBA Engineering assessment of 
benefits and costs assessment. 
Source: Author 
 
2.3 SOCIAL BENEFITS 
The term “social benefits” is at times interchangeably used as “social benefits, 
social costs, and social values” (Mishan 1976), and depends on the interpretation of 
benefits, as most public investments could either bring a benefit or a cost to society. 
According to Mishan (1976, pp. 11), social benefit is the total sum of the private 
benefits and external benefits of an infrastructure services delivery to society or the 
sum of the total value of the infrastructure as reflected in the market and value 
received by society as benefits. While social cost is the cost imposed and borne by 
society through a PPP delivery. It is the sum of the private costs and external costs to 
society, relative to unidentified effects of infrastructure delivery. 
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 This research prefers to use the term “social benefits” in preference to social 
values and means the benefits that accrue to society. In addition, “social costs” will 
be used to refer to costs, effects and impacts (negatives) that reduce quality of life 
and the standard of living of certain sectors of society. In addition, Watkins (2005) 
defined social benefits as the sum of private and external benefits to an individual in 
society, regardless of who paid for or produced the benefits, and whether the 
beneficiaries were involved in determining how much of the benefit to produce. 
While social costs are the sum of total costs to individuals in society, regardless of 
whether the individual pays the costs or who decides the social cost to be incurred 
(Watkins, 2005). However, advocates of economic theory tend to disagree with the 
notion of society as an independent factor, capable of driving benefits or suffering 
(costs) from the government or the market action (Jackson et al., 1995). The Green 
Book (HM Treasury, 2003) posited that governments’ activities and actions were 
capable of affecting individuals and society in many ways, such as by government 
policy having the potential to affect an individual either negatively or positively by 
way of income reductions or poor living standards.  
Therefore, social benefits and costs result as a by-product of an infrastructure, 
either delivered through PPP or conventional means that require the identification of 
all benefits and costs to be included into PPP cost estimates. The inclusion of these 
benefits and costs happens to reflect the actual cost of the investment to both society 
and government. An infrastructure evaluation has to detail the overall benefits and 
costs to individuals (internal) and those that would be affected in the future, who are 
non-participants of the decision (Mishan, 1976). For instance, in the mining sector in 
Queensland, Australia, mining exploration licences are issued to potential developers 
on the requirement of providing “Bank Guarantees” in accordance with the 
Queensland Environmental Protection Act (1974) for future rehabilitation of the site 
after mining is completed. Even when there is an existing policy, how effective is the 
policy to compel the polluter to devote resources as a clean-up cost or internalisation 
of pollution costs as part of its cost estimate (structure)? Because public investments 
(conventional, PPP) do produce benefits and costs, which are immediate and 
protracted.  
The issue with the benefits of PPP delivery is how to identify benefits when 
realised, which were originally identified during infrastructure assessment and 
 60 Chapter 2:Literature Review 
evaluation. Mishan (1976) defined benefit as “the value of a good or service to 
society”. The private investor’s perception of a benefit of a good or service is in 
terms of revenue received (sales) in comparison to cost of goods sold, while 
consumers perception of benefit is the willingness to pay for the goods or services at 
the price indicated (affordability). Some goods and services with future benefits, 
costs and effects are not always quantified in monetary terms, nor are they saleable in 
the immediate term, because they are non-market products. In other words, PPP 
future benefits, costs and effects to society are difficult to identify, quantify, and 
measure in monetary terms due to the uncertainty associated with them.  
2.3.1 Social cost benefit analysis 
Social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) is the measure of net benefits of 
infrastructure investment to society, rather than profit margins of the private investor. 
SCBA tends to consider the opportunity cost of resources provided to the private 
investor at no cost by society (interest free). The evaluation of resources either at 
consumption level (input) or based on output obtained, is valued at its opportunity 
cost to society and not at the market’s prevailing price (TCRP, 2002). SCBA uses 
opportunity costs to reflect economic scarcity of resources and governments’ role for 
the provision of public goods that are valued based on derived satisfaction, rather 
than the market pricing system. 
A public infrastructure investment is a public good, and so the method of its 
analysis and evaluation should reflect the objectives of the services industry of 
interest in conferring benefits and values to society. Moreover, public goods have no 
residual value or alternative use and are incapable of changing status because of the 
private investor‘s redefinition and attribution of economic values to the public 
infrastructure. Howes and Robinson (2005) argued that there was a theoretical 
indifference in any public infrastructure definition, either as economic stimulant or 
by its multiple effects on society, because it was a service-providing infrastructure 
with no alternative use. Therefore, SCBA assessment and evaluation of public 
infrastructure investment is based on completeness, a structure that captures and 
measures all benefits, as well as costs associated with particular public investment. 
On the assumption that the public sector infrastructure investments are 
designed to confer social benefits to society as the primary investment objective, then 
the question arises why use CBA, which is commercially oriented? The public 
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sector, as a service industry, needs to adopt an evaluation technique that reflects the 
benefits of the infrastructure to society, and CBA, for the reasons previously stated, 
is not really appropriate for such an evaluation. However, that being said, there is 
actually an invisible profit to the taxpayer, which is the ultimate satisfaction derived 
as the result of experiencing improved infrastructure quality services that in turn 
facilitates improved human living standards. To the private investor, a return on the 
investment is a profit (market return) or the opportunity cost of resources used to 
produce the outcome (capital and non-capital resources), but not so much to the 
taxpayer.  
Whether CBA, MCDM or SCBA is used for the assessment and evaluation of 
PPP benefits and costs to society depends solely on infrastructure characteristics and 
services objective. Each method is complicated and somewhat subjective based on 
the assessor’s perception of what is considered a benefit and a cost. However, as 
mentioned in the previous sections, using a combination of CBA with SCBA, or 
CBA and MCDM, is a more appropriate assessment methodology for evaluating a 
public investment decision, as using CBA in isolation for decision evaluation tends 
to ignore future effects and impacts of the infrastructure to society. In addition, the 
private investor’s investment returns are important, as well as net social benefits that 
accrue to society, which are largely determined by infrastructure characteristics and 
analytical tools used to identify the overall public investment benefits, costs, and 
effects to society.  
2.3.2 Measuring PPP success or failure 
Although some authors argue that PPP’s long-term financial sustainability is a 
measure of PPP success or failure (Arboleda and Abraham, 2006; Jamali, 2004), 
others argue that PPP’s measure of success tends to neglect the extent of these 
benefits against the costs and effects of the infrastructure to society. Levinson et al., 
(2006) argued that evaluating and measuring PPP success had to take into account 
the following: 
 The support for PPP by society, government, politicians and private 
firms (financial institutions).  
 The satisfaction of the infrastructure stated objectives (costs, demand, 
timetable) 
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 The infrastructure’s extension or undertaking of a new project with a 
similar consortium. 
 The infrastructure improvements of the efficiency of the system, equity 
of the system (government), the environment and users’ satisfaction.  
 
Hodge and Greve (2005) stated that there were no meta-analyses or statistical 
reviews of PPP performance, because the complexity of evaluating infrastructure 
arrangements was compounded by the observation and variety of contractual 
arrangements that existed among the PPP entities (financial institutions, 
governments, the private investor, society). Moreover, the lack of a consistent 
benchmark by which PPP performance can be evaluated has left the choice to 
individuals with their own criteria for assessment. For example, those involved with 
the financial transactions of these investments, often speak highly of PPP (Hodge and 
Greve, 2005). However, what matters most is the evaluation of PPP against the stated 
objectives and broader government policy promises being made to society. For 
instance, Hodge (2004c) argued that on the perspective of government’s policy, legal 
contract, or historical outcomes to discern partnership success that their outcomes 
varied and weakest evidence of success emerged from a policy perspective and 
strongest at the historical outcomes level.   
The success and performance improvements of PPP infrastructure could be 
aligned to monitoring the project activities by introducing performance indicators to 
eliminate or limit intrinsically opportunistic behaviour. Roumboutsos et al., (2013) 
argued that VfM identified in the business case development and PSC were 
established on a purely financial basis that related to technical, operational, and 
financial bases. Surprisingly, there was no reference with respect to innovation or 
economic benefits that were considered core drivers for the private investor’s public 
infrastructure investment. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) argued that PPP success 
depended on the capability of the private investor’s innovative skills, and Liu and 
Wilkinson (2011) identified the capabilities of the public and private sectors 
(combined) as the key to PPP performance success that encompassed the project size 
and anticipated traffic volumes which ensured the flow of revenue streams, and 
infrastructure financial viability. Apparently, risk allocation is the decisive factor to 
success, when actually located and priced adequately. Gausch (2004); Baeza and 
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Vassallo (2010), and UKHCTC (2008) stated that both PPP practitioners and 
academia had placed emphasis on effective risk allocation. PPP effective risk 
allocation could be possible, where complete information on the nature of the risk 
was available or the specifics that relate to the peculiarity of the infrastructure 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2005), as well as the financial market being capable  of  predicting 
the unforeseen economic changes that influence the infrastructure services outcome 
(Roumboutsos et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the success of PPP works best when roles and responsibilities are 
defined. Where infrastructure objectives are clearly defined, detailed and regulatory 
standards are met or enforced to ensure the public’s safety. For example, most PPP 
toll roads are within the concession period of 30 years or more and achieving VfM 
with such long-term concession requires the private investor managing construction 
and operational risks (transferred) effectively and government’s ability 
(administration) in managing the PPP contract for the specified period. In other 
words, the success or failure of PPP is shaped by this function:  
 
ܵ ൌ ݂ሺ ௜ܺሻ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	݅ ൌ 1………ܰ                    (5) 
 
N = the total number of factors affecting the infrastructure (project). 
Examples of factors that can impact on PPP success or failure are consortium 
tunnelling experience, technology, society acceptance and support of the project, the 
project’s timely delivery, and costs effectiveness of the project, among others. A 
project’s complexity, determination of services specifics and mode of procurements 
are dependent variables. Evaluating a project’s success or failure must be in response 
to the performance against indicators established like the unidentified risks, benefits 
identified and evolving needs for the project. Combinations of the formula below 
could be used to determine whether the project under consideration could be 
successful or not (Levinson et al., 2006). 
ܵ ൌ ݂ሺ ௜ܺሻ ଵܹ ଵܺ 	൅ ଵܹ ଵܺ 	൅ ⋯൅ ௡ܹܺ௡ (6) 
ݔ௜= representing factors affecting the project’s performance such as social 
acceptance,  
ݓଵ= representing weights to be determined (MCDM criteria) 
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In general terms, Hodge and Greve (2011) argued that success was attributed to 
a project’s accomplishment, such as (i) achieving intended outcomes, (ii) getting the 
process to work, (iii) reaching a milestone, (iv) achieving recognition from others, 
and (v) personal pride. The most common and recognised attributes of success from 
literature are (i) and (ii), (Hodge and Greve, 2011), where achieving an intended 
outcome is considered a success. The second criterion of getting the process to work 
tends to undermine the importance of outcomes, either from a policy change 
perspective or from any reform process. 
Often, success is a pre-established parliamentary process, or results from 
project partners setting the rules, which can be used to judge success or outcomes. 
Therefore, we may ask what criteria should be used to determine PPP success. Is it 
from a VfM perspective; technical and efficient in terms of services quality; a 
political manoeuvre as means of elongating politicians career, or the non-upfront 
payment (funding)of public infrastructure by a private investor (Hodge and Greve, 
2011)? These are surely not the determinants for measuring success, but rather 
success is a matter of interpretation, because there is no definitive standard for 
measuring success, as infrastructure objectives and contracts award are captioned 
success that is either supported or opposed by society (Hodge and Greve, 2011). 
Another aspect of success in terms of PPP procurement is the complexity of public 
infrastructure, which is regarded as a major project. Shaoul (2005) argued that public 
infrastructure complexity was an obstacle in the way of the private investor to 
achieve success, because the risks allocated or transferred to the investor were 
neither identified nor quantified. Ball et al., (2007) stated that PPP risk analysis and 
identification were subjective and Pollack et al., (2007) criticised that timely PPP 
delivery and cost savings were without evidence and even misleading when 
considering the success or failure of PPP deliveries. UKNAO (2009) noted in its 
review of UK PFI’s infrastructures that the use of private finance was encouraged 
through institutional incentives and its evaluation in terms of benefits was to say the 
least, difficult, because it was not well developed and auditable, and unlikely to 
represent the best value for money option (Hodge and Greve, 2011). In other words, 
the concept of success is based on the definition. It is interpretative and requires not 
necessarily just achieving of the stated prerequisites’ mentioned above but should 
include all the intangibles (benefits, costs, risks effects, impacts) in measuring 
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success. In addition, most PPP infrastructures have a long-term lease concession 
beyond 25 years and a whole life-cycle costing system based on the eventual 
infrastructure’s maintenance and because of this, changes in the economy (global 
financial crisis) have affected some approved infrastructures, and as such, they did 
not progress further. Achieving an infrastructure milestone such as financial close is 
not a success measure in itself, because other factors, such as contract renegotiation, 
bankruptcy and lack of patronage, could affect an infrastructure success (Hodge and 
Greve, 2011).  
2.3.3 Infrastructure social benefit cost to society 
Public infrastructure investment as a contributor to human quality of life has 
received little attention on the benefits, costs, effects and impacts of the unpriced 
components of PPP infrastructure delivery activities. It is arguable that PPP delivery 
standards are improving, but this does not negate the fact that society lives with the 
effects and impacts of these investments for a longer period. The effects of public 
infrastructure investments, either conventional or PPP, to society are likely to be 
identified by the number of persons affected or where a number of persons have 
suffered the same symptom. There is a medical cost involved (social costs) which 
needs quantifying in monetary value or other acceptable values to determine the 
actual cost to society.   
The point remains that every mode of delivery (conventional, PPP) has some 
negative or positive impact on human quality of life. The negative or positive effects 
and impacts tend to reduce the public sector resources or additional cost to society. 
Haughwout (2001) argued that PPP effects and impacts did reduce the level of social 
benefits to individuals and resources available to attend to other public programs. 
Therefore, the net social benefit of a PPP infrastructure to society must include the 
social benefits of direct effects and external effects, which could be expressed as 
follows:   
Net social benefit (NSB) = social benefit of direct effects + net benefits of externalities 
 
In a perfect market or in the absence of externalities, it could be assumed that 
the net social benefits of infrastructure to society will be greater than PPP profits. 
This means, a PPP infrastructure considered profitable to the private investor will be 
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equally profitable to society, as long as the direct and external effects (combined) are 
equal to the net social benefits available to society. The point remains, if the direct 
and external effects outweigh the net social benefits to society, such PPP 
infrastructure does not confer social benefits. Additionally, it is possible that a PPP 
infrastructure can be unprofitable, while at the same time remaining beneficial to 
society, only where the social benefits of the infrastructure is large enough to 
outweigh the infrastructure’s negative effects (Haughwout, 2001). With transport 
infrastructures, the social benefits (effects) are of a wider proportion to society and 
Minnesota (DoT, 2007) stated these wider effects are particularised with road 
transport: 
 Transport infrastructure impacts relative to employment opportunities 
that lead to increased productivity. 
 Road transport distributional impacts and effects in regional areas 
(connectivity). 
 Logistics and services distribution that adds value to human life. 
These social benefits of road transport have a negative aspect in the form of 
social costs and effects (environmental degradation, pollution and emission), which 
are a direct effect to users of the infrastructure and external effects to non-users on a 
long-term basis.  
2.3.4 Overview of road transportation investment 
In recent times, governments have used arguments for economic development 
to advance public sector capital investments, even when society is unwilling to 
accept the government’s rationale as genuine, because of the effects of these capital 
investments to society (Banister and Berechman, 2000). Road transport investment is 
an addition to an existing network or expansion of existing networks that adds to 
economic benefits and effects in relation to improved travelling times, operating cost 
savings and congestion reductions, as benefits to society (Banister and Berechman, 
2000). The term “economic development” refers to non-growth variables of the 
economy, such as equity changes and reduction in social benefits in society (i.e., 
quality of environment). Societal interpretation of economic development originates 
from the perception that such infrastructure will brings social changes based on 
employment opportunities, which will reflect in changes in households and firms 
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incomes, when adjusted nationally. On the other hand, “economic growth” is a 
continuous process of annual increases in per capita income, in consideration of 
increases in national productivity, or increases in product demand from a regional 
perspective and employment opportunities (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2005). The 
term “economic growth” measures the additional economic effect of an investment in 
the economy.  
There are benefits and effects that arise from transport infrastructure 
investment, which can be significant or insignificant (i.e., services quality, time 
savings etc.). On the assumption that benefits, costs, and effects are significant or 
larger than originally predicted, what measurement tool is appropriate and capable of 
capturing all potential benefits and effects on society, including a pricing model for 
the immediate and long-term effects (Banister and Berechman, 2000)? The fact is 
that a road transport network has longevity with wider effects; its consequences 
transcend to smaller investors in society that are unknown in the immediate term, 
given the distributional and logistical effects on society. Therefore, what is the 
appropriate evaluation method based on macro-microeconomic analyses capable of 
capturing direct and indirect road transport effects to society? Figure 2.3 below 
describes road transport infrastructure direct and indirect effects on society. 
 
Figure 2.3: Banister and Berechman (2000) 
 
As shown in the above diagram, road transport investment produces direct and 
indirect effects. An indirect effect of road transport investment is the economic 
multiplier and environmental impacts. Direct effects of road transport investments 
are in the context of social changes and impacts on society that improve human 
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quality of life or social changes emerging as a result of the infrastructure investment. 
The multiplier effect is the employment opportunities generated by investment and 
income generated in the locality where the infrastructure is located, during either the 
construction or post-construction periods. As argued above, developed countries, (the 
UK, Italy, Germany, France and USA) have adopted a combination of CBA and 
MCDM in their evaluation of public investments. However, evaluation and 
comparisons of results produced by CBA are prevalent to the conditions of the 
investment and assumptions of the analyst (Bekefi et al., 2003). For example, road 
transport investment is subjected to viability conditions or other future conditions 
(revenue demand), but excluded with the present (CBA) analysis.  
An early case illustrating this can be found where the European Commission 
(1996) classified road transport costs into construction, operation and maintenance 
with associated infrastructure benefits (wider effects). The road transport costs were 
based on construction, operation and maintenance, where risk allocation and transfer 
to the private investor fell within the responsibility of the services provider. 
Comparing benefits and costs that arise from a public road investment requires the 
summation of cost savings in comparison to the identified benefits, cost of capital 
and operation costs. A transport infrastructure development and its comprehensive 
feasibility analysis needs to include: (i) components considered feasible to the 
technical design (construction, operation); (ii) environmental impacts of 
infrastructure to society (monetary, non-monetary), and (iii) life-cycle benefits and 
costs projected, with the infrastructure overall economic viability (Alberta Treasury 
Board, 2011). CBA as most common and frequently used analytical tool with the 
evaluation of road transport projects that prescribes financial gains relative to market 
prices of benefits, costs, and effects, either positive or negative and attributes of 
monetary value based on assumptions of CBA relies on incomplete information 
(Eijgenraam et al., 2000). These benefits and costs that arise from CBA might seem 
to be weaker relative to other methods of evaluation that apparently contribute to 
make transport infrastructure project evaluation more objective. The diagram below 
describes the linkages between transport infrastructure development project based on 
aggregate life-cycle benefits and costs. 
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Figure 2.4: Cost-benefit analysis for evaluating transport development project. 
                    
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TCRP (2002) 
The OECD (2001), European Commission (1996) recommend a formula for 
socio-economic benefit/cost ratios as the NPV and numerator of the infrastructure to 
society and the denominator as the NPV of scarce resource, in consideration to 
present and future government finance represented as follows:  
ܸܾܲ െ ܸܲܿ
ܸܲܽ  
Where	 	 PVb	 is the present value of the benefits 
PVc is the present value of the costs 
PVa is the present value of the public finance required; capital 
required and net future maintenance outlays  
 
 Alternatively, the NPV relative to the investment return that describes the 
investment average. The method uses a discount rate, and when applied tends to 
produce a zero NPV for a given evaluation period. At the same time, a higher 
discount rate indicates a shorter period to extinguish the cost of a capital investment 
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(payment). No matter the approach, road transport investments are valued using the 
NPV, a process that determines the investment viability and profit margin to the 
private investor (OECD, 2001). 
 
These benefits and costs that arise from CBA might seem to be weaker 
relative to other methods of evaluation that apparently contribute to make transport 
infrastructure project evaluation more objective. For example, elements of analyses 
(costs, benefits) tend to vary as the result of the analyst perception. The table below 
represents typical benefits and costs of road transport infrastructure with CBA 
analysis. 
Benefits of road transport Costs of road transport 
Reduction in vehicle maintenance Land acquisition 
Reduction in traffic accidents Construction  
Economy in fuel consumption Maintenance 
Comfort accruing to road users  
 
Therefore, financial and viability of road transport infrastructure is satisfied 
when; (i) infrastructure benefits is greater than the costs, and (ii) infrastructure profit 
(benefit) is greater than those of other alternatives. The financial viability of a road 
transport could be verified through other criteria that represent the net present value 
(absolute) and infrastructure net benefits as follows: 
 Net Present Value (NPV) 
 Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) 
 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
Alternatively, the NPV relative to the investment return that describes the investment 
average. The method uses a discount rate, and when applied tends to produce a zero 
NPV for a given evaluation period. At the same time, a higher discount rate indicates 
a shorter period to extinguish the cost of a capital investment (payment). No matter 
the approach, road transport investments are valued using the NPV, a process that 
determines the investment viability and profit margin to the private investor (OECD, 
2001). 
Another approach often adopted for road transport infrastructure projects for 
comparing value for money that occurs over a set period of time, or at different 
times, due to economic and social changes (interest rate, inflation etc.) is a 
calculation of the net present value of cash-flows (PVC). The present value (PV) is 
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calculated by applying interest and inflation rates known as the “discount rate”, of a 
future sum. The discount rate is based on the interest rate that a government will be 
required to pay for the debt component of a particular infrastructure, the terms and 
conditions of specific payment streams and including the cost of issuing the debt. 
However, any potential risks related to the infrastructure under consideration are not 
included with the discount rate, as a project’s risks are assessed and quantified 
outside of the discount rate. For example, a discount rate with  risk premiums 
included would lead to an incorrect outcome of the calculation, i.e., if a project is 
evaluated as being a high risk project with a higher discount rate it is likely to result 
in a lower net present value cost than a less risky project with a lower discount rate. 
Discount rates of investments are calculated based on the prevailing capital market 
rates and other factors existing at the time of the analysis.  
 
2.3.4.1 Other methods for road transport evaluation 
There are other methods that may be used to support the decision-making phase of 
road transport projects, such as: 
 An analysis of cost effectiveness; 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/cost/guide2008
_en.pdf)  
 Multi-criteria analysis 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/examples/too_cri_res
_en.pdf); 
 Multi- criteria decision making (MCDM) 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/7612/1132618.pdf); and/or,  
 Risk benefit analysis (http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/projects-
queensland/policy-framework/project-assurance-framework/paf-cost-benefit-
analysis.pdf)  
 
The various alternative methods are described briefly below: 
 
Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used to evaluate benefits that are not 
easily quantified and for which there is no monetary value (market price) available.  
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There is no specific rule for the determination of a project’s viability or desirability. 
CEA’s objective is to obtain a monetary based index that will be helpful in 
comparing alternative investments for the same type of services objectives (Tanczos 
and Kong, 2001). CEA index is as follows:  
  
Cost Effectiveness Analysis Index (CEA)  = Units of Measure Costs in Monetary Units 
Units		of	measure	
Costs	in	monetary	units 
 
Any infrastructure with significant benefit or highest index is the preferred 
investment option.  
 
Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) takes into account the effects that are 
valued in monetary terms, as well as other infrastructure effects considered to be of 
significant interest to society. The difference between CEA and MCDM is that the 
latter has an ability to incorporate various effects that arise from any infrastructure 
investment decision that CEA cannot include within its analysis (Tanczos and Kong, 
2001). For example, the effects of a particular governmental policy (HM Treasury 
2006; TRCP, 2001) may not be included directly, due to  lack of a common unit 
(money), whereas MDCM could use weightings as basis for those benefits, without 
monetary measurements, i.e., by attributing values based on their importance 
(benefits, cost, and effects) to society (Tanczos and Kong, 2001). For example, let’s 
assume that reduced accidents on roads are considered more important than travel 
time-savings, and then MCDM can allocate a higher weight criterion to accident 
reduction than to travel time savings. If these benefits are algebraically expressed as, 
benefits associated with accident reduction being (A), travel time saving (T), and 
emission of gas on roads (E), with their respecting weightings of: a, t, and e and 
overall benefits of the investment is B, the MCDM formula based on the weights in 
monetary value and relative to the importance of each objective could be derived as 
follows: 
 
B = a + tat + eye 
 
 
MCDM’s real potential is the combination of several objectives from various 
sources that enables the integration of diverse objectives (Tanczos and Kong, 2001). 
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In comparison with CBA, the fundamental difference is that infrastructure economic 
efficiency is not the only consideration for public investment policy.  
 
Risk Benefit Analysis (RBA). A major problem with PPP procurement is the 
allocation of risks (design, construction, operation, commercial, financial, legal, 
political, and environmental) among the participating entities (public, private, 
contractors, and sub-contractors). The classification of projects into ‘risky’ and ‘non-
risky’ projects by financial institutions has led to the emergence of risk benefit 
analysis (RBA) of projects, a methodology resembling CBA (Tanczos and Kong, 
2001). It is obvious that road transport is associated with environmental pollution, 
which can lead to health hazards and RBA is focused on determining the project’s 
social viability. For instance, the number of people whose health is affected that seek 
treatment in hospitals as the result of increased pollution from a road infrastructure 
project represent costs to society. Likewise, the benefit emanating from a road 
transport project is the ‘action’ taken to reduce pollution levels and this minimize or 
negate the associated illness that could be attributed to such projects. When benefits 
and costs are compared as the result of pollution associated with road transport, the 
process is known as a risk benefit analysis and the difference between CBA and 
RBA is that the latter takes the number of people affected (falling sick) as costs and 
resources forgone (action taken) with risk benefit analysis of road transport 
development (Tanczos and Kong, 2001). 
So as stated above, there are various ways of evaluating road transport benefits, 
costs, effects, and impacts, and these vary from one country to another. The 
principles and objectives of these various methods remain the same, and are all 
directed towards performing a comprehensive appraisal capable of capturing all 
benefits, costs, effects, and impacts associated with public road investment. Table 2.7 
below describes various appraisal methods used by various countries with the 
objective of capturing the infrastructure variables.  
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Table 2.7: Classification of road investment appraisal methodology concerning countries 
 
Country 
Australia 
Denmark 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Germany 
Italy 
England 
Japan 
Korea 
France Belgium 
The 
Netherlands 
Canada, USA 
Evaluation  
method 
Conventional 
Cost benefit 
Analysis (CBA) 
Benefit-cost 
Analysis 
(BCA) 
Multi-
criteria 
Analysis 
(MCA) 
Multi-criteria 
analysis 
(MCA) and 
partially 
benefit-cost 
analysis 
(CBA) 
No particular 
framework∗ 
Source: European Commission (1996).  
 
The initial investigation and assessment of a road transport infrastructure 
investment is based on the infrastructure’s socio-economic and financial viability 
(appraisal). The process determines whether the choice of PPP is a better option and 
more efficient compared to a conventional procurement method (Tanczos and Kong, 
2001). With road transport development, several appraisals are performed by various 
interest groups (contractors, financial institutions, operators, and suppliers) involved 
with the eventual project procurement being based on potential risks of the 
infrastructure and its capacity to generate sufficient revenue (cash-flow). The 
fundamental criterion of a road transport development is centred on the socio-
economic and financial implications of the investment, capable of conferring socio-
economic benefits and financial surety (affordability) to society.  
2.3.4.2     Socio-economic analysis of road transport 
Socio-economic analysis in its wider sense remains the fundamental criterion, 
which influences the ultimate decision as to whether a road transport project 
progresses, either as a stand-alone project or as part of the infrastructure network. 
Socio-economic appraisal takes into consideration the direct costs associated with the 
project (capital, construction, operation, maintenance); the direct benefits to the road 
users (travel time savings, safety, productivity, vehicle operating cost reduction), and 
indirect benefits to society (land use and regional development, property value 
appreciation, environmental costs reduction). Tanczos and Kong, (2001) stated that 
road transport benefits and cost allocated with monetary value can be converted into 
socio-economic rate of returns of the investment to society and social benefits based 
on satisfaction derived by users and individuals.  
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2.3.4.3     Financial Analysis of road transport 
 
The financial analysis of road transport infrastructure is calculated based on 
actual costs and generated revenues and is expressed as the rate of return on 
investment or equity return. Infrastructure financial analysis is focused on financial 
viability of a cash-flow model that compares all the various costs and revenues of 
different funding options for a particular project under consideration, either yearly or 
semi-annually. Basically, financial viability is based on the return to equity or 
debt/cost ratio, and subsequently used to determine investment funding eligibility 
when resources are limited (Tanczos and Kong, 2001). Table 2.8 below describes 
road transport investment comparison of socio-economic and financial analysis, with 
various entities interests and objectives. 
Table 2.8: Comparison between socio-economic analysis and financial analysis 
Comparisons Socio-economic analysis Financial analysis 
PPP entity objective  Government, society  Maximise public benefits  
Private investor, project 
 Maximise private benefits 
Types of effects 
All benefits and costs to society 
(including external costs, transfer 
payments). 
All receipts and outlays that affect 
the financial position of a company 
(including external costs, transfer 
payments). 
Time horizon Project’s lifetime  The private investor’s time of involvement (duration). 
Taxes, subsidies Excluded Included 
Prices used 
in valuation 
Domestic market prices*   
 
Economic prices 
Actual, domestic market prices 
(prevailing market price) 
Evaluation 
method 
Cost benefit analysis, 
Multi-criterion analysis (weights, 
monetary value). 
Return on equity, debt/cover ratios, 
Cash-flow analysis (IRR, ROI). 
*if market prices fail to provide a comprehensive value to society, replace with economic prices. 
 
The above comparison includes a range of effects of road transport development 
based on socio-economic and financial analysis that could be evaluated using CBA 
and complemented with MCDM simultaneously. With the inclusions of a project’s 
various benefits, costs, and effects through a socio-economic analysis, an outcome of 
a positive economic rate of return to society or the private investor is possible. If 
after such evaluations the project’s return based on these combinations offers greater 
ultimate benefits to society, such a project may be unattractive to potential investors 
and financial institutions, or, investors may see the project as being too ‘weak’ to 
generate sufficient revenue (cash-flow) and therefore perceive it as having a lack of 
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financial viability in generating good returns to equity holders (low equity return and 
high risk project). Tanczos and Kong (2001) argued that road transport investment 
with sufficient economic rate of return to society could involve risk redistribution 
and reallocation among the entities (government, private investor, and financial 
institution), with additional government’s financial support (contribution) that could 
be used as incentive to reduce financial pressure to all PPP participants. While risk 
redistribution and reallocation is the most favoured option, UKHCTC (2010) stated 
that other methods for addressing the concerns of PPP participants are those of risk 
sharing and instigation of collaborative effort that focus more on rewards and 
performance. 
 
2.3.4.4 Road transport benefits and costs measure 
Accounting for road transport benefits and costs involves the identification of 
all, or at least significant, benefits and costs associated with the investment. While it 
is important to identify these benefits and costs with road transport investment, the 
process through which these benefits and costs are identified must not overlap to 
avoid double counting. The more these benefits and costs are categorised, the more 
likelihood that benefits and costs might overlap. TCRP (2002) stated that overlap of 
benefits and costs was not deliberate, rather a means of demonstrating the investment 
potential benefits to society from complex and uncertain relationships between the 
categories (benefits and costs). From an infrastructure investment benefits 
perspective, road transport counts reduction in travel time as a benefit, and it is also 
counted as a benefit in property price increases and tax revenues. In other words, the 
benefit of travel time reduction is also capitalised as an increase in property values, 
which suggests that double counting has occurred within the measurement of road 
transport benefits and costs (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). With road transport 
investments that use toll charges, the benefits to users might comprise additional 
trips, convenience and comfort, security and safety. These benefits to users could be 
gains or losses (negatives, positives) leading to cost reductions, or increases, 
meaning that the benefits of road transport investment are reductions in costs, which 
are difficult to disentangle. However, when such PPP benefits and costs are too 
difficult to measure using monetary values, or if there is no specific or appropriate 
measurement available, then they are reclassified and regrouped into financial and 
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non-financial benefits, in order that a clearer understanding of any PPP benefits to 
society might be better understood (EPEC, 20011, TCRP, 2002). For example, it is 
not easy or practicable to measure, or attribute, monetary value to the concept of 
travel time saving or society’s willingness to pay for improved service quality, as 
these are intangible concepts.  
The concept of non-financial benefits (NFBs) is based on evaluating socio-
economic benefits of services to users, or to the wider society, as the result of public 
investment. NFBs are distinctive from financial benefits or costs, which represent 
inflows and outflows of resources (cash), and are purely an investment decision. 
There are public investments which are not revenue generating investments (public 
schools, hospitals, prisons); even toll roads funded with availability payments still 
provide non-financial benefits to society. Table 2.9 below describes some examples 
of financial and non-financial benefits (benefits and costs) of public sector 
investments which apply to PPP and conventional procurements.  
Table 2.9: Types of road transport effects 
 Financial costs 
to  decision-
maker 
Financial benefits 
to decision-maker 
Non-financial 
benefits to 
users/society 
Non-financial costs to 
users/society  
Roads Capital and 
maintenance 
costs 
Toll revenues Reduced accident 
costs 
Noise and pollution 
from generated traffic 
Light rail Capital and 
maintenance 
costs 
Fare-box revenues Reduced commuter 
time 
Congestion during 
construction 
Schools Capital and 
maintenance 
costs 
Energy cost 
savings 
Improved 
educational 
outcomes 
Increased congestion 
around school 
Prisons  Capital and 
maintenance 
costs  
Reduced revenue 
costs  
Improved 
environment for 
prisoners  
Negative impact on 
local property prices  
Source: EPEC (2011) 
 
Additionally, the NFBs of public sector investments tend to fall into three 
categories as follows:  
a. NFBs valued in monetary terms based on their effects or impacts in 
the form of increases or reductions (property prices); 
b. NFBs which are quantifiable, but not generally valued in monetary 
terms, such as improvements in educational performance of schools; 
and  
 78 Chapter 2:Literature Review 
c. NFBs that can be identified, but cannot be quantified or valued in 
monetary terms, such as an improved environment for prisoners 
(EPEC, 2011).  
The evaluation of NFBs is desirable, where their benefits and costs can be 
measured appropriately. For example, a VfM quantitative analyses based on PSC 
risk-adjusted costs tends to infer comparisons of different procurement options by 
implying a simplistic approach of NFBs being the same, regardless of infrastructure 
size and complexity (PMBOK, 2004). However, PPP contracts and incentive 
structures tend to defy categorisation of NFBs using PSC, because a potential 
investment risk happens to also be the determining factor for incentives required. 
Perhaps, PSC analysis could be expanded to appraise the benefits and cost potentials 
to society of NFBs (EPEC, 2011). For example, the NFBs of PPP public investment 
(also partially identified as economic benefits) and its VfM are as follows:   
 accelerated infrastructure delivery; 
 enhanced delivery (delivery of services to a higher quality standard); 
and 
 wider social impacts (greater benefits to society as a whole).  
 
2.3.4.5      Non-financial benefits potential of public investment 
Accelerated delivery: is the concept of a benefit due to an asset or services 
being delivered earlier than otherwise planned (EPEC, 2011). For example, a road 
transport infrastructure project delivered earlier means that society can enjoy the 
benefits of transport services earlier. An accelerated delivery is a function of 
quickness and availability of services, which is associated with on time delivery 
where service delivery starts at the planned date, and service delivery commences 
that might otherwise have not been possible (EPEC, 2011).  
 
Enhanced delivery: refers to improved infrastructure quality and related 
delivery services. The benefits of enhanced delivery are accrued to individuals as the 
result of using the infrastructure or partaking of the asset services (EPEC, 2011), 
which could lead to an increased demand for the product as the result of the 
improved service quality. 
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Wider social impacts of NFBs are related to the positives of external effects 
(externalities) of PPP public investment that captures the benefits to individuals in 
society in general rather than just to the direct users of the services. Also, NFBs of   
wider social impacts could be benefits or costs.  
 
 However, the benefits of PPP are difficult to measure and the Green Book 
(HM Treasury, 2003) stated that where there is no market price available to measure 
benefits that accrue from the consumption of a particular public good or service, then 
various methods should be developed to infer the value of the benefit. This could be 
drawn from an observation of consumer behaviour or the willingness of the 
consumer to pay the price indicated for a good or service. Through interviews and 
questionnaires, end users could be asked about their willingness to pay for a 
particular service, improved services quality, travel time savings, or how much are 
they willing to pay to avoid undesirable outcomes. However, this might be difficult 
and subjective to measure either through monetary value or other generally accepted 
of metric measurement as these benefits and costs are protracted and sporadic by 
nature.   
 
2.3.5 Social benefits and costs measurement 
The term “benefit” describes a value to society of a good and/or a service and 
its interpretation varies dependant on whether it is being perceived by the consumer 
or the investor. For example, the investor’s perception of a benefit is the revenue 
received (sales) compared to the cost incurred by the production of the goods and 
services, but the consumer’s perception of benefit is based on the willingness 
(affordability) to pay for those goods and services at the price indicated. Mishan 
(1976); Cameron (2011) argued that benefits and effects that arose from non-market 
products of goods and services needed to be identified, before measuring their 
benefits and effects on society. 
 
The basic principle for evaluating and assessing economic and social benefits 
of infrastructure investment is to find the aggregate of welfare changes that have 
affected the society and measure those changes in monetary values, except for any 
effects that are difficult to measure such as improvements in human living standards, 
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as they are protracted in nature. Mulder and Tulder (2004) and Minnesota DoT 
(2007) noted that the measurement of a program’s social benefits was first proposed 
by Arsène-Jules-Étienne-Juvénal Dupuit (1804–66), who was a civil engineer and 
economist and subsequently used by the USA Army Corps of Engineers to construct 
projects such as dams, levees, dikes, and other control measures, and project 
economic benefits had to exceed the costs prior to construction (US Flood Control 
Act, 1936).The process involves the assessment of social benefits and substantiation 
of costs, by dividing the accrued benefits of the program by the overall costs. It is 
comprised of both a quantitative and non-quantitative analysis. The quantitative 
analysis is used to measure human quality of life and impacts as the result of the 
social benefits from the investment. The non-quantitative benefits are those that 
apply directly to society and individuals as a result of the government program, 
which is used as a guide for future government programs (Minnesota DoT, 2007) and 
expressed as follows: 
Government Program = Benefits of projects/Costs of projects 
Social benefits and costs assessment of a particular infrastructure delivery 
hinges on the systematic evaluation of effects and impacts on society based on the 
decision of the government or whoever is responsible to provide the public services. 
These are benefits and costs to individuals of the alternative choice (internal), and 
include those affected who were non-participants of the decision (external) (Mishan, 
1976). Benefits are determined based on the difference in risks of a proposed 
infrastructure and alternative that confers a higher net benefit to society; this 
determination applies equally to costs, which are determined as the difference in 
costs that confers a better VfM. Thus, a particular procurement mode is chosen based 
on how likely it is to confer the largest net benefit to society or exhibit a positive 
difference between benefits and costs. In other words, social benefits and costs 
assessments are based on the completeness by which alternative choices are reviewed 
to enable an informed decision, or public policy to be developed that affects an 
individual as a result of the external benefits and costs of a proposed infrastructure. 
For example, there is a likelihood of future compensatory claims directly 
caused by these effects on society, due to the production and supply of these goods 
and services, and social benefits and costs assessment process can be as follows: 
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1. Identify the expected private and external benefits relative to the proposed 
infrastructure, including future benefits (presently quantified in monetary 
values) and those likely to receive the benefits (target population).  
2. Identify the expected private and external costs of the proposed infrastructure, 
including any adverse effects, which cannot be quantified in monetary terms 
and those likely to bear the costs (society, individuals, population). 
3. Determine the potential net benefits (benefits minus costs) of the alternatives 
as compared to the proposed infrastructure, including an evaluation of effects 
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms. 
 
However, there are alternative measures beyond economic and market price 
mechanisms, that are more capable of attributing values to non-market priced assets 
and liabilities according to their impacts on, and contributions to, human quality of 
life and welfare improvements. Ding (1999) stated that multiple-criteria decision-
making (MCDM) could be used to evaluate social benefits across alternatives based 
on a weighted scoring approach and boundaries of measurement being established.  
As stated previously in section 2.2.3 of this literature review, the lack of clear 
definition of public infrastructure services objectives tends to somewhat cloud the 
question of the real benefits of PPP projects that could enable the determination of 
the followings; (i) identify and quantify the resultant benefits and effects of the 
infrastructure for measurement purposes, and (ii) set a boundary for the measurement 
the benefits and effects. Therefore, what is being measured must be known, including 
the target population (boundary) affected or unaffected.  For example, in the specific 
context of this research, the benefits and costs associated with the Brisbane Airport 
Link Tunnel relate to the population living within the construction area, i.e., those in 
Queensland predominantly affected by using the tunnel or those at a national level. 
At national level, there will be beneficiaries and losers because they are not frequent 
users of the Airport Link Tunnel, intermittently using the tunnel when compelled to 
do so. However, when the overall beneficiaries and losers are aggregated, to 
determine the level of benefits and effects of the Airport Link Tunnel to society, this 
might be significant and relevant when considering future investment development 
or public policy decision.  
 82 Chapter 2:Literature Review 
Therefore, specific infrastructure definition and boundaries measurement of 
public investment need to concentrate on particular targets such as:  
 Actual benefits to these beneficiaries and losers, or improvements to 
human quality of life as the result of infrastructure effects and impacts. 
 Expected community/public gains from the quantity of resources 
consumed (social benefits). 
 Measured quantity of resources to be consumed and projected outcomes 
of services objectives. 
 
Other measures need to be considered, such as the individual perceptions and 
general satisfaction derived from using a particular infrastructure service, based 
either on efficiency or effectiveness of the services and the targeted improvement to 
human quality of life. For example, according to the regulation impact statement 
(RIS 2007) policy improvements (used to ensure improvements to human quality of 
life of a proposed government programme), are consistently achieved in all 
government programmes (Hanley et al., 2003). The importance of RIS (2007) is to 
ensure that benefits which accrue to society are captured and compared with the 
overall costs involved with the infrastructure, in consideration to all potential effects 
and impacts to society. The Green Book (2003) stated that a wider scope of PPP 
benefits and effects on society needed quantifying in terms of whether these benefits 
and effects were direct or indirect, and if they were accurate in reflecting changes to 
the course of a PPP delivery. For example, environmental and health hazards that 
arise from PPP delivery tend to have immediate and long-term effects on society, and 
these require identification and measurement as part of the consideration of PPP 
costs to society. The United Nations (2011); Davis and Eustice (2005) stated that 
where PPP has provided the solution as a real and viable option in satisfying societal 
infrastructure requirements, benefits and costs associated with the infrastructure 
services needs to be recognised and quantified as follows: 
 The PPP project is the best option and capable of meeting the society 
service needs; 
 The PPP project is capable of achieving some of the government public 
policy objectives; and  
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 The PPP is a viable option based on the implementation and 
procurement strategies. 
 
When a feasibility study has been undertaken at the early stage of the project, a 
detailed analysis and re-confirmation of the infrastructure objectives and service 
needs have to be re-undertaken at a later stage, including the government’s position 
(equity contribution) with the proposed infrastructure (Delmon, 2012). The United 
Nations (2011) stated that infrastructure projects were a public good by nature, with 
strategic importance, effects on other sectors, public safety and security, and 
consumption of resources that required government’s active participation. Rather 
infrastructure success and performance will improve when there is a concerted effort 
from all partners. Therefore, it is to the advantage of the entities involved to learn the 
basis of each other’s business operations.  
In addition, private sector participation in the delivery of public infrastructures 
is not necessarily a guarantee that a project whose feasibility study is economically 
unsound can be transformed into a viable project. Neither using PPP nor private 
sector participation is a superlative strategy for turning an undesirable project into a 
desirable project. Even private investors being able to demonstrate the infrastructure 
economic benefits being more profitable than the overall governments’ financial 
costs (FHWA, 2007) will not turn an undesirable or unsuccessful project into 
desirable or successful one. Rather infrastructure success and performance will 
improve when there is a concerted effort from all partners.  
 
2.3.6 Monetary valuation of infrastructure effects and impacts 
Measuring the effects and impacts of PPP, or indeed any procured 
infrastructure, requires a common unit of value to determine the costs of these 
infrastructure effects and impacts to society. As already stated, the CBA 
measurement unit is money, a device used for convenience (Jackson et al., 1995; 
Hanley et al., 2003). Markets generate the value of goods and services traded and 
price often becomes a comparative tool in determining the quantity of goods and 
services consumed (Jackson et al., 1995). Using this monetary measurement base, 
PPP evaluations and assessments also identify infrastructure economic benefits, such 
as VfM on the basis of monetary value. The same monetary value system that 
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classified and allocated PPP public infrastructure evaluations and assessments as 
benefits and VfM needs to also evaluate and measure the effects and impacts of PPP 
infrastructure delivery on society, including PPP resource inflows (revenue) in 
monetary value. However, using monetary values with the evaluation and 
assessments of public investment fulfils the purposes of measurement, on the proviso 
that all benefits and costs of PPP activities can be measured in monetary values. This 
means that when PPP has provided benefits, but such benefits are difficult to express 
in monetary values, or where there is no market pricing system available, alternative 
non-monetary values can be considered, such as the satisfaction derived from the 
user perception in terms of appreciation of the quality of services. Money as a unit of 
measurement fluctuates and does appreciate or depreciate over time and therefore, it 
might not be the most adequate measure of infrastructure effects on society. For 
example, a dollar invested now for five years, could be worth more than a dollar in 
five years (see example below): 
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௧  
Interest rate = r, and years = t 
The discounted value or present value of a dollar available t years in the future: 
The net present value (NPV) of a project or regulation is the present value of 
estimated benefit minus costs. This is expressed mathematically as thus: 
      (7) 
ܸܰܲ	 ൌ ෍ ܤ௧ െ ܥ௧ሺ1 ൅ 1ሻ௧
௧ୀ௡
௧ୀଵ
 
 Source: Tanczos and Kong (2001). 
 
Where B
t
is the benefit in year t, 
C
t 
is the cost in year t, and  
r is the discount rate.  
  In general, the decision rule when using NPV is:  
 • accept a policy only if NPV>0; and  
 • in deciding between alternative policies, select the one with the highest  
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    NPV  
The weakness of NPV is that the value changes as discount rate differs, therefore, 
sensitivity analysis is essential when NPV is used as criterion for public investment 
evaluation. 
2.3.7 Benefit-Cost Ratio (B/C) 
The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of a project or regulation is the net present value 
(NPV) of the estimated benefits divided by the NPV of the estimated costs. In 
mathematical terms, it is expressed as:  
       (8) 
෍ ܤ௧	ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧
௡
௧ୀଵ
 
                                                B/C = ---------------------	
෍ ܥ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧
௡
௧ୀଵ
 
Source: Tanczos and Kong (2001).   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
B/C is a relative value, and separate from NPV value. It is not proper to use 
B/C as criterion when choosing a project in mutually exclusive cases. Though B/C is 
affected by the discount rate, it is an easy method to get a switching value.  
 
Measuring size, benefits, costs, and effects simultaneously is difficult whether 
using NPV or BCR. For example, BCR can summarise the relative size of benefits 
and costs of a project proposal, but not the absolute size and how impacts of a project 
are treated (OBPR, 2009). Put another way, BCR does not always tell us whether the 
impacts are additions to costs, or subtractions from benefits.  
An internal rate of return (IRR) could be used to measure the viability of public 
investment as follows: 
         (9) 
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ܸܰܲ	 ൌ ෍ ܤ௧ െ ܥ௧ሺ1 ൅ 1ሻ௧
௧ୀ௡
௧ୀଵ
 
Source: Tanczos and Kong (2001).               
Where, r means IRR and other letters mean the same as above. R is the rate of 
discounting the future that equates to initial cost and sum of future discounted net 
benefits such as: 
 BCR = 1 
 NPV = 0 
BCR is advantageous because it does not require the discount rate in economic 
evaluation and IRR is the barometer to know as the rate of the investment return, and 
IRR project is effective (viable) when the latter ሺݎሻ is greater than the discount rate (
). 
Given that there are no adequate analytics to measure PPP public infrastructure 
benefits, costs, effect, and impacts to society: as mentioned previously, both PSC and 
CBA are limited in capacity to identify and measure future related benefits and costs 
of public investment. This research proposes a measurement and evaluation 
framework that uses a range of various analytical tools for the specific purpose of 
identifying and quantifying benefits, costs, effect and impacts of public investment, 
using monetary and non-monetary values, or other accepted metric measurements, 
including an appropriate measurement of investment rate of returns to the private 
investor, as well as the overall net social benefits of infrastructure to society. The 
framework involves the combinations of various evaluation processes and 
measurements, enabling the proper identification of financial and non-financial 
infrastructure benefits to society.  
2.3.8  MCDM as an adjunct measurement tool 
The role of policy makers in the decision making process, roles, and methods 
of decisions is of primary interest that affects the decision implementations with real 
life problems. Pohekar and Ramachandra (2003) stated that choice of analytical and 
evaluation assessment and measurement has become methods of resolving multiple 
decisions making, for which MCDM is proficient as analytical tool to solve. The 
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major problem of decision making is the difficulty of choosing appropriate decision 
criteria, quantifiable and non-quantifiable, which does not result into conflicting 
solution. For example, road transport development is involved with many 
stakeholders and decision makers in the assessment, evaluation, and measurement of 
the infrastructure benefits and costs to society, which is often overridden by self-
interest and incompatible perceptions. Also is the problem of monetisation of all 
benefits and costs, which are hardly present during the evaluation process (Ferreira 
and Lake, 2002).  
 
Decisions governing road transport infrastructure are complex and difficult for 
policy makers, especially to reach consensus on particular patterns, or possible ways 
of maximising benefits and satisfying the varying interests of all entities. Herath 
(2009; 1982); Hayashi (2002) have examined MCDM techniques used in agricultural 
management; Romero and Rehman (1987) observed MCDM use in natural resource 
management and these research streams proved that MCDM was positive and 
efficient when used in those sectors. Smith and Theberge (1987) examined the basic 
measurement theory behind MCDM, including the application of multiple criteria 
decision making, and these authors (ibid 1987) have suggested that an MCDM 
collaborative approach is efficient and effective, but better served, if more than one 
MCDM method is used, i.e., a mixed approach. Both monetary and non-monetary 
values are considered in terms of the best interests of society, including policy effect 
associated with the infrastructure, which CBA and CEA are considered inadequate to 
measure appropriately (Tanczos and Kong, 2001). 
 
There has been an increase in interest over the years among academics, 
decision-makers, planners and others in various sectors around examining the use of 
MCDM as an analytical tool for evaluation and measurement of infrastructure effects 
to society (Stewart, 1992). It is structured framework for decision problem analysis, 
including estimation of long-term time horizons, consideration of uncertainties, risks 
and investigation of complex value issues (Nijkamp et al., 1990; Zeleney, 1982), that 
incorporates the use of multiple decisions to derive weighting factors and provide a 
sound analysis for optimal project selection (Tanczos and Kong, 2001).  
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Howard (1991); Keeney (1976); Hajkowicz and Prato (1998); Massam (1988) 
have discussed MCDM potential based on mathematical algorithms that are capable 
of ranking options and alternatives. Hajkowicz et al., (2000b); Janssen (1992); stated 
the application of MCDM could be reclassified into continuous and discrete 
methods, depending on the nature of alternatives and evaluation measurements. 
Whereas continuous MCDM method tends to identify the optimal quantity during 
decision-making (which could vary substantially), methodologies such as linear 
programming, goal programming, and aspirational based models are continuous 
programme applications, and adequate to deal with multiple decision criteria. Janic 
and Reggiani (2002) stated that MCDM can be used for multiple decisions in the presence of 
conflicting and non- commensurable criteria. Alternatively, the discrete method of MCDM 
uses a number of uncountable alternatives (benefits, costs, effects, impacts), based on inter 
and intra comparisons of quantifiable attributes (criteria), including implicit and explicit 
trade-offs of the chosen objectives. MCDM attributes are defined to quantify the 
performance of each alternative (roads, rail, airports, and seaports) relative to their 
importance to the decision-maker and stakeholders. Zanakis et al., (1998) stated that 
practitioners often look for a simple, understandable, and easily applicable decision 
method, as well as the justification for the preferred decision option.  
 
However, the problem with MCDM application relates to the disagreement 
around establishing a precise method of application due to infrastructure uniqueness 
and difference in risks that produces a challenge of interpretation to academics and 
practitioners due to the different methods being applied to the same problem 
(Zanakis et al., 1998). Saaty, (1980); grouped various MCDM methods as follows:  
 Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) is the simplest and clearest, often used as 
a benchmark to compare the results obtained from other discrete MCDM 
methods for decision making problem.  
 Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS): 
method is selected because of its unique (specific) and logical way of 
approaching discrete problems and computation, more complex than SAW. 
 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP): method is selected because of its 
specificity, which offers freedom to the decision-maker in expressing 
preference for particular criteria by using AHP measurement scale. 
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In addition, MCDM choice of weights relative to the importance of the criteria 
can be determined either analytically or empirically by the decision-maker. The only 
difference being that both SAW and TOPSIS require quantification of performance 
attributes for particular alternatives, while AHP does not require an explicit 
quantification of attributes, but needs specific hierarchical structuring of the MCDM 
problem. AHP method automatically generates the weights of the criteria according 
to the measurement scale specified in the procedure. With multiple decisions, the 
alternatives are not predetermined, rather a set of objective functions are optimised 
subject to the set of constraints, enabling the decision-maker to seek the most 
efficient and satisfactory solution to the problem. No matter what sets of criteria are 
in place, one particular criterion must be downgraded to achieve the intended 
solution. In a multiple decision-making process, a number of alternatives are 
evaluated against a set of attributes which are difficult to quantify (Gal and Hanne, 
1999). The best option is selected when comparatives between alternatives with 
respect to their performance measurements tend to satisfy the overall project team 
objectives (government, investor, and society).   
 
MCDM as an analytical tool, and in terms of its evaluation and measurement 
processes, is well established within the multiple objectives decision-making process. 
What remains as the critical problem for the decision-maker, is the choice of 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable multiple criteria, including the definition of 
conflicting objectives and solutions which are dependent on the preferences or 
compromises of the particular decision maker. As road transport investment and 
development is complex and often, overridden by self-interest with trade-offs 
between the entities. MCDM is suitable for the measurement of quantifiable benefits, 
costs, effects, and impacts, and also for the qualitative attributes such as social or 
political implications, where the value equivalent measurement is not necessarily 
present. In overall terms, road transport infrastructure evaluation and measurement of 
socio-economic benefits, technical, political, and environmental impacts are well 
suited to the use of MCDM evaluation and measurement.  
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2.3.9 Framework for evaluation and measurement of road transport 
The public sector as a services industry tends to consider the delivery through 
projects of social benefits as its prime objective, especially for road transport 
infrastructure. Macharis et al., (2009) stated that analytical tools such as SCBA and 
CBA provide a basic evaluation and measurement of infrastructure, but are incapable 
of justifying social acceptance of the infrastructure. Tanczos and Kong, (2001) stated 
that socio-economic benefits still remain the fundamental criterion that influences 
decisions on toll road projects, either as standalone or the whole of the road transport 
network. The framework proposed is one that extends the basic evaluation and 
measurement of CBA, and SCBA to include externalities and intangibles by 
combining other analytical tools or variants on the basis of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria. For example, Bouwman and Moll (2002), and De Brucker et al., 
(1998) have stated that the MCDM method of evaluation and measurement of 
transport infrastructure development tends to provide a broader spectrum, including 
measurement of the policy success of the delivery of the eventual infrastructure.  
De Brucker and Saitua (2006), Bekeffi et al., (2003), Vertonghen (1992) all 
recommend the combination of CBA and MCDM as appropriate analytical tools that 
provide complementary insights for transport infrastructure evaluation and 
measurement. The combination of CBA and MCDM simultaneously could serve the 
purpose of eclectic multi-criteria analysis, capable of integrating different analytical 
tools (CBA, SCBA, and MCDM) for the evaluation and measurement of 
infrastructure benefits, costs, effects, and impacts, which could lead to optimal 
project selection (De Brucker et al., 1998). Therefore, the framework takes into 
account the potential effects and impacts on a larger scale (Vincke, 2009), with the 
combination of CBA and MCDM as one evaluation and measurement tool.   
 
 However, MCDM evaluation and measurement criteria need to be established 
and predetermined relative to the overall importance of particular infrastructures to 
society. The point remains that both CBA and MCDM as analytical tools originate 
from the same theoretical base of social utility function that represents 
infrastructure’s ultimate value to society. Their values are derived from compilation 
of positives and negatives impact elements into a common set of metrics or weights 
allocation (Schutte and Brit, 2012). Therefore, if the proposed framework for 
evaluation and measurement of road transport infrastructure is based on MCDM 
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measurements, not only will it quantify the technological and economic merits of a 
public sector investment, but also, the political, environmental, and social concerns 
conjoined in a composite view of these benefits and costs of monetary and non-
monetary effects and impacts to society.  
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Figure 2.5: Framework for evaluation and measurement of road transport economic benefits to society 
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2.4 INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS 
In accounting terms, “cost” refers to the monetary value of expenditure for raw 
materials, equipment, supplies, services, labour and products, which is the amount 
recorded as an expense. In the context of investment, costs are the total money, time 
and resources associated with the purchase of an activity. Calculating a 
developmental activity tends to increase costs because as more knowledge about the 
cost structure becomes available, more resources are devoted to the project. By way 
of example, Queensland Treasury’s publication, Managing for Outcomes (MFO) 
(2002), stated that cost and resources (financial, non-financial) applied to achieve a 
particular outcome had to be allocated and attributed to the program. In other words, 
infrastructure benefits, costs, and effects are components of the delivery process, 
including the resources consumed to achieve a particular outcome.   
PPP activities need to be priced relative to their effects and impacts on society, 
or measured in relation to the quality of outcomes received. When PPP activities do 
actually reflect the benefits and effects on society, the following will emerge related 
to the costs of PPP (Banister and Berechman, 2000): 
 Less enthusiasm about PPP as a stimulus to economic growth and VfM 
entrenched. 
 Costs and value of financial incentives will reduce the clamour for PPP 
activities. 
 Mitigation cost of effects and future compensatory claims will be 
unlimited.  
In addition, loans from financial institutions, or loans borrowed on behalf of 
the government by the private investor, will require repayment at some stage. In the 
case of transportation network construction, borrowing costs are dependent on either 
the risks or the type of infrastructure project. The primary objective of financial 
institutions is to sale debt (FRBSF, 2001) by using deposits and borrowed funds 
(liabilities of the bank) to make loans or to purchase securities (assets of the bank) 
and to maximise the capability achieved by switching to loans that return the highest 
yield for a particular level of risk. Borrowing costs encompass interest rate charges, 
administration costs and in certain cases, stamp duty based on the percentage of the 
loan. Therefore, loans for assets under construction (AUC) such as road 
transportation represent a considerable risk to financial institutions.  
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One of the reasons that PPP is desirable to governments is the ability to utilise 
an off-balance sheet treatment approach to obscure the overall financial 
commitments, even when budgetary constraints prohibit the government from capital 
intensive public investments (Engel et al., 2009: UKHLSCE, 2010). The off-balance 
sheet process enables consumption of unbudgeted resources and an understating of 
government commitment to external entities (Chan et al., 2009). The off-balance 
sheet treatment of PPP transactions tends to circumvent the consideration of tax 
revenues that accrue to governments from the private investor, which could be used 
towards the reduction of PPP costs to society. It is possible that this obscuring of 
financial commitments by particular government departments is only successful 
because financial institutions are not really interested in government balance sheets, 
and neither government credit ratings nor the obscured commitments are the basis for 
determining financial management prudence. For example, Engel et al., (2010) 
provided the notable example of the obscuring of public debt in 669 UK PPP 
contracts awarded from 1992-2009. The UK Government reported debt on only 96 
projects (23 percent) of the investments on the government’s balance sheets. Overall, 
the total cost of these investments was approximately GBP 91 billion, which 
commits the UK Government’s financial exposure until the year 2032.     
The costs associated with obscuring public debts and deciding how best to 
effectively account for these PPP transactions and commitments are even of concern 
to accounting organisations. Hemming (2006) argued that governments were at 
liberty to use various accounting standards. The International Public Sector 
Accounting Standard (IPSAS, 2008) being most authoritative has failed to address 
the issues of PPP transactions that are off the balance sheet. However, the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS, 2006) provides guidelines on the 
treatment for off balance sheet transactions under the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS, 2008). Although, the IAS and IFRS guidelines are not mandatory for 
governments, they do prescribe the substantiation and transparency of costs to enable 
efficient credit ratings and valuations of stock prices. In addition, the European 
Investment Bank has provided similar guidelines on the costs of, and treatments for, 
off balance sheet transactions of controlled revenue, constructed assets, availability 
payments and demand risks (Eurostat, 2004). On the proviso that 50 percent or more 
of the asset revenue is generated from user charges, construction risks, availability 
 Chapter 2:Literature Review 95 
and demand risks that are the sole responsibility of the investor, such infrastructure 
can therefore be classified as a non-government asset. The Eurostat (2004) guideline 
has some other implications, in particular where the contract contains clauses related 
to a minimum revenue guarantee that might be expected from PPP toll road 
infrastructure. The UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP, 2009) on 
the treatment of PPP obscured transactions and government commitment focuses on 
infrastructure risk, rather than financial commitments (Yescombe, 2007). PPP 
procurement finances and constructs the infrastructure, and recoups capital costs 
through future revenue generation, which is a logically sound premise, but actually 
contradicts the advice of the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB, 117) 
Guidance (2007) on the treatment of lease payments under leases.  
The House of Commons (UKHCTC, 2012) determined that PPP should not be 
used on an “off-balance sheet” basis. Off-balance sheet debt is a liability that does 
not appear on the balance sheet of the organisation’s financial accounts. PPP 
decisions need to be based on a rigorous qualitative and quantitative based VfM 
evaluation of all procurement options available, which excludes the off-balance sheet 
option. The NSW PPP Guidelines (2012) have mandated that all government 
agencies include PPP activities into the balance sheet, including income statements, 
cash flow impacts, and full analytical notes stating the cost estimates of 
government’s exposure (termination liability, default of the private investor, 
individual actual effect). The UKNAO (2009) review of the PFI model and the 
follow-up VfM reports noted that the move towards predominantly using PPP for 
public infrastructure investment was in part driven by government agencies’ belief in 
PPP benefits, as well as the commendable zeal towards utilising the off-balance sheet 
treatment of PPP transactions, which did not appear as part of the government’s debt 
statistics (Hodge and Greve, 2011).  
 
 
One of the rights and obligations of PPP is the contract renegotiation in 
consideration of their effects on infrastructure lease concessional arrangements, is 
rarely mentioned as a potential cost with PPP procurement. Renegotiation of a 
contract fundamentally changes the original contract stipulations and undermines any 
competitive bidding process, because the original contract’s rights and obligations 
before renegotiation are annulled and the financial impact of the original contract is 
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significantly altered, which could affect the infrastructure services quality (Gausch, 
2002). At times, there is major public opposition to contract renegotiation because of 
costs involved and government losing credibility of the public investment might be 
questionable (i.e., ‘political careers at stake’) (Katz, 2006). Gausch (2002) argued 
that renegotiation of contract costs had a significant effect on the entities because of 
the resources involved, which could further reduce social benefits available to 
society if a contract was renegotiated. Renegotiation of a contract confers significant 
leverage to the investor over the government, as the latter cannot refute the 
renegotiation or claim that the contract is a failure. The private investor on the other 
hand has every incentive to renegotiate the contract, which, if successful, could 
undermine all of the intended infrastructure benefits to society.  
Nevertheless, whilst some contract renegotiations are actually desirable and 
appropriate, it is the high incidence of PPP contract renegotiation that raises concerns 
about the overall validity of the arrangement (Katz, 2006). In addition, there are 
often contract clauses in evidence that either forbid contract renegotiation altogether, 
or lay down a certain number of years before a contract can be renegotiated. Thus, 
this opportunistic behaviour from either of the entities concerned in PPP 
arrangements could potentially undermine the original infrastructure service 
objectives and ultimately the overall societal welfare. For example, road transport 
infrastructure that is used as a toll road under concessional lease arrangements could 
be best renegotiated when such contract exhibits incompleteness, rather than acting 
opportunistically to achieve additional benefits (Gausch, 2002). Other adverse effects 
of contract renegotiation are that the process is often stretched out too long. This is 
due to renegotiation requiring a series of activities, such as information gathering and 
analyses of operating costs and modelling, which are time and resource consuming. 
However, if contract renegotiation shows that societal benefits are evident, and its 
trade-offs are lower compared to the costs involved, it would be better to be pursued. 
Where contract renegotiation is aimed towards redistribution of resources, costs 
involved to achieve distribution of resources could be damaging to the objectives of 
the infrastructure (Gausch, 2002).   
2.4.1 Shifting the financial burden 
The problem with PPP collaborative arrangements and the attendant rhetoric of 
paying later are somehow financial burdens on the private investor and 
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contractors/subcontractors who are involved with the project. Shifting payments does 
not eliminate the financial costs, as the financial burden remains intact. Rather, it is a 
strategic manoeuvre to overcome budgetary deficit, driven by short-term benefits and 
public policy ingenuity, with long-term costs (UKHCTC, 2011). A private investor 
has no idle resources lying in waste or open line of credit designated to cover 
government’s delayed payments (Hodge and Greve, 2011). PPP is an uneven 
arrangement; perceived risky by financial institutions because of its structural 
complexities (Vassallo et al., 2012). 
Delaying the payment for services acquired from the private investor 
accumulates interest, which affects other government programs and societal welfare 
available for consumption. For example, there are arguments in favour of 
governments borrowing the funds from these financial institutions at a cheaper rate; 
this is possible because of government credit ratings and ability to raise revenue 
more quickly than the private investor. Klein (1996) argued that unless government 
debts are riskier than the private investor debts, then the rate of government 
defaulting is probable and therefore incapable of raising additional revenue.  Another 
possibility is that the government does not intend to borrow, but allows the private 
investor to invest due to public funds being overextended. Overextension means that 
the government has financial obligations towards other public projects and thus, 
servicing a new major infrastructure project might be too financially difficult. 
Alternatively, a credit organisation could finance the project which remains on the 
government’s balance sheet and could be expensive as the private investor’s cost of 
capital used with PPP public infrastructure delivery (Klein, 1996). As an example of 
this situation, the World Bank (1994) Development Report stated that ‘cheap’ credit 
available to governments needed to be weighed against possible inefficiencies in 
channelling any funds through the government, because a loan on a three per cent 
interest rate that may be advantageous to government would need to be offset by cost 
savings of more than 20 per cent to prove advantageous to the private investor. 
 
Funding of public infrastructure projects by private investors comes with many 
disadvantages, despite the apparent advantages of the non-upfront payment concept. 
For example, governments are non-active participant and monitoring of PPP cost 
activities, even when presumed that public resources are wasted. There are costs 
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involved with the monitoring of PPP activities, which continue to increase for as 
long as the duration of any infrastructure project. For example, government 
guarantees or contingent liabilities (HM Treasury, 2008), in the form of stand-by 
loans to the private investors are not provided through budget appropriations process. 
The OECD (2008) stated that government guarantees given on an ad hoc basis were 
regarded as contingent liabilities recorded off the balance sheet until the guarantee 
was eventually called. Other financial incentive packages designed to lure and retain 
private investment actually add to the cost of PPP, and so when these costs are 
accurately quantified, the overall cost of PPP delivery becomes exorbitant.   
Brixi (2004) argued in relation to the economic benefits that arise from 
effective policy development that these would translate to PPP efficiencies and cost 
reductions to society (new business approach) and not necessarily from investment 
inputs (costs) or replacement of explicit subsidies using an off-balance sheet 
manoeuvre. Potentially, PPP can deliver longer-term benefits, where there is a 
framework or guidelines exist (policy) that compare the cost of finance between the 
two entities (public and private) incorporating the financial cost involved with the 
monitoring of PPP activities, including the standards for reporting PPP obligations to 
the public (Irwin and Mokdad, 2009). However the presence of the financial risks 
described earlier tend to reduce the social benefits available for consumption and will 
also quarantine future investments.   
2.4.2 PPP contingent liability 
Financial institutions demand for governments to provide undertakings and 
guarantees against certain risks (demand revenue) is because of future economic 
conditions capable of influencing the outcomes of these investments. Other 
unquantified costs, such as environmental cleaning and land acquisition are 
conditions the government must fulfil, before the financial institution approves the 
private investor’s loan. For example, Rostiyanti et al (2013) argued that land 
acquisition is associated with uncertainties and immeasurable infrastructure delivery 
costs, particularly with countries the private investor has to acquire the land on its 
own right by negotiating with the land owners. Also,  the private investor wants a 
compensatory guarantee from the government in the event of an early termination of 
the contract, before its expiration date, or against any changes in government policy 
that are capable of affecting and reducing the overall earnings of the private 
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investors. These arrangements do create some financial burden and contingent 
liability on the government, which are difficult to quantify (Irwin and Mokdad, 
2009). Government guarantees and contingent liabilities are not recognised or 
reported in government consolidated financial statements. Irwin and Mokdad (2009) 
argued that contingent liability would arise with PPP public infrastructure delivery, 
even when costs were monitored. In other words, actual costs of PPP to the 
government and society are unknown until the project is completed and PPP is hardly 
a fixed sum contract. Therefore, PPP will be less expensive and more cost efficient if 
the cost is determinable and quantified in the contract, specifying an actual cost limit 
on society. Government’s exposure to unlimited costs and risks based on guarantees 
are part of PPP’s cost to society that needs to be included within PPP cost estimates. 
PPP will be expensive to society as the result of an overall government financial 
exposure and commitments to other investment programs will determine the interest 
rate charged from financial institutions (Polackova, 1989). Klein (1997) argued that 
government costs of PPP were manageable and quantifiable, if these liabilities were 
predetermined from the outset, including the risks associated with the PPP delivery 
being objectively identified. Based on this, the following would improve PPP 
success: 
 PPP approval based on economic interest and joint cabinet decision. 
 Governments’ risk exposure reduced to public sector business 
operations or risks it can actually influence and control. 
 Accrual accounting reporting that reduces government’s incentives to 
use PPP by disguising its fiscal obligations. 
 Government’s budget appropriation to include and provide for 
guarantees and contingent liabilities values. 
 Governments charging fees and interests on guarantees given to the 
private investor. 
 
Hemming (2004) stated that future government obligations to the private 
investor that arose from guarantees and contingent liabilities were yet to be 
considered appropriately under the extant and current accounting standards (AASB, 
IFRS, IPSAS, IAS), because there are no budget provisions for those commitments. 
Moreover, PPP commitments are neither recognised through accrual accounting 
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systems, unless the probability of making payments is more likely than less likely. 
Hemming (2004) noted that countries with commitments and guarantees as part of 
their PPP arrangements often had no records of these payments, and when records 
did exist, they were locked away within one particular government agency. In 
addition, he (ibid 2004) reported that PPP contracts did not permit the publication of 
these arrangements, i.e., “commercial in confidence”, and when the payments were 
made to the private investor, they were classified as a “special payment” that 
removed any link back to the PPP investor. Countries with known government 
guarantee and commitment records are Chile, Colombia, and New Zealand. These 
arrangements are quantified and included as part of the accrual accounting systems 
of such countries (Hemming, 2004).  
Given the seriousness of contingent liability and its impacts on the economy, 
and public resources, Polackova (1989) argue for the adoption of the extensive 
analytical approaches typical of scrutiny by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank towards contingent fiscal risks, which allowed for voluntary 
disclosure by governments. The adoption of IMF or World Bank methods would 
deter governments from excessive fiscal exposure and provision of guarantees with 
adverse effect on the public resources.  
2.4.3 PPP contingent liabilities in Australia 
In Australia, government guarantees depend on the type of infrastructure and 
specific project circumstances based on the desirability of the infrastructure. For 
example, the Melbourne to Mount Alexander railway project provided a guarantee of 
five per cent of its paid up capital to shareholders over 25 years, which became an 
enormous burden on the government (Irwin and Mokdad, 2009). In the 1980s, the 
New South Wales Government entered into a “revenue agreement” (demand risk) 
with the private investor on the Sydney Harbour Tunnel project, which protected the 
NSW Government from demand risk, or gaps in projected revenue, that would result 
from traffic low patronage. With PPP construction of the City Link and East Link 
Tunnel projects, the Victorian Government assumed the demand risk without 
offering financial guarantees to the private investor. As a result of a change in policy, 
the Victorian Government agreed to compensate the private investor for the 
difference in toll road charges and not necessarily for changes in law, because the 
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government reserves the right to change any law at its discretion (NSW PJV Act, 
1987; Grad and Keyon, 2013). 
 
2.4.4 Benefits and advantages of PPP versus conventional procurement 
A major benefit from PPP is the provision of additional resources to enable 
investments within the public sector, especially when governments are resource 
constrained on capital investments. PPIAF (2012) stated that private investment 
finance is expensive compared to loans from multilateral and bilateral institutions; 
however, it has been additional source of income for the public sector investments. 
Regardless of additional resources, the quality of investment outcomes has equally 
improved.  Dysard (1999) argued that the real major benefit of PPP is the improved 
value for money over conventional delivery on the proviso of affordability, 
sustainability, and accountability, which was previously been lacking in the public 
sector, and it is based on risk allocation and transfer between PPP entities (Dysard, 
1999; PPIAF, 2012). Herpen (2002) stated that PPP creates value for money in the 
delivery of public projects of the same quality that result from conventional 
procurement for less money, or the delivery of a superior quality, for the same 
amount of money. In other words, the benefits of PPP procurement touches on other 
aspects of benefits of PPP whole-life costings and holistic delivery approach that 
reduces maintenance costs.   
 
2.4.4.1   Benefits of efficient risk allocation 
 Efficient risk allocation and transfer to the private investor reduces exposure 
of a government to risks, while efficient risk allocation between the entities improves 
performance incentives and provides efficient risk management. Herpen (2002) 
argued that risk allocation and transfer to the private investor are conservatively 
presumed to enable adequate development of desirables and expected infrastructure 
outcomes. A major benefit of efficient risk allocation is seen in the output 
specification, or by specifying a project’s results as outputs that could lead to 
innovative developments. Outputs are defined as products of a service (Herpen, 
2002), however, the problem with public sector infrastructure procurement is the 
difficulty associated with defining service outputs, which the public wants. PPP’s 
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output specification is flexible, but this comes at a cost. The private investor’s 
willingness to offer an alternative investment option, which could reduce costs and 
still deliver quality outputs, is expensive. Irwin (2007) argued that risk allocation and 
transfer is efficiently managed when a responsible entity is capable of influencing 
some of the risk factors as follows: 
 
 Influence the risk factor, where possible; 
 Influence the sensitivity of project’s value to a potential risk factor through 
anticipation and immediate response to the risk factor; and  
 Absorption of the risk impact, where it can neither be influenced nor 
controlled. 
 
PPP allows for effective risk allocation, in particularly, those of design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance, which the private investor can influence. 
Likewise, there are some risks the private investor cannot influence such as demand 
risk, which is principally allocated to the investor, or the private investor being 
capable to influence the asset (infrastructure) value from depreciating (Irwin, 2007).  
 
2.4.4.2      Benefits of whole-of-life costing 
The application of whole-of-life costing uses a holistic approach based on the 
whole-life costing of infrastructure design, construction, operations and maintenance 
and provides a better leverage and incentive in striking a balance between capital 
costs and expected levels of maintenance required over the life span of an asset 
(PPIAF, 2012). PPP based on a long-term contract or lease concession allows the 
investor sufficient time for capital cost recovery and stabilisation of service charges 
which in turn becomes an overall cost savings to society (Herpen, 2002). PPP whole-
of-life costing includes the transfer of technological risk from the public sector to the 
investor and knowledge of when to make the decision on asset renewals and other 
capital expenditures. The essence of whole-life costing is primarily focused on 
reducing maintenance costs and ensuring more efficient use of public resources in a 
manner that that produces significant savings. Herpen (2002) argued that this asset 
maintenance component is considered during infrastructure design so as to maximise 
cost efficiencies and produce benefits to society as follows:    
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 High services quality based on defined outputs and specific service standards 
with infrastructure design and services delivery.    
 Definition of governance structures and infrastructure benefits with increased 
scrutiny. 
 Debt financiers and equity investors’ attentiveness on project’s performance 
and services delivery management.   
 
2.4.4.3  Benefit of performance measurement and incentives 
Performance measurement and incentives aligned with services payments 
provide the private investor with an incentive to deliver the required standards as 
defined in the output specification. It is an indirect method of transferring risks to the 
investor through an incentivised payment mechanism (UKNAO, 2009; Herpen, 
2002). The disadvantage of performance measurements of incentivised payments is 
that they tend to breed conflicts and contract misinterpretations. Herpen (2002) 
suggested the use of target cost arrangements as a preferred option, where costs are 
detailed and agreed by the entities and shared evenly. Also, the principle of “no 
service, no payment” (output based performance) tends to incentivise the investor to 
deliver the project on time, even when it means absorbing additional costs in the 
process of project execution (UKNAO, 2003; 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2007). 
 
So clearly, these performance measures have introduced competition due to 
PPP in those areas considered to be predominantly the public sector monopoly with 
lower prices, greater innovation, increased investment, and quality services. Herpen 
(2002) and HM Treasury (1995) stated that the actual difference that PPP has 
brought into the procurement industry is the integration of all activities and project 
management practices, by creating a single competition portal, rather than having 
several management options. 
 
2.4.4.4  Infrastructure sustainability 
PPP’s benefits to society are the improvements and sustainability of service 
quality that is introduced and delivered in the longer term. Apart from reducing 
overall infrastructure costs through technological innovation, PPP sustainability also 
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reduces the variability of the actual cost of services to governments, as well as 
reducing fiscal vulnerability due to unexpected economic shocks. These benefits 
arise from the concept of risk sharing in a PPP environment due to the competence of 
the private investors to in manage those risks and responsibilities specified in 
contracts (PPIAF, 2012). Also, using private finance to fund the public sector 
investment increases the potential for adequate risk identification and allocation 
upfront. For example, Herpen (2002) argued that there are investors whose contract 
and payment depended on successful project completion, and such contract would 
enforce the private investor to undertaken additional risk analyses as to achieve 
certain outcomes and benefits through cost savings.   
 
2.4.4.5   Accountability 
PPP procurement improves the public sector’s perception of accountability 
within public expenditure, because of the transferring of services delivery risk to the 
private investor. In other words, the public sector only pays for the services delivered 
at the specified quality over the specified contract period. With conventional 
procurement, the public is left with either options or choices, when services quality is 
below the expected standard, because there is no alternative available (PPIAF, 2012). 
When PPP is used for the right reasons, Dysard (1999) has stated that benefits of PPP 
comparative to public investments could be substantial, including the VfM in the 
form of cost savings. Herpen (2002) argued that given the benefits of innovation and 
a potential stable services price over a period of time provided through PPP, it is 
possible for the public sector to account for costs of services delivery through PPP.  
 
2.4.4.6     Time-to-delivery savings 
PPP procurement can lead to time-to-delivery savings as the result of greater 
private investor incentive to generate revenue as soon as possible. Another reason for 
time-to-delivery savings is the creation of a learning curve throughout all of the 
entities involved. For example, the difference in culture between the public sector 
and the private investor is motivated by various interests, such as the private 
investor’s motivation for shareholders’ financial profits and the ensuring that 
predicted profits are less affected by higher interest charges and revenue losses due 
to delays in project completion. By contrast, conventional procurement completion 
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delays might result in insignificant consequences or have a direct financial impact to 
the public sector, as the financial risk is also borne by taxpayers, while PPP has a far 
reaching consequence in terms of interest rates and repayment increases. Herpen 
(2002) stated that PPP projects can be delivered quicker than conventionally 
procured projects because of accrued incentives (better project management, risk 
management), and the private investor is not paid until the infrastructure becomes 
operational. In other words, time-to-delivery saving of PPP benefits extends to a 
wider social impact to society and could be categorised as follows: 
 wider society benefits and impacts of PPP procurement beyond a specific 
project to the public in general; and 
 wider macro-economic benefits and impacts of public investment on the 
economy and environment. 
The benefits and cost of PPP to society are comprised of:  
 benefits that accrue to society from a simplistic approach which is identifiable 
with costs; 
  benefits of long-term fixed price contract and uncertain outcome; and 
 benefits of innovative solutions and public sector skills improvement. 
 
The benefits of wider society impact are the fundamental learning practices and 
overall infrastructure management that accrue, which could be used in future capital 
procurements, irrespective of the procurement options. For example, English (2007) 
stated that PPP has demonstrated the benefits of competition with Australian and UK 
projects, including innovative services of quality assets that extend to the wider 
society and economy at large. The wider impact to society and the economy are 
either macroeconomic or microeconomic, depending on the timing differentials, 
which could extend beyond the specific infrastructure under consideration. Overall, 
VfM is the driver for several PPP projects (EPEC, 2011), and is an important benefit 
and possibly achieved through infrastructure design or services delivery, as long as 
the public sector specifies the services quality it wants (UKNAO, 2003; CBI, 2007; 
Yescombe, 2007). PPP designs of public schools, prisons, hospitals and road 
transport are of great economic and importance to society.    
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The benefits of well-designed infrastructure, if not purpose specific, could be 
replicated and used for future public procurement options (EPEC, 2011). As 
infrastructure design is an innovative art and a risky process to undertake…..????. 
One of those risky processes is the private investor inclusion of innovative design as 
part of the bidding process that appears certain to achieve one of two outcomes, 
either the private investor is  successful in winning the contract or unsuccessful as 
the result of including an innovative design. Table 2.10 is the summary of PPP 
benefits and costs of road transport. 
 
Table 2.10: Benefits and costs of road transport 
Entity Advantages and Benefits Costs and issues 
 
 
 
 
Public Sector 
Avoiding an increase in public debt.   
 
New facilities with little or no public 
investment funding.  
 
Avoiding legislative or administrative 
limits on reduced capital costs 
investments. 
Availability of additional revenue 
sources for road transport construction 
such as toll, tax revenue or private 
capital.  
 
Transfer of construction costs and 
scheduling risk to the private investor.  
 
The use of tax exempt financing and 
potentially refinancing investments. 
 
Assumption of risk (project scope, 
public support and right of way). 
Lack of legislation regarding 
establishment of PPP. 
Non-compete clauses and long-term 
lease concessions obstructs 
procurement improvements difficult. 
Little control over toll charge.  
Conflict and pursuit of self-interest.  
Excessive transactional costs 
(financial advisors and institutions). 
 
 
 
Private  Sector 
Efficient operations and management 
of assets.  
 
Access to innovations and technologies 
that substantially cut costs.  
 
Contractually obligated to maintain 
and repair infrastructure.  
 
Ability to increase the number or size 
of highway projects in production.  
 
Operation of toll road as long-term 
profitable investments.  
Assumption of construction cost and 
scheduling risks. 
 
Projects may require additional 
approvals (i.e. environmental review). 
Assumption of tort liability. 
Source: NCHRP (2009). 
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2.4.5 PPP accountability and transparency 
The participation by private investors and collaboration with the government to 
provide goods and services in the form of investments requires a greater degree of 
accountability in terms of resources consumed and/or opportunity costs forgone. The 
word “accountability” is an abstract concept with varying interpretations, and often 
expressed in reference to one’s behaviour (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). A more 
common translation of accountability is an obligation that compels individuals or 
organisations to account for their behaviour or activities in society (Bovens, 2007). 
Such a process requires the disclosure of one’s actions and activities in a transparent 
manner that enables an informed decision (Bovens, 2007). Likewise, accountability 
touches on the importance of, and need for, dialogue with various interest groups 
affected by PPP activities with the expectation of reaching a compromise for 
successful infrastructure completion (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). For example, 
UKNAO (2009) stated that the London Underground consortia had issues with 
accountability around the requirement for the substantiation of expenditures, which 
reinforced the obligation for the transparency of an auditable trail of fiscal 
performance. These two concepts, accountability and transparency are qualities for 
project success, in particular, where there is formidable opposition and lack of 
support from society for the project or protest from diverse interest groups which the 
government could hardly ignore (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). 
The aim of transparency is to encourage support for government activities or 
changes to public policy discussion that allows freedom of information to flourish, 
which can be used for an efficient resource allocation. UKNAO (2009) stated that the 
lack of proper enforcement accountability and transparency of the consortia of the 
London Underground Project by government oversight agencies, which were part of 
the performance measures of the contract, contributed to the project’s collapse and 
consortia’s bankruptcy.    
McPhee (2011) stated the public sector accountability reflected the sum of 
many parts, elements of convention, legislative and policy requirements and 
expectations, which, when combined, required those charged with the responsibilities 
to account for their performance and the utilisation of public resources. However, 
defining the term “accountability” with precision is difficult and the practicality is 
even more challenging, because governments have a unique role in serving the 
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public’s interest, and as such, accountability introduces complexities in the decision-
making process, performance measurement, and holding governments responsible to 
account for their actions (HM Treasury, 2006; McPhee, 2011). Historically, 
accountability has been established in the public sector to mean the accounting for 
receipts and expenditure in accordance with the legislative authority to enable the 
comprehension of programs and services performance based on desired outcomes. 
For example, Thomas (2004, pp. 3) defined the components of accountability 
relationships as follows: 
 The assignment or negotiation by a person or body in a position of 
authority of delegated responsibilities to others ideally based upon 
mutually agreed performance expectations and standards.  
 Those persons or bodies who are assigned responsibility are obliged to 
answer for their performance and are potentially subject to penalties for 
non-performance and rewards for successful performance. 
 For accountability to be fairly enforced requires that the responsible 
persons or bodies be given the authority, resources, support and 
reasonable control over events to achieve the desired outcomes. 
 The authoritative party in the accountability relationship must have the 
will and the capacity to obtain information and to monitor performance. 
 
As a result, the application of accountability to particular circumstances 
remains complex and contested (Mulgan, 2005), because of organisational structures, 
contractors, and sub-contractors involved with the same project, but such complexity 
should not relegate the critical importance of the scrupulous accountability and 
transparency of the public sector.  
2.4.6 PPP support for additional investments 
A PPP that supports additional increasing government investment is eminently 
possible with social infrastructure developments, but not necessarily possible with 
economic infrastructure, without increases to the public debt (Haughwout, 2001; 
CEE Bankwatch, 2008). With social infrastructures (school, hospitals, prisons, 
courts), there is an existing client base (patients, students, prisoners, 
plaintiffs/defendants, etc.) that uses the infrastructure by contributing user charge 
fees supplemented by availability payment from the government. Additionally, 
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Baxandall (2009) stated that the use of availability payments had a number of 
advantages over a toll road charge, because the government retains the greater 
control over transportation policy and would not be subject to non-compete clauses, 
nor would the public sector be liable or sued for compensation when government 
policies affected the private investor’s toll revenue.  
Despite perceived PPP benefits and attractiveness to governments, the financial 
implications and burden on society is worth considering against the benefits of PPP 
affordability (Mulder and Tulder, 2004). In principle, affordability is whether or not 
a project falls within a government’s budget constraint. Where the project does not 
fall into the government’s budget constraint, the project is unaffordable. For 
example, road transport infrastructure investment with toll road charges is seemly 
attractive to the private investor, because of its profit margin and the long duration of 
the lease concession period (Minnesota DoT, 2007). Road transport investment is 
considered a self-funding investment, with the imposition of a toll charge, which 
extends the capital costs recovery as follows 
 Cost of capital investment recoupment is often protracted, and toll road 
charges discounted or the revenue gap supplemented by a government 
subsidy. 
 Road transport investment through imposition of toll road charges 
hardly generates enough revenue. 
 Traffic volumes and motorists patronage are often marred by 
inaccuracies. 
With transport investment, the lease duration stretches over a number of years, 
generating no additional revenue to the government or sharing from toll revenue by 
the government (Minnesota DoT, 2007). The CEE Bankwatch Network (2008) 
argued that the declared potential of a PPP to bring additional funding to the 
collaborative arrangement was misleading. On the assumption that the private 
investor brings additional funding into the arrangement, what is unclear is exactly 
how much, and what is the purpose of the government’s initial capital outlays to the 
private investor (BrisConnections Media Release, 2008), including guarantees 
provided to financial institutions. Mineta’s (2006) perception of the private investor’s 
additional funding to the public sector infrastructure delivery was that it was 
inadequate and insufficient to exhaust PPP operational costs requirements and 
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unknown to the public. Klein (1996) has amplified its view by stating that the ideal 
solution for economic infrastructure (road transport) was to finance the project 
wholly in the public sector, either with government or multilateral funds, because it 
was expensive to raise debt with the private investor. Moreover, when government 
guarantees and commitments are considered, and provided to attract financial 
institutions funding, the best option is to borrow in its own right, because the tax 
benefit components are apparently unrestricted to the private investor (Armada et al., 
2008; Mason and Baldwin, 1998). However, private investment enables the 
immediate execution of public policies through applications to financial institutions 
for loans and as such is considered to be a source of additional funding and support 
for public sector investments (Stefanova, 2006). 
2.4.7 Government’s support and PPP 
The government’s decision to support PPP procurement is based on the 
concept of economic development; in particular road transport that plays a vital role 
in enhancing economic growth (Banister and Berechman, 2000). No matter how 
resourceful and skilful private investors claim to be, there is still the need of 
government’s guidance and protection on public policy interpretation and 
implementation matters. In other words, the private investor’s innovative skills are 
not sufficient to achieve success without the government’s support, even when the 
market and financial institutions have offered their support to the project.  
There are a few reasons that warrant government support for a PPP project, 
primarily government’s role and responsibility to provide certain goods and services 
below market cost and the user cost recovery concept. Moreover, Vassallo et al., 
(2007; 2012) argue that governments tend to have a lower cost of risk bearing than 
the private investor, and existence of uninsurable political risk, which could only be 
controlled by the government. For example, political risk that exist to obstruct the 
private investor’s ability to expropriate assets from a country of investment, can only 
be modify by governments (policies, Acts) to easy such impasse (Wibowo, 2005).  
The basic support instrument used by governments with PPP arrangements are: (i) 
subsidies, (ii) guarantees, and (iii) equity contributions, if stated in the contract.    
Other ways that governments can support PPP operations is through the 
provision of a subordinated loan that improves the infrastructure finances and in turn 
augments the loans from financial institutions (The European Commission, 2004). 
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For example, the Hungarian M5 Toll Motorway project is an example, where the 
government provided a subordinate loan to the private investor, which improved the 
M5 Toll Motorway performance, and ensured discharge of the contributing financial 
institution’s debt without relying solely on traffic numbers (European Commission, 
2004). In many instances, government assistance or support is required by the private 
investor to prevent infrastructure collapse or those private investors going into 
bankruptcy in the event of a project’s failure (UKNAO, 2009). Moreover, 
government’s support of PPP activities tends to attract greater public support and 
protection of interest when there is government’s unconditional guarantee of the 
private investor’s debt to institutional lenders. Irwin (2007) argued that government’s 
guarantee tends to cover the capital investment costs and other administration fees 
(financial and non-financial), incurred by institutional lenders in pursuit and recovery 
of the private investor’s loan that can only be offered by the government to 
institutional lenders. 
2.4.8 Government guarantees and incentive packages 
The government financial packages provided to the private investor for the 
delivery of public infrastructure are designed to lure and retain private investors. The 
overall value of these packages is unknown, unquantified, unmeasured in monetary 
value, and resource reduction (cost) to society, while it provides the private investor 
with unlimited financial rewards, such as income tax exemption and perennial excise 
duties (UKHLSCEA, 2010; Armada et al., 2008). These packages offer the 
enticement that drives the private investor to bid for the public sector projects 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). Reilly (2005) posited that government’s eagerness to 
implement and execute a project undermine the appropriate analytical diligence and 
proper costing of resources; in particular tax benefit components were apparently 
unrestricted to the private investor (Armada et al., 2008; Mason and Baldwin, 1998).  
For example, the value of corporate tax exemption provided to the private 
investor over a concessional period of thirty-five years, income tax exemption for 
foreign employees and financial lenders are potential source of revenues. Non-
financial components such as import duty exemption on construction equipment and 
raw materials are the primary source of government’s revenue generation (Demirag 
and Khadaroo, 2008; Armada et al., 2008; Cheah and Liu, 2006; Baldwin 1998). 
Other tax incentives such as tax refunds to the private investor for reinvesting profits 
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into the country of operation, depreciation and amortisation of capital equipment are 
the basis for PPP survival and continue to be popular among private investors. These 
tax exemptions and benefits to the private investor are excluded from the market 
pricing and costing systems. If these incentives are quantified and measured in 
monetary values and used as a bargaining tool to reduce the overall cost of PPP, the 
current practice or appetite for PPP might reduce. Consequently, the non-recognition 
of these financial and non-financial benefits as part of PPP cost estimates continues 
to reduce society’s stake in the PPP benefits and increases of public liability 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008). 
2.4.9 PPP protection and competition 
The idea of protecting PPP activities from competition is an indirect monopoly 
and very common in road transport investments. For example, a PPP road transport 
investment that uses a toll charge is protected by government agencies from any 
competitors developing a similar infrastructure in close proximity. This non-
competition policy, designed to protect the private investor, is detrimental to society 
that creates an artificial monopoly.  
A road transport investment is a long-term concessional lease, which is not free 
to society. When there is no competition or alternative service option, society is 
compelled to patronise what is available, whether the services are affordable or not. 
In Queensland, the Brisbane AirTrain has no public transport competitor along the 
corridor from the city to the Airport, as there is no bus route, which makes the 
private investor the sole service provider. Whilst cheaper than a taxi, it is still quite 
expensive to travel on the AirTrain.  
The government as the guarantor for the private investor’s loan to financial 
institutions prefers to avoid unnecessary financial exposure or construction of other 
economic activities that could have a devastating effect on a PPP investment. With 
government’s regulatory powers, a similar construction or parallel infrastructure in 
close proximity, if considered a threat to the economic interest, can be blocked even 
when the alternative infrastructure is in the best interest of society (Baxandall, 2009). 
The rationale to protect the private investor’s investment is a drain on the economy 
and not a financially efficient strategy. The advantages and disadvantages of using 
PPP for economic infrastructure delivery are summarised in Table 2.11 below. 
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Table 2.11: Summary of PPP advantages and disadvantages 
Advantages of PPP Disadvantages of PPP 
Investment decisions under PPP tend to be 
based on a long-term view rather than short-
term concerns. 
Various entities are involved and the long-
term nature of these relationships often 
results into complicated contracts and 
negotiations.
PPP risks are transferred to the entity who is 
well equipped to manage the risks effectively.
PPP takes years to complete, involving 
high transaction and legal costs. 
PPP infrastructures are subjected to a 
competitive pricing process (bidding), which 
means costs of public services are benchmarked 
against the market standards.  
The long-term nature of a PPP tends to 
incur debts, prior to the realisation of 
benefits. 
Fixed construction period and cost estimates are 
more certain to deliver better value (efficiency). 
 
The probability of the private investor 
becoming insolvent (risk) or making large 
profits in the course of the infrastructure’s 
life-cycle. 
Cross-transfer of the public and private sector 
skills, knowledge and expertise can create 
innovation and efficiency. 
Political problems and lack of community 
support  can affect  the  infrastructure 
patronage
The private investor often brings labour 
capacity and resources than would be available 
to the public sector. 
The possibility that the public sector could 
borrow funds more cheaply than the 
private sector. 
Payments to the private investor in PPP projects 
are usually linked to how they perform, creating 
incentives and efficiency. 
A PPP not completed within the stipulated 
construction timeframe attracts a penalty 
(private investor bears the costs).
PPP projects are not subject to political 
interference and deferred payments for the 
government. 
Capital expenditure incurred by the public 
sector counts as part of the Government’s 
expenditure.
Source: Author  
 
2.5 INFRASTRUCTURE RISKS 
Risk is defined as an event that arises from an exposure, the possibility of 
economic or financial loss or gain, physical damage, injuries and delays, as a 
consequence of pursuing or not pursuing a particular course of action (Akalu, 2003; 
Partnerships Victoria Framework, 2001). AS/NZS 4360 (2004) defined risk 
management as the culture, processes and structures that were directed towards 
realising potential opportunities by managing adverse effects. Risk is a critical 
component of infrastructure delivery, for which a holistic management approach 
should be adopted.  
Akintoye and Macleod (1997) and the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK), (2004) reinforced the argument that infrastructure 
uncertainties were detrimental and potentially capable of causing enormous 
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deviations from original cost estimates and infrastructure values. Therefore, 
infrastructure risk management needs to consider the following: 
 infrastructure complexity and size 
 infrastructure geographical location and number of stakeholders 
 regulatory policy and political influence 
 Socio-economic changes (interest rates, exchange rates, material 
procurements, etc.). 
Authors like Kerzner (1995), Edwards and Shaoul (2003), Al-Bahar (1988) and 
Raftery (1994) endeavoured to distinguish risk from uncertainty, but found both 
words to be synonymous. However, Akintoye and Macleod (1997) stated that risk 
was quantifiable and uncertainty was not, which separated the meaning and 
application of these two variables and thus, determined the accepted formula of risk 
and uncertainty to be as follows:   
“Risk = Uncertainty (or Probability) X Potential Loss/Gain. 
Therefore, risk associated with PPP procurement is uncertain, which could 
result in gain (opportunities) or losses (financial, infrastructure collapse) based on the 
probability that such gain or loss might be probable. For example, Wibowo et al., 
(2005) defined risk as an abstract concept, which is difficult to quantify with 
precision. Reilly (2005); Burger et al., (2009) further categorised the public sector 
infrastructure uncertainties into “known and unknown” or “exogenous and 
endogenous” risks, and further prescribed the use of appropriate standards (policy) to 
manage the “known” risks that were associated with governments’ business 
operations. The “unknown” are managed strategically, and included in the cost 
estimates as these risks unfold during construction phases. These uncertainties or 
risks are economic and financial losses or gains and considerable effort is devoted to 
identification and quantification of infrastructure risks. However, the complexity of 
public infrastructure and undefined public sector services objectives can impede 
adequate risk transfer to the private sector, because transferred risk must be known 
before that decision is made.  
PPP concept of risk allocation and transfer to the private investor is difficult to 
ascertain, as some of the risks transferred are protracted and difficult to quantify. For 
example, the Brisbane Airport Link Tunnel has a concessional lease of 45 years 
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(BrisConnections Media Release, 2008); and the Melbourne City Link Project a 35 
year lease (Ng and Loosemore, 2006; PAEC, 2006), so quantifying the exact risk 
transferred or evaluating the economic gain, loss, effects and impacts on society of 
these projects over such a long period of time can be difficult. For example, 
Boardman and Vining (2007) identified that the private investor generally accepted 
risk when the premium was high and not necessarily on the premise of being the best 
entity to manage the risk. With a toll road infrastructure, the private investor is 
incapable of influencing external effects that are future related events. In addition, 
regulatory risks that are regionally related or a local government associated with 
transportation policy might become an impediment towards the realisation of 
projected revenue (Wibowo 2005). The private investor’s acceptance of risk depends 
on the incentives on offer and would minimise its risk exposure by: 
 Forming a stand-alone special purpose vehicle (SPV) corporation 
(Brown, 2005), which would enable the private investor to reduce its 
costs by declaring the SPV corporation bankrupt when, or if necessary, 
and  
 Limiting its capital exposure through extensive utilisation of a third 
party financing arrangement (Boardman and Vining, 2007; Brown, 
2005). 
PPP procurement risks ranges from infrastructure design and construction, cost 
overruns and project delays, financial (interest rates, exchange rates, financial 
transaction costs), performance (availability of asset, and services continuity and 
quality), demand, and infrastructure residual value relative to the future market price 
(Cangiano et al., 2005; UKNAO, 2009). These risks are present in public, private and 
PPP projects and risk transfer to the private investor should not be used as end to 
itself in risk management. For example, inflow of capital resources from the private 
investor is significant benefits from PPP, and should affect changes to how risk 
allocation and transfer between the entities are distributed (Wibowo, 2010). One of 
the key benefits of PPP when risks are transferred efficiently between the entities 
tend to relieve the government from being responsible of those risks that can be best 
managed by the private investor such as construction, operation and maintenance, 
and market risk (Vassallo, et al., 2012)  
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However, it is important to distinguish between project specific risk and market 
risk, which could be priced by the government, and those that are difficult to quantify 
and price. Project specific risk reflects the variations in outcomes of individual 
projects, or a group of related projects. For example, road transport specific risks 
could include labour problems, interrupted material supplies and obstruction of the 
construction site by environmental groups. In the normal scheme of things, project 
specific risks are diversifiable across a number of government or private investor’s 
projects and do not require government pricing. While market risk often reflects an 
underlying economic development, which affects all projects, but is not diversifiable 
and therefore needs to be properly and very carefully priced.  
2.5.1 Managing infrastructure risk 
There are number of ways to manage infrastructure risks and NPPPG (2008) 
stated that risks needed to be allocated to the party best able to manage them and the 
cost of managing risk should be minimised on a whole-of-life and whole-of-project 
basis. Risk management involves the comprehensive identification, assessment, 
allocation and mitigation of strategies, which enables the determination of the 
infrastructure payment plan, contractual terms and conditions. For example, 
according to NPPPG (2008) risk allocation principles for social and economic 
infrastructures might differ, particularly with the market risk allocation, on a case-by-
case (defaults, terminations, force majeure, compensations) basis in consideration of 
the project characteristics and current state of the market.   
The most common approach is based on systematic management and 
organisational emphasis of effective planning, communication and continuous 
evaluation of risk exposure (Perminova et al., 2008). There must be a holistic 
approach towards risk management without exception, particularly for those 
intangible risks that are considered difficult to identify and quantify, and that tend to 
become obstructive towards the achievement of a successful public infrastructure 
investment. With a conventional delivery method, governments have established 
processes and procedures for risk identification, quantification and compliance, 
including mitigation of costs and compensatory claims from individuals in the 
society. PPP risk identification and quantification is based on a market approach that 
excludes intangible risks, which imposes long-term effects and impacts on society 
(Darvish et al., 2006). For example, road transportation construction, apart from 
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design, construction, operation and maintenance risks, there are also environmental, 
regulatory, economic and social risks involved, some of which are individually or 
collectively difficult to quantify.  
The Public Accountability and Economic Committee Report (PAEC, 2006) 
acknowledged that several risks associated with public infrastructure delivery were 
either unidentified, or not mentioned, in the Partnership Victoria Guidelines (2002). 
This is particularly true of those associated or referred to as intangibles, which are 
difficult to identify or quantify (e.g., public interest protection, public safety, 
environment, transparency, and public confidence). PPP economic benefits and cost 
savings concepts based on simplistic risk allocation and transfers to the private 
investor are unrealistic and inappropriate in practice. The question is therefore, what 
components of risks are being transferred and allocated to whom? Are the risks 
transferred immediate or long-term?  
Risks transferred and allocated to the private investor in a PPP arrangement are 
known as market risks, controllable through effective operational strategies and 
entrepreneurial skills (Darvish et al., 2006; Zhang, 2007; Zou et al., 2007). The 
NPPPG (2008) stated that risks were an inherent part of any project, therefore, a 
comprehensive and realistic cost of all quantifiable risks must be included as part of 
infrastructure risk assessment process. If the public sector comparator (PSC) is used 
to define the quality of services and standards expected from the private investor, the 
risk involved should be priced to the extent that is practical (NPPPG, 2008). HM 
Treasury (2006) stated that risks inherent with public infrastructure delivery were to 
be borne by the entity best equipped to manage those risks. Risks associated with 
public services delivery remain the government’s responsibility (HM Treasury, 
2006), and transferring those risks to the private investor does not tend to exonerate 
the government from any resultant culpability. Therefore, the end process of risk 
management is not actually the allocation and transfer of risks to the private investor, 
but rather the offering of incentives to the private investor to manage the risks more 
efficiently. Even when the private investor is incentivised, the government remains 
accountable and answerable to society (HM Treasury, 2006; NSW Government, 
2006). The problem with PPP public infrastructure delivery is not the allocation and 
transfer of risks to the entity that can best manage these risks; rather it is concerned 
with the effective management of these risks, which neither entity has control over. 
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Risk transfer can be implicit, using the PPP contractual agreement, which eventually 
reduces the economic values and benefits of the infrastructure (Nisar, 2007), or 
infrastructure overall benefits to society based on the guarantee required from the 
government (Vassallo et al., 2007; 2012). The NSW Government, Guidelines for 
Privately Financed Projects (2006) stated that risk unfolds as procurement 
progresses and impacts on the asset’s economic value either during the construction 
phase, or at the end of the contract term. When one of the risks does occur, it does 
change the infrastructure value, financial structure, contract value, and in turn, 
reduces the overall economic and social benefits. 
2.5.2 Road transport risk 
Road transport infrastructure risks can be classified into market risk, 
unpredictable risk, legal and political risk (Izquierdo et al., 2004), and further 
summarised them as (i) global risk, and (ii) project risk. Global risk refers to the 
unpredictable such as earthquakes, terrorist acts, or changes in the government that 
are difficult to contemplate during contract negotiation (Vassallo et al., 2012). 
Project risk is associated with infrastructure construction, operation, and other 
availability risk which are manageable by the private investor (OECD, 2008). 
Vassallo et al., (2010) argued the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007; 2009, 
and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 affected the liquidity and global 
funding arrangements of road transport infrastructure using toll charges, in particular, 
financial institutions were stringent and restrictive when funding such projects. 
Greenfield projects with demand risk allocated to the private investor are no longer 
eligible for funding without substantial risk mitigation mechanisms, such as flexible 
terms and a minimum income protection guarantee from the public sector (Vassallo 
et al., 2012). Brownfield projects with established traffic volumes records and 
Greenfield projects with the support of availability payments could be funded with 
strict requirements from financial institutions prior to the global financial crisis. For 
example, the collapses of the Brisbane CLEM7 and Airport Link tunnels, and 
Sydney’s City Cross and Lane Cove tunnels, were largely financially related and not 
structural (Bain 2012; Grad and Kenyon, 2013). 
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2.5.3 Financial risk 
NPPPG (2008) stated that incentives paid to the private investor were to cover 
all potential risks (contemplated and uncontemplated), including financial, 
construction and operational risks (presumably borne by the investor). However, the 
amount of any incentive covering contemplated and uncontemplated risks might not 
be sufficient because infrastructure potential financial risks occur in stages.  
However, Pierson et al., (1995) quoting the theory of Modigliani-Miller (1958) 
stated that a government’s transfer of risk to the private investor should not 
necessarily affect the cost of financing the project, but it was rather a case of the cost 
of capital being dependant on the risk characteristics of the project and how the 
project was financed, meaning that the sources of funding could influence the 
project’s risk. For example, if markets are generally well-placed to bear risk, it 
matters little who bears infrastructure risks, the government or the private investor, 
and depends on the capital composition (debt vs equity ratio) based on the spread. 
Grennes and Strazds (2012) in applying the Modigliani-Miller theory stated that in 
perfect capita markets, the value of a company did not change with relative weights 
of debt and equity financing structure, and it was unreasonable to assume that in a 
perfect capital market additional value could be created for governments. In other 
words, where public investments are funded primarily with debt, the cost of 
borrowings or capital cost (interest rate) would rise to reflect the nature of risk 
associated with the infrastructure (Grennes and Strazds, 2012). 
Cantagiano et al., (2005) stated that governments were better at spreading their 
own risk across taxpayers, an advantage that the government held over the private 
investor in terms of risk management. This does not mean that the private investor is 
incapable of handling risks, the private investor uses many financial institutions to 
fund the project and this certainly facilitates some risk spreading (McIntyre, 2008; 
Moir, 2008; The Australian 25 June, 2008). However, in certain instances the private 
investor might be disadvantaged, depending on the infrastructure complexity and risk 
characteristics, and where the project is undertaken (location), in particular, with less 
developed market economies.  
On many occasions, the private investor’s transactional borrowing costs might 
be higher than the governments, which in part reflects the difference in risk default, 
because the government has a broad base of resources and can raise taxes more 
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quickly, which reduces the likelihood of the government defaulting on its fiscal 
responsibilities. However, the private investor is prepared to lend to the government 
at a risk based on non-upfront payment to finance high risk infrastructure projects 
where the outcome is uncertain. What remains a mystery is how the private investor 
survives as the cost of capital depends on the risk of the project in which the capital 
is invested (Peirson et al., 1995). Additionally, if the private investor’s cost of 
borrowing is higher and interest rates are at a premium, even when the project risk is 
lower, the question must be posed as to whether PPP efficiency gains (cost savings) 
are sufficient enough to offset the high borrowing and interest rate costs? 
A PPP public infrastructure investment overloaded with private debt is neither in 
the best interest of the public sector nor attractive to potential private investors 
(Vassallo et al., 2007; 2012; UKNAO, 2009), even when financial risk is assumed as 
the sole responsibility of the private investor seem be influenced by the outcomes of 
economic and social changes (Vassallo et al., 2012). PPP procurement current 
practice based on risk allocation to the private investor would require additional 
financial support or equity contribution from the government to counteract and 
reduce the overall financial risks, as well as stabilise the project’s future financial 
prospects on the premise of a balanced risk allocation between the entities. In effect, 
governments can provide subordinated loans to the special purpose vehicle (SPV) or 
the private investor to improve the project’s financial stability (Vassallo et al., 2007), 
and such a loan will be paid back to the government by the private investor in the 
future. Most SPV’s are funded with equity contributions (Boardman and Vining, 
2008) by prospective project sponsors and non-recourse debt provided by financial 
institutions or capital markets.  
2.5.4 Government’s risk and PPP 
The government’s partnership with the private sector is not a risk-free 
relationship, no matter how small the risk might be. However, the containment and 
management of risks can be devastating to projects when governments are less 
resourceful and indisposed to exercise rigorous control over PPP activities 
(Cantagiano et al., 2005). A typical liability is the government guarantee of the 
private investor’s debt to lenders (financial institutions), and no matter whether 
explicit or implicit, this is a potential claim on the government’s resources (APEC, 
2007). The liability is conditional, and depends on the occurrence of an event that 
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lays bare the magnitude of the governments’ risk exposure. However, it appears that 
often analysis, identification and quantification of these risks are ignored with the 
transfer and allocation of risks to the private sector (investor) in PPP delivery 
(Polackova, 1998). Reilly (2004) referred to these risks as ‘uncertainties’, hard to 
quantify and which presented great mitigation challenges. In other words, these 
uncertainties are external to the ambit of the entities and it is difficult for the 
government or the private investor to control them. For example, changes in market 
sentiments, collapse of future infrastructure revenue, trends in the movement of 
interest and exchange rates, or an abrupt end of the government in power that 
approved the infrastructure construction, are all uncertainties that can derail PPP 
delivered projects (Reilly et al., 2004). 
With the procurement of public infrastructure, either conventional or PPP, 
there is no simple solution to these problems to government’s risk exposure in terms 
of financial liabilities. On one hand, financial institutions have contributed to the 
problem in relation to risk analyses and loan approvals for economic infrastructure 
becoming more difficult. Time has passed where the government’s triple AAA credit 
ratings were used to gain approvals to loans, whether the government includes or 
excludes its liabilities and assets in the consolidated financial statement now matters 
little to financial institutions (Vassallo, et al., 2007; 2012). An example of this is seen 
in the research of Polackova (1998) who argued that financial institutions lending 
decisions were based on government’s overall financial exposure (commitments, 
guarantees), whether reported or not. Therefore, these government guarantees, 
commitments to private investors and other commitments of an operational nature 
are the determinants for credit ratings and the perceived ability to repayments of a 
potential loan. On the part of the private investor, financial institution demand is 
based on the work profile of the investor that includes successful and unsuccessful 
projects executed and references. Using the BrisConnections as point of illustration, 
the consortium (BrisConnections) used the Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel project as part 
of its work profile to win the Airport Link Tunnel project of Queensland 
(BrisConnections Media Release, 2008).  
In summary, these risks and financial obligations of the government need 
identifying, quantifying, and measuring, allocating clear monetary values that reflect 
the true cost of the public infrastructure delivery to society. Table 2.12 shows a 
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combination of explicit and implicit risks, which are not necessarily the 
government’s own financial risks but are nevertheless legally binding on the 
government. 
Table 2.12:  Categories of Financial Risk 
  Direct Liability:  
An obligation caused by any event
Explicit:  
Government liability as 
recognised by contract law 
Sovereign Debt:  
Budgetary expenditures (including legally 
binding long-term expenditures such as 
civil servants salaries and pensions) 
 
Explicit:  
Government liability as 
recognised by contract law 
Implicit:  
Government’s obligation 
towards public 
expectations 
 
Future public pensions, if not required 
by law: 
Social security schemes, if not required by 
law 
Implicit:  
Government’s obligation 
towards public 
expectations 
 
Source: Adapted from Polackova (1989) and Brixi (2004). 
 
There is increasing support for risk sharing rather than risk transfer in a PPP 
arrangement (Akitoby et al., (2007; IPA (2012), as certain risks can be influenced 
and controlled by the public sector. Wibowo (2010) stated that the fundamental 
principle of PPP of PPP is risk sharing, and where risks are transferred 
inappropriately to the private investor, the public sector is likely to pay a premium 
(Victoria Partnership, 2001). Other risks associated with public investments such as 
political and regulatory risks are capable of affecting predicted revenue streams 
(Wibowo, 2005), which governments can effectively manage. In addition, regulatory 
risks and other social risks are best managed by the government, including the use of 
guarantees to support the PPP infrastructure considered necessary to enhance human 
living conditions because governments are better poised to control these risks 
through legislative amendments or possibly, revoke those harsh regulations with 
adversarial effects on the economy.  
2.5.5 Perceptions of risks 
There is extensive literature in relation to infrastructure risk allocation 
(Loosemore, 2007; Medda, 2007), in particular, public infrastructure that uses the 
same constructed asset to provide services to the public, such as road transport. 
Perception of risks tends to differ among the entities of PPP procurement 
(government, financial institutions, and the private investor). Demirag et al., (2010) 
stated that many authors had examined PPP procurement and risk (Broadbent and 
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Laughlin, (2002, 2003, 2005); Edwards and Shaoul, (2003a, 2003b, 2004); Froud, 
(2003); Broadbent et al., (2003, 2004); Demirag, (2004); Edwards et al., (2004); 
Bing et al., (2005a); Demirag et al., (2005); Khadaroo, (2005, 2008); Shaoul, (2005a, 
2005b); Shaoul et al., (2008), and their findings reflected the complexities in 
relationships that existed between the project participants. Demirag et al., (2010) also 
noted that little research existed on the perception of risk from financial institutions 
as the project financer. Risk perception within the construction industry is different, 
in particular, those risks that relate to finance (debt risk, interest and exchange rates) 
and infrastructure (affordability) payments, were considered less important to design, 
construction and performance operation risk (Akintoye et al., (1998).  
The fact remains, public sector infrastructure procurements, either by PPP or 
conventional delivery mode is a large scale operation, riskier than any other business 
activity because of the project complexities, such as the coordination of the various 
disparate and interrelated functions (Demirag et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2006). These 
authors further argued that PPP or the public sector infrastructure procurement 
complexity was largely due to the number of stakeholders, whose interests and 
objectives were diverse, and infrastructure services objectives which were specific, 
with no alternative use and predominately referred to as a sunk investment (Howes 
and Robinson, 2005). Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) related a difference in 
perception of PPP procurement to risk allocation among PPP entities, where the 
private investor might be reluctant to bear certain risk (aversion). An optimal risk 
allocation and transfer within PPP arrangements might be deceitful as there is a lack 
of sophistication in the public sector to manage risk adequately (construction, 
operation and maintenance) and a PPP contract does not offer the route for optimal 
risk allocation and transfer mechanisms (Quiggin, 2005) and optimal risk transfer 
remains impossible.  Rodney and Gallimore (2002) argued that the private investor 
used a simple, sensitive analysis which was limited in capacity to determine the costs 
of risks that could lead to infrastructure risk being overpriced, underestimated or 
unidentified. PPP risk as underestimated costs received the supported of Keating 
(2004) who described PPP infrastructure risk in Australia as mispriced due to the 
lack of competition to involve potential private investors, and which the government 
referred to as a lower project cost with value for money.   
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Ginés De Rus (2006) described the risk of building large public infrastructures 
as “white elephants”, quite complex with several public sector agencies and weak 
incentives regarding efforts to obtain value for money, and Flyvbjerg et al., (2003) 
stated that the reason used to defend public sector developments was in relation to 
economic growth that disregarded the long-term values and benefits of public 
investments, beyond the short-term effects common to any public works.  
Gao and Schachler (2001) reconfirmed the growing interest in research about 
PPP (Grout, 1977; Akintoye et al., 1998; Ball et al., 2000; Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1999; Cheung et al., 2010; Hodges and Mellett, 1999; Froud and Shaoul, 2001; 
McCabe et al., 2001; Gao and Schachler, 2003) and these studies tended to 
demonstrate the problematic nature of PPP and highlighted the danger of seeing PPP 
as an effective way of delivering a large scale infrastructure.  For example, Ball et 
al., (2000); Froud and Shaoul, (2001); Gao and Schachler, (2001) tended to suggest 
that PPP procurement could involve potential mistakes when considering the 
evaluation and transfer of risk to the private investor. On the issue of whether 
financial risk was less important comparative to construction risk (Akintoye et al., 
1998); Gao and Schachler, 2003) argued that financial risk management was 
important to the public sector in the PPP environment for various reasons, as follows: 
 
 Public sector financial debts (liabilities) are guaranteed by taxpayers and 
demands for accountability on the public resources and outcomes; 
 Where financial losses are incurred in the public sector, increases with the tax 
burden are eminent to cover the losses, and somehow affects the level of 
public services provision.  
 
Other effects that emerge from the public sector financial mis-management 
could lead to the delay of desirable capital expenditures and maintenance of public 
roads (Gao and Schachler, 2003). Bain (2012); Grad and Kenyon (2013) stated that 
construction risk of PPP infrastructures had been managed efficiently to such an 
extent that these infrastructures were successfully completed, and what had failed 
was the financial aspect of the PPP arrangements. In addition, PPP is not an 
alternative source of funding public sector expenditure. Gao and Schachler (2003) 
argued that the process of PPP procurement had been misused as a means for off 
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balance sheet arrangements. In retrospect, this argument originates from an 
accounting perspective where assets under construction (AUC) must be recognised 
as a liability on the public sector balance sheet until the debt is extinguished. 
Additionally, PPP is not the most appropriate method for public borrowing, and PPP 
debt would have the same future effect on public finance as other public borrowings 
(Gao and Schachler, 2003). In other words, public investments procured through PPP 
increase the likelihood of committing future tax revenues to the private investor so as 
to cover the cost of public investment acquisition. As a PPP contract is hardly 
severed, either by the public sector or private sector without penalties, the scope and 
duration of the PPP is quite significant and imposes an enormous responsibility on 
the entities, in particular, taxpayers that fund PPP public investments.     
 Gao and Schachler (2003, pp. 28) suggested that the important issues to 
consider in PPP was “additionality” (i.e., does the use of PPP allow a higher level of 
capital investment, value for money, and risk transfer) (Ball et al., 2000, pp. 97), 
because risk transfer to the private investor is considered as VfM (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005) which are interconnected as integral part of PPP benefits to society and 
risk transfer remains the key criterion in testing VfM (Froud and Shaoul (2001). 
2.5.6 Public interest Risk 
The term “public interest” is a value implicit within public policy that refers to 
the interest (stake) society has in public affairs that confer welfare upon it (Edwards, 
2007). However, the interpretation of public interest varies within the public sector, 
for instance politicians may use the word to advance their political careers 
(Boardman and Vining, 2007), whereas community leaders may use it to refer to 
public safety or safe guards. The inclusion of public interest as a value in PPP 
delivery is still a market cost even though it is asocial benefit to society, but the 
former is often ignored by policy makers (governments). The London Underground 
inclusion of public interest as a performance measure with the rehabilitation and 
restoration of the tubelines was complicated and undefined (UKNAO, 2009). 
According to the Minnesota DoT (2011), public interest is central to PPP 
infrastructure success and often considered as the combination of costs and risks to 
infrastructure delivery performance. Moreover, public interest definition is subjective 
because of varying interpretations of what is to actually be included as part of that 
public interest. In Australia, the Victorian Partnership (2009) refers to the public 
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interest protection as “public interest test” in terms of PPP public infrastructure 
procurement and assessment. Baxandall (2009); Gilroy et al., (2007); and Minnesota 
DoT (2011) stated that public interest was often contradictory and at times 
complicated, because it usually imposed a risk that outweighed the eventual benefits. 
However, there is a common consensus on how PPP can combine the public interests 
in its delivery:  
 Define PPP contracts to allow for societal input, based on 
accountability and transparency currently lacking in present PPP 
arrangements. 
 Development of a regulatory framework (public policy) that defines and 
clarifies public interest in the context of PPP services delivery. 
 
The Victorian public interest protection is designed to minimise potential risks 
and conflicts of PPP public infrastructure investments and help the realisation of PPP 
benefits (VfM), social benefits, effects and impacts by considering them as part of 
the assessment and evaluation process. The success or failure of a public interest test 
depends on assumptions and interpretations of what constitutes a genuine public 
interest. In society, individuals’ interests or concerns might pose a significant threat 
for a potential infrastructure delivery that outweighs the collective public interest 
(benefits). In such circumstances, rationalising or amending the infrastructure’s 
original scope might proffer a solution to those concerns. UKNAO (2009) noted that 
public interest protection was expensive for all entities involved, and often lead to 
litigation and claims when managed ineffectively. Therefore, a public interest test is 
necessary as a performance measure and protects the publics’ future financial 
liability that may arise from PPP deliveries. In other words, the choice of PPP over 
conventional delivery method seem to create fears within the public system of losing 
control over what had predominantly remained in the control of the public sector 
(Baxandall, 2009).These fears are summarised as follows:  
 Eroding of democratic values 
 Increasing costs to taxpayers rather than cost reductions and savings 
 Losing control over a system, which has historically remained public 
good. 
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For example, public infrastructure investment funded with private finance, 
does not confer free access to society, particularly a toll road infrastructure. There is 
societal apprehension based on the process of public sector procurements that 
virtually uses the private sector either to construct a new infrastructure or manage an 
existing public infrastructure. The control and management of these public 
infrastructures creates an unsettling environment (Baxandall, 2009), as society fights 
back to regain control and in some cases fails to patronise the services of the private 
investor through unspontaneous action. In addition, government agencies are 
disturbed by the possibility of losing long-term control of transportation planning and 
development policy, if the private sector remains in control of providing these 
services (Baxandall, 2009). 
The second concern of society about public interest is due to continuous price 
increases of PPP products. With PPP long-term concessions, price increases mean 
additional financial burdens on society, rather than cost savings as originally 
predicted (Baxandall, 2009; Minnesota DoT, 2011). For example, toll road charge 
increases are more frequent and unpredictable with the private investor in control 
than when the public controls the toll road. In addition, other PPP services to the 
public, such as water, energy, and communications have experienced price increases 
as a result of these services being provided by private investors (Baxandall, 2009). 
This all makes it very difficult to realise the full potential VfM, which was what 
compelled governments to enter into the PPP arrangement in the first place, as 
households experience increases in the cost of living and governments are unable to 
stop the escalation of a PPP service price. In other words, PPP soaring prices deprive 
society of both economic and social benefits, and cause additional financial burdens 
(Baxandall, 2009).  
In addition, PPP as a long-term investment is unpredictable and as a result can 
deny future generations of their democratic rights and future infrastructure 
investment decisions based on what is appropriate and suitable for future generations 
economic conditions. The paradox here is that decisions made during the time of the 
present generation may be denying future generations the ability to make their own 
choices and interests, leaving them to inherit PPP accumulated debt and this too 
many authors is what is disappointing about PPP’s legacy (Minnesota DoT, 2011). It 
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is an erosion of democratic values, or one that lacks societal input in relation to 
infrastructure service quality for the end user (Baxandall, 2009).  
 
2.6 THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND REGULATORY POLICY 
Public infrastructure investments are of a twofold nature, namely (i) ability to 
improve societal quality of life and living standards, and (ii) impact on the well-
being of society through the effects of these investments (Cardno, 2008). In spite of 
PPP’s costs to society, Grimsey and Lewis (2007) stated that PPP has become 
acceptable by governments and preferred option of procurement by the public sector 
than conventional delivery method. For example, Cardno (2008) argue for 
appropriate policy guidance for private investments in the public sector that defines 
and specifies infrastructure services quality capable of improving human living 
conditions.  
The question that therefore arises is, even when government policy guidance is 
required to control PPP activities, how will governments realise their own objectives 
(political), if PPP is regulated? Boardman and Vining (2007) noted that 
governments’ specific objective function was to minimise its current short-term 
expenditures, which included off the balance sheet recognition of PPP liabilities and 
political costs, suggesting that governments were not interested in minimising the 
social costs associated with PPP. Rather governments appear to be more interested in 
prolonging their tenure in power by using off-budget expenditure methods to hide 
governments’ financial exposure, so as to avoid criticism or public scrutiny (Chan et 
al., 2009) from the general public and tax payers.  
While there is a need for government regulation of PPP activities, what type of 
policies will specify and prescribe PPP procurement terms, including minimisation of 
social costs and reduction of political opportunism (Delmon, 2012)? The public 
sector as a service-oriented industry has been involved in projects of a complex 
nature with huge capital investments based on socio-economic benefits, which have 
been delivered under strict government regulation. The public sector is a regulated 
entity, with a meticulous approach towards the provision of goods and services that 
improve human quality of life. What separates the public sector from the private 
sector in terms of orientation is the type of services each sector provides (Deepak and 
 Chapter 2:Literature Review 129 
Coleman 1996). Azizi and Russel (2001) stated that private sector participation in the 
provision of public infrastructures undermined the governments’ pre-established 
processes and procedures, which covered all technicalities about the public 
infrastructure delivery and risks. 
Kirlin (1996) observed that in any contemporary society, provision of public 
goods and services, and management of the economy were designed to guarantee 
societal welfare. Therefore, it is the government’s role to protect the continuity of 
such services through regulatory policies, which limits undesirable actions of firms 
and individuals within the society. The same regulatory powers of the government 
will encourage and promote desirable effects, which will reduce externalities to 
society such as:   
 Refocus and change public infrastructure investment based on internal 
rate of return to  “net social benefit” to society; 
 Assessment and appraisal of PPP infrastructure of VfM to enrich social 
cost benefit analysis and other acceptable metric measurements.  
 PPP cost estimates to include long-term benefits, costs, effects and 
impacts to society identified and measured in combination of CBA and 
MCDM; and  
 PPP benefits to equal actual cost to society (outcomes obtained). 
 
Katz (2006) argued for the need for regulatory policies prohibiting PPP public 
infrastructure delivery that was anti-public interest, and incapable of generating long-
term financial benefits to society. There are other ways that government regulatory 
policies or actions can confer social benefits to society with PPP infrastructure 
delivery, such as: 
 Define infrastructure expected outcomes in terms of services quality, 
and performance standards. 
 Specify measurement outcomes with rewards, incentives and penalties 
for under performance. 
 Reduce unlimited financial risks exposure to PPP delivery; except those 
that are directly affected by regulatory policy changes. 
Figure 2.6 shows what is required of governments in terms of a regulatory 
policy that caters for all stakeholders’ interests in a PPP arrangement. 
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Figure 2.6: Analysis of a government’s role in a PPP environment 
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based on traffic volume projections and motorists’ patronage. There are no 
guarantees that traffic volumes or motorists patronage predictions will be sufficient 
to cover the costs incurred, without government contributions or subsidies. Bain 
(2009) argued that traffic volumes, which were used to predict future cash-flow 
streams, were exaggerated. The essence of predicting traffic volumes is to show 
project desirability, even when demand is lacking, forged to obtain infrastructure 
approval (Reilly, 2004). Poole (2007) stated that traffic volume predictions were 
biased and its revenue forecasts were “unrealistic”, and out of touch with the 
economic realities of the time. For example, the problems with infrastructure 
collapses in Australia (Lane Cove, Sydney City Cross, CLEM7 Tunnel, The Airport 
Link Tunnel) (PAEC, 2006) are linked to traffic volume numbers. The question is; 
has the private investor misread the economic realities of traffic volumes or 
complexities associated with motorist’s patronage? Bain’s (2009) criticism of road 
concession projects was the result of the traffic volumes, which were designed to 
maximise the private investor’s revenue by minimising expenditures. Therefore, 
traffic volumes and revenue forecast of transportation networks using tolls are not 
without bias and inaccurately predicted to achieve infrastructure approval (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2009; Reilly, 2004).  
Perhaps future traffic forecast divergence is reducible, if uncertainties 
associated with traffic volumes and motorists patronage are considered. There are 
external risks that are beyond the control of the private investor, as well as the 
government, which should feature prominently in toll revenue predictions. Quiggin 
(2004) argued for the adoption of Partnerships Victoria general guidelines on traffic 
volumes, where the private investor had no control over the level of service demand, 
as it was inappropriate to predict payments based on a significant motorist usage 
component. Where possible, part of a service demand risk is to be borne by the 
private investor; unless the government is the predominant user of infrastructure, 
then the demand risk has to be borne by the public sector (social infrastructures). An 
exception to this is an economic infrastructure where the services are marketed (the 
Airport Link Tunnel, CLEM 7, Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel, etc.) to generate revenue.  
However, demand risk transfer to the private investor does indicate the most 
important risk between a PPP delivery and contracting out a public provided service 
that does not involve asset ownership transfer (Quiggin, 2004).  
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2.6.2 Need for collaborative effort 
Private sector participation in the delivery of public infrastructure is based on 
the premise of collaborative effort. In a PPP related arrangement, there are three 
entities (agents) involved, (i) society, (ii) private investors and (iii) the government. 
Each entity has a separate agenda based on the investment objectives and outcomes, 
and refuses to compromise its own agenda (Boardman and Vining, 2007). The 
solution to such an impasse is to leverage the combination of skills and expertise of 
the three entities to achieve a successful outcome. It is possible to argue that the 
private sector is struggling to master the complexities of public sector infrastructure 
deliveries and business operations. For example, the concept of intangible risks 
(social effects and impacts) (UKNAO, 2009) of PPP activities on society is yet to be 
understood by the private investor.  
The term “partnership” involves the sharing of profits, as well as liabilities, on 
an equal basis or the percentage of capital contributed by each partner. Therefore, if 
governments are serious about using PPP to address the challenges of public 
infrastructure demands or the implementation of its public policies, the demand risk 
needs to be shared between the entities. Possibly, where the government is unwilling 
to share the demand risk, an equity contribution might be appropriate that encourages 
active participation and is part of a PPP decision. Alternatively, the M5 Hungary toll 
road flexible approach, where the government compensates for the shortfall in toll 
revenue could be adopted. PPP objectives and true partnership should focus on 
maximising the taxpayers’ values and best interest based on each entity’s capability.  
It is arguable that PPP is not a universal remedy for the government’s fiscal 
problems or infrastructure challenges, but a process that nurtures collaboration and 
sharing of responsibilities among partners. On the assumption that PPP is a sharing 
of responsibilities (financial and non-financial), the outcome will lead to a better 
understanding of PPP benefits and cost savings to society. The concept of sharing 
responsibilities entails developed methodologies that enable equitable sharing of 
revenue risks, operational risks, long-term effects and impacts and rewards based on 
concerted effort of all partners. 
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2.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the extant and current literature about PPP 
procurement of public infrastructure and come up with some focused areas for 
further investigation that are rolled into some broad research questions. Summarising 
the historical and current thinking on the efficacy or failure of PPP has revealed 
some gaps in the current knowledge, which are also discussed in the preceding 
section of the thesis.  
What is known is that PPP is a contractual agreement between a government 
and the private sector, which allows private participation in the delivery of public 
infrastructure projects (Deloitte, 2006). It is a long-term collaborative arrangement 
allowing for the combination of complementary skills and expertise of each partner, 
with interest in improving the quality of services and value for money to taxpayers 
(CBI, 2007). PPP is an innovative delivery mode that adopts a holistic approach to 
design, build, finance, maintain and operate (DBFMO) the infrastructure for a 
concessional period by the private investor. The problem with PPP public 
infrastructure delivery is the impact of the bundling of many contracts into one 
without detailing the services that are associated with any particular cost (English, 
2006). Within government agencies, private sector participation with the delivery of 
core government services is a threat to the long-term transport development policy, 
as well as an inequitable provision of services (Baxandall, 2009). Moreover, the 
governments’ spending pattern is affected and distorted whereby the attracting of 
other competitors is unlikely, as PPP is considered a prominent mode of delivery for 
governments (Thia and Ford, 2009). 
However, the fundamental objectives underlying the use of PPP are to manage 
public sector debt levels and the private financing of public infrastructure 
investments without necessarily increasing the public sector borrowings ratio (PSBR) 
and to reduce pressure on public sector budgets. Regrettably, these PPP objectives 
failed to mention the exclusion of PPP transactions from the public sector balance 
sheet and apparently avoid providing proper accountability of capital funding as to 
circumvent scrutiny (Hodge and Greve, 2005). But when PPP is viewed closely, PPP 
has offered governments the opportunity to convert capital expenditures into a series 
of smaller, annualised expenditures over a period of time without making a lump 
sum payment to extinguish the debt.  
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It matters little how PPP payments are scheduled and paid, as just like any 
other credit arrangement or household mortgage, the financial pressure is ever 
present, until the debt is settled. Additionally, central to the use of PPP is the notion 
of delivering value for money (VfM) to taxpayers, which has remained the least 
realised of all the PPP objectives. Added to these objectives was the implicit ethos of 
accountability, improved services delivery, on time and on budget, as well as greater 
innovation. Levinson et al., (2006) stated that too often, PPP has not use scarce 
resources successfully and wondered if the public sector would be better served 
without the partnership due to the commercial cultural differences and varied 
motivations of the partnered entities.    
According to Pakkala (2002) PPP as an innovative mechanism for the delivery 
of public infrastructure was seen to have adopted a holistic approach, where the 
private investor was required to design, build, finance and operate the infrastructure 
for a concessional period. Whether PPP is actually a holistic approach that includes 
pricing, allocation and transfer of risks to the private investor, remains controversial. 
The risk transferred to the private investors has not been properly identified and 
quantified or the management of such risk proven effectual (UKHCCPA, 2009). At 
the same time, the HM Treasury (2006) stated that governments remained 
accountable for the actions of the private investor and could not abandon their 
primary purpose of public protection. Although PPP is an innovative way to deliver 
public infrastructure and services, it is associated with weaknesses and limitations as 
described in detail in this chapter. For example, PPP assessments and evaluation 
processes cannot be verified nor replicated, so the VfM and other economic benefits 
associated with a proposed infrastructure delivery cannot be systematically identified 
during either the feasibility study and/or the business case development, because 
economic benefits and VfM are protracted. The concept of pay later associated with 
PPP delivery is a benefit to society that enables the implementation of public 
policies, as well as accumulation of future debt (Pakkala, 2002). However, the 
essence of public infrastructure investments is to confer social benefits and values to 
society, and not to defer costs. In the process, human living standards should be 
improved, likewise human productivity should be increased (Cardno, 2008; OECD, 
2010).  
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The private investor (consortium) has somehow underestimated the risks 
involved in the delivery of public infrastructure, as well as future benefits and 
impacts on society, which are part of PPP delivery (Reilly et al., 2004, 2005). For 
example, benefits and costs of PPP activities, which are immediate with long-term 
consequences, are excluded from PPP cost estimates. However, the public sector in 
defining services output relative to a proposed infrastructure delivery tends to detail 
the likelihood of these benefits occurring at various times that would bring wider 
economic benefits to society (Thia and Ford, 2009). Likewise, some PPP 
infrastructures are protected from competition, or the developing of similar 
infrastructure within close proximity, even by government’s own agencies. This non-
competitive policy and protection of a PPP investment are the conditions and 
demands from financial institutions, extending to the unconditional support of 
government before the loan approval is gained.  
In addition, PPP confers rights, obligations and responsibilities in terms of 
benefits and commercial gains through which attainment of service quality 
satisfaction and profit margins are possible if opportunistic behaviour and self-
interests are averted. No matter what the procurement mode (conventional, or PPP) 
the essence is to improve human living conditions with these goods and services and 
the private investor to achieve commercial gains in satisfaction of debt lenders and 
shareholders’ interests (Mishan 1976). PPP’s role to society and government is 
important and based on the prompt execution of government policies and respond to 
the immediate infrastructure needs of society seem to neglect the long-term financial 
of the arrangement. With a PPP arrangement, society is affected when the 
infrastructure collapses, resulting in financial losses and tax increases. PPP is 
expensive with compensatory and mitigation claims, government guarantees and 
other financial incentive packages (Haughwout, 2001). 
In the collaborative arrangement, the private investor is presumed to be 
financially remunerated (incentivised), the extent the remuneration covers 
contemplated and uncontemplated risks are unknown. Undoubtedly, PPP possesses 
benefits, as well as costs to society, which needs identifying, quantifying and 
measuring in monetary values or other socially acceptable alternative measurement, 
where there is no market value for these benefits and costs. Also, public 
infrastructure investment effects and impacts are protracted and difficult to be 
 136 Chapter 2:Literature Review 
identified and measured adequately with PSC and CBA that are limited in capacity to 
consider future events and commercially aligned to internal rate of return (IRR). 
VfM as core to the use of PPP is not immediate but post-construction and when the 
economic and social benefits are realisable remains unknown (Kristiansen, 2009).    
Therefore, MCDM is considered to provide better evaluation measurement of 
benefits, costs, effects and impacts of a proposed public infrastructure investment 
using monetary and non-monetary components. MCDM tends to supplement CBA 
basic data information to produce alternative investment option through the process 
of weight allocation importance to the established criteria. Other measurements such 
as service quality and satisfaction derived by the end user are appropriate in 
measuring benefits and costs of PPP delivery (The Greenbook, HM Treasury 2003; 
DoT, 2011, TCRP, 2002). Also, SCBA measures the benefits and costs of projects’ 
to society using a pre-established set of values that represent the public’s perception 
of the perceived infrastructure related risks and uncertainties based on future events, 
is equally appropriate. Wattage et al., (2000); Pearce, (1993) stated that SCBA is 
adequate for project appraisals and evaluation of environment related issues.  
With all these analytical tools, the calculation of PPP benefits and costs to 
society, either in terms of monetary values or using other existing measurements that 
are appropriate and socially acceptable is actually immeasurable, due to those 
benefits and costs to society being so protracted and sporadic. With the proposed 
framework in evaluating and measuring financial and non-financial benefits, costs, 
effects, and impacts of public sector investments, the assessment will improve, as 
many stakeholders are involved with representation of various interest groups.  
The next chapter discusses the research design and methodology, beginning 
with a contemporary investigation and data collection. This will involve using 
multiple sources of evidence for measuring the benefits, costs and impacts of PPP on 
society.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the delivery of public infrastructure investment with 
the participation of the private sector was examined. The essence of public 
infrastructure as a public good is to confer social benefits and values to society. PPP 
as an innovative way to deliver public infrastructure and services is associated with 
weaknesses and limitations. The rhetoric of “pay later” as a benefit of PPP to society, 
is in reality, an accumulation of debt to a future generation and puts pressure on 
households and creates additional taxes. It is the process of consuming unbudgeted 
resources that stagnates the economy. PPP possesses benefits, as well as effects and 
impacts, which need to be identified, quantified and measured in monetary values or 
alternative measures, such as the satisfaction derived by the end user from the 
infrastructure services, because of its protracted effect on society. 
This chapter discusses the research methodology of this thesis, including the 
philosophical foundations of the study, processes for structural interviews, data 
collection, interview analysis, limitations of methodology and ethical considerations. 
The term “methodology” means different things to different people, in this research it 
is used in the context “continue to evolve”. For example, a research methodology 
deals with the method of creating knowledge about the world or environment. The 
interpretation of the knowledge is regarded as an ontological and epistemological 
research method (Mason, 2002). 
 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
3.2.1 Theoretical position 
A theory is a coherent set of general propositions used to explain apparent 
relationships among certain observed phenomena that allows for generalisation of 
individual facts or situations (Zikmund, 1996). Theory development relies on 
research, and research relies on theory (Fawcett and Downs, 1986) that characterises 
the relationship as dialectic. A process where theory determines the data collection 
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and research findings provides challenges to accepted theories. Research process of 
developing theory could be classified as descriptive or explanatory theory.  
A descriptive theory is the most basic type of theory that describes and 
classifies specific dimensions or characteristics of individuals, groups, situations or 
events through a summary of the commonalities found in disconnected observations. 
Fawcett and Downs (1986, pp 4) stated that descriptive theory was necessary, when 
little or nothing was known about the phenomenon in question (exploratory), and 
could be used in answering questions such as the “what, why, and if.” Gilbert’s 
(2007) perception of theory is one that provides explanation, prediction and insight 
about the existence of the phenomenon, and Zikmund (1996) stated that theory could 
be developed at either abstract or conceptual levels through deductive reasoning and 
logical process by drawing conclusions from known phenomenon or something 
known to be true. For example, if we know that all PPP projects are perceived to be 
privately financed and often expensive and we also know that the Airport Link 
Tunnel is a PPP project, then we can deduce that the Airport Link Tunnel is privately 
financed and therefore may be expensive. 
3.2.2 Inductive and Deductive Theory 
Gilbert (2007) stated that deductive theory was the process of using a theory to 
explain particular observations, known as deduction. Deduction takes the data of a 
particular case and applies a general theory in order to deduce an explanation of the 
data. The difference between induction and deduction theories is; induction is the 
technique for generating theories and deduction is the technique for applying them. 
Zikmund (1996) defined inductive theory as a logical process of establishing a 
general proposition on the basis of observation of particular facts. It is the basic 
technique for moving from a set of observations to a theory and is at the heart of 
sociological theory construction (Gilbert, 2007). Induction theory is not without 
mistakes, and could construct erroneous, misleading or over simplistic theories. For 
example, all PPP projects that have ever been constructed are expensive; therefore 
all PPP projects are expensive. Figure 3.1below demonstrates the development of 
theory through induction methodology. 
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Figure 3.1: Construction of induction theory. 
Source: Gilbert (2007) 
 
The problem associated with inductive research is the justification of the 
research question, because a theory based research question can extend into an 
existing theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), meaning the researcher has to 
frame the research question within the context of the theory. The justification of such 
a research question relies on the ability of qualitative data to offer insight into a 
complex social process that quantitative data cannot easily reveal.  
3.2.3 Interpretivism Theory 
A major anti-positivist stance is interpretivism, which looks for “culturally 
derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty, 
1998; pp. 67). There is no direct one-to-one relationship between the researcher 
(subjects) and the phenomenon (object). Interpretivism is defined as an alternative 
research philosophy with its own ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
focus on reality as a human construct that can only be understood subjectively 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; pp. 13). Interpretivism is the opposite of positivism 
Theory 
The social world 
Data Data
Data 
Data
Data
Data 
Data 
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“a philosophical system that recognises only the positive facts and observable 
phenomenon” (Kroeze, 2012). On the other hand, positivism provides a framework 
to explore the reality of a particular entity which can be understood objectively. 
Unlike positivist research, interpretivist research does not work with “falsifiable 
statements” or “strict hypotheses” (Ballsun-Stanton, 2010; pp. 123), but through 
integration of human interest into the research.  
According	to	Myers	(2008,	pp.38),	“interpretive	researchers	assume	that	
access	 to	 reality	 (given	 or	 socially	 constructed)	 is	 only	 through	 social	
constructions	 such	 as	 language,	 consciousness,	 shared	 meanings,	 and	
instruments.”	 Interpretivism	 is	 “associated	 with	 the	 philosophical	 position	 of	
idealism,	 and	 is	 used	 to	 group	 together	 diverse	 approaches,	 including	 social	
constructionism,	phenomenology	and	hermeneutics;	approaches	that	reject	the	
objectivist	 view	 that	 meaning	 resides	 within	 the	 world	 independently	 of	
consciousness”	(Collins,	2010;	pp.	38).	Moreover,	interpretivism	studies	usually	
focus	on	meaning	and	may	employ	multiple	methods	in	order	to	reflect	different	
aspects	 of	 the	 issue.	 The	 basic	 differences	 between	 positivism	 and	
interpretivism	are	illustrated	by	Pizam	and	Mansfield	(1999)	as	shown	in	Figure	
3.2.	
Assumptions  Positivism  Interpretivism 
Nature of reality  Objective, tangible, single Socially constructed, multiple 
Goal of research  Explanation, strong 
prediction 
Understanding, weak prediction 
Focus of interest  What is general, average 
and representative 
What is specific, unique, and 
deviant 
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Knowledge generated Laws 
Absolute (time, context, 
and value free) 
Meanings 
Relative (time, context, culture, 
value bound) 
Subject/Researcher 
relationship 
Rigid separation Interactive, cooperative, 
participative 
Desired information  How many people think 
and do a specific thing, or 
have a specific problem 
What some people think and do, 
what kind of problems they are 
confronted with, and how they 
deal with them 
Figure 3.2: Difference between Positivism and Interpretivism theory (Pizam and Mansfield, 1999). 
 
3.2.4 Research aim and purpose 
The purpose of research is to discover the truth, which is hidden and yet to be 
discovered through the application of scientific procedures. The primary aim of this 
research was to examine the various issues related to the use of PPP procurement 
models and their causes and effects. The research also investigated the impacts of 
PPP delivered projects on society, and where weaknesses existed, searched for ways 
to make improvements. PPP delivered public infrastructure is preferred by 
governments primarily because it allows for non-immediate payments (United 
Nations, 2011) until after completion. The concessional component allows the 
private investor to manage the infrastructure or use the constructed asset to provide 
services to the public through a lease arrangement, and later transferred back to the 
public upon expiration of the lease.  
This research investigated and evaluated the key principles surrounding PPP 
arrangements, the true cost of PPP to society (financial and non-financial) and 
potential VfM, (perceived by the United Nations, 2011) as benefits. The research 
further examined benefits that arose from using the PPP mode of procurement, 
including costs, and effects associated with PPP, which were either ignored or 
excluded from PPP costs estimates (Shaoul, 2005).  
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3.2.5 Research problem 
The research examined in depth the extant literature on PPP and public 
procurement to establish what the espoused benefits to society and resultant costs of 
provision of those benefits, by PPP arrangements were, and how they could be 
measured. The basic principle in the evaluation and assessment of economic and 
social benefits of infrastructure investment is to find the aggregate of welfare 
changes that have affected individuals and society. Changes in welfare are measured 
in monetary values, satisfaction derived in terms of efficiency, and quality of 
services by how the infrastructure meets the expected infrastructure outcomes. 
The basic research question that arose from this research was how do we know 
if the benefits identified during the infrastructure assessment and evaluation process 
were actually realised, if they were not properly quantified and measured? With PPP 
transport infrastructure delivery, it is possible to identify the number of people 
affected by project operations and outcomes, but the difficulty associated with social 
benefits and costs measurement relates to their intangible nature. This makes the real 
benefits (or lack of them) hard to identify, quantify and measure, both in monetary, 
or other value perspectives, considered acceptable by society.  
There is also an issue in determining the population target definition, i.e., the 
boundary of the population affected or unaffected by the infrastructure construction. 
For example, when measuring the PPP benefits, effects and impacts of the Airport 
Link Tunnel Project, the population target was considered as being those living 
within the construction area and end-users of the tunnel at the local level. At the 
national level, the numbers of those affected (beneficiaries and losers) might be 
proportionally lower. However, when the overall beneficiaries and losers are 
aggregated, the benefits and effects may become significant and relevant enough to 
be considered in future policy development. The use of other measures such as 
individual perception and satisfaction derived from using the Airport Link Tunnel, 
based either on efficiency or effectiveness of the services, and the impact to improve 
or detract from human quality of life, becomes too vast a measurement task for one 
research study. For these reasons, this research investigated and examined the 
benefits, costs, effects and impacts that had immediate and short-term protracted 
impact on local society as a whole, and evaluated whether the benefits of PPP 
delivery of public infrastructure projects outweighed the costs involved. 
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3.2.6 Research objective 
The major objective of this research is to improve knowledge in the public 
domain on PPP arrangements, which will contribute to filling the disparity in the 
literature on using the private investor in the delivery of public infrastructure, 
identified in Chapter 2 of this study (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; IPA, 2007; Katz, 
2006; Mineta, 2006). In addition, the intent is to provide a clearer understanding of 
public infrastructure investments’ and their benefits, costs, effects and impacts on 
society; in particular, road transport infrastructures that are capable of conferring 
these attributes and considered as a self-funding asset (Yescombe, 2007). However, 
the data required to fulfil the aims and objectives of the research were difficult to 
obtain as PPP is protected from normal development competition, or more 
transparent accountability by the government. This is despite the fact that there is a 
perception by some authors (Ding, 1999; Loosemore and McCarthy, 2008; Nijkamp 
et al., 1990) that the activities of PPP are protracted, have spill-over effects and 
impose financial burdens onto the taxpayer. PPP concessional arrangements stretch 
from 35 to 45 years, and as they are not immediately measurable within a short time 
of development completion, do cast doubt on real PPP VfM, or other benefits 
identified during earlier feasibility studies and business case development. Risks 
associated with PPP delivery are neither quantified nor evaluated adequately 
(UKNAO, 2009; Shaoul, 2005), which can therefore threaten, devalue or even derail 
infrastructure delivery outcomes.  
Therefore, the governments’ intention in using PPP as a collaborative 
arrangement which provides VfM is largely undefined, and this research therefore 
poses the following fundamental questions:  
“Can PPP benefits and costs be effectively measured through assignment of 
monetary values?”  
  “Are there other alternative measurements that are appropriate and socially 
acceptable to measure the benefits and costs of PPP to society”? 
The research aim was to critically assess and investigate the benefits and costs 
of PPP road transport procurement to society.    
The objectives of the research were:   
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1. To investigate the full nature and scope of all PPP potential benefits and 
costs, including microeconomic, macroeconomic, financial, political 
and social. Additionally, how these benefits and costs, either short-term 
or long-term, arose from PPP? 
2. To assess the extent to which these benefits and costs are being 
effectively measured, along with scope and viability to improve 
measurement 
This question was answered using case studies and expert interviews, which 
were developed using the concepts below: 
 Examine the concept of PPP public infrastructure delivery using an 
evaluation of historical and existing case studies and interviews of 
various government agencies staff; such as the Department of 
Infrastructure and Planning, Queensland Treasury, BrisConnections Pty 
Limited and other private sector organisations involved in the delivery 
of PPP. It comprised of: 
o Data collection on current and past projects PPP infrastructures; 
o Observation of phenomena; 
o Interviewing of experts within the transportation construction 
industry (public and private sectors); 
o Ethnographic fieldwork; 
o Discourse analysis; and 
o Textual analysis. 
 To investigate government regulatory policies on the measurement of 
social benefits and effects and impacts, the research considered the 
following issues: 
o Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
o Net Present Value (NPV) 
o Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
Because, PPP infrastructures (economic and social 
infrastructures) are determined by the above analytical measurements, 
including benefits that accrue to society. 
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 To examine funding arrangements of PPP public infrastructure 
delivery, as well as the potential risks involved, the research considered 
the following issues: 
o Implications of deferred payments and future economic changes 
(risk); 
o Quantifying financial and non-financial governments’ incentives 
(diminution of public  resources); 
o Impact of government guarantees on the economy and 
consumption of unbudgeted resources. 
This was achieved by examining the Queensland Government’s borrowing 
capacity and credit rating, and establishing whether the ability of the government to 
raise taxes was a limitation to this capacity. In addition, the question of whether the 
Queensland Government was capable of funding these public infrastructures and 
services without the private sector’s participation was also considered.  
On completion of the analysis of the findings on whether or not PPP conferred 
real social benefits, and effects, and impacted positively or negatively on society, 
conclusions were drawn by relating findings back to the literature review of the 
rationale and eventual outcomes of similar PPP models and practices that had, or 
potentially could, confer social benefits to society. Interviews with experts involved 
with PPP delivery, in particular, road transport procurement and drawing from their 
actual project observations provided an in-depth view of PPP public infrastructure 
delivery practices. This process was designed to evaluate governments’ assertion of 
the economic benefits wrought by engagement in PPP in the form of VfM achieved 
and sheds more light on the reasoning by government that private sector participation 
is the preferred option over other traditional methods of delivery. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
Research methods can be either quantitative or qualitative, using direct 
observation of phenomenon, interviews and documents to produce an investigative 
outcome. In quantitative research, such as laboratory experiments, the researcher, in 
measuring dependent variables, could manipulate independent variables in a 
controlled environment to achieve a pre-determined outcome (Benbasat et al., 1987). 
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The manipulation and control of variables also applies in field experiments, where 
measurement of clearly defined data in a natural setting is controlled to achieve a 
certain outcome. In such cases, the researcher has prior knowledge of the experiment 
or field results, and hardly deviates from a prescribed outcome. Strauss and Corbin 
(1991) argued that quantitative research answered the question “how much”, which 
enabled the researcher to interpret existing events. However, combinations of many 
variables can lead to the risk of losing the research objective and accurate 
interpretation of the phenomenon. This research used the literature review as a means 
of substantiating or refuting current PPP procurement practices; case studies of 
completed and uncompleted projects (Airport Link Tunnel Project and London 
Underground Project), and interviews of PPP practitioners from the public and 
private sectors. The choice of the interviewees was based on their involvement with 
the PPP industry, either in the capacity of funding or delivery of PPP infrastructures. 
Most interviewees experience with PPP was of more than 10 years in practice and 
the private sector interviewees worked with Metronet consortium (London) and were 
subsequently engaged with the various PPP consortia in Australia. 
This research used both inductive and deductive theory, as well as 
interpretivism theory as its research methodology to unravel PPP procurement of 
public infrastructure delivery that started with a literature review of existing theories, 
and continued with case studies, and interviews.  
3.3.1 Qualitative methodology  
Hoepfl (1997) argued that qualitative research used a naturalistic approach that 
sought to understand a phenomenon in the context of a specific setting. However, 
logical positivism or quantitative research tends to use experimental methods and 
quantitative measures to test hypothetical generalisations. Each of these methods 
represents a different fundamental inquiry paradigm and the researcher’s actions are 
based on the underlying assumptions of each paradigm. 
Qualitative research is defined as a means that “produces findings not arrived 
at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). While quantitative research seeks causal determination, prediction, 
and generalisation of findings, qualitative research instead seeks illumination, 
understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations. Qualitative analysis results in 
a different type of knowledge than quantitative inquiry. There are several 
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considerations when deciding to adopt a qualitative research methodology. Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) claimed that qualitative methods could be used to better 
understand any phenomenon about which little is yet known. It could also be used to 
gain new perspectives on things about which much is already known, or to gain more 
in-depth information that may be difficult to convey quantitatively. Research 
problems tend to be framed as open-ended questions that will support discovery of 
new information.  
A qualitative research methodology was used in this research, with other 
research methods used for exploratory investigation, such as case studies and 
interviews. This research adopted these methods, due to the case studies (The Airport 
Link Tunnel Project and London Underground Rehabilitation and Renovation 
Project), as the data collection involved various sources. These two case studies were 
chosen because they were PPP projects with different contractual terms and funding 
by private investors. In qualitative research, the researcher has no prior knowledge of 
the outcomes of the investigative process or possibly even the true variables of 
interest. Using a case study approach provides the flexibility to allow for answering 
of the questions “how and why”, which enables a deeper understanding of a 
particular phenomenon and its complexities. Qualitative research does not include 
statistical procedures or ways of quantification; rather, it deals with the real world 
context, such as a person’s life, emotions, and feelings, as well as considering the 
functionality of organisations. Qualitative research is interpretative, though an 
element of background information expressed in quantitative terms might be present.  
For example, Yin (1989; 2003) stated that qualitative research could be used in 
the exploration areas, where little was known about a particular phenomenon, and 
based on the nature of the problem. Tellis (1997) stated that one of the benefits of 
qualitative research was the exploration of the unknown, which could be a single 
case study, multiple cases or randomly selected cases being used. In other words, the 
number of case studies is irrelevant in exploration research; rather, what is important 
is whether the case study chosen is capable of leading to the knowledge of discovery 
and work structure of the phenomenon.  
The Airport Link Tunnel and the London Underground projects were chosen 
because they presented or highlighted the difficulties associated with PPP delivery. 
For example, the Airport Link Tunnel highlighted the tunnelling engineering 
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difficulties and underestimating the risk involved with a tunnelling project, for which 
the outcome was uncertain, as capital recovery depended on traffic numbers and 
motorist patronage. The London Underground project was abandoned by the 
consortia that were incapable of executing the project, in spite of government support 
and financial incentives available.  
3.3.2 Case study 
Case study research is a method that excels at bringing us to an understanding 
of a complex issue, which adds strength to what is already known through previous 
research (Dooley, 2002). It is an exploratory process towards the discovery of a 
phenomenon and the extensiveness of such phenomena in the real life context; which 
makes it distinctively different from other research methods (Yin, 1994; 2009). 
Therefore, a case study has the ability to use various resources. In addition, a case 
study allows for broader investigation of historical and behavioural issues of a 
particular phenomenon.  
However, Rowley (2002) stated that a case study as a research method lacked 
rigor and objectivity, when compared with other social research methods, because its 
dependence on a single case rendered the research incapable of providing a 
generalised conclusion. Tellis (1997); Yin (1989) refuted the statement and argued 
that the number of cases was immaterial with exploratory research, because there 
were pre-established goals and parameters in the research aims and objectives, which 
were rigidly followed and it mattered little what number of case studies were used. 
Benbasat et al., (1987); Rowley (2002) stated that case studies were suited for new 
research areas, where existing theories were inadequate and fresh perspective was 
needed. Yin (1994) summarised a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigated 
a contemporary phenomenon for which its context was not evident. To paraphrase 
Yin’s (1994) statement, a case study has the ability to undertake an investigation of a 
phenomenon to a particular level, if the context and procedure can be replicated or 
produce a better understanding of the phenomenon. It is evidence of a theory 
discovery (Benbasat et al., 1987; Rowley, 2002). If a case study is capable of 
answering questions, it is also capable of introducing a new theory or future 
researchable concept. Benbasat et al., (1987) stated that the difference between a case 
study and other research methods was the lack of prior knowledge of the variables of 
interest, and the ways these variables were analysed. In this research, the chosen case 
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studies were used in the validation of PPP infrastructure social benefits to society. 
Data collection from many sources enables accurate data analysis and interpretation 
of what is under investigation (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) stated that case studies enabled the construction of theories, propositions, and 
mid-range theory based on empirical evidence. They serve as a replication of logic 
that serves as a distinct experiment which stands alone as an analytic unit 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, Yin (1994) described case studies as a series of 
laboratory experiments that served as replications, constructs, and extensions to an 
emerging theory. In addition, a research methodology that incorporates case studies 
is capable of accommodating a rich variety of data sources, including interview, 
archival data, survey data, ethnographies, and observations (Hargadon and Sutton, 
1997).  
These research case studies were considered the best option because they were 
PPP procurements, which highlighted the difficulties associated with infrastructure 
risks and inclusion of unreasonable contract caveats. It was an exploratory process 
that involved interviews with respondents from the public and private sectors, who 
were directly involved with the delivery of the Airport Link Tunnel Project. The 
research also involved a document review of hard and soft copies of correspondence 
and printed documentation related directly to the Airport Link Tunnel Project 
funding arrangements, in particular, papers from the Department of Infrastructure 
and Planning and the government agency responsible for the Airport Link funding 
and procurement arrangements.  
3.3.3 Research justification to use case study 
Case studies are complex, because they involve multiple sources of data 
collection and may include multiple cases within a study, thus producing a large 
amount of data for analysis. Dooley (2002) stated that case studies employed the 
process of identifying patterns inherent in discourse, or other phenomena, such as 
conversational analysis, ethno science, and other qualitative research methods.  
The choice of the Airport Link and London Underground projects satisfies the 
application of a real life contemporary setting, human situations and public 
accessibility of written reports. Although the second case study is not a road 
transport , however, railroad fits within the overall category of transportation 
industry (World Bank Database and PPIAF, 2012), and positioned firmly within PPP 
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with distinctive characteristics of private funding, construction, operation, and 
concessional lease agreement of 33 years based on 7½ years segment with 
established SPV.  
Levy (1988) stated case studies were appropriate where they represented and 
met all of the necessary conditions for testing a theory. Yin (2009) argued that case 
studies allowed for in-depth investigation that produced a rich description and 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The Airport Link Tunnel Project can generally be described as a complex 
project (3 projects in 1) as the construction was underground, capital intensive and 
funded through staple units. The Airport Link Tunnel project achieved a financial 
close through foreign banks. The PPP consortium (BrisConnections) was previously 
involved with the delivery of the Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel. The London 
Underground project consortia were unable to identify the risks associated with the 
tubelines and misinterpreted the performance measures included within the contract. 
In both instances, the Airport Link Tunnel and London Underground project case 
studies are robust, covering the research objectives, problems, assumptions and 
claims of the government of the virtue of PPP projects benefiting the society. Figure 
3.3illustrates the stages in this research. The definition of the research problem and 
literature review that includes the review of concepts of previous research findings 
were completed at the beginning of this research. This is followed by examination of 
case studies (Airport Link Tunnel and London Underground projects); interviews, 
data analysis and data interpretation. This process is likely to lead to generating 
hypotheses and discovery of new theories or future research based on the 
investigation outcome. 
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Figure 3.3: Research process in flow chart 
Data collected from interviews, and examination of current and historical 
case studies will enable the opportunity for consideration as to whether PPP 
infrastructure delivery provides socio-economic benefits or not, and to what degree. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, (2007) stated that interviews were a highly efficient way of 
gathering rich, empirical data, especially when the phenomenon of interest was 
highly sporadic and infrequent. However, interview data is not without bias, when 
interviewees are considered as informants. The bias is avoidable when interviewees 
are chosen from different backgrounds and knowledge of the phenomenon is diverse. 
Another way of avoiding interview data bias is to combine retrospective and real-
time cases (Leonard-Burton, 1990) to enable the researcher to discover more 
informants and cases that can build on existing theory.  
This area of investigation of PPP’s benefits, costs, effects, and impacts to 
society is largely unexplored when reviewing the extant of literature that prompted 
further research into the social benefits and other effects of PPP on society.  
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3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
One of the virtues of qualitative research is the ability to use many sources for 
data collection. Data collection can utilise various processes, such as interviews, 
observations, videos, documents, historical data, newspapers and magazines (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008). A combination of these sources can be used depending on the 
problem under investigation. Equally, triangulation as a means of data validation can 
be considered (Jick, 1979), whereby, a combination of interviews with observations, 
and document reviews are brought together for the purposes of verification.  
This research adopted semi-structured interviews as part of its data collection, 
with the aim of collecting the views of experienced PPP practitioners’ in order to 
build up a valid set of views on the efficacy of, and problems related to, PPP 
infrastructure delivery as informed by the Airport Link Tunnel case study project and 
others. Unstructured interviews (open-ended questions) were not used in this 
investigation to avoid analytical difficulties and negate the need to use a more 
sophisticated statement analytical software rather than simple manual theme coding. 
Interview questions were developed based on the outcomes of a preliminary pilot 
study outcome, which confirmed the research questions suitability and validity for 
this research. Moreover, using a semi-structured interview obtained an in-depth data-
set of experts’ perceptions on critical relevant issues, related to the research problem. 
At the same time, the interviews provided a lucid real-world view on PPP public 
infrastructure deliveries. 
3.4.1 Interviews 
Each interview focussed on personnel actively involved with the public 
infrastructure delivery in the public and private sectors respectively. About 10 
interviewees (all having considerable engineering and financial experience) were 
involved in both case studies (The Airport Link Tunnel and London Underground 
Project). Apart from the interviewees from the Lutwyche team of the Northern 
Busway project, whose specific experiences were used to investigate the perceptions 
of social disadvantages and effects of living close to ALT (environmental), the 
remaining interviewees have all worked internationally and in Australia on various 
projects undertaken on a PPP basis.  Corbin and Strauss (2008) stated that 
unstructured interview questions tended to produce a formidable result in most cases. 
By adopting an unstructured interview style, the researcher maintains control and 
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influence over the course of the interview. The interview questions were sent one 
week ahead of the interview date to the interviewee. This research adopted an open-
ended interview style that allowed for individual variations (Hoepfl, 1997), based on 
a list of questions or topics of interest. The prepared questions were to ensure the 
same information was obtained from each interviewee. There were also no 
predetermined responses, which allowed the researcher to probe and explore within 
the predetermined inquiry areas. More importantly, the interviews were timed to a 
maximum of 45 minutes to help keep the interaction focused and exclude questions 
that were not relevant to the goals of the research. Therefore, two purposes were 
achieved by satisfying the line of inquiry, and simultaneously, asking friendly 
questions that were non-threatening in the interview (Yin, 2006). The interview data 
were tape-recorded and permission was obtained from the interviewee prior to 
recording. Hoepfl (1997) stated that tape recording of interviews was indispensable, 
while Lincoln and Guba (1985) did not recommend the use of tape recorders, except 
for unusual reasons, which was based on the intrusiveness of recording devices and 
the possibility of technical failure. By recording the interviews, the entire data was 
captured, which allowed the researcher to concentrate on the interview, rather than 
writing notes. The interview data was later transcribed.    
Questions and answers are a means of communication, and often, are 
embedded with unspoken assumptions through expressions, feelings, beliefs, 
experiences and intentions (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Manson, 2002). PPP public 
infrastructure delivery is a sensitive issue, especially when it comes to seeking 
information on the perceived benefits of PPP to society.  However, caveats and 
commercial in confidence clauses contained within PPP arrangements prohibited the 
divulgence of privileged/confidential information to a third party for a certain period 
of limitation (statute of limitation 10 years) in Queensland. The interviewees briefly 
described some of the funding arrangements without tabling these documents, in 
particular in the private sector, even when anonymity was offered to the participant.  
3.4.2 Data analysis 
Data analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating or otherwise 
recombining evidence to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin, 2009). The 
process of analysing interview data is difficult; because there is no simple pattern to 
analysis data, although the analytic process is confined within working with the data, 
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breaking the data into manageable units, synthesising the data, searching for patterns, 
discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what to tell 
others (Hoepfl, 1997). Qualitative research tends to use inductive analysis, which 
means the critical themes will emerge out of the data and require some creativity in 
placing the raw data into logical, meaningful categories, and to find ways of 
communicating the interpretation to others. Data analysis begins with identification 
of themes that emerge from the raw data, a process often referred to as “open 
coding” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). For example, the transcribed interview data 
produced a total number of 106 pages (52,869 words), which were manually 
assigned sub-titles and categorised into groups. The idea was to create descriptive, 
multi-dimensional categories, which formed the preliminary framework for the 
analysis. The data was later loaded into a computer programme called NVivo that 
was designed to aid in the task of data analysis.  
Strauss and Corbin (1990) stated that analysing the first interview and 
observation with line-by-line analysis lead to data categorisation, which became the 
basis for theoretical sampling and results coding. Charmaz, (2006) defined coding as 
a pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain 
the data. The process of coding enables definition of happenings with the data that 
leads to a better understanding of the data. This enables a close examination by 
comparing similarities and differences of answers to questions asked about the 
phenomena under investigation as reflected in the data.  
NVivo was chosen based on its capacity to analyse and categorise large 
amounts of data collected from open-ended interviews or volumes of written 
materials (Yin, 2009). NVivo classifies, sorts, codes and arranges a variety of 
qualitative materials. Following the NVivo data analyses, a theoretical reassessment 
of the case study findings was undertaken to ascertain whether the data was 
substantiated or refuted, or extended some of the existing theories. The summary of 
the interviews is presented in Chapter 6. Here is a sample of NVivo data coding on 
PPP costing and procurement: 
 
 Interview 22022012[1]> - § 6 references coded [11.95% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 2.00% Coverage 
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 The PPP tender process is hellishly expensive, very expensive process. So 
from a contractor’s perspective, there are only a limited number of people 
that would have the balance sheet to be able to support the big costs. 
Typically, you’re probably looking at one per cent of the project value to bid. 
So on a job that’s worth two billion dollars, you could be up to twenty million 
dollars for your big cost.  
 
 
3.4.3 Theory discovery 
Theory discovery tends to establish how the finding complements, 
substantiates, or refutes a related research program. Keating (1995) stated that theory 
discovery tended to confirm the present theory knowledge, gaps in knowledge of the 
theory, and any unresolved theory puzzles. Theory refinement is the middle ground 
between theory discovery and theory refutation, because theory refinement utilises a 
definitive theory that serves as a focal point for examining a research objective. 
While theory refutation is designed to establish any non-conformity of a well-
established theory, it usually produces a negative outcome that contradicts an 
existing, or well-accepted, theory interpretation. Table 3.1 shows the functions of 
theories and objectives in qualitative research. 
 
Table 3.1: Theories and objectives in qualitative research. 
Theory discovery case Theory refinement case Theory refutation case
Theory discovery cases are 
mostly open ended and 
remotely guided by any 
existing theory. 
Theory refinement seeks to 
establish credibility of a 
specific theory or develop the 
theory into a testable form. 
Theory refutation seeks to 
function as a crucial test of 
theory or counteracts 
established theory by 
producing a different 
theory. 
Source: Keating (1995) Categories of case study research 
 
3.4.4 Generalisation 
The key principles of good quality research are found in the researcher’s notion 
of neutrality and findings or decisions. It is based on these criteria that other 
researchers regard the piece of research as knowledge, which can be assimilated into 
the knowledge base of the field of study (Rowley, 2002). Therefore, it is important 
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that the researcher considers and demonstrates that the principles of good quality 
research are articulated into the research. 
Generalisation of a case study, which contributes to theory development, is 
important. Generalisation can only take place if the case study design has been 
appropriately formed by theory, which can be seen to add to an existing or 
established theory. Case study generalisation is not statistical, rather, an analytical 
generalisation for which previous theory is used as a template to compare the 
empirical results of a case study. Where two or more cases tend to support the same 
theory, replication can be claimed. However, in analytic generalisation, each case is 
viewed as an experiment, and not a case within an experiment. Therefore, the 
number of cases a study that supports replication of a theory involves, the greater 
rigour with which a theory can be established (Rowley, 2002). 
3.4.5 Validity 
Validity refers to the degree to which a test, tool or technique is capable of 
measuring what it is supposed to measure. Validity deals with soundness and 
effectiveness of measurement instruments of research and to what extent the test 
complies with the aims it is designed for (Rowley, 2002). For example, interview 
questions and case studies were relevant to PPP operations and research objectives, 
and were used to validate the literature review findings on PPP mode of 
procurement. For the purposes of this research, validity in relation to this research 
design was confirmed through the following types of validity tests: 
Construct validity: this is proven by establishing correct operational measures 
for concepts under investigation or being studied. It is concerned with exposing and 
reducing subjectivity, and linking data collection questions and measures to research 
questions and propositions, which was the focus of this research project (Lucko and 
Rojas, 2010; Golafshani, 2003). For example, research questions were sent to 
interviewees ahead of the interview date and those less comfortable with the 
questions withdrew before the interview date. 
Internal validity: means the degree to which the researcher is justified in 
concluding that an observed relationship is casual. In relation to this research, data 
was collected using multiple sources such as literature reviews, case studies, and 
interviews, which were used to triangulate the findings (Golafshani, 2003).  
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However, the use and publication of commercial-in-confidence project data was a 
sensitive issue and concern to the organisations that provided the information. 
However, the data compiled for this research were derived from publicly sourced 
documents, which can be validated from those sources.  
External validity: is the degree to which the researcher can establish the 
domain of a research finding can be generalised. Generalisation is based on 
replication of logic as discussed above. The external validity and generalisation of 
this research finding was in line with the sources used, therefore, if the same process 
was replicated, it should produce the same or similar results.  
Reliability: reliability demonstrates that the operations of a study, such as the 
data collection produced, can be repeated with the same results (Rowley, 2002).It is a 
term that refers to data accuracy. Data is said to be reliable if the same process is 
replicated and it achieves the same result or outcome. Equally, data reliability can be 
achieved through documentation of procedures and appropriate record keeping. As 
mentioned in this research methodology, participants involved in this case study 
were those directly involved with PPP deliveries or practitioners. For example, 
interviews and conversations were tape-recorded and could be used to verify the 
authenticity of the information reported, including the manual transcriptions, if the 
process is repeated by another researcher.  
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
This research methodology describes the process of investigating phenomenon 
using the qualitative research method to examine the benefits of using the PPP mode 
of procurement, including costs, and effects associated with PPP, which is either 
ignored or excluded from PPP costs estimates (Shaoul, 2005). The aspects of 
methodology adopted include a literature review of PPP procurement and the VfM 
inherent. Case studies of the Airport Link Tunnel and the London Underground 
project were used to determine why PPP is predominantly used with the delivery of a 
public infrastructure. In addition, PPP practitioners in both the public and private 
sector were interviewed that were involved in either the funding of a PPP project or 
its construction.  
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The interview data were transcribed and given sub-headings, before using 
NVivo software to perform the data analyses, which had the ability to analyse not 
only audio and text sources, but also visual sources like videos.  
The next chapter discusses the Airport Link Tunnel project, which is a case 
study used in this research.   
Chapter 4: Airport Link Tunnel Case Study 
A Case Study of the Brisbane Airport Link Tunnel Project 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the research methodology was discussed, which adopts 
a qualitative approach using a mixture of literature review, case studies and interview 
data that will lead to new theory development and refinement of existing theory. The 
process of analysing case study data varies, as different forms of analysis can be 
undertaken in order to describe the events that took place.  
This chapter discusses the case study of the Airport Link Tunnel project (ALT 
project), which is the most capital-intensive project carried out in Queensland over 
the last 6 years. The Airport link Tunnel was a three-in-one project that comprised 
the Northern Busway, the Airport Roundabout Flyover, and the Airport Link Tunnel 
(Deloitte, 2009). In 2005, TransApex performed feasibility studies of proposed 
transport networks in Brisbane (Queensland) for four to five potential road tunnels at 
an estimated cost of around $10 billion (TransApex, 2005), this was later split into 
three tunnels, with the Airport Link Tunnel being one of those three.   
 
4.2 THE AIRPORT LINK TUNNEL PROJECT 
The ALT project is part of the Queensland Government’s strategic plan for 
decongesting traffic on the SEQ region arterial roads (The Coordinator-General, 
2006). The Queensland Government and Brisbane City Council were the proponents 
and joint sponsors of the ALT project. In 2005 the preliminary cost evaluation of the 
project was estimated at around $1.2 billion of capital works, with a qualifying 
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statement stating that, “Costs will vary and depend on the construction mode” in the 
Initial Advice Statement (IAS, 2005). The project pre-investigation led to the 
feasibility study and business case development, which was conducted in accordance 
with the Queensland Government Value for Money Material Guidelines (2008) and 
funded by the Brisbane City Council (BCC) and Queensland Government. The 
diagram below is the ALT design Ariel photo. 
 
 
There existed optimism within both governments that the ALT project would 
create job opportunities in Queensland in the areas of design, construction, and 
management, which was reaffirmed in the Coordinator General’s Report (CGR, 
2008) and became a precondition for the ALT project’s approval. Moreover, as the 
spill-over effects from the ALT construction would impact on the materials and 
supplies services, this would in turn benefit the services provider (consortium). In 
Queensland, the State Development Act (1971) is a comprehensive policy guideline 
on environmental impact assessments and evaluations for conducting feasibility 
studies and estimating the overall impact of proposed infrastructure investment on 
society. In addition, the ALT terms of reference (ToR) were limited regarding details 
of the costs associated with the ALT delivery, but still highlighted the benefits of the 
project to society, as both government bodies were eager to proceed with the 
construction. The implication being that the ALT was politically guided and 
circumvented the government’s own policy based on established processes and 
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procedures for capital developments (TransApex, 2005). One of the clauses in the 
State Development Act (1971) empowers the Coordinator General, as the responsible 
officer, to declare a project significant or insignificant. Following such a 
pronouncement, further actions can take place, such as the carrying-out the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) and Initial Assessment Statement (IAS). 
The essence of the IAS report is to detail the benefits, infrastructure effects and 
impacts on society, and also on policy development. The IAS covers the following 
aspects: 
 project detailed objectives; 
 policy frameworks and guidelines, including those relevant to local, 
state, and commonwealth governments; 
 project potential effects on other existing and relevant infrastructures; 
 project potential employment opportunities; 
 project potential environmental effects on society; and  
 project benefits to society at a state or national level. 
 
The difference between the IAS and EIS is that IAS focuses on the economic 
benefits and social effects of a proposed infrastructure on society and its potential to 
improve human living standards. EIS identifies the potential causes and 
environmental effects and impacts on society (pollution, dust, noise) and possible 
mitigation processes (SDA, 1971). In 2006, the Queensland Premier announced 
(Media Release, October 2006) that a business plan and business case had been 
developed by an independent consultant (name withheld) that indicated the proposed 
ALT and Northern Busway projects were commercially viable and affordable, and 
would reduce travelling times for the public in SEQ. The ALT would cost taxpayers 
the sum of $3.4 billion and the Northern Busway $728 million, these estimates did 
not include the Airport Roundabout Flyover. These projects were to be delivered 
simultaneously to maximise resources (costs) and reduce effects of the ALT 
construction on residents (Media Release, October 2006).   
4.2.1 The Airport Link Tunnel project economic objectives 
The ALT project was put forward as “building a better and more liveable city 
in the SEQ (2008)” and “transport for Brisbane” (BCC 2008), which was the major 
  
Chapter 4:Airport Link Tunnel Case Study 161 
selling point to make the development attractive to Queenslanders. One of the 
economic benefits envisaged in the project was the potential of creating job 
opportunities and stimulating Queensland’s economy (macroeconomic rationale) and 
easing traffic congestion in the SEQ region. In early 2003, prior to considering any 
other alternative modes of delivery, the Queensland Minister for Transport and Main 
Roads (Steve Bredhauer) expressed concern in Parliament about the viability of these 
toll roads without substantial contributions from the BCC and Queensland State 
Government (QSG), or a possible strategy to force traffic off the Story Bridge into 
the toll tunnels, however, this went unheeded (TransApex, 2005).  
TransApex (2005) stated that PPP was chosen as the preferred option, and 
referred to the ALT as “Newman’s Five Tunnel Vision”. BCC argued that other 
delivery options could not offer similar value as PPP, and provided $2.9 million for 
the toll transport feasibility assessment and additional $2.4 million for detailed pre-
construction studies on the North-South By-Pass to TransApex in 2004-2005 budget 
appropriation. The bidding process was by invitation, which eliminated other 
services providers from participating. In addition, the bidding clause (Deputy 
Premier’s Office, June 6, 2007) stated that the winning consortium or services 
provider would use the constructed asset to provide services to the public for a 
concessional period of forty-five years, a clause which might have discouraged many 
services providers (had they actually been permitted to bid). The service provider 
would design, build, finance, operate and maintain the infrastructure for the same 
period (Deputy Premier’s Office, June 6, 2007; Coordinator General’s Report, 2008) 
and needed to be able to demonstrate relative experience with funding arrangements 
(private finance). Much later, the BCC and Queensland Government decided to fund 
the Northern Busway project (Stage 2) as a separate project, but it still remained part 
of the original three-in-one project contract awarded to BrisConnections.   
 
4.3 INITIAL AIRPORT LINK TUNNEL PROBLEMS 
The IAS (2005) identified substantial environmental hazards, as well as social 
and economic defects with the tunnel construction and predicted major disruptions of 
existing and pre-established organisations, such as schools and churches. Dust and 
pollution concerns were raised as having potential damaging effects on property 
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values, in particular between the Kedron and Windsor areas, and the construction 
works could subject the residents to sub-human living conditions, if the tunnel passed 
through those suburbs. Potential effects on road infrastructure included connections 
to the state road network, as well as changes in traffic volumes on other roads 
resulting from the construction. Other identified effects were to existing services, 
such as possible effects on the water supply, drainage, energy and 
telecommunication. Additionally, substantial environmental, social and economic 
benefit effects were identified at the regional, city and state levels. However, benefits 
expected from ALT construction included the followings: 
 Improved network travel time and reduced traffic accidents and congestion, 
with associated social benefits; 
 Increased road capacity available for use to the advantage of buses (including 
the proposed Northern Busway) and high-occupancy vehicles, pedestrians 
and cyclists; 
 Reduced noise levels and air quality impacts over significant areas, where the 
diversion of traffic from the existing road network moved into the tunnel. 
This would result in a reduction in severance effects, amenity and access 
improvements, with associated economic (property values and urban renewal) 
benefits. 
Despite the benefits associated with the ALT construction,3,000 submissions 
were received from the public, which raised 2,000 issues for consideration and 
change to the original project’s scope (CGR, 2008).These submissions from the 
public, due to their magnitude and the issues raised, demanded and justified rigorous 
analyses of the potential environmental impacts, prior to the tunnel’s approval. Even 
the EIS Report (2007) criticised the project’s scope and recommended linking the 
SEQ arterial roads and other existing networks with the ALT project (CGR, 2008) to 
maximise traffic volumes and motorists patronage. Table 4.1 shows examples of the 
changes required to the ALT project from various interest groups. 
Table 4.1: Submissions Received on the Environmental Impact Statement (2007) 
Submissions from the following categories: No of Submission
Government Advisory Agencies 16
Community Organisations 9
Private individuals or companies 141
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Pro-forma letters 131
Total 297
Source: EIS (2007) 
 
Pro-forma letters: Submissions received were related to project impacts on 
Kedron State High School. The first pro-forma submission of 104 responses was 
from members of the school community raising issues, and offering suggestions 
regarding ALT operations, including the following: 
 the safety of students and the wider school community during both 
construction and operation of the project;  
 the negative construction impacts arising from dust, noise, loss of grounds 
and reduced access; and  
 on-going operational impacts from traffic noise, air pollution and loss of 
access and amenity.  
 
The pro-forma submission also suggested that the minimum measures required 
to adequately address the issues raised were: 
 preparation of a safety management plan;  
 road and busway design with access and safety measures appropriate to the 
school community;  
 an indoor sports complex to compensate for the loss of school sporting 
facilities;  
 school air conditioning, including acoustic and air sealing treatment; and  
safe vehicular access and improved parking arrangements.  
 
The second pro-forma submission of 27 responses was a letter of objection that 
raised environmental and health concerns, as follows:  
 air quality and impacts on health;  
 tunnel emission filtration;  
 dust and noise pollution during construction; and  
 negative operational impact on traffic congestion, 
 
 The construction issues raised were as follows:  
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 noise and vibration from tunnelling and surface works;  
 disruption to local and regional traffic flows due to construction traffic and 
spoil haulage traffic in particular;  
 increased traffic hazards and safety concerns adjacent to worksites and some 
community facilities (e.g. Wooloowin State School, Kedron State High 
School);  
 reduced connectivity due to worksite impacts on pedestrian and cycle routes 
and open space networks; and 
 loss of locally important places and vegetation (Kalinga Park). 
 
Other operational issues were raised relative to the long-term effects and 
impacts of the tunnel on residents were as follows: 
 diminished air quality in proximity to the ventilation outlets, and 
potential health risk associations;  
 visual impact of the infrastructure on urban amenities;  
 impact on future land uses and regeneration potential around the surface 
connections; and  
 reductions in pedestrian connectivity across major roads adjacent to the 
project connections (e.g. Lutwyche Road, Sandgate Road and Campbell 
Street).  
 
Other issues were focused on the three surface connections of the tunnel, which 
were to be located at the north-east connection at Clayfield and highlighted potential 
impacts on the ventilation of the station. Concerns regarding the ventilation outlets 
were directed at residential properties around Alma Road (Clayfield) due to ALT 
structural size and visual dominance of the structures that could reduce property 
values in those residential areas.  
 
The submissions regarding the southern connection at Windsor were related to 
construction impacts (noise, dust, vibration and construction traffic) on nearby 
sensitive receptors, such as the Mews Apartments and the Royal Brisbane Hospital. 
In response, the BCC and QSG prepared and submitted a supplementary report to 
  
Chapter 4:Airport Link Tunnel Case Study 165 
address the issues raised in these submissions by category. Other concerns and 
mitigation processes as part of the ALT changes are presented in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2: Key changes of the proposed ALT project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These changes were approved by the Coordinator General; however, they 
increased construction risk, as the original ALT route was affected, requiring further 
risk investigations and resources which increased the delivery cost from $3.2 billion 
to $3.4 billion (TransApex, 2005). However, feasibility study and business case 
development costs already paid by BCC and QSG were excluded from the $3.4 
billion. For example, in the 2004-05 financial year the BCC provided $2.9 million 
for TransApex assessments and $23.4 million for detailed studies and pre-
construction work on the North-South By-Pass (RACQ, 2005) that were not 
considered towards ALT cost to society. The HM Treasury (2006) stated that 
establishment of the ultimate project benefits during infrastructure pre-concept 
development was important prior to any formal market engagement, as this was 
capable of reducing the overall project costs in terms of defining and clarifying 
The key changes of the proposed ALT project 
Amendments to the project 
design  
Increase in the length of tunnel built below ground, 
which has in turn reduced the amount of above-ground 
‘cut and cover’ tunnelling works, particularly along 
Lutwyche Road at Kedron and behind Kedron State High 
School. 
$5.5million to mitigate impacts on Kedron High and 
Wooloowin State
Ventilation 
Two ventilation stations will be below-ground to reduce 
noise and visual impact. 
The Clayfield station will be fully buried and the Bowen 
Hills station partially buried.
Earthing materials 
Use of an enclosed conveyor belt system to  transport 
soil and rock (spoil) from Toombul to the Brisbane 
airport site  
Reduce the number of spoil truck trips on local roads by 
80,000 movements
Social amenities 
Create new connections between green open spaces.  
New cycling and pedestrian paths in addition to existing 
ones 
Logistics Improvements 
Improve and enhance the Kedron Brook intersection road 
and relocate the surface road and overhead bridge 
underground. 
Future traffic management 
Manage and preserve arterial surfaces for future 
requirement to cater for change in alignment 
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infrastructure services objectives, by removing any misunderstandings and 
preconceived assumptions among the entities.  
4.3.1 The Airport Link Tunnel Project bidding consortia profile 
One of the conditions stipulated by the government with potential bidders was 
the need to have experience in the design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) 
mode of delivery, together with tunnelling engineering experience, and unlimited 
ability to secure finance without major difficulties (Deputy Premier’s Office, June 6, 
2007). The project attracted three consortia expressing interest in delivering the 
proposed ALT and Northern Busway projects. These groups were BrisConnections 
Pty Ltd, NorthConnect Motorway Pty Ltd, and Northern Motorway Pty Ltd. Table 
4.3 shows the bidding groups’ profiles and engineering experience in Australia. 
 
Table 4.3: Profile of bidding consortia 
Bidding Groups / Consortia Construction and Engineering Experiences
 
 
 
BrisConnections Consortium 
Consortium  comprises of: 
Macquarie Bank; Thiess; and John Holland 
 
Construction involvement: 
Sydney’s Lane Cove Tunnel 
Melbourne EastLink Motorway 
 
Queensland: 
 The Boggo Road Busway, 
 Eleanor Schonell Bridge 
 TrackStar Rail  
 
 
 
 
NorthConnect Pty Ltd 
Consortium 
Consortium comprises of: 
Baulderstone Hornibrook; Abigroup Limited; Bilfinger Berger 
Civil; and Babcock &Brown 
 
Other members  of the consortium (service providers): 
Bilfinger Berger Services Australia; Hyder-SMEC Joint-Venture; 
Coffey Geotechnics; and Hassell.  
 
Construction involvement: 
Queensland: 
 North-South Bypass Tunnel; 
 Gateway Upgrade Project; and  
 Tugun Bypass 
 
New South Wales: 
 Sydney’s M2; M5 East and M7 Motorways; 
 Sydney’s Cross City Tunnel; 
 NSW Ralcorp Rolling stock (PPP); and 
 Liverpool-Parramatta Transit way 
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Northern Motorway Pty Ltd 
Consortium comprises of: 
Leighton Contractors; and ABN AMRO Australia 
 
Other members of the consortium (service providers): 
Kumagai Gumi; Maunsell; GHD; EDAW; Woods Bagot; and 
Golder Associates. 
 
Construction involvement:  
North-South Bypass Tunnel; Gateway Upgrade Project; and 
Southbank TAFE Development (Concession Service 
Arrangement). 
Source: Media Release; Deputy Premier’s Office (June 6, 2007). 
 
Based on consortia profile and engineering experience in Australia, it appeared 
that NorthConnect Motorway Pty Ltd had an enviable record with experience in 
tunnelling construction and had been involved with motorway construction in New 
South Wales and Queensland), an exposure that favoured the group as the preferred 
bidder for the ALT project, and more importantly, with tunnelling experience as 
required by QSG (Deputy Premier’s Office, June 6, 2007). However, 
BrisConnections won the contract after failing in its bid to win the Clem Jones 
Tunnel (CLEM 7) project in 2006. In 2008, the QSG announced the appointment of 
BrisConnections Pty Ltd as the preferred contractor to deliver (at a cost of now $4.8 
billion) the ALT, the Northern Busway (Windsor-Kedron), and the Airport 
Roundabout Flyover (Media Release, Premier’s Office, 2008), known as three 
projects in one. The ALT would cost ($3.4 billion) to build, which included land 
costs, with the QSG making an initial contribution of $1.5 billion, instead of the 
$2.37 billion original budgeted and would cost taxpayers $47 million annually 
(interest) (Premier Media Release, May 19, 2008). ALT construction comprised of 
two tunnels and a new airport connection of a 7km, mainly underground toll road, 
with a 3km Windsor to Kedron section of the Northern Busway and a 750m flyover 
above the airport roundabout.  
The incentives offered to the successful consortium as part of the contract 
were: 
 45 year lease concession to provide services to the public using  the 
ALT as a toll road to recoup capital cost,  
 QSG initial capital outlay of $1.5 billion to BrisConnections; and 
 Annual interest payments of $47 million on ALT debt (private finance). 
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In other words, the perception of PPP being presumed to be solely financed by 
the private investor is incorrect, as the private investor also requires government 
contributions and annual payments of interest on funds borrowed from financial 
institutions. Katz (2006) stated that only developed economic (countries) could 
afford the services of PPP because of the costs involved and capital intensive. 
4.3.2 The implication of lower number of bidders 
There are a number of reasons for a project attracting a limited number of 
bidders and these can relate to a number of factors, such as infrastructure complexity, 
undefined infrastructure services objectives and infrastructure potential risk (HM 
Treasury 2006). In recent times, concentration of the construction industry into fewer 
hands has resulted to amalgamation, insolvency and forced takeovers of the industry, 
and Shaoul (2005) argued that when a proposed infrastructure attracted only a few 
bidders, the reasons for this might be linked to the large resources needed or the 
relative complexity of the infrastructure, which might at that stage be fairly 
undefined. In addition, financial markets are intolerant of small construction 
companies and somehow, use stringent conditions to force those small companies out 
of competition (funding refusal) (Shaoul 2005). The evidence for this can be seen in 
the amalgamation of the industry into formidable empires that results into formation 
of special purpose vehicle (SPV) arrangements (e.g. the Airport Link consortia 
bidding profile), or alternatively, smaller companies tend to become subcontractors 
to the consolidated empires (Shaoul, 2005).   
One of the disadvantages of consolidating the construction industry into fewer 
hands is that it tends to create potential price upsurges in the industry and in turn 
affects the services acquirer (public) as they are the services providers in the industry 
(Shaoul 2005) that determine the cost of services and quantities of supply. The 
downside is the possibility of creating an artificial monopoly through power and 
resource concentration into fewer hands that can inadvertently create uneven 
bargaining power and preferential contractual terms (ibid, 2005).  
The National Audit Office (UKNAO (2007); Shaoul (2005) argued that when 
power and resources were concentrated into fewer hands, the bidding process was no 
longer competitive. In other words, the empire (consortium) with vast resources is 
likely to exert undue influence and control over the future direction of the 
construction industry through acquisition or takeover of the smaller firms so as to 
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expand its own empire. In contradiction of UKNAO (2007) and Shaoul (2005) of 
having robust competition in construction industry, Grimsey and Lewis (2004; 2007) 
posited that the concentration of the construction industry into fewer hands perhaps 
might transform the industry into innovative and sustainable industry, thereby 
eliminating unwanted competitors. According to Shaoul (2005), by eliminating those 
unwanted competitors from the construction industry the services of the big empires 
have become largely unaffordable, except for few developed economies who could 
afford their services, because it is expensive.  
4.3.3 Airport Link Tunnel financial close 
The term “financial close” is defined as the existence of a legally binding 
commitment of equity holders or debt financiers in mobilising or providing funding 
for a particular project (Silva 2000). In 2008, BrisConnections reached a financial 
close with 10 banks, which indicated that ALT construction could commence in 
earnest and financial arrangement for the project was secured. In addition, reaching a 
financial close meant that the responsible consortium or consortia could potentially 
fund a significant portion of the project’s costs, and had secured the construction 
facilities as per contract stipulations, authorised construction and management of the 
project (Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2012), which BrisConnections managed to 
achieved before the deadline. 
BrisConnections achieved the financial close by securing underwritten debt 
from 10 banks (the Allied Irish Banks Plc, Bayerische Hypo and Vereins Bank, AG 
BNP Paribas, DEPFA Bank Plc, DZ Bank, AG HBC Finance Ireland, Society 
General and United Overseas Bank Limited, Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) 
Banking Group, BOS International (Australia) Limited, Deutsche Bank AG and JP 
Morgan Australia) for a total of $3.055 billion. The Queensland Government 
provided $1.5 billion (McIntyre, 2008; Moir, 2008; The Australian, 25 June 2008). 
One of the other conditions in the ALT contract stated that the winner of the 
contract (consortium) must register with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
and its shares were to be traded on the stock exchange, and BrisConnections was able 
to lodge the product disclosure statement (PDS) and initial public offer (IPO) with 
ASX as required by QSG.  
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4.4 FINANCIAL MARKET ANANLYSIS OF AIRPORT LINK TUNNEL 
STAPLE UNITS 
The market condition of the construction industry on the Australian Stock 
Exchange prior to BrisConnections’ registering of shares was experiencing a decline 
(BrisConnections Media Release, September 2008). The weighted average 
capitalisation of the toll road sector (Transurban, MIG, ConnectEast and RiverCity) 
decreased to 32 percent (15 September, 2008). The ALT initial public offer (IPO) 
launched in May, 2008 and traded below the weighted average of the toll road 
industry (32%).It continued to slide and never recovered. Figure 4.1, shows the 
market conditions of BrisConnections staple units trading below the weighted 
average of the toll road sector. 
 
Figure 4.1: Toll sector market conditions 
Source: BrisConnections Media Release, September 2008. 
 
BrisConnections traded on the Australian Stock Exchange under the name of 
BCSCA (BrisConnections Holding Trust) (ASX code) and its initial public offer 
(IPO) was underwritten by Credit Suisse (Australia) limited, Deutsche Bank AG and 
JP Morgan Australia Limited. BrisConnections appointed Macquarie Capital as the 
financial adviser and booker for the initial public offer of $1.2 billion 
(BrisConnections, 2008). The initial public offer (IPO) was offered on an instalment 
basis with $1.00 payable on application to raise $400 million, followed by two other 
instalments of $1.00 payable nine months apart. Ten to fifteen per cent of ALT 
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shares were directed to retail investors and 85 per cent to domestic and international 
investors. 
Thiess, John Holland and Macquarie Capital were to provide $300 million on 
the overall IPO and would-be investors (shareholders) were guaranteed a return of 14 
per cent in the first year, and 8 per cent per annum in the next five years (McIntyre, 
2008). Thiess and John Holland’s IPO units of $200 million were considered an 
equity contribution to the project, which would be paid post construction within 24 
months of ALT’s completion. Theoretically, Thiess and John Holland could not pay 
the IPO even on demand, as they were part of the BrisConnections consortium (see 
Table 4.3). While Macquarie IPO units of $100 million were expected to be paid in 
full, as were other IPO investors (BrisConnections Media Release, 24 June 2008). 
Both Thesis and John Holland were subsidiaries of Leighton Holding Limited and 
part of BrisConnections SPV consortium.  
BrisConnections Media Release (2008) stated that debt facilities raised were 
fully underwritten by leading Australian and international banks with experience in 
motorways financing, and the ALT financial structure aligned to projected revenue in 
comparison to other toll road projects. The same release (ibid 2008) also stated that 
this financial strategy would enable BrisConnections to service the debts, even if the 
ALT experienced traffic reduction of 40 percent per annum and it was expected to 
extinguish the ALT debt within 10 years of operation. Table 4.4 shows the source of 
funds and application to the ALT construction. 
 
Table 4.4: ALT Financing and Uses of Funds 
Source of funds $ million Application of funds $ million 
Bank debt 2,928 Construction cost - ALT 3,400 
Equity raised in the Offer 1,170 Upfront development and financing 
costs 
269 
Equity raised via DRP 3451 Net interest prior to ALT opening 575 
Deferred Equity 200 Reserves 2532 
State Works Contribution 267 Equity distributions during 
construction 
301 
  Ongoing development, financing and 
other costs 
1123 
Total 4,910 Total 4,910 
Gearing                                                                                                                             
% 
Debt/(Deb + Equity + DRP)                                                                                                                          
65.9 
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Debt/(Debt + Equity)                                                                                                                                    
71.4 
1Comprises all proceeds received from the issue of Stapled Units under the DRP for the period up to Airport Link 
Opening. This includes the proceeds received from the Second Instalment and the Final Instalment in respect of 
party paid Stapled Units issued under the DRP.  
2 This includes the Distribution reserve and the cash funded component of the Ramp-up reserve. In addition to 
these reserves, there is up to $120 million in available debt facilities under the Reserve Facility. 
3 Includes ongoing company costs, ongoing DRP underwriting fees, provision for the capitalisation of interest in 
respect of the Equity Bridge Facilities, net GST and other ongoing costs.
 
The ALT units traded at a 60 per cent discount before the global financial crisis 
(GFC 2008). The falling value exacerbated the financial problems of 
BrisConnections, and ALT units became the lowest stock traded on the Australian 
Stock Exchange. The ALT units fall in value became attractive to retail investors, 
unaware of the two dollar liability remaining (unpaid) per each unit that made the 
ALT units expensive. BrisConnections’ Chairman, being appreciative of the market’s 
evaluation of ALT units, wanted to rally support and so appeared on the ‘Inside 
Business Forum’ (TV Programme) to convince the public of the ALT’s importance 
to the SEQ Region, but this failed to improve the financial value of the units (Swan, 
2009).  
A retail investor with 15 per cent equity worth $150 million was Mr. Nicolas 
Bolton refused to continue with the second ALT instalment of partly paid shares 
which he perceived to be overpriced and initiated a court action to have 
BrisConnections wind up before the next instalment was due on April 2009, by 
requesting an extraordinary general meeting. Before the next instalment of the staple 
units was due (29th April 2009), Bolton had transferred 77 million ALT units to a 
family friend (John Williams), which meant the former was technically free of any 
financial obligation towards BrisConnections (liability), however, inadvertently he 
failed to transfer two smaller parcels that comprised 800,000 and 500,000 units, 
which still made him financially liable for the un-transferred parcels. Neither Bolton 
nor Williams were able to pay for the two parcels, which added to BrisConnections 
financial pressure. In addition, Mr. Bolton secretly sold his voting rights to Leighton 
Holdings Contractors (Leighton Holdings Media Release, 14 April 2009).Table 4.5 
shows the ALT IPO per staple unit price of three equal instalments of three dollars 
($3.00) each instalment. 
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Table 4.5: Key Statistics of ALT IPO 
Issue price per staple unit (fully paid, over three equal 
instalments) 
$3.00 
Offers opens 3 July 2008 
Offers closes 16 July 2008 
Staple Units expected to commence trading on ASX1 31 July 2008 
1On deferred settlement basis  
Source: BrisConnections Media Release (2008) 
 
Apart from this incident, other unit holders (retailers) were reluctant to pay the 
second instalment, which affected the overall value of ALT shares and forced the 
units to trade at a 75 per cent discount of $1.00 per unit (http://www.gft.com.au), 
Ferguson, 2010). Institutional and retail investors that previously perceived ALT 
units as bargain stock found they were exposed to double digits of liability (from 
$500 to $1,500), and many investors preferred to abandon their units. Therefore, the 
units of those who failed to pay the next instalment were considered forfeited and 
sold at the market’s auction at the face value of $1.00, while the ASX trading price 
was $0.53 (Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 2009). 
The Macquarie Capital Group and Deutsche Bank as financial advisors and 
underwriters of ALT shares were faced with a funding hole of $279 million due to 
institutional investors only paying $111 million out of the $390 million expected. 
Macquarie Capital Group and Deutsche Bank provided $8 million. The remaining 
$271 million was deferred until June 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 2009), 
with the expectation of recovering some fund from other retail unit holders.   
4.4.1 Leighton Holdings Limited and Airport Link Tunnel project 
LHL’s involvement with the ALT project came as the result of Nicholas Bolton 
(executive unit holder in BrisConnections) selling his voting rights for the sum of 
$4.5 million (Sydney Moring Herald, Monday June 1, 2009). The court action 
initiated by Bolton to wind up BrisConnections was avoided, as his voting right was 
acquired by LHL who had originally been part of Northern Motorways Pty Limited 
(consortium) and unsuccessful with the ALT bid (see Table, 4.3), but indirectly 
acquired a 50 per cent interest in the ALT (Thesis John Holding Media Release, 9 
April 2009). Below is the organisation structure of Leighton Holdings Limited and 
Leighton Contractors as Northern Motorways consortium. 
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Figure 4.2: Leighton Holding Limited Organisational structure 
 
Source:http://www.leighton.com.au/or-business/our-brands/group-structure 
 
LHL, on acquiring the ALT units from Bolton, issued a media release on 
behalf of Thiess Australia and the John Holland Group Limited, who was wholly 
owned subsidiaries of LHL, restating the importance of the ALT to the SEQ region 
and also highlighting the changes in management (Leighton Holding Media Release, 
April 2009). Thiess and John Holland, to ensure no further destabilisation, 
approached the Australian Style Investment (ASI) to secure their proxy votes for the 
Extraordinary General Meeting initiated by Bolton, which they secured. The 
agreement with ASI was lodged with ASX to stop further proceedings on Bolton’s 
court action, in particular the wind-up of BrisConnections. Thiess and John 
Holland’s strategy was that of commercial expediency, an effort to maximise their 
interest in the ALT project by dislodging other potential litigants (Sydney Morning 
Herald, June 1, 2009).   
4.4.2 BrisConnections financial structure 
There are questions about the ALT units’ continuous slide and trading at a 
discount due to BrisConnections robust financial structure, and it became apparent 
that international investors support for the ALT project failed to attract financial 
support or did not provide the required funding (Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 
2009). It is possible that the risk analyses of the ALT and revenue projections were 
insufficient to service its future debts and uncertainties associated with tunnelling 
construction as capital cost recovery was based on toll charges without other QSG or 
BCC services payment support. For example, the major underwriters Macquarie and 
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Deutsche Bank paid only $8 million of the outstanding $279 million (combined), 
leaving BrisConnections to rely on retail shareholders to fund the gap (Sydney 
Moring Herald, June 1, 2009)   
A robust financial structure based entirely on balance sheet performance, might 
be of little interest to financial institutions (Polackova, 1989), because financial 
institutions no longer require balance sheets to either approve or reject loan 
applications, rather organisations financial exposure (risk) and type of infrastructure 
is the benchmark for repayments affordability consideration. Other risks such as 
mitigation costs of effects and impacts on residents as this was an underground 
project and therefore could potentially affected property values leading to 
unquantified compensatory claims was a possibility for consideration in terms of 
unquantified risk. So, the financial market analyses and evaluations of the ALT 
potential failed to uplift BrisConnections optimism, in addition to the delays 
experienced by BrisConnections in achieving an early financial close 
(BrisConnections Media Release, September 2008).  
Another contributory factor to the reduced enthusiasm may have been the 
collapse of the Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel, where BrisConnections was also the 
consortium, and where LHL also lost $132 million as part of the services provision 
team (BrisConnections Media Release, 2008),still being fresh in the minds of 
investor who lost their savings. The collapsed of Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel was used 
by BrisConnections as part of its engineering tunnel experience and was part of 
BrisConnections inability to meet its financial payments and financial institutions 
refusal to renegotiate repayments schedule with BrisConnections (Polackova, 
1989).As an example to further put off investors, toll roads have failed to attract 
sufficient motorists in their first year of operation (Channel Tunnel, Melbourne 
EastLink Toll Road and Sydney Cross City Tunnel) (Bain, 2009; Flyvbjerg et al., 
2006; Standard & Poor, 2004). Alternatively, financial markets reluctance to reward 
BrisConnections could be related to past transactions and activities, when the same 
market refused to extend BrisConnections debt payment of $1.14 billion on the 
Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel project in 2007.  
Another problem with the ALT related to the traffic volume prediction, as 
BrisConnections claimed to have adopted a conservative rather than an optimistic 
prediction (BrisConnections Media Release, 2008). The Queensland Premier’s 
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Media Release (May 19, 2008) stated that the business case developed by the private 
sector was commercially buoyant, and the amount of traffic that used a toll road 
added importance to its survival. In other words, traffic volumes are dependent on 
future events, which neither of the entities can manipulate or control, rather the end 
user influences them. Reilly et al., (2005); Flyvbjerg et al., (2006) these authors have 
described toll road forecasts as deceptive, delusional and inaccurate, and difficult to 
substantiate. Bain (2009) argued that the reason traffic numbers were not achieved 
was due to economic changes and motorists’ behaviour based on their preference to 
use toll free roads, which creates a problem with the predicted revenue streams.  
 
4.5 TOLL ROADS 
Any transportation network aimed at reducing traffic congestion on arterial 
roads is a high risk adventure (Enron and Read, 2012), particularly those involved 
with tunnels. The drowning factor for all transportation network construction is 
finance and the difficulty in providing all necessary and required funds from not just 
one, but two to five banks. The issue with the transportation network is the 
involvement of many stakeholders (corporate, institutions, retails) all with varying 
interests. The attraction of a transportation network depends on the revenue 
predictions (traffic numbers) and base for investments decision by investors. No 
matter the attractiveness of a tunnel construction, there are several potential known 
and unknowns (e.g. rocks) and of course ‘Black Swan’ risks, all of which are thus 
unpredictable.  
Toll roads are basically used as means for capital costs recovery of the new 
infrastructure, as well as rate of return on the investment to the private investor, 
which varies with vehicle type, and not with the traffic volume (TransApex, 2005). 
An AusLink White Paper (2004) stated that the Commonwealth of Australia’s refusal 
to accept urban congestion as part of its wider responsibility was one of the reasons 
for toll roads emergence in Australia. However, local and state governments 
interested in alleviating congestion on arterial roads should use their own resources 
and charge tolls (AusLink 2004), or engage the private sector to provide the services. 
For example, the Commonwealth Government failed to provide funding announced 
in 7 June 2004 to TransApex for five years (RACQ, 2005) and efforts by TransApex 
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to obtain the Commonwealth contribution of $400 million over 15 years was 
unsuccessful, as was consistent with AusLink position and principle that urban traffic 
congestion is a state and local government responsibility, not a federal government 
problem (RACQ, 2005).   
There are concerns about using toll roads as means of alleviating congestion on 
arterial roads, from a resources perspective; it is a reallocation of funds from roads to 
heavy public transport subsidies, a policy that governments have adopted as a key 
anti-congestion strategy. Additionally, where new roads are primarily built as toll 
roads with the sole objective of alleviating congestion on an existing road system, 
such transport policy could be viewed as poor public policy with lack of 
consideration for economic and equity efficiency implications in society (TransApex 
2005; RACQ, 2005).   
4.5.1 An overview of toll roads 
Toll road constructions are designed to demonstrate the public-private 
partnership efficiency management of resources (Hall 1998). Flyvbjerg, et al., (2009) 
stated that PPP has dismal records on delivering a major infrastructure and achieving 
the performance promised. Probably, this may be financial deficiency or weakness, 
rather than structural or engineering related. For example, the EastLink Tunnel 
project in Victoria (Australia) had been deemed successful (DoT, 2009), has not been 
under financial administration and the largest urban road project with a PPP 
arrangement, but it still failed to achieve forecasted traffic volumes (average 45 per 
cent). The EastLink was completed and opened to motorists ahead of schedule, no 
major issues have been reported by the Victorian Government (2008) and it has the 
lowest toll charge among other toll roads in Australia, at $0.28 per kilometre. The 
design includes noise shielding wall construction, pedestrian bridges, and public art, 
with a full electronic tolling system (DoT, 2009). However, The ConnectEast Group, 
EastLink Tunnel consortium has approached institutional investors twice to raise 
additional funds as the debt increases. Likewise, the Sydney Cross City Tunnel, 
Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel, and CLEM 7, these tunnels have all struggled with traffic 
volume problems, and they are PPP projects. The Royal Automobile Club of 
Queensland (RACQ) predicted in 2010 that traffic forecasts of CLEM 7 were in 
doubt, unless the RiverCity Motorways (consortium) reduced the toll charge to 
attract motorists (RACQ, 2010). Table 4.6 represents toll roads in Australia that have 
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experienced problems, either as the result of financial distress or being unable to 
achieve the traffic volumes predicted.  
 
Table 4.6: Toll Roads and tunnel concession projects in Australia 
Name Tunnel Dimension Date Open/Cost Consortium 
Melbourne City Link 
Builders: 
Transfield Services 
Australia 
Obayashi Corporation of 
Japan 
22km - M2 Southern 
& 
Western Link Tunnels 
2000  
 
$2.2 billion 
Transurban Transfield 
Services, Australia, and 
Obayashi Corporation 
of Japan 
Experienced financial difficulties due to traffic forecasts; regarded as successful. 
Melbourne EastLink 
Builders: 
Thiess and John Holland 
39km Toll Road 
M3 freeway. 
June 2008 
 
$2.5 billion 
Thesis and John 
Holland 
EastLink suffered a loss of $93 million in first six months of operation. Refinanced in 2010 and traffic 
forecast downgraded due to lower traffic volumes. 
Sydney,  
Harbour Tunnel 
 
Builders: 
 Transfixed, Australia, 
and Kumagai Gumi, 
Japan,  
2.8km long immersed 
tube harbour crossing 
August 1992 
$554 million 
 
The tunnel was 
handed back to the 
NSW Government 
in June 2013 
The New South Wales 
Government and private 
investors.  
Harbour Tunnel traffic forecasts perceived as optimistic. The operator Sydney Harbour Tunnel 
company is satisfied with the tunnel’s financial performance.   
Sydney,  
Cross City Tunnel 
Builders: 
Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 
 
Bilfinger Berger  
2.1km - link between 
Darling Harbour and 
Rushcutters Bay 
August 2005 
$680 million 
 
E-tag toll $4.32 
and $6.75 without. 
Cross City Motorways 
 
In December 2006, the Tollway declared insolvency with debts exceeding $500million. Leighton 
Contractors ABN AMRO purchased the tunnel in June 2007 for the price of A$700 million. The 
Office of State Revenue (OSR) (New South Wales) imposed exorbitant stamp-duty fees which have 
not been paid. Leighton Contractor and ABN AMRO took OSR to the Supreme Court.  Tunnel’s 
revenue well below the forecast volumes and financially struggling. 
Sydney,  
Eastern Distributor 
Builders:  
Leighton Holding  
Contractors 
 
6km motorway with a 
1.7km  tunnel 
 
 
December 1999 
$730 million  
Toll $6 cars/ 
motorbikes. 
 
$12 Heavy 
vehicles 
Transurban and State 
Government 
 
In comparison with other toll roads in Australia, the Sydney Eastern Distributor Tunnel is a financial 
success.  
Sydney,  
Lane Cove Tunnel 
 
Builders: 
Leighton Holdings,  
 
Mirvac and Li Cashing 
 
Twin tunnel tollway, 
connecting the M2 
Motorway at North 
Ryde and Gore Hill 
Freeway. 
 
Toll $2.94 Cars  
 $5.87 Heavy vehicles. 
March 2007 
$1.1 billion 
Connector Motorways,  
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Thiess and John Holland 
JV 
The tunnel went into receivership in January 2010. Transurban purchased Lane Cove Tunnel in May 
2010 for $630 million.  
The tunnel is also the subject of a lawsuit. Two superannuation funds, REST Infrastructure Trust and 
AMP Capital Investors, contributed $80 million of the $500 million equity raised in 2003. In 2009 
AMP started court proceedings against the traffic consultants for the tunnel, Parsons Brinckerhoff and 
Booz Allen Hamilton (renamed Booz and Company). AMP claims "the companies failed to exercise 
reasonable care and diligence" and made "misleading or deceptive" traffic predictions.  
Parsons Brinckerhoff predicted 187,700 cars a day using the tunnel by 2011. Booz predicted 149,900 
cars a day using the tunnel by 2011.  
In 2012, only 70,000 cars a day used the tunnel (highest traffic number).The Court case is expected to 
last for years. 
Brisbane, CLEM 7 
 
Builders: 
Leighton Holding 
Contractors  
Baulderstone/Bilfinger 
Berger Joint Venture 
4.8km M7 motorway 
grade toll road tunnel 
built under the Brisbane 
River. Current toll 
between $2.27 and 
$12.03. 
March 2010 RiverCity Motorway.  
An economic disaster due to traffic volume predictions. Insufficient toll revenue to pay the interest on 
its $1.3 billion debt and RiverCity Motorway went into receivership.  
CLEM 7 shares became worthless, costing investors millions. The Receiver (Korda Menthe) started a 
$2 billion Federal Court action against Aecom that performed the traffic forecasts for CLEM 7 and 
claimed "misleading and deceptive conduct" and of making "negligent misstatements". 
Traffic volume predictions of 100,000 vehicles a day, while the actual traffic volumes were 22,000 a 
day.  
Aecom stated that the Court proceeding would be defended vigorously and dismissed the allegations 
as "without merit".  
CLEM 7 is also the subject of a $150 million class action lawsuit, against Aecom that was lodged by a 
Law firm (Maurice Blackburn) for damages in the Federal Court in Sydney on behalf of 700 investors. 
The lawsuit focused on the gap between the traffic volume predicted by Aecom and the actual 
patronage. 
Brisbane,  
Airport Link 
Builder: 
Leighton Holding 
Contractors 
 
Thesis and John Holland 
6.7km of twin tube 
tunnels connecting  
Brisbane city centre and 
Clem 7 Tunnel. 
East-West Arterial 
Roads leading to 
Brisbane Airport.  
Toll $4.90 per vehicle 
July 2012 
cost $4.8 billion 
BrisConnections 
(Macquarie Group, 
Thiess and John 
Holland). 
In 2013, BrisConnections announced the decision to place the tunnel into administration due to low 
traffic volumes. 
Tunnel debts $3 billion, more that the tunnel’s value. 
Traffic volume per a day 48,000 (December 2012) averaged. 
ARUP traffic volume predictions 179,000 vehicles per a day after six months of operation. 
PPB Advisory (Nicol McGrath) will operate the tunnel.   
Adopted: Tunnel Tail Discussion Forum (2013) 
 
In Australia, the toll road industry is facing some challenges, which in part 
arise from shortages of long-term debt and equity funding as the result of global 
financial crisis (Vassallo et al., 2010, 2012), and partly from evaluation and 
prediction of traffic volumes and other risks in the sector. A number of toll road 
projects have been constructed in Australia; some are regarded as commercially 
successful, while others have struggled for variety of reasons. In New South Wales, 
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taxpayers have objected to traffic funnelling (restriction or closing of nearby free 
routes) and the overall toll levels have remained a taxpayer concern (expensive). The 
Cross City Tunnel went into insolvency, and the Lane Cove Tunnel was recapitalised 
by its investors (Connector Motorways) on both projects, the NSW Government did 
not make any financial contributions, rather it charged the winning consortium a 
large concession fee. The Westlink Motorway is somehow different from the two 
inner urban tunnels (Cross City Tunnel, Lane Cove Tunnel), because it has no 
directly competing free routes, and not suffering from the same issue that had 
affected the two inner urban tunnels. While Victorian (www.connecteast.com.au) and 
Queensland toll road projects have no traffic funnelling arrangement with their 
services providers, however, both states contributions towards construction costs 
have increased to allow for a lower toll charge in the two states, although the private 
investor still carries the full traffic risk (www.rivercitymotorway.com.au;  
www.brisconnections.com.au) 
According to the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 
(BITRE, 2011), Li and Hensher (2010) investigated 14 toll roads that comprised 9 
motorways, 3 tunnels and 2 bridges, which were PPP projects with concession 
arrangements. The roads (M2, M7, Cross-City Tunnel, Lane Cove Tunnel and 
EastLink) data on actual and forecast traffic volumes were available for the first year 
of operation. On the average, actual traffic volumes were 45 per cent below the 
forecast levels. Bain et al., (2005); Flyvbjerg et al., (2005) stated that the main 
reasons for forecasting errors were because of outdated and incomplete traffic data 
used by traffic volume analysts and inappropriate assumptions on the land use 
development plans.  
4.5.2 Inequity of toll roads 
TransApex (2005) stated that toll imposition on public roads was inequitable 
for many reasons, as various taxes imposed on motorists already cover the full costs 
of road provision, including external costs to society (air pollution, congestion, 
environmental). Toll imposition could be levied on frequent users of public roads, 
which in turn could become an extra imposition to motorists unable to drive in areas 
with adequate toll free roads. TransApex (2005) further described toll imposition as 
discriminatory and economically unjustified applied to a motorist who avoided busy 
roads. The same principle applies to those who stay on a congested road in attempt to 
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avoid toll charges, which adds to road congestion that imposes additional external 
costs to society (air pollution, gas emission).  
However, Mineta (2006) argued that the merit of toll roads was that it provided 
a means for funding new motorways, and this view was supported by the American 
Transportation Research Board comparative analysis conducted on toll roads over a 
period of two years (Cardno, 2008). An AusLink White Paper (2004) and American 
Transportation Research Board (Cardno, 2008) both endorsed toll roads as methods 
for congestion alleviation to society. Toll road users accept and acknowledge the 
economic realities of the time and user-pay concept as enforceable on users to enable 
the protection of the private investment (Mineta, 2006). Besides, the imposition of 
tolls is not exclusive to newly constructed roads; it is also applied to an old road and 
hardly objected to by motorists on those roads as part of public policy. The provision 
of toll roads by the private investor or construction of new roads designated for tolls 
are both economically sound propositions as argued by Cardno (2008). What is 
criticised about toll roads is the level of toll charge increases, which has become a 
financial burden to motorists and inequitable (Button, 1998).  
Therefore, there are merits and demerits in building toll roads, particularly 
when a toll road undermines the congestion alleviation objectives and efficiencies of 
traffic volumes that occur at peak and off-peak times (TransApex, 2005). For 
example, in the event of toll road charge increases, motorists would be forced to 
avoid paying the excessive toll charges, while allowing free access to congested 
roads. In addition, the provision of public roads with the imposition of toll charges 
tends to have lesser regard for equitable resource distribution in society (RACQ, 
2005).  
Additionally, there are clauses in project contracts that prevent government 
agencies from developing similar infrastructure on the same corridor. In the case of 
the ALT, the AirTrain was built on the same corridor, from Brisbane Central to the 
Airport, possibly contravening the PPP non-complete clause of constructing similar 
infrastructure on the same corridor, and might have inadvertently affected the ALT 
revenue stream. Baxandall (2009) stated that reports to the USA Congress in 2004 
recommended the inclusion of non-compete clauses with toll road contracts to help 
attract potential investors. These clauses are to protect the private investment, as well 
as to attract the financial market’s confidence, which could lead to the registration of 
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the shares with the Stock Exchange. In the absence of these clauses, free arterial 
roads built on the same corridor could be competing to divert traffic away from the 
toll road, or indirectly force the investor into bankruptcy (Baxandall, 2009). Ibid 
(2009) cited the examples of Beesley Point Bridge, New Jersey, where a competing 
public bridge was built only 300 yards away that affected the revenues of the Beesley 
Point Bridge.  
In the event of bankruptcy, the toll road contract can also be renegotiated when 
there is significant departure from the contract or irreparable circumstances that did 
not form part of the contingencies detailed in the contract. For example, Gausch 
(2002) stated that toll road increases adjusted to cost price index (CPI) as the result 
of economic conditions does not constitute contract renegotiation, and neither a non-
payment of specified contingency that affected the infrastructure value is a reason for 
renegotiation. However, renegotiation could occur when the contract was not 
executable, such as being due to conflicts of interest, and investor’s failure to comply 
with contract clauses. Gausch (2002) argued that contract renegotiation was not cost 
free to the entities and the process could affect the infrastructure revenue stream, but 
depended on who had advantage over the other. The table below shows toll roads in 
the United States from 1991-2010, which have had financial distress, been 
renegotiated, defaulted or have gone bankrupt. 
Table 4.7: USA toll roads 
Transport Public Private Partnerships in the United States: 1991 - 2010 
Projects State 
Investment 
(in US$ 
millions 
Year of 
financial 
closure 
Selection 
process* 
Renegotiation
** Current status 
IH 635 Managed 
Lanes TX 2,800 2010 CB No 
Construction 
begins 2011 
Northwest 
Parkway CO 603 2007 CB No 
Operation. 
Went from 
public road to 
PPP 
Pocahontas 
Parkway VA 611 2006 UO Yes 
Near default 
2005, 
renegotiated, 
expected 
completion in 
2011e 
Chicago Skyway IL 1,830 2004 CB No 
In operation, 
went from 
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4.5.3 The Airport Link Tunnel Project social costs 
The Coordinator General’s Report (2008) and EIS recommendation for the 
ALT construction was to use an enclosed conveyor belt system for transporting spoil 
and rocks from Toombul to the Brisbane Airport site. The essence of the 
recommendation was to reduce the number of spoil trucks on residential areas. This 
proposal however became untenable for BrisConnections due to being considered too 
expensive and time consuming. The reason BrisConnections did not obey the 
contract terms was primarily for avoiding such things as “…the penalty of $1.2 
million per a day, if the tunnel is not completed on or before 30 June 2012” (Robyn 
Ironside, The Courier Mail, 2012). 
Another inequity problem facing the tunnel (EIS, 2007) was with regard to the 
complaint lodged by Wooloowin residents to the State Government regarding 
public road to 
PPP 
Southbay 
Expressway (SR 
125) CA 658 2003 CB Yes 
Operational, 
Bankrupt 
2010 
Las Vegas 
Monorail NV 650 2000 None PR 
Operational, 
Bankrupt 
2010 
Foley Beach 
Express AL 44 1999 UO No 
Operational, 
Governor’s 
son main 
proponent 
Greenville 
Southern 
Connector SC 240 1998 CB No 
Operational, 
Bankrupt 
2010 
JFK Terminal 4 NY/NJ 689 1997 CB No Operational 
Camino 
Colombia Toll 
Road TX 85 1997 UO No 
Foreclosed 
2003, 
repurchased 
by Texas 
DOT. 
Dulles Greenway VA 350 1993 UO Yes 
Near default 
in first few 
years of 
operation 
Orange County 
SR 91 Express 
Lanes CA 130 1991 CB Yes 
Near default 
in first few 
years of 
operation 
Source: Public Work Financing, October 2010, and 
other sources.     
* CB=competitive bidding. UO=unsolicited 
offer.      
** Significant changes in initial contract terms to the advantage of the firm. 
PR=pending renegotiation.   
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excessive noise levels and hours of operation based on the Coordinator General’s 
Report (2008). In this report (ibid 2008), noise levels, construction vibrations, 
disruptions of traffic movements and operational hours were undefined. These 
undefined issues and concepts played to the advantage of BrisConnections as they 
demanded interpretation of the concepts (Solomons, The Courier Mail, 9 April 2010) 
of unreasonable work hours and forced the Queensland Government to establish a 
legal and defendable understanding of the term “excessive”. Prior to BrisConnections 
demand for the interpretation of excessive noise levels, the Commonwealth Federal 
Treasurer (Wayne Swan, 2010) wrote to BrisConnections expressing concern and 
disapproval of excessive noise and hours of work as a fundamental failure of the 
project due to the fact that they were undefined and lacked community consultation 
and support. Other effects apart from excessive noise levels, dust and house 
vibrations were the closures of Joe’s Grocery Shop on Lutwyche Road, the New 
Workshed in Wooloowin and the closure of a whole community’s parkland at 
Kedron (Solomons, The Courier Mail, April 9, 2010).  
In response, BrisConnections denied any involvement with Joe’s Grocery 
closure “Farmer Joe’s was nothing to do with us, that was a decision of the State 
Government and we do have a high level of consultation with the community,” 
(Solomons, The Courier Mail, 9 April 2010). With this denial, it became apparent 
that BrisConnections wanted to reconcile with Kedron and Wooloowin residents, and 
they offered an air-conditioning package aimed towards alleviating any construction 
noise impacts and to provide a more comfortable environment into the future 
(Premier’s Media Release, May 19, 2010). This in itself could be regarded as an 
example of deteriorating societal values where the consortium was offering the 
option to stay indoors instead of experiencing the noise. A family was offered 
accommodation in a nearby hotel, which was rejected as the condition of the family 
required more than a temporary relocation (due to having an aged mother in the 
family) (Heger, The Courier Mail, 22 January 2010). By discrediting the complaints 
of Kedron and Wooloowin residents, BrisConnections directed the monitoring of 
noise levels to its own staff, in particular at Mrs Jones’ house, as she had an elderly 
mother and was unable to relocate to new suburb or accept hotel accommodation.  
In May 2010, the Queensland Government announced an assistance package of 
$5.5 million for those Kedron and Wooloowin State Schools affected by the ALT 
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construction. The package was to offset the construction cost of an indoor sports 
facility, and air conditioning was donated to the schools to enable students to remain 
in classrooms as part of the noise reduction strategy (Premier’s Media Release, May 
19, 2010). The mitigation process undertaken by the Queensland Government in 
providing financial assistance to Kedron and Wooloowin State Schools does 
reinforce the HM Treasury (2006) argument about PPP infrastructure delivery, as the 
ultimate responsibility rests with the government in terms of accountability when 
issues arise and projects go wrong, particularly in such a public way. Apart from 
schools and churches, complaints about declining property values were lodged by 
individuals and organisations seeking monetary compensation or who were unable to 
sell their properties in the Kedron and Wooloowin areas. Tim Marsden (2010) stated 
the claims of these individuals and organisations were legitimate and avoidable, if 
BrisConnections had followed a simple procedure for spoils conveyance (The 
Courier Mail, 2010) that would have prevented the complaints from residents of 
Kedron and Wooloowin.  
While BrisConnections was celebrating the first anniversary of the ALT 
project, Thiess and John Holland acknowledged the complexities of the projects and 
difficulties involved in relocating six kilometres of electrical cables, eighteen 
kilometres of telecommunication lines, ten kilometres of gas pipe lines and two 
kilometres of water lines, which were the conditions given by the cable owners 
before construction could proceed. These extra costs were not included in 
BrisConnections’ cost estimates (BrisConnections Media Release, November 14, 
2009) and so the consortium had penalties and fines of approximately $22.4 million 
that are related to contraventions with the ALT construction (EPEC, 2011), and were 
likely to incur other penalties of $973,973 million per day (reduced from 1.2 
million), if the tunnel was not completed by June 2012 (Robyn Ironside, The Courier 
Mail, 2012). 
4.5.4 Interviewees’ comments on the Airport Link Tunnel project 
 In the specific context of this research case study, the following views were 
given by those interviewees that participated with the construction, or funding, of the 
ALT project. The public sector project director’s view of the ALT was that it was a 
project with a couple of problems, such as underestimated work scope and costing by 
BrisConnections that attracted adverse publicity. Moreover, director affirmed that 
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BrisConnections Holding Group’s composition affected the stock price of ALT, 
which forced the stock to trade below the toll road industry average price. Other 
issues that were mentioned with the ALT were that traffic volume predictions and 
motorists’ patronage estimates were unreal (see interviewees profile on pp. 230-231) 
He stated “numbers which do not really exist.” The public sector infrastructure 
planning strategist said “the problems with the ALT were in the nature of oversight 
and inadequate management of dusts pollution on residents.” He also remarked that 
from an operational perspective, “the dust pollution was a nightmare for residents as 
the tunnel operators failed to observe operational hours.” ALT was a massive project; 
the effects and impacts on residents were beyond the expected magnitude and 
became uncontrollable, and maybe worst of all, “the ALT operators used a different 
business case model rather than the business case approved by the Coordinator 
General Report (2008).” The “unofficial and unapproved business case used by ALT 
operators was designed to reduce costs, in pretence of offering a similar product 
without adjusting for the difference in costs and scope alteration,” the economic 
strategist stated. However, the private investors involved with the ALT construction 
services stated that the ALT project to the SEQ residents was a political fulfilment of 
the incumbent government (local and state governments), “an infrastructure the 
governments could not afford outright without the private investors participation.” 
Whether the ALT was likely to be successful or not, at least the governments have 
achieved their public policy objectives, “as long as the infrastructure remains with 
society,” the private investment manager said. 
 
4.6 AIRPORT LINK TUNNEL PROJECT COMMISSIONED 
On July 25, 2012, the ALT was opened, offering a free toll on the road for 
three months, to enable reassessments of traffic volumes and motorists patronage 
within the period (Kim Sweetman, The Courier Mail, July 2012).BrisConnections 
involved the Royal Automobile Club of Queensland (RACQ) as an advocate for 
ALT patronage and encouraged motorists to pass through the tunnel while it was still 
free. In spite of BrisConnections offering a free trial, traffic experts had reservations 
about ALT achieving its traffic volume predictions, which were significantly higher 
than the number of vehicles (100,000) that used the Gateway Bridge daily (Kim 
Sweetman, The Courier Mail, July 2012). In addition, the benefits of the free trail 
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were to sell the time-savings benefit with ALT. The average number of vehicles that 
passed through the ALT per day was about 77,320 against the 135,000 per day traffic 
volume predicted (Robyn Ironside, The Courier Mail, August 2012).  
Key dates to the demise of the Airport Link Tunnel 
 July 2012 – Brisbane Airport Link Tunnel opens to the public and 
BrisConnections (consortium) offers three months toll free and a further 
12 months of discounted tolls. Traffic numbers were still below the 
predicted target of 135,000 vehicles per day. 
 November 2012 – Traffic numbers for the first month of tolling reached 
53,313 vehicles a day, about 82,000 short of the estimate. Banks 
appointed PPB Advisory (Public Policy Brief) to restructure 
BrisConnections and rein in costs. 
 January 2013 – BrisConnections asked lenders for an indefinite 
repayment period on its $3 billion loan. 
 February 2013 – Banks reject BrisConnections proposal and decided to 
go into voluntary administration seven months after the Airport Link 
Tunnel opened. 
 
The collapse of the ALT involved $3.055 billion private debts (loans) and 
$1.782 billion in subscribed equity, totalling $4.842 billion more than the ALT value 
that indicates a financial disaster, rather than engineering failure. Grad and Kenyon 
(2013) perception of ALT collapse is that of taxpayers’ gain and opportunity to 
inherit a world class infrastructure at a reduced capital cost. In other words, the 
concept of self-funding infrastructure and non-upfront payment based on financial 
arrangements is not working as presumed. Storr (2009) stated that availability 
payment and shadowing toll were considered successful in European and North 
American countries (Canada, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA, etc.) with 
PPP toll roads, perhaps, the introduction in Australia could alleviate the financial 
pressure on toll investors. The diagram below is the ALT tunnel. 
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Also, reaction from Leighton Holdings Group Chief Executive Officer (David 
Stewart) was such procurement strategy not to be automatically replicated with mega 
projects of fixed contract price and current tendering practices, where material costs 
and risks were underestimated (Grad and Kenyon, 2013). Additionally, Hochtief AG 
chairman, the parent company of Leighton Holdings Group reaction to the collapse 
of ALT stated that “it is unlikely for the subsidiary Leighton Holdings Group to be 
involved in further procurement risk strategy with Australia future toll projects, 
unless the risk is equally shared with the public sector,” (Grad and Kenyon, 2013). 
Goldberg (2012) noted that the ALT financial disaster could have been 
avoided, if the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) were 
proactive in investigating the Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) that 
BrisConnections lodged in June 2008, and provided the public with the financial 
model that the PDS was derived from. In addition, the ALT going into voluntary 
administration after seven months implied the PDS contained certain elements that 
contributed to the ALT failure, one of which was the “robust and simple financial 
structure” that could fund a 40 per cent traffic volume reduction (BrisConnections 
Media Release, 2008).  
In Queensland, the BCC and state government supported the use of PPP for the 
procurement of the CLEM7 Tunnel and ALT projects (RACQ, 2005), which relied 
on the business case developed around the traffic volume risk (Jagger, 2012). As the 
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result of the different natures of the public and private sector business environments, 
economic roles, and governance, the likelihood of forging a cohesive and workable 
partnership would remain difficult. For example, Noble (2009) questioned the real 
value of CLEM7 Tunnel and the ALT, both procured through PPP to taxpayers, and 
whether PPP was really a mechanism to shift cost away from the public purse. He 
posed the question (ibid 2009, pp 1-6) “Is there any partnership that exists between 
the entities within the concept and meaning of partnership or a semantic relevance 
for political and ideological reasons?” Noble’s (2009) position was reinforced by 
McPhee (2011) who stated that partnership was meaningless, unless governments 
were willing to monitor and report on all contractual undertakings, and apply 
effective contract management, which was important for maintaining the public 
sector’s risk exposure and also for securing a good working relationship with private 
sector contractors (Weingart et al., 2008).   
While the failures of PPP specifically when used in developed countries road 
infrastructure and transport projects might continue (Toll Discussion Forum, 2013; 
USA Toll Roads, 2010), some authors posit that the remarkable difference in project 
costs and approaches to business between the sectors needs to be recognised and 
addressed by a dedicated central agency (Jagger, 2012). Commercially, evaluations 
and analyses of infrastructure costs are undertaken using the CBA technique that 
determines the rate of return to the investor and risks, through allocation and transfer 
to the private investor, which hardly addresses the issues mentioned above, in the 
case study. COAG (2007) stated that CBA was conducted in terms of financial 
evaluation and to the advantage of an individual firm, group or organisation, which 
removed the public sector investment objectives and goals in terms of the orientation 
of the sector (services sector).  
In Queensland, PPP infrastructure procurement is managed by a variety of 
agencies (Queensland Treasury, Transport and Main Roads, Department of 
Infrastructure Planning), but with no dedicated specific agency to monitor the 
outputs. This suggests that cost is more important than the output obtained. Both PPP 
tunnels in Queensland have failed because there was no extensive research based on 
economic and social changes of SEQ residents along the corridors where these 
projects were constructed (RACQ, 2005; Weingart et al., 2009). In addition, the 
public sector has had to make fundamental internal reforms that include changes to 
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infrastructure perception in terms of public investment benefits, costs, risks and value 
to society (Jagger, 2012). Moreover, the public sector as the prime user of this 
infrastructure (economic, social) must understand the nature of public investments as 
a sunk cost (Howe and Robin, 2005) with no residual value and support for the 
success of these investments through equity participation to the ultimate benefit of 
society. What is still difficult for economists and accounting professionals involved 
in public infrastructure to understand is the concept of VfM, and how the 
comparisons of VfM and other economic benefits were reached remains a mystery. 
For example, with reference to the supposed VfM of $3 billion for SEQ residents for 
the CLEM 7 Tunnel and $4.8 billion for the ALT, it is difficult to see how these 
numbers can be considered accurate when both of these projects were virtually 
abandoned by motorists after their completion. This requires some explanations 
about VfM of PPP public investments. 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The ALT was one of the most capital-intensive projects in the SEQ region with 
a total cost of $4.8 billion, 45 years of lease concession service arrangements (CSA), 
and using the constructed infrastructure as a toll road to recoup capital investments. 
The expectation from both governments (BCC and QSG) was that the ALT would 
confer economic and social benefits to SEQ residents in terms of reduced travelling 
times, employment opportunities, and improved living standards, which was 
captioned as “building a better and more liveable city in the SEQ and transport for 
Brisbane” (BCC Transport for Brisbane, 2008; SEQ Transport 2008).  
The ALT environmental impact statement (EIS, 2007) performed for the 
project’s contract identified substantial environmental defects and major disruptions 
of pre-established organisations such as schools and churches, decline in properties 
values in the suburbs of Wooloowin and Kedron, or subjecting residents in those 
areas to sub-human living conditions (e.g., excessive noise, long working hours, dust, 
pollution, etc.). The release of the IAS and EIS reports to the community attracted 
over 2,000 complaints, which led to the alteration of the project’s scope. The ALT 
bidding contained three stipulations to potential bidders based on engineering 
tunnelling experience, unlimited ability to secure external funding’ and registration 
with the Australian Stock Exchange that attracted only three bidders (Deputy 
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Premier’s Office, June 6, 2007). However, ALT share price when launched on the 
Australian Stock Exchange, traded at a discounted price and was well below the toll 
road industry average, which was attributed to the financial market perception and 
interpretation of the risks associated with tunnelling construction. Moreover, 
BrisConnections cost recovery strategy was purely based on traffic volumes and   
motorists patronage. The predicted volume of traffic to use the tunnel was more than 
the current number of vehicles operated in Queensland that was unsustainable and 
much financial pressure brought upon BrisConnections (Reilly et al., 2005; and 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2006),  and incompatible with road decongestion objectives (Medda, 
2007).   
BrisConnections underestimated the risk involved with the ALT project, in 
particular, those intangibles that affected the Kedron and Wooloowin residents and 
remained defiant about mitigating the costs associated with those risks in relation to 
the ALT activities. Rather, QSG provided financial assistance packages (HM 
Treasury, 2006) to affected schools and churches in the process of alleviating the 
noise and dusts levels of the ALT construction impacts on residents, this has proven 
to be absolutely accurate in this case study.  
The public view of PPP as being entirely funded by the private investors is not 
actually true, as evidenced in this case study. This case study identified contributions 
made by the QSG of $1.5 billion for the initial capital outlay to BrisConnections 
(Media Release, Premier’s Office, 2008) and $267 million (see Table 4.4) described 
as “State Work Contribution” as part of BrisConnections robust financial structure 
(BrisConnections Media Release, 2008). These government contributions reinforce 
the view of a private sector interviewee who stated “the private investor will not 
commit to any liability either cut or uncut without the government’s resources.” 
4.7.1 Conclusion 
This case study has reconfirmed some of the literature review findings that 
question the benefits of PPP in the delivery of public infrastructure (economic), and 
suggests that VfM identification through feasibility and business case development 
appears to be inappropriate. Also, non-definition of capital development services 
objectives prior to the market’s actual engagement is expensive. The QSG had pre-
stipulation for potential bidders, which attracted few bidders. ALT contract is not 
without undefined terms and clauses, which BrisConnections swiftly benefited from 
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and questioned QSG on the legality of those contract terms and clauses, including 
their interpretations. BrisConnections action forced the Coordinator-General back to 
basics as to provide clearer definition, interpretation, and meaning to those undefined 
terms and clauses. 
The case study findings are summarised as follows: 
 The cost of the ALT project continued to rise from $3.4 billion (2008) to 
$4.8 billion (2010), and the actual projected final cost of the tunnel is 
currently unknown.  
 The ALT risks were inaccurately identified, in particular, those 
intangibles of immediate consequence to the community (dust, noise, 
vibration) and operational risks (relocation of underground cable 
alignments and road networks). 
  
 The case study revealed that BrisConnections violated the ALT contract 
stipulations, as sub-contractors refused to use the appropriate method for 
conveyance of spoil trucks. 
 The operational risks transferred or allocated to BrisConnections were 
managed inadequately, which later became the responsibility of QSG.  
 Motorists’ patronage of the ALT, even during the “free trial period”, has 
not achieved the predicted daily average forecast (demand risk), which is 
externally determined and influenced by motorists’ behaviour, appetite, 
and the number of free arterial roads which are beyond the manipulations 
of the investor. 
 Toll roads collapse in Australia are not engineering or structural related, 
rather financial based on the non-upfront payment concept and allocation 
of demand risk to the private investor.  
 
Another aim of the research is to look for ways to improve knowledge in the 
public domain on PPP arrangements, which will contribute to filling the gap or 
disparity that exists, as stated in the literature review in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For 
example, undefined concepts in the contract such as “excessive noise and hours of 
operation” became additional costs to the public sector. Perhaps BrisConnections, 
QSG, BCC, and SEQ residents’ relationships would have improved if these concepts 
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were defined from the outset. The fact that BrisConnections was previously involved 
with the Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel (NSW) should have been positioned and 
knowledgeable of environmental implications and effects of dust in residential areas, 
even when the IAS and EIS identified substantial defects, but BrisConnections chose 
not to comply with these reports.  
A public transport road associated with toll charges requires a collaborative 
effort to stand a chance of ultimately being successful in contributing societal 
benefits and value as well as value for money, and it also demands a sharing of risk 
and equity contributions by the entities. The essence of such an approach is to reduce 
the long-term concession period and avoid frequent toll increases to society. The 
perception of PPP procurement as a solution to all infrastructure challenges also 
needs to be rethought, because economic infrastructure in Queensland, in particular 
toll roads, are often resisted (TransApex, 2005), but social infrastructures procured 
under PPP are successful(Jagger 2012)and would ultimately fit the aims of 
government and aspirations of society better, a win-win situation. 
The next chapter will discuss the London Underground rehabilitation and 
restoration project, which is the second case study used in this research.  
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Chapter 5: London Underground Case 
Study 
A case study of the London Underground Rehabilitation and Restoration Project 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter four, the Airport Link Tunnel (ALT) case study was discussed, and 
this highlighted some of the problems associated with BrisConnections funding 
arrangements and the market’s perception of the infrastructure’s potential, in 
particular those risks associated with underground construction, for which outcomes 
are often uncertain. The market’s perception of the ALT project forced its staple 
units to trade at a discounted price, well below the toll industry average price, and 
risks were inadequately identified and costed, thus making it very difficult for 
BrisConnections to manage risk associated with Kedron and Wooloowin residential 
areas effectively. This chapter discusses the London Underground (LU) 
Rehabilitation and Restoration project, the other case study used in this research. 
In 1998, the Department for Transport (DfT) announced the rehabilitation and 
restoration of the London Underground (LU) tube train lines under a PPP 
arrangement that involved three consortia. DfT’s objective was to allow private 
sector participation in the project for the rehabilitation and restoration of the public 
infrastructure, as previous to this point it had been inadequately maintained due to 
budget constraints, which led to the deterioration of the LU tubelines (Kellaway and 
Shanks, 2007). Through PPP, private investors were able to finance the tubelines 
rehabilitation and restoration project based on a 30-year contract, which was 
subdivided into four 7½ years renegotiable contracts and was output performance-
based driven.  
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5.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LONDON UNDERGROUND 
TUBELINES 
The Metropolitan Railway opened London’s underground rail system, known 
as ‘The Tube’, in 1863, and it operates from Paddington to Farringdon. In the early 
20th century, six private investors (operators) operated different underground lines, 
which caused inconvenience to passengers. These private companies that owned and 
ran the railways were merged in 1933 to form the London Passenger Transport Board 
(LPTB) (Kelley and Shanks, 2007). The LPTB was established as a public 
corporation to manage London roads and underground transport, and the Greater 
London Authority was established in 2000 as a local government authority that 
became responsible for London underground transport(Kellaway and Shanks, 2007; 
UKNOA, 2009). The current operator, London Underground Limited (LUL), is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Transport for London (TfL), the statutory corporation 
responsible for most elements of the transport network in Greater London. 
The LU contract was awarded to two consortia: Metronet and Tube Lines. 
Metronet, was itself comprised of two consortia, Infraco BCV (servicing Bakerloo, 
Central Victoria, and Waterloo Citylines), and Infraco SSL (Sub-surface Limited) 
(servicing the Circles, District Metropolitan, East London, Hammersmith and City 
lines), while Tube Lines (Infraco JNP) serviced Jubilee, Northern, and Piccadilly 
lines. The LU project was a £15.7 billion contract signed in 2003 that had the support 
of then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown), however, the project 
collapsed in 2007.This failure was attributed to inadequate identification of risks 
associated with the infrastructure tubes, complexity, and size (PMBOK, 2004). In 
terms of LU size, it was a multifaceted and capital intensive project compared to 
typical public sector infrastructure delivery (Vining and Boardman, 2008). The LU 
project thus, represents a colossal failure at the most fundamental level of private 
sector partners in delivering and managing entrusted public sector services.  
Looking deeper into this case, prior to the engagement of the private sector 
partners, there already existed a conflict between TfL and the DfT due to failure to 
agree on the best procurement mode and objections from TfL on the use of PPP for 
the rehabilitation and restoration of the tubelines. Meanwhile, discussions were 
undertaken between the government, the Mayor of London, and Transport for 
London (TfL) to determine the most appropriate way to undertake the maintenance 
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and modernisation of LU in the long-term (UKHCTC, 2008). The Secretary of 
State’s initial decision on the long-term management of the project was that it should 
be primarily the responsibility of the Mayor of London and TfL, but the Mayor was 
to work closely with the government to determine the appropriate vehicle to deliver 
the upgrades in an attempt to secure the best value for money in future. However, the 
Secretary of State stated “there was an argument in principle to ask the private 
investor to deliver in the most innovative manner it can, but also acknowledged  that 
this might not represent the best value for money option” (UKHCTC, 2008, pp 6).    
This conflict between the government departments based on which specific 
procurement modes were best suited for the delivery of the tubelines maintenance, 
upgrades, and renewals was eventually settled in 2002. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, who was determined to spend government resources and have the project 
delivered by PPP (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010; Vining and Boardman, 2008), 
eventually fought London’s Mayor through the courts to get his way. Vining and 
Boardman (2008, pp. 156) stated that the Exchequer’s devotion to PPP was not 
wasted on those who might put it into practice, seeing a desperate customer coming 
as they pitched their charges accordingly.  
Following the court’s decision, DfT and TfL resolved their differences and 
agreed on the terms and conditions of the private sector participation (UKNAO, 
2004). In 2002, DfT and TfL jointly announced that the delivery of the LU project 
would involve private sector participation and offered reasons why this was the best 
option compared to others, such as value for money and adequate maintenance of the 
tubelines that had suffered neglect for too long. Furthermore, the benefits of using 
private participation were highlighted, which included innovative management skills 
expertise, and a greater customer focus that would uplift the image of LU, as well as 
of the transport industry in general (Kellaway and Shanks, 2007; UKNAO, 2009). 
In addition, London Underground Limited (LUL) had consistently managed 
two roles such as the maintenance and renewal of a major public infrastructure 
simultaneously, and would be in the public’s best interest for LUL to concentrate on 
the services delivery aspect and ceased from the maintenance component of the 
tubelines (Kellaway and Shanks, 2007). 
 The tubelines renewal project and maintenance upgrades were to be performed 
and executed during the night, when all trains had stopped running, thereby causing 
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less public nuisance or commuter disruption. Additionally, LU was thus providing 
greater social benefits to passengers due to private investors’ participation, in order 
to add to the social benefits already being conferred to passengers from using the 
public transport system (UKNAO, 2004). The pronouncement of the forthcoming 
PPP projects by the relevant government and LUL departments led to the 
undertaking of feasibility studies and business case development for the tubelines 
renewal, rehabilitation and maintenance.  
5.2.1 Feasibility studies of London Underground infrastructure 
The LU feasibility study performed by DfT reconfirmed the objectives of the 
government. PPP as the preferred option would provide VfM in comparison to other 
procurement options (UKNAO, 2004). The tubelines analysis and evaluation did in 
fact produced VfM, but this was heavily criticised because of inaccuracies associated 
with the cost estimates and risk analyses. Some authors argued that cost estimates 
used to obtain project approval needed to be revisited, or even reversed to reflect the 
changes to VfM identified, including actual infrastructure benefits and costs (Reilly 
et al., 2005; Shaoul, 2004). For example, it was highly improbable of 100 years old 
infrastructure to produce VfM. Shaoul (2004) stated that the existing condition of the 
tubelines imposed difficulties in establishing actual cost estimates, let alone the 
tubelines producing VfM in their present form of deterioration. DfT swiftly moved to 
defend the VfM and feasibility study report and other decisions of the government in 
choosing PPP as the preferred procurement options (Kellaway and Shanks, 2007; 
UKNAO, 2004). The defence was as follows: 
 The LU 30 year’s contract would deliver benefits beyond a piecemeal 
improvement on the tubelines. 
 The contract was incentivised, enabling the consortia to develop a long-
term interest in doing what they liked best, i.e., to “live by the results of 
their work” and get it right on the spot.  
 The consortia would be responsible for managing deliveries across a 
complete range of assets, train tracks, signalling, communications, 
stations, tunnels and structures, which allowed for compatibility and 
integration of all designs and maintenance systems.  
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 LUL would be responsible for the LU investment priorities and 
strategies, monitoring consortia performance and tubelines 
maintenance.  
 
In other words, DfT’s primary objective to use PPP for the LU rehabilitation 
and restoration was motivated by finance and maintenance of the tubelines, while the 
revenue aspect and investment priorities and strategies remained the government’s 
responsibility.  
DfT and TfL did not formally request PPP consortia to produce a formal 
business case development in terms of the work scope to be potentially performed by 
the private investors, but concentrated on eliminating the backlog of unmaintained 
tubelines in a timely manner. However, LUL did request assurances from DfT and 
TfL that tubeline maintenance and upgrades would be based on realistic long-term 
investment needs, which could be achieved through the use of the specific and 
desired performance outcomes (UKNAO, 2004). LUL’s suggestion was considered 
and they were allowed to engage a consulting firm that created a simulation model 
with the aim of achieving a high level of infrastructure performance with linkages 
between investments and desired outcomes. Finn et al., (2007) and UKNAO (2004) 
both stated that the simulation model was incentivised to attract potential investors 
who, with the combination of the LU contract terms and conditions, could potentially 
bring improvements to the infrastructure tubes, in particular to passenger services.  
The contract terms and conditions were based on performance obligations, 
standards, asset conditions and services quality, but failed to specify the rights of the 
private investors or what accrued benefits might result. One of the contract 
conditions centred on private ownership (asset ownership), which conferred 
responsibilities of track maintenance and upgrades based on a whole-life costing 
system of a 30-year contract without guaranteed rights to the private investors or 
participation with the LU investment decisions and/or the level of maintenance that 
would be required. In addition, monthly payments to each consortium, which 
covered the tubelines maintenance, upgrades, and renewals, otherwise known as the 
“infrastructure services charge” (ISC), were subject to adjustments that could be 
reduced depending on pre-determined and specific performance measures for the 
particular infrastructure under consideration (UKNAO, 2004). What complicated 
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these performance measures were the uncertainties that surrounded the existing 
conditions of the tubelines and the level of sustainable performance required, which 
was also completely vulnerable to the constant changes and restructuring of business 
operations, especially by Metronet (UKHCTC, 2008; UKNAO, 2009). 
5.2.2 London Underground PPP type 
The London Underground projects formed a highly complex PPP structure, 
which could be categorised as a design, build, finance, and operate (DBFO) 
arrangement. In the case of a PPP contract being structured under DBFO, the private 
investor is guaranteed a long-term right of access to the infrastructure, while the 
government makes services payments to the private investor based on performance 
metrics (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010).As discussed earlier, Metronet was made up 
of two consortia (Metronet BCV and Metronet SSL) that were responsible for two-
thirds of the contract. Metronet BCV was responsible for Bakerloo, Central, Victoria, 
and Waterloo and City lines. Metronet SSL was in charge of the District, Circle, 
Metropolitan, East London, Hammersmith and City lines. The companies that 
formed Metronet were Balfour Beatty Plc, Bombardier Inc., WS Atkins Plc, EDF SA 
(formerly Seeboard Group Plc) and Thames Water Plc (UKNAO, 2009). The other 
one third of the LU contract was awarded to Tube Lines (Jubilee Northern 
Piccadilly). 
To add to the complexity of things, DfT established various oversight 
authorities, while Metronet created layers of companies to manage the construction 
and delivery of the tubelines that became a self-induced catastrophe (UKHCCPA, 
2010).UKNAO (2004) stated that the objectives of LU rehabilitation and restoration 
project were not to create a complex structure that would eventually become an 
insurmountable impediment to the delivery of the tubelines. Rather, selecting PPP 
consortia based on performance output and subsequently each consortium’s efforts 
and services were to be reimbursed based on their ability to manage the entrusted 
assets efficiently. No matter the conclusions reached regarding the eventual collapse 
of the LU project, what was evident is the unhealthy relationship that exists between 
the consortia and the government based on the type of contract signed and inherited 
by the entities (Vining and Boardman, 2008). Figure 5.1 shows the profile of the 
consortia and government agencies involved with the LU rehabilitation and 
restoration project. 
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Figure 5.1: LU Consortia and oversight authorities (UKNAO, 2009) 
 
5.3 THE LONDON UNDERGROUND PROJECT COMPLEXITY 
 
In the case of LU, a complex PPP structure was required and three consortia 
formed. The engagement of three consortiums for the LU project appeared to have 
been a colossal mistake that created many impediments affecting successful 
execution of the project (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010). Some of these impediments 
included: 
 coordination of various consortium performance, and 
 layers of oversight authorities in monitoring the activities of the 
investors. 
DfT created the LU complexity based on the choice of consortia, whose 
interests and visions were quite contrary to the expectations of the government.  One 
of the interviewee’s for this research who worked for the BCV consortium stated 
“DfT appointing three consortia for the LU was a disaster in waiting, no matter the 
government’s generosity, the contract clauses (caveats) was obstructive to enable 
project performance.” The introduction of performance measures to the delivery of 
the LU tubelines added to the complexity of the project (UKNAO, 2004; 2009), and 
  
Chapter 5: London Underground Case Study 201 
payments for services rendered linked to performance measures that were undefined, 
as the level of performance required for the maintenance, upgrades, and renewals of 
the tubelines were not fully detailed (Vining and Boardman, 2008, UKNAO, 2009). 
These performance measures and their interpretations (UKNAO, 2009; Wright, 
2010) were as follows:  
 Capability: A target measure of passenger journey time for the given 
capability of the railway infrastructure. The capability of a line is either 
estimated or tested when the condition of the infrastructure has changed 
and this has affected the passenger journey time. For example, after a 
line upgrade has reduced passenger journey time, or a speed restriction 
has been imposed for more than three months. 
 Availability: A measure that assesses the availability of train and station 
infrastructure in terms of non-performance, using lost customer hours 
per line, per month. 
 Ambience: A measure that assesses the quality of the train and station 
environment provided to passengers, including the cleanliness and 
general condition of trains and stations, and the provision of passenger 
information. The ambience measure is conducted through surveys by 
unknown shoppers and scores are weighted by station and online to 
obtain an average score for a particular consortium.  
In addition, a fourth measure that London Underground did not include, but 
which is common in PFI contracts was: 
 Service Point Regime: A regime designed to incentivise preventative 
maintenance in areas not covered by other measures and provide 
assurance on quality standards achieved, for example, in station 
refurbishment. The point’s regime calculates deductions for equipment 
failures and rewards timely fault rectification. 
Some of these performance measures were basically unachievable, given the 
LU infrastructure conditions prior to the rehabilitation and restoration project. These 
measures are related to intangible risks and question what type of risks the consortia 
were managing with the LU rehabilitation and restoration project? For example, the 
UK House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (UKHCCPA, 2005) 
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investigation of the LU contract revealed instances where the project failed to 
appropriately transfer and risk to the consortia. Where risks were transferred, 
exclusion clauses limited the level of risks borne by consortia, such as risks 
associated with cost overruns, repairs of tunnel walls, or repairs of unknown asset 
condition, were excluded from consortia responsibilities, because the assets residual 
life, or original purchase price were unknown. Vining and Boardman (2008) 
observed that in areas where an asset condition could be evaluated against specific 
engineering standards, the cost borne by the consortia was capped where the 
consortia could demonstrate to have acted economically and efficiently within the 
guidelines and stipulations of the contract (UKNAO, 2004).  
Howes and Robinson (2005) stated that the policy objective of the UK 
Government in 1992 was to improve the level of public services, and this was 
underpinned by the driver of services delivery improvements, rather than the 
ownership and construction of infrastructure. Ibid (2005) further argued that the key 
challenge for the private investor was to understand the public sector services 
obligation with respect to the infrastructure performance for a pre-determined 
contract period, without exceeding those limits. The consortia were quite conversant 
with the deteriorated infrastructure conditions, but preferred to avoid potential risks 
that could arise in future by demanding the tubelines residual value, which was non-
existent. Moreover, the public sector assets have no residual or alternative use for 
purpose; they are service specific and often referred to as a sunk cost (Howes and 
Robinson, 2005). 
In addition to the complexity of LU, was the payment regime with inbuilt 
periodic review mechanism that allowed the entities to re-specify the services 
requirement within the infrastructure scope and contract price every 7½ years. 
Vining and Boardman (2008) argued that this constituted an inherent conflict of 
interests with existing project complexities. The LU performance-based output and 
payment regimes differed from the contract’s original meaning and the specific 
interpretations of the nature of the contract acquired and signed by the entities. TfL 
and DfT assumed they had purchased an output-based, fixed-price contract, while 
Metronet believed the contrary, i.e., that they were being engaged to undertake an 
agreed series of heterogeneous, cost-plus contracts (Vining and Boardman, 2008). 
The cost-plus component refers to “extra work performed economically and 
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efficiently” that resulted in ex-post transaction costs that had to be resolved by 
arbitration (UKHCTC, 2008, pp. 21). LU’s goals and objectives were not being 
attained as the delivering entities were at cross-purposes, the government was eager 
to minimise costs and improve service quality to passengers, using performance 
measures to drive achievement of these objectives (UKNAO, 2004).  
According to (FHWA, 2011), the introduction of performance measures in a 
PPP environment needs to consider all aspects of the project, including the 
effectiveness of the performance measures and how they would impact on the overall 
project execution and future performance of the consortia. Performance measures are 
broad classifications of desired outcomes required of the private investor that reflect 
contractual goals and statements of increasing and decreasing specifics, ensuring and 
establishing specifics or implementing specifics of a project (FHWA, 2011). These 
measures are derived from the programmatic levels of intended services and imposed 
contractually as broad classifications of desired outcomes required to be achieved by 
the private investor in the PPP environment. They are different from key 
performance indicators (KPI), which typically include, but are limited to the project’s 
benchmarks, targets, milestones, numbers, percentages variance and distribution 
ratios (FHWA, 2011).   
The success of performance measures requires a constant review of the 
effectiveness of these measures and changes being implemented where the 
performance measures are found to be ineffective, or obstructive to the execution of 
the project. UKNAO (2004) stated that achieving performance measures led to LUL 
collecting information on the performance of the network through customers’ 
surveys to develop passengers’ perception on the services and likewise, measure the 
consortia’s overall performance. The disadvantage of using customer surveys to 
evaluate performance or perception of services is that they tend to fluctuate over 
time, which could be destructive to the project delivery, as well as constructive to the 
entire business operation when the survey recommends a particular action (FHWA, 
2011).      
5.3.1 Public Sector Comparator 
DfT perception of PPP as the most suitable way of achieving financial freedom 
towards LU tubelines maintenance and renewals that would allow LU to provide 
more efficient services was a hasty decision. The public sector comparator (PSC) 
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assessment and evaluation of LU project produced VfM, which used the perspective 
of conventional delivery methods to compare costs, finance, and risks associated 
with the tubelines proved to be inappropriate. The PSC analyses that produced VfM 
were cost estimates of LUL for managing the Underground infrastructure based on 
finance, maintenance, upgrading, and renewal of the tubelines based on conventional 
delivery method. These were moderate cost estimates compared to the actual costs of 
performing these functions effectively (Shaoul, 2005). The comparison includes the 
costs of some of the risks associated with the construction, asset management and 
services delivery costs. As some of the risks were transferred to the private investor, 
for comparison purposes, PSC needs to include the costs of the risk transferred, as 
such; the PPP option could therefore provide greater VfM than publicly financed 
alternatives where the public sector bears all of the risks. The LU was later adjusted 
to include some other variables, such as consideration of the public sector’s inability 
to deliver projects on time and on budget (social-economic benefits), which did not 
reflect the actual costs and risks involved to perform those functions (Finn at al., 
2007; UKNAO, 2000). Private investors’ cost estimates to perform these functions 
were greater, and the government took the view that these higher costs were 
acceptable as the private sector management and innovative skills were more 
efficient than those in the public sector (Finn et al., 2007). Moreover, the government 
opined that the benefits of an improved transport system and better risk control 
funded by the private sector would outweigh the extra costs involved; this view was 
not shared by the many critics of the LU project (Finn et al., 2007; UKNAO, 2000). 
PMBOK (2004) referred to the uniqueness of projects, which all differ in terms 
of resources consumption, and risks and complexities, and the LU project is certainly 
unique and a prime example of these differing factors and elements. Because of the 
uncertainties of the tubeline conditions and considering the periods between contract 
negotiations and signing, the undertaking of an accurate risk analyses or a reasonable 
assets comparison based on changing values between 2002 and 2003 was always 
going to be difficult (UKNAO, 2004). 
The House of Commons, Transport Local Government and the Regions 
(UKHCTC, 2001) stated that the LU contract was comprised of 135 separate contract 
documents, more than 2,800 pages of contract terms, with 2 million words. Blaiklock 
(2008) described the LU contracts as certainly one of the most complex, if not the 
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most complex infrastructure concession of all time. At the time TfL believed that the 
LU contracts offered only limited public control over the consortia activities and 
were unmanageable, which could be extraordinarily expensive by disrupting trains 
operation services (UKHCTC 2001). In defence of the LU contracts complexity, 
LUL told the sub-committee responsible for the PPP implementation that LU 
contracts were manageable and the contract complexities were merely codification of 
activities. Moreover, that LUL had been operating under a similar situation, (PPP) 
with one operating company and three infrastructure companies under the public 
sector control since September 1999, known as shadow running (UKHCTC, 2001), a 
complexity the State Secretary described as thorough but perfectly workable.  
The LU contracts codification, though complex, would equally produce 
benefits, but was most likely to be an expensive process. For example, the shadow 
running of the tubelines had spent over £600,000 a year in attributing faults as the 
result of delays associated with the train operations to any of the entities (three 
infrastructure companies and operating company). However, the anticipation was 
that with PPP such faults would have a financial penalty attached and the cost of 
monitoring and disputing the faults would actually increase (UKHCTC, 2001). Other 
concerns were expressed, in terms of safety monitoring and the possibility of the 
contracts management becoming hostile, rather than a partnership.  
The New Zealand Treasury (2009) stated there was some partial evidence that 
PSC tend to have a pessimism bias and should not be overstated when measuring 
PPP value for money. The VfM is principally judged at the business case stage, and 
whether the best bid is acceptable depends on whether the bidding process was 
judged to be sufficiently competitive. Shaoul (2004) stated that where the PSC 
evaluation of proposed public infrastructure investment was tinted with bias, it was 
therefore inadequate for future comparative analysis, and it was possible to argue that 
the PSC process was manipulative and those benefits identified might be exaggerated  
to attract potential equity investors. It is also possible that a proposed infrastructure 
investment evaluation that produces the lowest net present cost (NPC) is assumed to 
offer greater VfM (Shaoul, 2004), in such cases, PPP procurements would produce 
greater VfM than publicly financed conventional procurement, because the public 
sector bears all of the risk, while PPP risk is shared between the entities. However, 
PPP advocates argue that the difference in the costs of what the public sector is 
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paying to use the private investor’s procurement option tends to constitute a premium 
for the risks transferred to the private investor and greater use of the efficiency, 
expertise and innovative skills of the investor (Shaoul, 2004). 	
The definition by different authors of what constitutes VfM differs with 
interpretation. Hodge and Greve (2009) argued that assessment and evaluation of 
public infrastructure tended to produce contradictory results concerning VfM PPP 
effectiveness to society. Kwak et al., (2009) stated that the public infrastructure 
investment’s success or failure through PPP largely depended on four factors, no 
matter the VfM and economic benefits identified. These factors are: (i) the 
competence of the government, (ii) selection of an appropriate consortium, (iii) 
adequate risk allocation and transfer between the entities, and (iv) appropriate 
incentive package. For example adequate risk allocation and transfer between the 
entities were non-existent, as risks and costs associated with tubelines tunnels were 
capped as their conditions and acquisition dates were unknown (UKHCTC, 2008). 
5.3.2 London Underground value for money realisation 
DFT and TfL objectives of obtaining maximum value for their investments 
prompted the inclusion of economic and efficiency caveats during the LU contract 
negotiations, and designed to protect the public interest. PSC evaluation process or 
control is not neutral (Shaoul, 2004), as PSC is limited in capacity to capture future 
costs and risks of particular major capital expenditure decisions with future revenue 
projections, which are difficult to predict. For example, authors such as Heald 
(1997); Pollack et al., (1999); and Froud (2003) have raised questions regarding the 
suitability of discounted cash flow techniques in the context of public investment, the 
choice of discount rate, PSC, and the risk transfer that lies at the heart of justifying  
PPP procurement (Shaoul, 2004). While governments and proponents of PPP policy 
claim the procurement option represents VfM and little empirical evidence has been 
produced to support their case. However, the evidence is largely based on a 
hypothetical PSC and PPP procurement option with no independent assessment 
produced to support the case for VfM procurement as a better option (Shaoul, 2004, 
2005). 
The VfM principally identified with the LU project was based on the lack of 
funding that had persisted and prevented the upgrades of the tubelines for which the 
private sector participation was seen as a relief to the government. UKNAO (2004) 
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stated that the community simply wanted an improved service without any 
significant tax increase and/or exorbitant attendant service fees. Other considerations 
were the transfer of risks to the private investors, such as cost overruns, time 
overruns, and underperformance risks, which would have been considered VfM, had 
they ever actually materialised. Also, DfT and TfL expressed optimism regarding the 
infrastructure renewal benefits to LU passengers, and the expertise of the consortia, 
which were seen as uncommon and unavailable in the public sector that could 
revolutionise the transport industry, which did not materialised.    
5.3.3 Public interest protection 
Public interests featured prominently in the LU contract and the LUL were 
appointed to coordinate the operation of the project. Much of the publics’ concern 
related to fare increases, service patterns, train operations and public safety, the 
control over which remained with the LUL. In protecting the public interest, DfT 
instituted a reporting hierarchy that neutralised the consortia’s authority in many 
ways, in particular with Metronet. In order to receive services payments linked to 
performance measures based on the management of the LU infrastructure, Metronet 
had to justify their services. In most PPP cases, the private sector usually has 
absolute control over the constructed asset and sets the fee charges to recover their 
capital investments. In the case of the LU, DfT and TfL denied such recovery of fee 
charges to both Metronet and Tube Lines Pty Limited, thereby diluting the powers of 
both entities. The oversight authorities exercised much influence and control over 
what constituted extra work to be performed economically and efficiently under the 
PPP contract. In part, DfT and TfL protected the public interest over primary 
essentials and core services the government was supposed to provide to society 
(UKNAO, 2004).  
Other protection provided by DfT and TfL was by way of imposition of safety 
standards to prevent social unrest through the establishment of Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) that became responsible for safety standards. HSE was established 
as an additional oversight authority for the LU project, not being part of the original 
contract arrangement. However, Metronet and Tube Lines Pty Limited contributed to 
the LU safety standards and implementations, which the government rejected 
(UKNAO, 2004). This was despite UKNAO (2009) stating that the safety standards 
proposed by Metronet and Tube Lines were adequate for the LU project and aligned 
 208 Chapter 5:London Underground Case Study 
with commercial principles for public safety. Also, Price Waterhouse (PWH) 
analytical report (1997) on safety standards of the LU was also rejected by HSE. The 
reason given by HSE (1998) was that “the safety standards are potential for failures”. 
Another issue was that Metronet had two business operations and because of this, a 
conflict of interest was always a possibility where safety standards were concerned, 
in comparison to a single business structure where no conflict would exist if the 
proposed safety standards were adopted. Metronet’s two business operations 
experienced several such conflicts of interest and frequent disengagement of the 
board of directors (UKNAO, 2009) that reinforced the refusal of the safety standards 
of PWC by the HSE on behalf of Metronet.   
 
5.4 LONDON UNDERGROUND ANALYSIS 
The deplorable conditions of the LU infrastructure tubelines warranted an in-
depth risk assessment, based on the significant changes of services payments which 
were linked to performance measures or performance driven. This meant that 
additional risk was introduced by DfT and TfL that required evaluation of the 
performance measures and their impact on available resources, rather than relying on 
the claims for extra work performed. UKNAO, (2004) stated that the uncertainty 
associated with the condition of some assets highlighted the importance of the 
proposed periodic reviews. LUL accepted during contract negotiation that contingent 
provisions would be made to compensate for the unforeseen risks and adjusted 
adequately. But what was introduced by DfT and TfL were unidentified, 
unquantified and unpriced intangible risks, included based on the assumption that LU 
project had been adequately incentivised and a promise made on the basis of 
delivering improved services to the community using PPP (UKHCCPA, 2009). 
In a PPP environment, government’s feasibility studies, assessments and 
evaluations of infrastructure procurement only produce cost guidelines in terms of 
upper and lower limits of what is acceptable to the government (UKNAO, 2004). 
Neither the government’s risk analysis nor cost guidelines were sufficient to prevent 
the private investor from conducting their own risk analysis or cost estimates to 
ascertain the actual cost involved or potential risk posed by the rehabilitation and 
restoration of the tubelines (Blaiklock, 2008). During the interviews of respondents 
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for this research, one public sector PPP director interviewee stated that “the 
government is better with risk assessments and analysis than the private investor” 
and government’s predictions were much better because of the stakeholders 
involved. UKHCTC (2010, pp. 37) stated that “government’s approach to risk in PPP 
projects does not seek to transfer risks to the private investor as an end in itself, but 
only to transfer those risks which the private sector is equipped to handle.” 
Therefore, this introduced the possibility that attempting to transfer inappropriate 
types of risks could lead to excessive costs and potential default, with the 
materialising costs falling back onto the public sector. In most cases, the failure of 
PPP can be traced back to inadequate risk analyses, financial and incomplete data 
information (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010).  
In addition, Metronet’s own organisational structure posed some difficulties 
when it came to the transfer of risks. The House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts inquiry discovered that the LU contract did not specifically transfer any 
risk to the consortia (UKHCCPA, 2005) and yet this had been the primary reason for 
using PPP. Also, corporate cultures of the public and private sectors in terms of 
management techniques and perception of risks differ greatly. The public sector 
management style is a hierarchical system, and decisions are made through a 
consultative process and procedure (Reijniers. 1994), often referred to as “red tape”. 
However, the “red tape” is a core public sector value that co-opts accountability and 
transparency, even when the system is considered an inefficient business model that 
serves the purposes intended and significantly reduces avoidable human mistakes 
(Reijniers, 1994). 
 
5.4.1 London Underground performance measures 
The involvement of the private investors with the LU rehabilitation and 
restoration of the infrastructure tubes was focused on three main objectives (Finn et 
al., 2007). 
 Guarantee of VfM to the taxpayer and improved passenger services.  
 Obtain the private investor’s funding and expertise to modernise the 
tubelines. 
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 Protection of the public interest and limited exposure to future financial 
liability. 
These objectives were aimed at eradicating and eliminating infrequent 
maintenance servicing of the tubelines and through private sector participation, the 
needed solution to achieve these objectives was envisaged to be provided (Finn et al., 
2007, pp 7). Public safety was guaranteed, as long as the construction was carried out 
during the night, with minimal interruptions. The long-term social impacts of the LU 
rehabilitation and restoration were based on the private investors developing a long-
term interest in the improvement of the tubelines, and subsequently concentrating on 
delivering the tubelines with less distraction (UKNAO, 2009).  
The conditions and terms of the performance measures empowered the LUL to 
set investment priorities and equally monitor the consortia performance. With 
performance measures introduced, DfT and TfL could replace an underperforming 
contractor if any was proven to be incapable of executing the project (UKNAO, 
2004). For example, the extent of services the consortia would need to provide to be 
considered “economically and efficiently performed”, as stipulated by the contract, 
were not clearly stated (UKNAO, 2009, pp 33). The undefined clauses were the 
cause of litigation concerning the actual interpretation and perception of the 
oversight authorities based on these performance measures. The government 
oversight authorities’ interpretation of extra work performed economically and 
efficiently was within the guidelines of cost substantiation and not actually work 
performed. Put differently, appropriate interpretation of these performance measures 
could be seen as a guide to budget compliance, financial prudence, and taxpayers’ 
value for money and used for evaluating consortia service delivery based on 
effectiveness and efficiency (Hughes, 2001). Efficiency is defined as the extent to 
which an agency maximises the outputs produced from a given set of inputs or 
minimises the input cost of producing a given set of outputs (Hughes, 2001, pp. 4). 
The Independent Group (IEG, 2007, pp. 8) defined efficiency as the extent to which 
a government “maximised the outputs produced from a given set of inputs or 
minimised cost to achieve the same level of output”, and Samuelson and Nordhaus 
(2005, pp. 158) defined efficiency as “the use of economic resources that produced 
the maximum level of satisfaction with a given input and technology.” 
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In other words, efficiency is not cost substantiation, but rather the cost 
outcomes and impacts (satisfaction) over time that are measurable (time series 
analysis). In addition, efficiency could be compared at a particular point in time for 
similar entities (cross sectional analysis) requiring performance measures (Hughes, 
2001). Achieving a particular performance measure requires a robust definition of 
inputs and outputs, including the use of pre-existing data (historic), or data 
information relating to those inputs and outputs, but these were unavailable for the 
LU tubelines. However, performance measures are useful, where performance 
variations across organisations and divisions, or detailed analyses across the 
organisation and operational units are available for comparative purposes (Hughes, 
2001). For example, the oversight authorities failed to define the type of performance 
techniques or data information required to achieve these measures, or any other 
comparative measures on which their decisions were based. 
Hughes (2001) argued that the government services delivery objectives were 
characterised by a number of challenges in achieving particular service outcomes:  
 Inadequate information regarding services objectives and requirements. 
 Indecisiveness between short-term and long-term services delivery 
strategy. 
 Lack of market price guidelines to services provision and consumption 
decisions. 
 Uniformed infrastructure incentives for stakeholders (Metronet and 
Tube Line Pty Limited). 
 Unstructured political processes. 
 
In addition, definitions and interpretations are inherent in PPP contracts, as are 
clauses requiring additional interpretation by a Court of Law. At times, differences in 
meaning, understanding and interpretation of these clauses tends to foster litigation 
and disagreements in terms of contract performance and conditions and this was 
evident within the LUL project (UKNAO, 2004). Reijniers (1994) stated that the 
original common goals between the PPP entities were no longer common, as the 
financial institutions’ and the service providers’ interests diverged in terms of 
performance and associated costs. At times, organisation perception is driven by 
motive and maximisation of benefits, either commercial or social to satisfy various 
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interest groups. The meaning, understanding, and interpretation of the PPP clauses 
within the contract(s) becomes the primary focus of each entity desirous of 
maximising its own position, either by obtaining profits (investor) or being seen to 
provide social benefits (government) (Reijniers, 1994). What all of this suggests is 
that there is a hidden agenda in the operational PPP environment within the entities 
that could have been avoided if regulatory policies (not specific) were in existence 
prior to the private investor’s involvement. For example, if services quality was 
defined relative to performance measures and outcomes expectations, infrastructure 
costs would increase in proportion to perceived risks, whether identified or 
quantified (BrisConnections Media Release, 2008). 
Another problem with the LU performance measures was the inability of the 
review organisation (LUL) to acquire the market’s prevailing costs and prices, 
preferring to rely on the Arbitrator’s cost details to update its records (UKNAO, 
2009; Wright, 2010). LUL’s lack of use of prevailing cost prices affected the 
relationship between the entities. According to Cooke (2001), the Arbitrator and 
LUL colluded by sharing cost information that contravened commercial law and 
made it possible, even to set aside the contract caveats of economically and 
efficiently performed clauses if the consortia wanted. LUL’s litigations and 
investigations based on the Metronet cost data also became another additional cost to 
taxpayers, but a simple verification of the market’s prevailing cost price, or 
comparison of material costs with another consortium of the same size and 
complexity would have produced a more effective result if economic conditions 
remained static (UKNAO, 2004; 2009). 
Whilst there appears to be no doubt about the private investor’s entrepreneurial 
ability and skill to transform a commercial operation into a success and thus increase 
shareholder values, often in the delivery of public infrastructure projects these skills 
have not been transferred successfully. The private investor’s success is also limited 
by the predetermined service objectives and governments’ regulatory frameworks, or 
in compliance with certain regulations that are difficult to achieve in most cases. The 
marketing technique often used by PPP generally focuses on highlighting 
“innovation, expertise, and value for money” (Pollitt, 2005; Shaoul 2005), but 
according to the extant literature, in infrastructure projects, the promised benefits are 
seldom fully delivered. UKHLSCEA (2010, pp. 103) stated that VfM tests based on 
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input costs of PSC were limited by “the shortage of relevant information”, and 
possessed “selective inclusions of optimism bias”. Even when PPP assessments and 
evaluation deficiencies were addressed, the public sector could not rely entirely on 
PSC when choosing a procurement mode. For example, one private sector 
interviewee stated that “PPP is exorbitant, based on the speculation of the unknown 
and untested performance assumptions of practitioners.” UKHLSCEA (2010) stated 
that the key benefit of PPP was the transfer of risk from the public sector to the 
private investor; however, such risks were not transferred in the LU project. The 
knowledge and understanding of risks matters greatly, prior to being transferred and 
allocated to the entities, and unfortunately according to Wright, (2010), the current 
practices of PPP have not allowed this particular process to develop and flourish. 
5.4.2 London Underground - an incomplete contract 
The difference between economically efficient and incomplete contracts relates 
to both ex-pre and ex-post efficiencies. An inefficient contract has ex-post 
inefficiencies because it necessitates exchange to happen regardless of the ultimate 
benefits to the entities. The ex-pre and ex-post efficiencies are found in the intentions 
upon which entities enter into a contract when existing conditions to be encountered 
in operating that contract are under any sort of uncertainty (William, 2010). In such 
uncertain conditions, the value of performance (output) might be less than the value 
of a consortium’s cost of performance, which is regarded as an incomplete or 
inefficient contract. The solution to inefficiencies associated with ex-pre and ex-post 
contract values requires the setting up of a completely contingent contract that 
clearly and precisely specifies the obligations and rights of the entities, which are 
enforceable according to stipulated conditions and terms of the contingent contract 
(Bentz et al., 2004). The advantage of a contingent contract is to ensure that 
performance occurs, and then only when it is efficient to perform a particular 
activity.   
Unfortunately, many PPP contracts are incomplete because they fail to specify 
the obligations and rights of the entities. An incomplete contract exists when there is 
insufficient information at the time of project negotiation and contract signing (Bentz 
et al., 2004; Williams, 2010). With the LU, an incomplete contract existed, because 
the asset conditions of the infrastructure tubelines were unknown and the extent of 
risks associated with them were unascertainable. UKNAO (2004) stated the 
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uncertainty that surrounded the LU infrastructure conditions resulted in Metronet 
seeking protection from the consequences of adverse effects that could exceed the 
level of contingencies provided by DfT and TfL. Further, evidence of incomplete 
contract emerged during the refurbishment of the stations, where DfT and TfL 
disagreed with Metronet on the fundamental principles of the contract (Vining and 
Boardman, 2008). Unfortunately, the extent to which a station refurbishment could 
be classified as modernised, refurbished, or enhanced refurbished, or what level of 
refurbishment could be considered appropriate, was not defined in the LU contract 
(UKNAO, 2009). The same incomplete contract became the basis for contention on 
the type and nature of contract purchased and signed by the entities that led to 
misinterpretation of the type of contract acquired. DfT and TfL assumed the nature 
of the contract was an output-based performance with a fixed price, while the 
consortia believed and agreed to a series of heterogeneous cost plus contracts 
(Vining and Boardman, 2008). 
The same incomplete contract causes divergent goals and objectives in pursuit 
of self-interest in a PPP environment, when the contract clause interpretation is 
misread or actual meaning of the contract by the entities could lead to the pursuit of 
self-interest (UKNAO, 2009; Reijniers, 1994). The pursuit of self-interest was 
evident in the case of the Metronet consortia as they were clearly intent on 
maximising immediate profits through exaggeration of services payment claims, 
which portrays clearly the different corporate culture of the private sector and 
services industries. DfT and TfL were in pursuit of social benefits and improved 
services quality to society, which were unaligned with commercial profits or 
shareholders improved investment returns, not even as divergent objectives. Reijniers 
(1994) argued that the initial stages of a PPP environment barely notice any contrary 
interests, or cultural differences as the entities appeared at the start of the LU projects 
to work collaboratively. However, significant changes occurred once the contract 
was signed and a close review was performed on the content of the contract 
documents that automatically changed the principles, terms, and conditions of the 
PPP arrangements (Reijniers, 1994). Blaiklock (2008) stated that the consequences 
were far reaching as disputation of the contract wording and interpretations became 
the basis for litigation. Therefore, incomplete contracts tend to affect the overall 
infrastructure performance, as well as the ultimate outcomes, but are avoidable if 
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contract clauses, and terminologies are defined from the outset to prevent 
misinterpretation and assumptions unrelated the contract.  
 
5.5 LONDON UNDERGROUND CAPITAL COST 
The cost of the estimated work that Metronet was expected to perform in the 
first 7½ year segment of the contract, based on 2002 prices, was in the vicinity of 
£6.9 billion, and this was equivalent to £8.7 billion in 2004 (in cash terms) 
(UKNAO, 2009). On top of this was extra cost for the contingent liability and 
reimbursement for additional work performed economically and efficiently. DfT and 
TfL were responsible for defining the milestones, processes, and length of time of a 
particular phase, while LUL was in control of operational strategies and resources. 
The work schedules and milestones were as follows:  
 £1.2 billion to refurbish, enhance and modernise 150 tube stations as 
contractually agreed to specification by 2012;  
 £620 million to refurbish assets such as bridges, tunnels and 
embankments to meet asset conditions and benchmarks by 2010; 
 £460 million for train tracks upgrade by 2010; and 
 £2.8 billion for signal upgrades and rolling stock including the design 
and manufacture of over 1,700 railway cars by 2018. 
Metronet (BCV and SSL) went bankrupt in 2008 and subsequently, the 
remaining consortium (Tube Lines) was taken over by the government in 2010. The 
rehabilitation and restoration project reverted to LUL to continue with the 
maintenance and upgrades of LU tubelines.  
5.5.1 London Underground funding 
The Department for Transport provided annual funding of £1 billion to TfL by 
way of payments for the LU project, which was to be disbursed as follows, Metronet 
(£600 million) and Tube Lines (£400 million) (Kellaway and Shanks, 2007; 
UKNAO, 2009). Metronet had access to a private debt of £1,325 million, equity of 
£175 million and a shareholders loan of £350 million, and “comfort letter” covering 
95 to 98 per cent of Metronet’s debt. The reason the banks requested a “comfort 
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letter” from the government was because of the Rail Track collapse, where the 
government was accused of opportunistic behaviour (Vining and Boardman, 2008; 
Shaoul, 2004). Financial guarantees to Metronet underwriters were provided by DfT 
as a result of the government’s commitments and support for the tubelines project.  
Both the “comfort letter” and “financial guarantees” were assurances given on 
behalf of Metronet’s debt. Blaiklock (2008) posited that by guaranteeing Metronet’s 
debt, financial institutions (lenders) had no incentives of monitoring the activities or 
transactional costs of Metronet closely, because the debt had been guaranteed in the 
event of early termination or bankruptcy. Vining and Boardman (2008) stated that 
the Deutsche Bank and European Investment Bank required a guaranteed 95per cent 
of £3.8 billion before providing approval, and this also included upfront negotiation 
fees of 2 to 5per cent for potential losses of the government to offset against any 
early termination costs. With these guarantees provided, the banks were satisfied that 
the terms and conditions were better than those available in the markets and were 
happy to see the debt stretched to maturity (Blaiklock, 2008; Vining and Boardman, 
2008). UKHCTC (2008) report on LU’s financial arrangements stated that they were 
confusing to understand. Blaiklock (2008) stated that £450 million was paid in 
excess to Deutsche Bank and European Investment Bank, and would been 
appropriate if the government had directly secured the loans on its own right and 
passed it to the consortia. 
The fact that the cost of LU borrowings was actually greater than the cost of 
issuing public debt, and that private debt was used to finance the LU project (that did 
not provide any savings to the taxpayer), was a controversy that DfT could not 
explain. Williams (2010, pp. 3), one of the critics of LU financing arrangements, 
stated "You'll often find public quotes saying that the PPP or PFI enables the private 
sector to step in and provide infrastructure that the taxpayer cannot afford... Whether 
it's deliberate or not, I don't know, but it's a delusion. What you are doing is delaying 
paying for something - it's like public borrowing of other kinds, where the state 
issues gilt-edged securities but repays them out of future taxation." 
Williams (2010) also observed that the government’s rate of borrowing was 4.5 
per cent in its own right, but DfT preferred the consortia borrowings of 20 per cent, 
which was obtained from Metronet shareholders banks. The LU project was 
fundamentally funded on debt, because debt to equity ratio was approximately 
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88.3per cent debt to 11.7 per cent of equity. LU’s annual interest on £3.8 billion of 
the private debt finance was £450 million, which substantially increased the costs; 
DfT justified this as the result of potentially unknown risks and uncertainties 
associated with the tubelines infrastructure (Williams, 2010). Other attributes 
contributing towards the higher interest charges were the contract renegotiation every 
7½ years and potential conflicts in funding arrangements between DfT and TfL 
(UKNAO, 2000). The investment returns were available on the proviso that Metronet 
and Tube Lines Pty Limited achieved the objectives of the delivery, with risk free 
rate returns of 4.5per cent. Metronet and Tube Lines Pty Limited were likely to earn 
between 18 to 20 percent on investment returns, but where they performed poorly, 
the rate of return would be lower (UKHCCPA, 2000). Williams (2001) argued that 
on the assumption of the LU project being funded with government bonds, the £450 
million paid in excess to Deutsche Bank and European Investment Bank would have 
been avoided, and the 95 per cent required by the banks on the private debt could 
have been saved.  
While the costs of private sector finance were greater, DfT took the view that 
private sector management of the tubelines would be more efficient than the public 
sector management. For example, the benefits of an improved transport system and 
better risk control management happened to outweigh the extra costs. However, the 
option of issuance of bonds would have been less expensive and lowered the costs of 
remunerating the vast shareholders of Metronet (Finn et al., 2007; UKNAO, 2000). 
A series of costs associated with the LU bidding and mandatory on the government 
were paid, such as the consortia expenses of doing business with the government, 
negotiation cost, bidders’ selection, and agreements costs. Others, such as success 
fees and cost of staff time during the bidding process were included and paid. 
Unfortunately, neither DfT nor TfL was able to imposed limits on the bidding costs, 
but being obligated to reimburse Metronet and Tube Lines Pty Limited over £89 
million in success fees alone (UKHCCPA, 2002). Table 5.1 shows LU bidding cost 
summary of various transactions by the consortia (Tube line, Metronet). 
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Table 5.1: LU bidding costs 
 Unsuccessful 
Bidders (£m)
Tube 
Lines 
(£m) 
Metronet 
(£m) 
Lawyers for bidders - 13.6 14.0 
Advisers - 13.1 16.4 
Lawyers for banks and funding institutions - 7.8 6.2 
Banks technical advisor, modelling, etc. - 4.4 2.5 
Other 3rd party advisers’ costs to end 2002 – tax, 
audit, VAT 
- 4.2 3.4 
Balance of 3rd party costs forecast for remaining 
period to close 
- 5.4 3.0 
Bid team resources - 16.6 14.3 
Transition team resources - 21.5 2.4 
Project office expenses - 1.4 3.2 
Unsuccessful SSL Bid - 7.0 - 
Success fees - 39.0 50.6 
Unsuccessful bidders 25.0 - - 
Total (£m) 25.0 134 116 
Source: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts. London Underground Public Private 
Partnership. Seventeenth Report of Session 2005-2005. HC 446. March 2001 
 
 
A further analysis on 11.7 per cent equity ratio (contribution) from Metronet 
shareholders (SSL, BCV) provided less of an incentive for the consortia to perform 
efficiently (Vining and Boardman, 2008). In terms of the services charge, Metronet 
received £3 billion, or 60 per cent, of its capital expenditure from 2003 to 2007, of 
which a greater portion of the amount was transferred to Bombardier and Tran4m, 
stand-alone companies owned by four shareholders of Metronet (Vining and 
Boardman, 2008). Yet the LU contract was structured to prohibit any government 
influence and intervention with the maintenance and upgrades of the tubelines, or a 
demand for transactional costs, or details of services performed economically and 
efficiently by Metronet (Williams, 2010). 
Metronet was technically divided into two consortia (BCV and SSL) and 
funded equally with a view to recouping a capital cost of £1.5 billion in the first 7½ 
years for each consortium. Also, each consortium was to claim for extra work 
performed economically and efficiently under the £1 billion contingency liability, 
and Metronet had an estimated cost overrun of 60-70 per cent as the rehabilitation 
and restoration project entered its 5th year of operation. According to Blaiklock 
(2008), Metronet was under enormous pressure because of the debt-to-equity ratio of 
88 per cent, and 11.7 per cent equity and had to make these claims because of cash-
flow problems (Vining and Boardman, 2008; Blaiklock, 2008).  
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5.6 METRONET’S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 
The LU rehabilitation and restoration project commenced in 2004, and by 2008 
Metronet consortia (BCV and SSL) was declared bankrupt due to the transactional 
cost increases mentioned earlier (UKNAO, 2009; Kellaway and Shanks, 2010; 
Wright, 2010). Metronet’s financial problems started in 2006, when Metronet (BCV 
and SSL) made their claim for services payments for extra work performed 
economically and efficiently in the first 7½ year segment, totalling £1.2 billion. The 
claim was rejected due to the lack of cost substantiation that the contract required. 
UKNAO (2009) stated that £360 million included in the extra work performed 
economically and efficiently was related to contingency liability claims, and each 
consortium (SSL and BCV) had previously already claimed £50 million which was 
the maximum amount authorised and guaranteed by the contract. Metronet attempt to 
resolve the matter promptly, sought the intervention of DfT, but was directed by DfT 
to seek an Arbitrator’s decision on the matter. At this time, Metronet was claiming 
£1.2 billion for services payments. The Arbitrator only recognised £1.1billion as 
being legitimate work performed economically and efficiently within the contract 
guidelines but determined that £100 million was work performed uneconomically 
and inefficiently (UKNAO, 2009; Wright, 2010). 
The reduction in the services payment claim of £100 million should not really 
have come as a surprise, because of the dominance of Metronet shareholders, who 
were also the supply chain to Metronet and thus in control of all relevant cost 
information. Metronet shareholders invested total equity to the value of £350 million 
through their various individual shareholding companies (Atkins, Balfour Beatty, 
Bombardier, Edf, and Thames Water) (Blaiklock, 2008). Due to the organisational 
structure of Metronet, it was difficult to trace the exact financial position of the 
organisation at any point in time, or what loan or other repayments were being made, 
even to the subcontractors used by Metronet.  
The earnings of Metronet (shareholders) were above £2 billion, which 
excluded those referred to the Arbitrator for substantiation. Blaiklock (2008) argued 
that Metronet lenders might have been liable to the government for those payments if 
DfT and TfL did not approve them. Metronet declared bankruptcy in 2008 and the 
DfT made available a grant of £1.7 billion or 95 per cent of the entire debt holdings 
of Metronet to LUL to settle the remaining private debt outright. The repayment of 
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Metronet’s private debt was to be over a period of 30 years with the financial 
institution (Deutsche Bank and European Investment Bank). Metronet’s bankruptcy 
and failure to deliver the LU tubelines renovations created additional financial 
problems for the government. Kellaway and Shanks (2010); UKNAO (2009) stated 
that the estimated loss to the taxpayers as a result of Metronet’s bankruptcy was as 
high as £4.1 billion, which excluded other social cost settlements of various interest 
groups as follows:.  
 £3,060 million paid for infrastructure service charges;  
 £1,750 million of repaid debt;  
 £180 million of other costs incurred by London Underground, including 
administration costs and procurement costs; and  
 £110 million of anticipated benefits of the PPP contracts which were not 
received. 
 
In May 2010, Tube Lines Pty Limited declared bankruptcy and asked for a 
£6.8 billion payout based on work performed on the Piccadilly and Northern lines 
renewals. DfT and TfL disputed the amount and Tube Lines later reduced the price to 
£5.75 billion. The Arbitrator finally offered £4.4 billion to Tube Lines (UKNAO, 
2009). The £1.4 billion shortfall created financial problems for the Tube Lines 
consortium and LUL purchased the shares of the consortium outright for £310 
million and the entire LU was returned to LUL control. However, according to 
Vining and Boardman (2008) the controversy still lingered for DfT and TfL over 
why PPP had been the best procurement option and how the management of LU 
infrastructure tubelines maintenance, upgrades and renewals could be performed by 
LUL at an even lower cost than the consortia. On the contrary, other authors and PPP 
advocates believe that LU costs could be one third higher (UKHCTC, 2010; 
Williams, 2010). The actual cost of LU rehabilitation and restoration project is yet to 
be determined to this day.  
5.6.1 Metronet management problems 
According to Vining and Boardman (2008), Metronet’s failure is best 
attributed to a combination of governance and leadership issues, which were 
compounded by conflict of interests and indecision within the board of management. 
The succession and frequent replacement of the management board and internal 
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leadership struggle destroyed Metronet. The operations of Metronet were controlled 
by its shareholders who had access to cost information and work scope, and were 
thus much better informed than Metronet’s Executive Management (UKNAO, 2009). 
The poor quality of information available to management, particularly on the unit 
costs of the station and track programmes, meant that Metronet was unable to 
properly monitor costs and could not obtain adequate evidence to support claims for 
work performed economically and efficiently (UKNAO, 2009). The internal 
structure of Metronet did not permit access by DfT and TfL to the required cost and 
management data of its component companies whilst they were conducting the 
rehabilitation projects. 
Metronet was unable to develop a governance and internal control culture 
within its own organisation, which reflected an uncharacteristically poor 
management style in such an astute commercial organisation (UKHCTC, 2008). 
Even successive boards of management were unable to provide guidance and 
oversight on operational costs, and continually allowed shareholders to manipulate 
the economy and efficiency clauses to their advantage. The internal control system 
based on the core processes and procedures of the Metronet organisation 
(authorisation, approvals, reviews, reconciliation) were completely circumvented. 
UKNAO (2009) stated that Metronet permitted unauthorised and unapproved work 
to be performed on its behalf and that was also outside of the LU contractual terms, 
which was disastrous for Metronet. Litigation for substantiation of transactional costs 
could have been avoided, if Metronet had conducted an in-house review of these 
transactions that produced distrust among the entities (Cooke, 2001).  
DfT primary objective of appointing Arbitrators was: (i) to acquire a sound 
knowledge of the consortia; and (ii) the understanding of the industry cost 
information. The knowledge of prevailing market prices was of importance to the 
Arbiters, which could help in their argument on inflated costs prices (UKNAO, 2009; 
Wright, 2010). A private sector interviewee for this research stated that Metronet 
structure was additional to LU failure, and DfT choice of three was a colossal and 
strategically unsound.  
In other words, LU’s collapse was a self-inflicted problem brought about by 
the entities and financial incentive packages were a waste of resources as service 
payments were aligned to an output based performance contract, renegotiated every 
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7½ years, and were ultimately obstructive to the tubelines improvement. However, 
Tube Lines consortium adopted a different approach and exercised diligence in 
itemising its costs for extra work performed economically and efficiently. Despite 
the generous government contingent liability available to Metronet and Tube Lines 
Pty Limited, the oversight authorities imposed stringent and obstructive measures to 
prevent claims (UKNAO, 2009).   
5.6.2 The London Underground collapse and impact 
The financial effect of the underground collapse was the direct loss to 
taxpayers which is based on the difference between the public sector costs incurred 
and the value of work performed by Metronet (UKNAO, 2009). The social aspect 
(effects) was the public anguish over littered train tracks, disruption to life caused by 
frequent cancellations and rescheduling of timetables and thus, extended travelling 
times. The LU’s VfM originally identified vision for improved service quality of 
renovated train tracks all but disappeared and the public sector was left with the 
additional financial responsibility of purchasing the shares of Metronet and Tube 
Lines Pty Limited (Shaoul, 2004). The New Zealand Treasury (2009) statement that 
PSC was an inadequate measure to identify VfM on the basis of public infrastructure 
delivery economic benefits is confirmed by cases such as the failure of LU due in a 
major part to the inadequate analysis of cost estimates and inherent risks.  
The collapse of the LU project represents financial losses and failure of the 
private sector to understand the risks that exist within a complex service industry that 
controls infrastructure serving multiple purposes. This fundamental error in 
judgement typifies a lack of knowledge of the provision of public services and 
misinterpretation of a contract that confers rights and obligations to the entities 
(Vining and Boardman, 2008). For example, UKNAO (2009) stated that Metronet’s 
problems originated from the government’s lack of support, divergent project 
objectives, and a lack of interest and enthusiasm by the oversight authorities in 
sharing the vision of the consortia for the LU project. It is possibly arguable that the 
establishment of the Arbitrator, HSE, and oversight authorities were 100% directed 
towards the realisation of VfM identified with the LU Project. For example, LUL 
engaged professional project managers (Hornagold & Hills) to track expenditures 
against budgets, to obtain estimates of future expenditures and report progress, with 
LUL senior project managers, which had negligible effect on LU budget (UKNAO, 
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2004). In addition, UKHLSCEA (2010) noted that the establishment of the Arbitrator 
was at the request of the PPP entities (Metronet, Tube Lines Pty Limited, and LUL) 
in order to provide guidance and direction on operational matters when requested, or 
to undertake a review of consortia performance on behalf of the government. 
UKHLSCEA (2010) found the actions of the government regrettable and that the 
PPP contract could have been much more beneficial if worded differently, or if the 
words used had been more carefully chosen, as the Arbitrator had the power to make 
additional observations of anything out of the norm, without being requested by the 
entities to do so. PPP contract terms and conditions are achievable, if a complex 
economic contract with ambiguities is substituted with a simple detailed commercial 
contract and made less difficult to understand and interpret (Blaiklock, 2008; 
Reijniers, 1994). There is nothing wrong with the inclusion of caveats in PPP 
infrastructure contracts that offer protection to the interests of society, because these 
infrastructures are permanent structures that are not easily removed, or that may be 
used for other purposes (Howes and Robinson, 2005). However, it is crucial that PPP 
contracts should be written to permit the monitoring of the performance of both 
contractors and sub-contractors (UKHLSCEA, 2010), or to guide entities towards 
achieving particular outcomes. 
Based on the ultimate levels of economic and social benefits and overall losses 
of the LU project, the question has to be asked, who are the actual beneficiaries or 
losers (financial) of the LU project apart from taxpayers? Vining and Boardman 
(2008) opined that the group most benefiting from the LU collapse were the lawyers 
and financial advisers that designed the complex PPP structure and allowed the 
structure to flourish. The Chancellor of Exchequer was predetermined to use PPP 
above all other procurement options according to various authors (Taylor and 
Chinowsky, 2010; Vining and Boardman, 2008), because of perceived economic 
benefits and a VfM evaluation exercise that ultimately proved to be flawed, resulting 
in wasting of public resources. Metronet could be blamed for establishing 
organisational over-complexity and creating internal conflicts of interest, as well 
exaggerating the services payment claims, although this is often the norm in 
commercial operations (UKNAO, 2009). Clearly the government cannot be absolved 
for taxpayers’ losses, and so responsibility has to rest with the UK Treasury (HM 
Treasury, 2006) who believed the benefits of a whole-life costing, and operating cost 
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and funding stability of LU tubelines were difficult to be obtained through any other 
conventional delivery methods (UKHCTC, 2010). Or, if the LU rehabilitation and 
restoration project were subdivided into sub-projects or contracts, the likelihood of 
achieving a different outcome might have been greater.  
5.7 IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
According to (UKNAO, 2009), Metronet’s internal control systems lacked 
processes and procedures of authorisation, approval, control, and review of 
transactions. The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO, 2011) defined 
internal control as the process of safeguarding the organisation’s assets and 
resources. A process is not performed intermittently, rather a continuous control 
within all levels of the organisation. This is categorised in Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2: The objectives of internal control measures 
Internal Control Process 
Objectives 
Desired Outcome 
 
 
 
Performance Objectives 
Effectiveness and efficiency of activities. 
 Consortia and government oversight authorities working to achieve 
project’s goals and objectives efficiently. 
 Efficient use of resources based on limited   conflict of interests. 
 Transparent and cost substantiation of resources consumed and 
outcome achieved.  
 
 
 
 
Information Objectives 
Reliability, completeness, timeliness of financial information data. 
 Information used for decision-making must be relevant, timely, and 
reliable to the end user (consortia, government). 
 Dissemination of information to shareholders, and stakeholders must 
be timely. 
 Information received by board of management, shareholders, and 
stakeholders must be qualitative which allows for accurate 
resource allocation. 
Compliance Objectives Within the applicable laws and regulatory policies 
 Consortia to comply with applicable laws and other government 
regulations. 
 Cost of monitoring performance is expensive and should be 
controlled, where possible. 
 All consortia policies and procedures to comply with regulatory 
policies 
Source: Author 
 
Therefore, the core value of internal control system is to limit the avoidable 
human errors and reposition of the organisation’s integrity through management 
oversight. No doubt about the LU assessment and evaluation that produced VfM, but 
the realisation of benefits depended on consolidated efforts of the entities. For 
example, work approvals and authorisation of transactions is part of internal control 
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system, which proved difficult for Metronet to maintain, but allowed the shareholder, 
also known as the supply chain to dominate the process of approval and authorisation 
of transactions. 
 
5.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.8.1 Summary 
The London Underground infrastructure rehabilitation and restoration was 
awarded to Metronet (BCV, SSL) and Tube Lines Pty Limited in 2004 based on 30 
years of infrastructure maintenance, upgrades, and renewal of tubelines (UKNAO, 
2004). The contract was divided into 7½-year segments and was an output based 
performance contract that allowed the government to replace the investor and adjust 
service payments based on poor performance.  
DfT and TfL announced the use of PPP procurement as the preferred option, to 
protect the public interest and reduce exposure to future financial liability. To 
achieve government objectives, certain performance measures were co-opted into the 
LU contract, which focused on budget compliance and reduction in the waste of 
public sector resources (UKNAO, 2009). Indirectly, the public sector core values of 
accountability and transparency were introduced that could gauge the consortia’s 
performance and keep the overall project on track. Other benefits of PPP were the 
innovative skills of the private investors, in particular, adequate funding 
(maintenance, upgrades and renewal) of the tubelines through private finance, 
because “London Underground has for too long suffered from unstable and 
inadequate investment, they will deliver the stable funding the Tube needs” (Taylor 
and Chinowsky, 2010, pp. 5). LU failed to develop a business case and work scope 
that fully incorporated feasible project services’ objectives or defined what, and how, 
the private investors were expected to perform. Rather, LUL’s expectations of 
services quality and desired outcomes led to the introduction of infeasible 
performance measures. Additional to the differing perceptions and interpretations on 
the nature of contract signed and acquired by each entity based on “output driven 
performance” were some of the problems of LU. 
The introduction of performance measures was to protect the community’s 
interests and safety. Unfortunately, these measures were undefined, or did not 
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specifically detail the type of work required, or the required level of attainment of 
these measures. However, government oversight authorities were established to 
monitor the performance of the consortia and services payment claims linked with 
these measures that affected the project’s performance leading to disputes and 
litigation of services payment claims.  
Although the major blame has been apportioned to Metronet (Finn et al., 2007; 
UKNAO, 2009) due to its internal leadership struggle, the government remains 
culpable and should not be exonerated of blame (Finn et al., 2007). The LU project 
was based on an incomplete contract and data information required during 
negotiation and signing, which were unavailable, prompting the negotiation of risks 
transfer to the private investors in broad commercial terms in respect of the 
unforeseen and unforeseeable asset conditions, and to avoid transferring too much 
risk to the investors that might likely tend to over compensate them on the grounds of 
uncertainty (UKNAO, 2004. If the assets condition were known, it could have 
enabled better knowledge of the tubelines and the development of infrastructure 
maintenance levels or upgrades required. The infrastructure tubelines could not 
permit appropriate risk analysis due to the deteriorated conditions of 100 year old 
track and support infrastructure. Another problem with the collapse of LU related to 
the knowledge and understanding of the risks involved with the public sector 
provision of services’ objectives. In most PPP failures, the collapse has been 
characterised by either inadequate or optimistic risk analysis by the private investor 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2006; Bain 2010; Reilly et al., 2004). There is no doubt in the 
extant literature on infrastructure project success stories (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007) 
about the private investor’s entrepreneurial skills in transforming certain business 
operations into success requires a broader understanding and perspective of the 
public sector services and its associated complexities with multi-purpose objectives. 
It is difficult for these investments to produce outcomes and benefits to the expected 
level due to their complexities, a concept yet to comprehend by the private sector.   
Some of the literature review findings that question the benefits of PPP in the 
delivery of public infrastructures and services were reconfirmed with this case study. 
In the LU case, the inclusions of performance measures with public infrastructure 
delivery were not feasible, even when the private investor was adequately 
incentivised. Moreover, performance measures linked to extra work performed 
  
Chapter 5: London Underground Case Study 227 
economically and efficiently were undefined (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010), which 
led to disagreements and disputation about the LU actual cost to the entities. The 
case study findings are summarised as follows:  
 LU’s project was based on an output driven performance model 
(DBFO) of PPP designed to protect public interest. 
 The LU project operated on incomplete contracts, where data 
information regarding infrastructure tubes was unavailable, undefined 
and contained undetailed contract clauses that rendered the project 
impossible to fully complete.  
 LU consortia were guaranteed a long-term benefit access to the 
infrastructure; while services payments to the private investors were 
linked to performance but difficult to achieve to the level of 
performance required.  
 Accountability and transparency of transaction costs was a problem for 
Metronet and they were unable to substantiate the costs for extra work 
performed economically and efficiently as stipulated in the LU contract. 
 LU risks were incorrectly identified and quantified, incapable of 
producing VfM because of the extant of uncertainties associated with 
infrastructure that was over 100 years old, under-maintained and 
unfunded due to lack of government’s budget appropriation.   
5.8.2 Conclusion 
The case study revealed that Metronet and Tube Lines misinterpreted the 
nature of the signed contract and contract clauses, which excluded the investors from 
LU investment decisions, or from opposing those performance measures relative to 
extra cost and risk involved: 
i. Capability, availability and ambience performance measures were 
additional risks and costs, that were required to be defined but the 
intended outcomes expected required additional data that was 
unavailable. 
ii. The additional analysis of resources (risk, cost, effort) by Metronet and 
Tube Lines Pty Limited was required, but presumed the LU contingent 
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liability was sufficient to cover extra work performed economically and 
efficiently, which ultimately was not the case. 
iii. Renegotiation of the contract driven by below par output performance 
authorised the government to terminate the private investor 
involvement on the basis of poor performance and also because the 
contract was open to services payment adjustments (decrease, increase).  
 
Finally, the case study suggests that private sector participation with the 
delivery of public infrastructures and funding is not the optimum solution to public 
sector infrastructure challenges (UKNAO, 2009; Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010). In 
addition, the objective for using PPP is not primarily to transfer risk to the private 
investor, but only to transfer those risks which the investor is actually equipped to 
manage (UKHCTC, 2010). Otherwise transferring inappropriate risk can often lead 
to excessive costs and potential defaults of the private investor as the case with the 
LU project. Thus, intangible risks were transferred to Metronet and Tube Lines Pty 
Limited (i.e., the achievement of capability, availability ambience).   
Other findings from this case study are related to the undefined contract clauses 
and concepts of extra work performed economically and efficiently that ultimately 
relied on the Arbitrator’s interpretation. Perhaps there is a need in future PPP 
procurements, for the public sector to avoid using concepts, clauses and 
terminologies that requires an external interpretation (law court). PPP is based on a 
collaborative effort (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; 2007) but the meaning of true 
partnership did not appear to have filtered down to the entities involved. The 
objectives of PPP are primarily sharing of rewards and risks on equal terms and 
conditions (UKNOA, 2004), not necessarily for an entity to make investment 
decisions in isolation of the partner. The LU consortia remunerations were uneven  
that destroyed the fundamental meaning of partnership, and worst still, based on 
incomplete data information with divergent goals and objectives of the entities of 
self-serving (Vining and Boardman, 2008; UKNAO, 2004). 
LUL’s assumed demand risk was to retain the financial institutions confidence 
as well as community support (Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010). DfT and TfL could 
have shared demand risk with the consortia, which could have redirected the refocus 
and concentration of the consortia on the maintenance and upgrades of the tubelines. 
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DfT and TfL withheld (or in some cases did not possess) data information on the 
deteriorated conditions and age of LU tubelines from Metronet and Tube Line Pty 
Limited. Perhaps, if the information withheld by LUL was made available and 
disclosed to the consortia, it is likely, if not possible that a better outcome could have 
emerged, or better still, why those performance measures were introduced.   
The two case studies are now completed, and the next chapter will report on 
the interview data to uncover personal experiences of PPP on a variety of projects 
and from the perspectives of various involved experts. The results of all of these 
studies will be triangulated to provide a rich set of results, which satisfies the aims 
and objectives of this research. 
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Chapter 6: Interview and Summary Data 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters 4 and 5, two case studies summarising some of the issues 
associated with public infrastructure delivery, together with potential ways for 
improving private sector participation, in particular internal governance issues with 
PPP consortia, were discussed. The case studies suggested that the inclusion of 
certain performance measures into PPP delivery of public infrastructure and services 
was not always feasible, even when the private investor was adequately remunerated 
and recognising the fact that in the latter case study, the LU project was based on an 
incomplete contract that ultimately seriously affected and undermined the project 
execution. 
This chapter discusses the results from in-depth face-to-face interviews of 20 
individuals from the public and private sectors and two other non-government 
organisation respondents. All of those interviewed were experts with PPP 
experience, in either the provision of funding arrangements or construction of assets. 
In addition, five residents from the suburbs of Kedron and Windsor were interviewed 
about the effects of the Airport Link Tunnel construction on their livelihoods and 
business operations. Table 6.1 describes the interviewees profile and current role in 
the procurement industry.   
Table 6.1: Profile of interviewees 
 
Participant Gender Years of 
Experience 
Nationality Current Position 
P1 DDP Male >15 Australia Executive Director, Infrastructure 
Implementation North.
P2 DMP Male >15 Australia Executive Director, Major Projects.  
P3 QIV Male >10 Australia Manager, Infrastructure and Land. 
P4 QIV Male >12 Australia Manager, Project Governance & 
Procurement.
P5 QIV Male >12 Australia Commercial Manager, Property Services. 
P6 ES Male >15 Australia Executive Director, Economic Strategist, 
Infrastructure Procurement.
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P7 LG Male >10 British Principal Engineer, Infrastructure Advisor 
P8 SE Male >15 Australia Principal Structural Engineer, Geotechnical 
Operations.
P9 IVM Male >15 British Manager, Infrastructure Investments. 
P10 DVM Male >15 British Director, Infrastructure Investments. 
P11 IDM Female >12 Hong Kong International Infrastructure Development 
Manager. 
P12 CP Male >15 British Manager, Infrastructure Cost & Planning 
P13 PP Male >15 British Director, Infrastructure Delivery 
P14 NG Male >12 PNG Team Leader (NGO) 
P15 NG Female >14 Australia Manager (NGO) 
P16 SS Male >4 Australia Resident  (Kedron/Lutwyche) 
P17 SS Female >4 Australia Resident(Kedron/Lutwyche) 
P18 SS Male >4 Australia Resident(Kedron/Lutwyche) 
P19 BB Female >4 Australia Business Owner (Lutwyche) 
P20 BB Male >4 Australia Business Owner (Lutwyche) 
 
Prior to the interviews the QUT form “Participant Information for QUT 
Research Project” containing the QUT ethics approval number, researcher’s contact 
details as well as the contact details of researcher’s principal supervisor were sent to 
the participants by e-mail. The interview brief, which included short background 
information about the research and its significance, and the interview questions, were 
sent to the participants at least four days before the interview date. The interviewees 
were identified and contacted using the Queensland Government web directory, as 
well as the researcher’s personal network based on his previous and present 
association with various government agencies and use of the snowball sampling 
technique (Morgan, 2008; pp. 816-817). 
The interviews were tape recorded to enable an accurate transcription of the 
conversation and allow for deeper analysis and minimise the loss of the actual 
context and meaning of the discussion, because it is difficult to maintain interview 
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flow and write-up what is being discussed simultaneously. The recorded interviews 
were transcribed, and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, pp. 180) stated that there are no 
standard rules to follow when transcribing a voice recorded interview into text, but 
the transcriber has a choice either to use a verbatim or written style. A verbatim style 
was used as all interviews were conducted with English and data transcripts were 
then uploaded into NVivo qualitative data analysis software (QSR International Pty 
Ltd. Version 9, 2010) for organisation and coding. The QSR International NVivo 9 
was used to support the coding and manage the process of data analysis. 
 
6.1.1 Data analysis and coding process 
Qualitative interviews are conducted with an aim of developing an in-depth 
understanding about a phenomenon through identifying patterns of association and 
explaining their interaction. This is achieved by knowing the participants’ perception 
founded on their knowledge and experience of the issue under study (Flick 2008, 2). 
There are different approaches to qualitative data analysis and they are known as 
inductive and deductive. In the deductive approach to data analysis, coding is usually 
done with an emphasis on the themes derived from the literature, however using the 
inductive approach the researcher puts aside theory-driven tools and turns the focus 
on exploring what has actually been discovered by the study  (Thomas 2006; Altinay 
and Paraskevas, 2008; pp. 168). In order to explain the pattern of relationship and 
interaction between variables, and at the same time to avoid introducing bias by 
limiting findings (ibid 2008; pp. 168), both deductive and inductive approaches were 
applied in this study. The general categories of the emerging themes were first 
identified, and then more detailed coding was conducted by revisiting the general 
coded categories, and re-reading the interview transcripts. For example, an 
investment manager was interviewed twice to clarify the use of the phrase “cut and 
uncut liability” relating to initial outlays and funding arrangements of PPP 
arrangements and a public sector interviewee was queried about the comment “PPP 
has not translated into success expected”. 
The QSR International NVivo 9 was used to support the coding and manage 
the process of data analysis. The qualitative analysis software, QSR International 
NVivo 9, was used to support the coding and manage the process of data analysis 
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(Bazeley 2007; pp. 67). Nodes containing codes that held conceptually similar 
meaning were merged at parent and at children levels 
 
Figure 6.1: Node classification and relationship between parent and child 
The diagram below represents another form of projecting the parent and child 
relationship and basis the interviews response were structured, being the most 
important nodes and frequently commented by interviewees  
 
Figure 6.1: Diagram of parent and child relationship 
6.1.2  Results 
As explained, the interview transcripts were read and coded using ‘mixed 
style’, meaning that both deductive and inductive approaches were employed. Unlike 
in quantitative research, findings from the qualitative data can be presented in a 
Parent 
Child 
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variety of different ways depending on the format that best fit the purpose of the 
investigation (Sandelowski 1998; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; pp. 279). Even though 
there are no set forms of presenting qualitative findings, qualitative research 
interviews can be reported in a structure of questions followed by interviewees’ 
comments, descriptive summary followed by quotes, or by quotes and interpretation 
and quotes presented using text and tables. In this study, the interview analysis will 
be presented along with some important selected quotes. 
 
6.1.3 Thematic analysis of interviewees responses 
Thematic Analysis is a type of qualitative analysis, which is often used to 
derive sense from seemingly unrelated material (Ibrahim, 2012). Also, it can be used 
to analyse qualitative information so as to systematically gain knowledge about a 
particular group, situation, or organisation and (thematic analysis); it is considered as 
most appropriate for studies that uses data interpretation as it enables the researcher 
to group frequency of themes of the data together. As qualitative research requires 
data collection from various sources (field diaries, observational data, pictures, 
videos, historical data, questionnaires, transcripts, audio recording) for eventual 
analysis and interpretation, thematic analysis provides the opportunity to understand 
a particular issue more widely. Boyatzis, R.  (1998) and Marks and Yardley, (2004) 
have stated that thematic analysis is capable of identifying the factors or variables 
that influence the issue, based on data generated from interviewees.     
Aronson (1994) in support of the thematic analysis methodology stated that 
themes emerge from interviewees that enable stories to be grouped together to form a 
comprehensive picture of their collective experience by identifying data, relating to 
an existing classified data pattern. Furthermore, thematic analysis is an interpretative 
approach which should be considered as distinct from the data origination (Constas, 
1992), because the data clarity and understanding rests with the researcher, including 
the preferred method of data components analysis that would convey meaning, when 
the data is linked together (Leininger, 1985). The researcher has chosen to present 
verbatim responses of the interviewees according to themes known as thematic 
analysis. This chapter presents the results of these interviews and summary of the 
overall findings of the interviews is provided at the end of the chapter. 
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6.2 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Question 1a:  How successful do you consider PPP to be related to the provision 
of public infrastructures and services to society? 
Question1b:  How effective is the decision of government to use PPP in the 
delivery of public infrastructure? 
 
These questions were designed to examine the extent of the benefits and 
perception of the success of PPP in the delivery of public infrastructure and services, 
as well as whether using the private sector participation procurement methodology is 
considered as the best procurement alternative on the basis of government’s decision.  
6.2.1 View supporting PPP as a successful methodology for PPP delivery 
In response to Question 1a, the majority of the public sector interviewees 
agreed that PPP was generally a good procurement mode and has developed as a 
very unique method, because PPP differs from the conventional methods of delivery 
previously favoured by governments such as design and build, or design and 
construct, including other types of partnering arrangements (e.g. alliance) used to 
achieve and expedite the government’s business operations and deliver public assets, 
however, the way it is usually currently structured makes PPP expensive. The public 
sector director of a PPP project, Respondent P1’s (DPP) perception of PPP success 
with the delivery of public sector infrastructures was:  
“PPP and its associated process are hellishly expensive and only a limited 
number of governments would have resources (balance sheet) to support PPP 
costs… A PPP contract worth two billion dollars could add to another twenty 
million for your big costs, and under the alternative management contract 
system the government uses, the cost could be a fraction of PPP cost.”  
As a result of his experiences and in his view, this respondent doubted the 
efficacy of the economic arguments in favour of PPP noting: 
“Whether PPP success can be justified based on the funding arrangements 
and design, construct and maintain (DCM) contract, I’m not sure. If you have 
got the money you might have bought and built it yourself.”   
 236 Chapter 6:Interview and Summary Data 
The respondent (P1) stated that PPP success depended on the meaning of 
success and how the word success was phrased and proceeded to say:    
“Because you will get different answers for a different cluster of PPP and 
their payments are structured differently, and the infrastructure maintenance 
component is added during a contract negotiation to make PPP a bit more 
efficient, which could be regarded as success.” 
He provided an example regarding what PPP could do to achieve success and 
address the public infrastructure challenges as: 
“[PPP] needs to attract the community support and government policy that 
addresses the concerns of the community of a proposed infrastructure.” 
“When you think about PPP success, it varies and depends on the 
interpretation and what is conceived as success.” 
He compared the choice of investment options to PPP success and the private 
investor’s choice of public investments as being selective and stated:  
“The private investor is selective in choosing its investment portfolios, which 
will hardly lead to a better public sector investment option.” 
Respondent P2 (DMP), a director of major projects of the public sector 
perceived PPP success as being a good investment for the private investors. 
Respondent P2 noted that this was due to the governments:  
“Provision of financial generosities” (incentives) without them questioning 
the value received in return.”  Respondent P2 (DMP) continued to say:     
“When PPP becomes competitive the government will diversify its investment 
options by cutting across smaller contractors, which is not present now…the 
only way governments could acquire the services of the private investor is by 
offering a better incentive.” 
He alluded to the fact that the participation of the private investor involves the 
management of demand risk and remarked: 
“[This] does not work in favour of the private investor, but given the right 
settings PPP is a good concept. Where higher degrees of risk were involved 
in terms of revenue streams, PPP might not be the best option. PPP has got 
its shortcomings in terms of its ability and hence, the government is not really 
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comfortable in going down the path completely. However, PPP might not 
seem to be the answer to the public sector infrastructure challenges, because 
of its limitations and potentials to address these challenges.” 
Respondent (P2) also noted that some PPP infrastructure deliveries have been 
successful, such as the Victorian Government (Australia) model, though he 
acknowledged that it has not necessarily achieved its traffic volume predictions, and 
continued to state: 
“But on the basis these infrastructures have not out-rightly collapsed, unlike 
the New South Wales and Queensland PPP infrastructures that collapsed 
months after their completion.” 
The public sector Treasury investors (Respondents P3, P4 and P5 (QIV) were 
interviewed together, in answering whether PPP delivery of public infrastructure had 
been successful, they grouped PPP delivery into ‘economic’ and ‘social’ 
infrastructures, and said that the funding arrangements of the public sector 
infrastructure type tended to determine their success, and Respondent P3 (QIV) 
stated that:  
“...economic infrastructure such as the Airport Link Tunnel and CLEM7 are 
considered as economic infrastructures and funded through toll charges 
which facilitates the infrastructure delivery and social infrastructure such as 
schools, hospitals, prisons are funded with availability payments.”  
 
Respondent P5 (QIV) also answered the question on PPP success with the 
delivering of the public sector infrastructure by saying:  
“It depends on how success is phrased and you will get different answers for 
a different cluster of PPP, because their payments are structured differently.” 
He saw the difference as being the "risk revenue transfer tends to create a 
different outcome and answer.....economic infrastructure failures are not the 
same as services payment (social) infrastructures. Social infrastructures are 
supported with budget appropriation and the core government’s primary 
obligation to society.” 
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Respondent P5 (QIV) continued on the topic of PPP success and effectiveness 
with the delivery of public infrastructure and compared PPP with conventional 
delivery method as: 
          “With the traditional design, build, operate (DBO) projects during the bidding 
and tendering process, the government could ask for innovation without 
going through a PPP. PPP involves whole-life costing, maintenance and 
operation and the bidding consortium knows and is aware of being 
responsible for the infrastructure.” 
 
Respondent P3 (QIV) also noted the government’s effort to achieve success 
with PPP infrastructure tended to include some performance measures with the 
delivery and stated the type of performance measure included such as: 
“those linked with payments, if you do not deliver the KPI’s, you don’t get paid 
a certain amount of money, has been rigorously adhered to, but has failed to 
achieve the result intended result and has not successfully worked. The 
Victoria Government (Melbourne) KPI’s on PPP Court buildings were related 
to “time performance measures,” which has been successful within a 10 
second limit to answer the bell when a client rings. These are on social 
infrastructure, not economic infrastructure or toll road infrastructure.”  
A public sector cost analyst from the Treasury, Respondent P4 (QIV), stated 
that PPP success and effectiveness with the delivery of public infrastructure were 
thus:   
“PPP outcomes are uncertain, and in certain cases, PPP is presumed to be 
successful due to governments’ support and incentive packages… [If]… these 
packages are withdrawn, PPP is no better than a design and construct type of 
delivery.” He continued, “It is the government’s role to ensure public services 
are provided in most cost efficient and effective manner, but society’s 
perception of the government is one that performs every role, which is not 
remotely possible. If the private sector or investor could deliver the public 
sector services in the most cost efficient ways, the option could be considered 
rather than waiting for the government to perform all roles.” 
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In defence of the Queensland Government on PPP success and effectiveness 
with the public sector infrastructure delivery, an economic strategist from the 
Treasury, Respondent P6 (ES) stated: 
“Everyone expects the government to provide an efficient public transport 
system and equally fund these obligations, and most households or people are 
not interested in special levies, extra taxes, rather they prefer to pay fifty times 
above their current train fare rather than paying a PPP toll charge…the 
private sector participation is the area governments’ have to explore to fund 
some of these projects and in doing so, absorb some risks.” “The government 
assumes the role of an underwriter for the private investor loans from financial 
institutions and other support mechanisms with the delivery of public 
infrastructures in the collaborative arrangement. This is a risk that increases 
the government’s financial exposure with PPP delivery.” 
 
A public sector structural engineer, Respondent P8’s (SE) perception of PPP 
success and effectiveness with the delivery of public infrastructure differed. He 
related success to PPP infrastructure structural quality and designs stating:  
“It is evident that PPP infrastructure structural design and quality has met 
the prescribed safety standards and continues to be a successful procurement 
mode for public infrastructure delivery.”  
He continued to elaborate on PPP success and effectiveness:  
“PPP success, particularly with road transport is engineering and structural 
related. The collapse or failure of toll roads in Australia is financially related 
as the result of economic climate. You don’t expect PPP to achieve all the 
cardinal points before it becomes successful, what is important are the basics 
that relates to human safety, undoubtedly it is present with the structures. 
PPP structures are good, even when the services provider changes the design 
to fit into his own design, but evidently, PPP has achieved success with its 
design and structures.” 
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6.2.2 Private sector view supporting PPP as a successful methodology for PPP 
delivery 
Responses from the private sector interviewees on PPP success and 
effectiveness confirmed that PPP was successful in addressing the infrastructure 
challenges to society. The private sector investment manager, Respondent 9 (IVM) 
said this about PPP success and effectiveness with the delivery of public 
infrastructure:  
“PPP is highly discussed within society and is the object of distraction for all 
persuasions and industries, because PPP usually involves the delivery of 
complex and major projects. PPP processes are complex and so monumental, 
‘the elephant in the room’ that cannot be ignored because of the important role 
PPP plays within the society. And…. the PPP method of procurement has 
become a hostage to the dialogue, and has become a political lever with 
political value to politicians.”  
The investment manager also attributed PPP success and effectiveness with the 
delivery of public infrastructure as:  
“PPP’s real success is in the transfer of resources from the private sector 
(corporate) to the public sector that enables the construction and delivery of 
these infrastructures in the immediate-term. I suppose, the advantage and 
success of PPP is a process that allows for money transfer between the sectors 
and enabling the implementation of governments’ economic and social policies 
in a timely manner.” 
 
Respondent (P9) also stated that by virtue of PPP long-term concession 
arrangements, PPP was successful and did deliver good value for money and added:  
“As long as the procurement methodology has nothing to do with the project’s 
success, and PPP’s success is within the field of politics and within all levels of 
governments, which have nurtured a platform for most governments’ to ignite 
their political ambitions, in particular, road transport that adds legitimacy to 
government’s performance.” 
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The private sector director of investments, Respondent P10’s (DVM) response 
on PPP success and effectiveness was one that has not been successful and stated:   
“The downside of PPP is how to pay for these infrastructures in the long-
term.” 
Respondent (P10) stated that infrastructure affordability is the long-term 
resource commitment and payment of PPP infrastructure, which needs to be 
disassociated with: 
“Value for money and neither is the private investor’s involvement with the 
public sector infrastructure delivery a VfM. PPP success is not overrated, but 
relates to the non-upfront payment that enables an immediate execution of 
public policies. However, there are other procurement options available to 
governments that could produce a similar result to PPP, rather than 
committing to something that is too complex and resource consuming. A 
project is successful when the services objectives are considered ahead of time. 
Road transport infrastructures in Queensland and NSW are assumed to be 
unsuccessful, but it takes time to notice the success and impacts of economic 
infrastructure and CLEM7 is a poor example of a project success that never 
delivered value for money to taxpayers. Queensland social infrastructures are 
successful, unlike the tunnel infrastructures or roads where the demand risk is 
specified in the contract and allocated to the private investor. Whatever 
process PPP adopts in the delivery of these infrastructures, the challenges are 
enormous, which cannot be achieved simultaneously (market pressure, 
economic changes), and potentially, could affect the infrastructure 
performance success.”  
He attributed PPP success and effectives as the result of private investor’s 
financial fortunes received from the public sector:  
“PPP is successful as the result of changes with its financial fortunes, which 
includes government incentive packages. The PPP aspect which has been 
overlooked is the long-term affordability and government’s resource 
committed to PPP is somehow underestimated.”  
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Another private sector director of PPP delivery, Respondent P13’s (PP) 
perception of PPP success and effectiveness with public sector infrastructure delivery 
was thus: 
“PPP is not appropriate for every public sector project, but within government 
agencies, their choice and preference of procurement mode is PPP, even 
before asking the question.”  
 
6.2.3 Infrastructure whole-of-life costing 
Respondent P1 (DPP) also commented on the PPP whole-life costing system as 
an effective infrastructure maintenance approach and stated that:  
“Governments would be better off using PPP, rather than engaging a 
separate construction entity to manage the maintenance and operations 
component.” 
On the issue of government’s inclusion of maintenance cost with PPP public 
infrastructure delivery, Respondent P1 perceived the strategy as an innovative 
approach towards public asset maintenance and stated:  
“Quality standards of PPP infrastructure maintenance is part of a procured 
innovative arrangement for which, maintenance cost is not separated from 
operations cost or gazetted schedule maintenance. Having infrastructure 
maintenance included in the contract is to have a functional asset at the 
expiration of the concession and whether these assets are functional after 40 
years of usage after going through wear and tear is yet to be established.” 
 
However, the respondent’s view on the government’s inclusion of maintenance 
cost with PPP public infrastructure delivery as being non-cost effective was:  
“PPP maintenance cost included with infrastructure delivery is not cost 
effective, because of the prolonged concession period of the arrangement, 
and how well PPP infrastructure is maintained is unknown. The private 
investor might be asked to provide the maintenance services, 
but….infrastructure delivery costs are not separate from maintenance cost.” 
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Respondents P3, P4, P5 (QIV) from the Treasury provided an insight on PPP 
infrastructure maintenance costs describing them as being locked into the 
government’s budget appropriation with qualification. However they opined that this 
depends entirely on the “economic climate and government’s priorities”. 
 Respondent P5 (QIV) of the Treasury, elaborating on economic climate and 
priorities stated: 
“Maintenance of public assets is within the departmental guidelines and 
standards, which can be skipped when there is no budget. It could also mean 
rearranging of government priorities to reduce its recurrent budget 
expenditures to sustain PPP maintenance cost.” 
Respondent P4 (QIV) added to the issue of infrastructure maintenance cost 
included in the delivery as being expensive and stated: 
“You expect PPP infrastructure to be maintained which is a strategic benefit 
that accrues from infrastructure operations and maintenance because a 
greenhouse infrastructure tends to cost everything.” 
A local government PPP advisor, Respondent P7 (LG) did not respond to PPP 
success and effectiveness in the delivery of public infrastructure, but responded on 
public infrastructure maintenance with PPP delivery and stated:  
“Infrastructure maintenance included in a PPP contract enables the 
government to consider a road asset maintenance as these assets would 
eventually revert to the public sector.”  
Focusing on the public sector asset maintenance he continued:  
“The government hardly plan for adequate maintenance of public roads. As 
long as a PPP contract exists, infrastructure maintenance for the concession 
period is well guaranteed.” 
6.2.4 PPP delivery costs 
Almost all (4 out of 5) of the private sector interviewees confirmed that PPP 
non-upfront payment was actually a deferred payment with accumulating interest. 
The investment manager, Respondent P9 (IVM) had a different perception of PPP 
cost and stated:  
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“PPP costs to society are not excessive when comparing the Queensland 
Government annual road maintenance budget to PPP overall costs, which 
are relatively small and negligible to the amount, spent on public road 
repairs.” 
The respondent’s comment involved further investigation into the TMR annual 
budget and Table 6.1 below is an extract of Queensland State Budget allocations to 
the department from the 2010-11 to 2012-13 financial years. The TMR Department 
is comprised of Transport and Main Roads, RoadTek, TransLink Transit Authority, 
Queensland Rail Limited, and Ports Corporations.  
Table 6.1: Department of Transport and Main Roads Budget Allocations 
 2010-11 
State Budget 
2011-12  
State Budget 
2012-13  
State Budget 
TMR Department $7,325 billion $5,448 billion $6,218 billion 
Transport & Main Road $3,276 billion $3,931 billion $2,696 billion 
Source: Queensland Government State Budget Papers. 
 
Respondent P9 (IVM) continued to say:  
“No matter how PPP is eventually perceived, it has exhibited various forms of 
success with different infrastructures, and [The public] misconception about 
PPP costs to society is disproportionately high, which is unproven…what the 
public has ignored in the PPP discussion and debate is the risk undertaken by 
the private investor to deliver these infrastructures for which losses have 
occurred and been sustained by the private investor.” 
One of the respondents that believed PPP public infrastructure delivery cost 
was expensive was the international development manager, Respondent P11 (IDM). 
She was of the opinion that PPP cost was excessive and provided examples of 
projects in Victoria (Melbourne, Australia), such as the Victoria de-salinition plant, 
City Link, and East Link to illustrate her viewpoint on excessive cost and cost 
overruns. She stated: 
“PPP is not cost additions to households but should be on the premise of 
services affordability that adds benefits to society.” She continued “increases 
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in services cost as the result of government’s failure, who’s borrowing capacity 
to fund these public infrastructures is lower than that of the private investor, 
but refuses to do so.” 
The private sector cost planner, Respondent P12 (CP) justified PPP delivery 
cost and stated:  
“…the private investor’s cost of delivering a public infrastructure is the 
combination of bidding and operation costs, which is subsequently passed to 
taxpayers; if the bid is successful…PPP is branded unsuccessful and 
expensive because of the limited number of projects, which inhibits the private 
investor to spread an overhead cost evenly, either through equity returns or 
products differentiation.” 
 
 The comments of Respondent P11 (IDM) were also supported by a private 
sector PPP director, Respondent P13 (PP) who stated: 
“When the private investor is asked to fund the entire project, layers of costs is 
added which ordinarily does not reflect the actual infrastructure cost, and 
governments’ are aware of the risks involved.” 
 
6.2.5 Infrastructure risks 
This topic relates to PPP risk and how risk is priced, transferred and allocated 
to the private investor. Whether PPP risks are actually identified, quantified and 
measured relative to their opportunities and values to society, and what constitutes 
PPP infrastructure delivery risk. The public sector interviewees, Respondents P3, P4, 
and P5 (QIV) claimed that PPP was associated with political risk which was 
expensive and transferrable to subsequent governments, as long as a PPP contract 
existed and Respondent P5 stated: 
 “Political risk exists, when there is lack of community support, stakeholders, 
and interest groups objection towards a proposed infrastructure development, 
which consumes a larger amount of resources, becomes a nightmare for the 
government.” 
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All public sector respondents believed that public infrastructure delivery in 
Queensland was mostly concentrated within the road transport industry. Respondent 
P1 (DPP) stated:  
“These economic infrastructures or self-funding assets were considered as 
commercially profitable projects.”  
 
Respondent P3 (QIV) contributing to PPP infrastructure risk added: 
“The difference between PPP and conventional delivery are their purposes 
and the objectives they fulfil and state governments are motivated to deliver 
these infrastructures because of moral values which are driven by society’s 
safety.”  
The structural engineer, Respondent P8 (SE) responding to PPP infrastructure 
risk grouped risk into controllable and uncontrollable risk and stated the following: 
“The private investor has an attitude of being capable to respond to the 
unknown, which is not always the case. I was involved with CLEM7 and the 
Airport Link Tunnel structures approval and do understand structure risk. 
Controllable risk, I refer to as raw materials, not necessarily burrowing 
through rocks in the case of underground tunnels. Infrastructure risk comes 
in different shapes and sizes, the outcome is uncertain…..much is left to 
speculate, because these are the causes of PPP cost increases and any other 
costs underestimation or financial stress.” 
Respondent (P6) described the risk analyses performed on behalf of the two 
tunnels in Queensland as: 
“Weak and understated, and neither is the government better than the private 
investor with risk analyses, but it presents a potential concern and area to 
undertake some studies.” 
 
The private sector interviewee stated that PPP was inherent with considerable 
risk, such as construction, finance, legal, and political, from the concept of design to 
the commissioning of the infrastructure. The private sector cost planner, Respondent 
P12 (CP) stated that:  
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“…risk in a PPP setting is not priced separately, rather a lump sum 
allocation without actually identifying and quantifying these risks in terms of 
their impacts, opportunities and values to society. The time frame between the 
bidding process and contract negotiation is short, and risks assessment and 
evaluation, if performed, would be inaccurate. In support of inadequate PPP 
risk assessment risks transferred and retained by the entities are 
underestimated, because risks transferred are related to construction and 
operation risks. Other risks associated with the infrastructure delivery, which 
are intangible, are neither transferred nor quantified. The private investor’s 
perception of risk is different and would entertain those risks that can be 
managed through operation phases.” 
He continued to elaborate on risk and stated: 
 “There is no specified mechanism for risks transfer in the contract or methods 
that guarantee risk transfers.” 
 “Risks transfer to the private investor increases infrastructure cost delivery.” 
 “There must be a balance between cost and risk transferred based on 
appropriate costing mechanism.” 
 On the issue of risk transfers between PPP entities, Respondent P9 (IVM) 
provided legislative guidelines on risk transfer and treatment of PPP transactions 
based on concessional arrangements being covered in the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB12 and AASB117) and stated: 
“Economic infrastructures use the constructed asset to recoup its capital cost 
through toll charges. The Accounting Standards state that assets and liabilities 
should be recognised in the entities balance sheet, but the standard failed to 
specify which entity's balance sheet (AASB12).The private investor recognises 
the constructed asset and associated liability within its consolidated financial 
statement as the result of being responsible for the greater portion of the 
infrastructure’s risk. As long as the private investor keeps the road open to the 
public, there is always risk transference to the end user through a toll charge.”  
 
 248 Chapter 6:Interview and Summary Data 
6.2.6 Political risk 
Almost all, (5 out of 6) of the private sector interviewees confirmed that 
political risk was real and expensive to all entities. The international development 
manager, Respondent P11 (IDM) had this to say about political risk: 
“Political risk is one of those risks, if you don’t get it right, you’re just not re-
elected and your career is gone is voluntarily retained by the government. 
Other risks associated with infrastructure development, operations, 
construction and on-going maintenance are assumed as the sole 
responsibility of the private investor. Political risk is relevant with economic 
infrastructures and needs to be incorporated into the PPP risk evaluation and 
pricing system.” The manager continue to say 
 “The question to be asked is this ‘What part of risk has been allocated and 
transferred to the private investor, at what cost within the definition of 
partnership?’” 
6.2.7 PPP economic and social benefits 
An international development manager, Respondent P11’s, (IDM) perception 
of PPP success was: 
“Although PPP had great potential, the only problem is how to achieve the 
immediate and long-term economic and social benefits that actually address 
the society needs.” 
She opined about the provision of this infrastructure by the private sector or 
with private sector participation: 
“The use of PPP to procure public goods and services was as the result of 
governments’ financial stress and political reasons that created an appetite 
for PPP, and the public sector financial stress is still unresolved, rather it 
increases.” 
Respondent P6 (ES) in support of government’s motives for public investments 
stated the following: 
“Public infrastructure delivery is primarily underpinned by sound commercial, 
economic values, and the government’s determination to deliver those goods 
and services because of their inherent benefits to society. Proceeding to 
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conduct an environmental impact assessment is entirely dependent on the 
commercial viability of the proposed infrastructure…the physical location of 
the [CLEM 7] infrastructure was an impediment in delivering value for money 
or full benefits of the tunnel, perhaps until the entire network is completed in 
Queensland. CLEM7 is not useful, probably not in the immediate term but in 
the long-term the infrastructure might become a good investment in future. 
Queensland road transport infrastructures, CLEM7 and the Airport Link 
Tunnels are perceived as failed projects, but both tunnels have exhibited higher 
engineering standards in terms of innovative technology,” 
 
 
Question 2a:  How accurate are the government’s feasibility studies and 
business cases used to award PPP contracts; and  
Question 2b:  How efficient and robust are these studies to achieve prompt 
decisions on economic potentials of public infrastructure when considering a 
PPP arrangement? 
The feasibility studies and business case development questions were asked to 
explore the efficiency of the assessments and evaluations, which were presumed to 
identify and quantify economic and social benefits associated with the infrastructure 
delivery. More so with the business case development, VfM is identified and 
becomes a driver towards public investment.  
 
6.3 BUSINESS CASE DEVELOPMENT AND FEASIBILITY STUDY 
About 4 out of 8 of the public sector interviewees stated that the government’s 
feasibility studies and business case development were preliminary studies of a 
proposed public infrastructure investment, and Respondent P1 (DPP) believed that: 
“These reports are detailed enough and contain required information to 
progress the delivery of a proposed public infrastructure.”  
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Those respondents from financial and funding backgrounds appeared to lack 
any detailed knowledge of feasibility studies and their actual content. Responses to 
the questions (from those respondents who could answer them (P1, P2, P5, and P6) 
are summarised below. 
“The primary objectives of feasibility studies and business case development 
are to detail the economic benefits, as well as the infrastructure risk and 
mitigation processes.” 
According to Respondent P1 (DPP): 
“Business case development and feasibility studies are performed to highlight 
infrastructure benefits, costs, environmental impact and potential 
infrastructure risks, which is not absolute with these early assessments.” These 
reports are “preliminary assessment and evaluation processes that are 
inconclusive and vague on details.”  
 
Public sector procurement is complex, likewise the business case development 
relative to services requirement and various stakeholders involved. Respondent P2 
(DMP) stated: 
“To get the business case development right, the government uses in-house 
expertise, including contractors to perform these analyses, and whether all the 
benefits, costs and impacts are actually identified, I think is beyond the 
assumptions of business case development.” 
 
According to Respondent P5 (QIV): 
“A business case development is a rigorous process, and …we go through 
much detailed analyses to prove our assumptions and environmental impact 
statement (EIS) and infrastructure effects are included. We apply economic 
analysis with the business case development that leads to VfM determination, 
and are subsequently tested with the public sector comparator (PSC) to 
authenticate these assumptions.” 
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On the contrary, Respondent P6 (ES) had a different view on governments’ 
business case developments and feasibility studies reports, which was: 
“That which has failed the accuracy test, in particular with regard to their 
application to the two PPP tunnels delivered in Queensland. The business case 
and feasibility study performed were below the level of a detailed engineering 
buildability, which was considered a detailed level where the project’s risks 
and impacts could be adequately assessed. CLEM7 and Airport Link Tunnels 
business cases and feasibility studies lacked the robustness expected in 
identifying risks and impacts of these tunnels on society. The business case 
development reports on CLEM7 and the Airport Link Tunnel respectively, the 
private investor did not devote time to study the report and vice versa.” 
Respondent P6 stated that government business case development was 
primarily focused on the infrastructure’s immediate economic benefits to society and 
added:  
“The business case development is done without considering the long-term 
economic implications and risk to the government. Government’s business case 
development happens to lack rigor and risk transfer between the government 
and the private investor might not proffer the expected solution towards the 
infrastructure problems and challenges. A business case development ‘that 
leads to VfM determination needs to be robust with detailed inclusions of the 
analyses performed’.”  
 
6.3.1 Private sector response: Business case development and Feasibility Study 
All private sector interviewees expressed a perception of government’s 
business case development and feasibility study as being founded on inadequate 
information and subject to gross manipulation. A common theme identified was the 
lack of detailed analysis of the long-term infrastructure risks. In response to the 
business case development and feasibility studies of a proposed public infrastructure 
investment, Respondent P9 (IVM) stated: 
“Governments have an end game and will always work to achieving the end 
game or answers wanted without undertaking an appropriate research or 
study” There are “abnormalities and anomalies entrenched within the 
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government’s business case development that are persuasive to conclude those 
government analyses are predetermined. These reports are ‘driven by political 
posturing of the government in power’.”  
Respondent P10 (DVM) did not believe that government’s business case and 
feasibility studies were accurate and fit and stated this about the reports:  
“That which lacks consistency, regardless of the measurement being utilised. 
As long as the method of assessment is consistent, as long as it is consistently 
applied and verifiable at all times, it is acceptable.”   
 
Respondent P11’s (IDM) perception of what the government’s business case 
development and feasibility studies should be was: 
“A detailed representation of proposed infrastructure development, economic 
benefits, social costs, and services provider obligations to the external 
environment (society)…these representations are subsequently recognised as 
values and drivers that lead to infrastructure approval, of which these 
components (benefits, costs obligations) should be integrated into the delivery 
process.”  
Other comments on the government’s business case developments and 
feasibility studies focused on allocation and transfer of risks between entities that 
failed to address long-term infrastructure affordability. Respondent P10 (DVM) used 
the UK National Health Services Trust’s business case development model, which 
was developed on the Trust’s core services based on services affordability, as an 
example. He further stated: 
“Unfortunately, business cases developments in Australia are weak and that 
eventually creates problems along the infrastructure delivery phases.”  
He attributes the problem of business case development in Australia as: 
“Lack of rigor and analyses as either, the underestimation of the risks or 
optimistically over inflation of the economic benefits associated with the 
infrastructure delivery.”  
The comments of Respondent P10 (DVM) were supported and supplemented 
by Respondent P13 (PP) who said: 
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“Governments’ business case developments and feasibility studies problems 
emerge as the result of those that perform these analyses, as most analysts are 
inexperienced without industry knowledge.”CLEM7 “demonstrates the lack of 
rigor and detailed analyses that associates with business case 
developments…the essence of a business case and feasibility study is to identify 
as practically as possible all benefits, costs, and risks of a proposed delivery 
without exemption, governments’ business case developments and feasibility 
studies are expensive and could be in the vicinity of $25 million or more in 
pursuing a particular strategy, even when the option is wrong, by manipulating 
the overall process before seeking consultation. If these reports are not 
improved in the future, governments have to be responsible for their actions, 
and rethink their strategy because the outcomes produced are below 
expectation of these infrastructure performances.”  
 
Question 3: Has PPP delivered value for money (VfM) to society, either 
economic or social benefits that outweigh the costs of PPP to society? 
  
Many authors (Pollitt, 2002; UKNAO, 2000; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004) have 
stated that using PPP allowed for risk allocations and transfers from the public sector 
to the private sector, which constituted real VfM in its own right. The UK National 
Audit office’s (2002) review of PPP deliveries stated that VfM in seven empirical 
cases were based on cost savings, which was summarised by Pollitt (2002) in the 
findings of the National Audit Office and reaffirmed in a sample of 10 PPP projects 
on the basis of evaluation undertaken that the best deal was probably obtained, 
including the best value for money 
 
6.4 VALUE FOR MONEY: PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE 
Most (13 out of 20) of the interviewees were of the view that value for money 
(VfM) has driven governments’ decisions to use PPP for the delivery of public 
infrastructure, because this can be regarded as a benefit to society. Question 3 queries 
whether PPP has produced any real societal benefits. 
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The public sector Treasury PPP investors defined value for money (VfM) P3 (QIV) 
as: 
“The process of demonstrating, whether delivering a public infrastructure with 
PPP will provide additional benefits to the government as opposed to the 
conventional delivery method. The Queensland Government Project Assurance 
Framework (2009) has shifted its focus from VfM to infrastructure benefits to 
society and innovative ideas that could lead to the overall infrastructure cost 
reductions. Also, the Queensland Government has given priority to 
infrastructure affordability while considering the economic benefits of the 
infrastructure as PPP preferred option…[the decision to]…choose PPP or 
conventional delivery method is difficult to retract, when resources are initially 
committed towards the business case development and feasibility study of the 
project.” 
Another Treasury Respondent P5 (QIV) continued to explain the process with 
identifying VfM of PPP public sector infrastructure investment and stated:  
“Right up the front, you’ll identify whether PPP has satisfied the public policy 
objectives, including benefits to society. The business case development 
identifies the VfM and the decision whether to proceed with the PPP mode or 
alternative delivery method is made.”  
 
Respondent P2 (DMP) perceived VfM as being subjective and meaningless 
without extending the comparison of PPP and VfM to all related costs and benefits 
based on the criteria of measurability of PPP outputs by saying:   
“VfM needs to be compared to the overall project costs and government’s risk 
portion with the identified benefits. VfM needs to be defined, including criteria 
for VfM recognition and that is a test that governments have failed to establish, 
because VfM can be measured in variety of ways, and not necessarily in 
monetary values or rate of investment returns, but could be measured relative 
to services quality and satisfaction derived from using those services.” 
 
A Local Government PPP Advisor, Respondent P7 (LG) perception of VfM was that: 
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 “It’s imprecise in a commercial sense, as VfM requires detailed analyses and 
areas it will be achieved and not necessarily hiding behind cost-benefit 
analysis that highlights infrastructure economic benefits and investment 
returns as VfM.”  
In their various responses, Respondents P2 (DMP) and P7 (LG) stated separately:  
“The private investor participation with the delivery of public infrastructure is 
not a VfM. Because, exchange in the form of values and services are yet to 
occur, and VfM is protracted and post-construction related, value obtained 
should match infrastructure services objectives.” 
Respondent P7 continued to describe other attributes which were components of 
VfM as follows:  
 “combination of economic and social benefits”,  
 “efficient management of externalities”, and  
 “cost effectiveness based on infrastructure funding arrangements”.  
 
However, a public sector structural engineer, Respondent 8 (SE) and involved with 
CLEM 7, The Airport Link Tunnel and Legacy structural certification of these 
tunnels had a different view about VfM and PPP public infrastructure delivery and 
stated: 
“PPP is a market that recycles its products as most PPP infrastructures are a 
replica of what has been constructed somewhere else, repackaged and sold to 
the government at a reduced price. The design is fine-tuned to the 
government’s assumptions and services objective. To the services provider, it 
is value for money and not to the public as the infrastructure scope has been 
altered. The reason governments are involved with PPP, and PPP has not got 
to the tail end to verify the full benefits of the new procurement mode.” 
He continued to state (SE): 
“There is value for money with the CLEM7 and Airport Link Tunnel projects, 
innovative ideas were employed, new flyovers and roads, which were not 
included in the original design, were incorporated to add to the elegance of 
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these tunnels. PPP construction qualities are priceless; accepting the concept 
of PPP is to have a different buildability solution which is an advantage that 
PPP offers. This expertise and knowledge are lacking in government agencies, 
including risks the government might not want to take, because it is a bit 
implied.” 
 
According to Respondent P6 (ES): 
“There is a possibility of achieving VfM with PPP economic infrastructures, 
but PPP effects, impacts and negative consequences based on the delivery 
mechanism have to be separated from VfM…through PPP, innovative designs 
have been achieved and better management outcomes based on the whole-life 
of infrastructure costing and maintenance.” 
He continued to say: 
“VfM could be achieved by the bundling of services of design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance, which could lead to cost savings, if the risks 
involved are managed effectively.”  
 
6.4.1 Value for money: private sector response 
The private sector interviewees, (5 out of 7), including non-government 
organisation staff confirmed that PPP has conferred VfM to the community in one 
way or another, and Respondent P9 (IVM) stated: 
“There was evidence that suggested PPP was the most effective procurement 
mode that manages its tracks (operations) effectively.” 
Respondent P9 (IVM) continued: 
“The VfM concept is subjective in relation to the assessor’s attributes, and 
ideally refers to allocation and transfer of risks between the entities…the 3Es 
(economy, effectiveness, efficiency) are hardly mentioned as these are post-
feasibility studies and business case development.  
He continued and defined VfM as “the attainment of effort applied and 
efficient use of resources.” The respondent (P9) explained and cited examples 
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of VfM, and things recognised as VfM which were not actually VfM. One of 
those examples was the difference between the economics of project 
desirability and project funding, which is not ordinarily defined as VfM and 
stated, “Project desirability is not VfM, until the constructed asset satisfies 
the services objective…non-upfront payment of an infrastructure is a VfM, 
because the infrastructure is being delivered without immediate payment and 
the infrastructure’s risk profile undertaken by the private investor is a VfM.” 
 
Respondent P10 (DVM) response to PPP delivering value for money to society 
was that the effectiveness was: 
“PPP has delivered the level of value and is consistent in delivering value for 
money to taxpayers. The question to ask would be ‘What is value for money. 
Are these cash returns? ’and “you’ve got a great description of VfM, which 
will not be satisfied within government’s concept and literal definition of 
VfM.” 
 
PPP value for money was further explained by Respondent P10 (DVM), who 
stated: 
“There is a misconception that exists about VfM. There is pure value for 
money and value received.”  He stated that “Pure value for money is a pre-
conceived idea that PPP is delivering value as opposed to the conventional 
delivery method in managing its tracks of procurements efficiently. While the 
value received is the infrastructure outcome in satisfaction of infrastructure 
services quality objectives. “However, the respondent continues to say: “PPP 
VfM has fallen into economic difficulties relative to the government’s long-
term affordability and sustainability of payments. Whether the government has 
adequately budgeted for these long-term payments is unknown and it probably 
has not. Governments concentration on VfM without devoting enough time to 
infrastructure affordability for the next 25 years is an ill-conceived strategy 
and PPP non-upfront payment is not different from a house mortgage which is 
repayable over a period of time.”  
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Respondent (P10) continued to explain why VfM was difficult to realise based 
on the present economic climate and global financial crisis (GFC) which has affected 
project deliveries, business environment, and long-term funding arrangements and 
stated: 
“The financial markets stringent terms and conditions for PPP procurement 
funds require the satisfaction and demonstration of VfM without exception, 
throughout the infrastructure’s whole-life-cycle. Managing borrowing costs 
and risks simultaneously are becoming more difficult than before, and VfM is 
likely not realisable at the moment,”  
 
 Question 4: How effective is the public sector comparator (PSC) as a 
quantitative and comparable measurement tool for the whole-life-costing of 
public sector projects based on monetary valuation (on the immediate and long-
term basis) of economic benefits and social impacts? 
 
The extant literature stated (Cruz and Margues, 2012; Quiggin, 2004; Pangeran 
and Wirahadiusumah 2010) that PSC was a benchmark used to compare PPP and 
conventional deliveries. It is a quantitative measure and this question explored 
whether PSC was really capable of apportioning monetary values and was an 
effective measure of costs and benefits. 
6.5 PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR: PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE 
About 75 per cent of the public sector interviewees had a detailed knowledge 
of PSC and their responses are summarised below.  
The public sector Treasury respondents (P3, P4, and P5) stated that PSC’s 
primary focus was on: 
“Cost efficiencies based on the best techniques and practices for the delivery of 
public infrastructure.”  
PSC as an evaluative tool used by the government is based on determining its 
own risk profile that has served the government efficiently as stated by Respondent 
P5 (QIV). He continued: 
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“If other evaluative tools were used in comparing and identifying 
infrastructure benefits and costs, the outcome might be inconclusive. An 
economic infrastructure investment, in particular, road transport benefits, 
costs, and risks are difficult to identify and measure accurately, even when the 
best analytical tools are used, such as cost-benefit-analysis and it is unlikely to 
determine the government’s risk profile.”  
He continued Respondent P5:  
“The government PSC is not designed to calculate project’s environmental impacts, 
rather infrastructure economic values, benefits and costs that associate with the 
infrastructure delivery.” “Queensland Government has used the services of KPMG 
and other consulting organisations in its PSC evaluation processes, also... [There 
are] key experts’ working on PSC and still, it goes wrong. TMR has established in-
house experts working on PSC calculations and analyses, and outcomes obtained are 
not encouraging. Queensland Government has just started to use PPP in the delivery 
of road transport and has never been involved before or exposed to comparing 
project against project.” “Whether PSC would achieved the intended objectives is 
difficult to conclude, because the private investor is manipulating the PSC script.” 
The public sector PPP director, Respondent P1 (DPP) focused his response on 
road transport infrastructure and stated that PSC was used to determine: 
“The external and internal effects of the infrastructure being considered, and 
compared to identical objects…what the private investor bases its own 
comparison on is unknown, and at times is not economically realistic…[the] 
private investor relies mostly on CBA without additional analysis. I am not 
quite sure, what PSC is doing and where the values are derived.”  
 
6.5.1 Public sector comparator: private sector response 
All of the private sector interviewees accepted PSC as being a reasonable 
analytical tool, or a benchmark for quantifying economic values and costs of 
proposed infrastructure delivery.  
According to the private sector investment director, Respondent P10 (DVM): 
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“The problem with PSC as an evaluative tool is how to demonstrate the 
identified economic values to the project financiers (financial institutions).”  
 
The cost planner, Respondent P12 (CP) defined and described the primary 
objectives of PSC as:  
“Benchmarks by which a project can be delivered that lead to VfM 
determination, and involve the government developing a prototype project used 
with the PSC evaluation technique before the project is released to the market. 
The benchmark provides the basis to achieve better value or an alternative 
procurement method, if PPP fails to match PSC benchmarks…” [PSC]… is a 
process that “defines and calculates the government’s portion of risk,”  
 
Respondent P9 (IVM) perceived problems with PSC and deceit in terms of 
creativity and stated that PSC:  
“Needed to be creative in terms of its analyses to include costs to the 
government, as well as the private investor’s borrowing costs, because these 
are excluded from PSC analysis? PSC’s problem is associated with the 
evaluation technique and limitedness of the tool to examine those PPP 
deliveries associated with demand risks, which are inappropriately identified. 
It requires further analyses and inclusions of other factors that influence 
infrastructure delivery…(what…constitutes the PSC problem or is wildly 
wrong with PSC is it is an evaluation tool trying to finance debt revenue which 
is non-existent relying on toll charges that society would not pay as part of its 
analysis). The PSC analytical and evaluation process has failed to itemise 
economic benefits, costs, and risks of proposed infrastructure delivery or 
provide alternative course of action, while comparing objects of non-equal 
values.”  
 
6.5.2 Cost benefit analysis 
Respondents (P3, P4, and P5 (QIV) stated the Treasury role with evaluation 
tools:   
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“The Queensland Treasury is responsible for cost-benefit-analysis of all 
infrastructure deliveries and this is used in conjunction with PSC.” 
Respondent P3 (QIV) continued to describe CBA functions:  
“The CBA considers all economic benefits and costs of the infrastructure to 
society in accordance with the Queensland Government Value for Money 
Guidelines (2009).” 
 
Respondent P5 (QIV) continued to finish the sentence and added:  
 “CBA performed are based on the potential of the infrastructure in conferring 
benefits and VfM to society. The analysis performed through CBA is a bye-
product of PSC which is hard to replicate in the future, and neither is the 
private sector better than the public sector with these analyses, because the 
private sector analysis is optimistically inflated.”  
 
 
Question 5: How accurate is the market costing and pricing of public 
infrastructures, including external long-term effects and impacts of PPP 
delivery on society? 
 
This question explored how effective the market system was capable of 
including long-term effects and impacts of public infrastructures as part of cost 
estimates.  
6.6 EFFECTS AND IMPACTS OF PPP DELIVERY TO SOCIETY 
The public and private sector responses are combined in this question.   
According to the Co-ordinator General Report (2008) the business case and 
feasibility study does identify the long-term effects and impacts of a proposed 
infrastructure. Public sector Respondent P5 (QIV) stated: 
“PPP economic infrastructure depends on the demand and supply equation, 
and interestingly the outcome fundamentally depends on the profit margin that 
accrues to the private investor, before a proposed infrastructure can 
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precede…a fundamental stop-gap is this, if there is no sufficient profit margin, 
the private investor will not get involved.” “The downside of PPP was that the 
demand for PPP is greater than the supply due to the limited number of 
bidders with the required resources.” 
The public sector director of major projects, Respondent P2’s (DMP) 
perception of PPP infrastructure effects and impacts on society was: 
 “It is difficult to price, when competition is limited. This is an unquantified risk 
which is difficult to identify. The infrastructure effects and impacts might be good in 
the long-term, but who knows? When competition is limited, the service provider can 
get away with so much, that’s the risk, and compensation might not be enough, if 
health is involved.” 
 
Private sector Respondent P10 (DVM) described infrastructure effects and 
impacts as: 
“Non-protective of public interest, and social cost not adequately priced with 
a proposed PPP infrastructure delivery.” “Social cost inclusion with PPP 
delivery would increase the costs of delivery and potentially, unlimited claims 
from various interest groups, which financial institutions are not the least 
interested in.” “Infrastructure development effects and impacts are not 
individually priced with PPP delivery but, the private investor’s generosity 
does compensate for the effects suffered by society through voluntary 
inclusions such as pedestrian parkways, community halls and swimming 
pools, which are quite expensive.” 
 
In support of Respondent P10’s (DVM) comments that inclusion and pricing of 
infrastructure effects and impacts on society would increase PPP delivery costs, 
Respondent P9 (IVM) added:  
“The inclusion or pricing of infrastructure potential effects and impacts on 
society of a proposed infrastructure delivery is impossible, either during or 
after contract negotiations. If suppliers were more than consumers (demand) 
competition would be effective and this could include costs and products 
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differentiation in offer…the private investor is incapable of dictating the 
conditions and terms of funding arrangements with the financial institution, 
rather these are specified by the financial institution…most financial 
institutions will protect their investments through the exclusion of those risks 
perceived obstructive towards PPP loan repayments.” 
Other respondents from Lutwyche, Kedron, and Wooloowin who were 
residents (SS) and business owners (BB) were interviewed about the Airport Link 
Tunnel effects and impacts on their livelihood. Respondents P16, P17, P18 were 
residents, while P19 and P20 were business owners. Their responses are summarised 
as follows: 
Respondent P16 is a Kedron resident, who described community action prior to 
the Airport construction and aftermath negotiation with the government and stated 
the following: 
“A community group was formed that tabled our submission to the 
government; we were concerned about how our houses would be affected and 
the aftermath property values in the local area. Concerns were expressed 
regarding the impact of the worksite which was adjacent to residential homes. 
No one explained there would be construction at night or haulage of dirt going 
through the street.” 
He continued after a pause:  
“There are cracks in the house as the result of the Airport construction 
vibration. We don’t have access any more to the park or the children playing in 
the park as before. Our local shops are affected, churches, schools are no 
different. We did not know it was a private road. What the government 
promised to do, we still wait for. What we’ve seen is politics; no one is 
responsible for anything these days, and…. [We] got nothing in return.” 
 
Respondent P17 (SS) from Lutwyche interrupted: 
“Oh, what we received was the government being smart enough to protect itself 
from compensation for declined property values to home and business owners 
in close proximity to construction site. How could I know 25 years ago, as a 
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young lad that a tunnel would pass through this corridor? How could I know 
that all these years, I’ve lived in the wrong suburb? As it stands, we’ve lost our 
life savings, because no one wants to live close to the tunnel and traffic noise.” 
 
Respondent P18 (SS) responded about the effects and impacts of the Airport 
Link Tunnel along the corridor by stating: 
“The local school (Kedron State High School) is covered with dust, parents are 
withdrawing their children from the school, it is no longer a safe school to 
attend and local access to the school and car park is limited, it’s difficult to get 
a parking space during week days, if you’re lucky. If I did have the money, I 
would pack and go, but to where, when you cannot sell the house you’ve paid 
the mortgage all these years? The smart ones sold before the construction and 
nobody is buying anything from this area anymore.”  
 
A property firm (name withheld) Respondent P19 (BB) described the 
construction of the Airport Link as a violation of Lutwyche Corridor Plan and 
government contravening on its promise by stating:  
“The Airport Link Tunnel design and approval process was inconsistent with 
the existing land plans, in particular that of the Lutwyche Road Corridor Draft 
Neighbourhood Plan. The potential for urban regeneration in Lutwyche is lost 
because of the Airport Link Tunnel and the Northern Busway projects. The 
Airport Link Tunnel was designed not to permit urban development near the 
tunnel route and has a sterilising effect on future development in Lutwyche. We 
used to have a livelihood, which has been taken away, when you look around, 
does it seem to be something is happening? Our business was developed here, 
our family was here, what else I can say than, it is unfair, and the treatment 
we’ve received.” 
 
Respondent P20 (BB), who was a bit emotional, stated: 
“The government’s handling of the construction of the tunnel effects and 
impacts on homes and businesses had left a bad taste. The mitigation process 
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which the government offered to cracked houses was air conditioning to 
residents as the result of the Airport construction. A commercial building, such 
as the Royal Brisbane Hospital with sensitive medical equipment was affected 
by the tunnel’s vibration. Along this corridor, from Lutwyche to Wooloowin, 
businesses have closed or relocated, transaction volumes declined, a process 
ill considered. You asked me whether there is anything that can improve the 
process. At least there is one, tell the person that built the tunnel to take it 
away and put it somewhere else, I don’t need it to go to the airport.”  
 
6.6.1 Road transport infrastructure 
Public sector Respondent P2 (DMP) described PPP toll roads as: 
“One with an enormous risk and whether PPP toll road outcomes and 
performance is fair to the community or not, depends on the punting if 
governments should be involved with PPP or type of risks, because PPP is 
not a core public service delivery or government’s basic business operations. 
PPP toll roads in Australia have failed to achieve their expected outcomes 
(Clem 7, Sydney City Cross, Sydney Lane Cove, and the Airport Link) that 
were initially considered good investments. It is likely with the collapse of 
these infrastructures that the government might retain control or step in 
financially to acquire these infrastructures outright, but this is by no means a 
good investment decision and is an inappropriate way of using public 
resources and a waste of effort in building something that will collapse in a 
matter of months.”  
The respondent rhetorically stated: 
“Governments present decisions and actions to use PPP to deliver road 
transports might be justifiable in years to come, 20 to 30 is all speculative 
right now. Toll roads transport systems in Australia have not delivered the 
expected benefits to the community and probably, will not be considered as 
an optimum investment decision.”  
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The public sector director of PPP, Respondent P1 (DPP) explained the primary 
objectives of toll road infrastructure were to decongest the surface roads and a means 
for providing alternative routes of travel to motorists: 
“But this does not imply building every single road as PPP toll road and 
that’s probably not useful and not the best offer to society. A road transport 
services objectives needs to be defined relative to the purposes and 
requirements, either to decongest other existing roads which could probably 
attract public support or as self-funding economic infrastructure with little 
imposition of toll charge. CLEM7 toll road has not been successful, but has 
provided an alternative route for travel. If you ask me whether CLEM7 toll 
road has successful provided an alternative route for travel, the answer to the 
latter is yes. Would Brisbane residents continue using the infrastructure as 
alternative route? The question will receive mixed answers… I suppose, time 
will tell whether CLEM7 would become a successful investment, more traffic 
volumes and patronage depends on future events.” 
 
The economic strategist from the public sector, Respondent P6’s (ES) view of 
PPP toll road infrastructure was directed to the proponents of the infrastructure on 
the basis of capital recoupment and he stated:  
“Toll road infrastructure has relied on toll charges to fund a major capital 
public investment, but over a period of time it is not sustainable. Funding of 
PPP road infrastructure with toll charges is possible when there are other 
community services payment obligations in support of the toll road. Because 
in SEQ (Brisbane), residents are anti-toll road payments, and it would take 
considerable time to change motorists’ behaviour.”  
He continued to explain other problems of PPP toll road infrastructure were 
the inability of the proponents in demonstrating the core value of a toll road 
to society and added:   
“It is the inability of the private investor to demonstration the core benefits 
and values of PPP to society, and risk allocation and transfer between the 
entities is least understood in society.” 
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A local government PPP advisor, Respondent P7 (LG) was of the opinion that 
a PPP toll road in Brisbane could be successful, but required a team effort which was 
lacking, stating: 
“Toll road success in Queensland will require a collaborative effort and 
support, which is presently lacking with these PPP deliveries.” “Toll road 
arrangements required an overhaul and should be structured in proper 
commercial settings, because toll negotiations based on a long-term 
concession contract do not require emotions or sentiments, because much is 
at stake.” 
  
The cost planner from the private sector, Respondent P12’s (CP) view of PPP 
toll roads was about the lack of underwriters and guarantors of PPP predicted traffic 
volumes and stated: 
“The reason PPP toll roads collapse is because there are no underwriters to 
guarantee the traffic volumes, either the government or the private 
investor…unguaranteed traffic volumes tend to affected toll road staple unit 
prices such as the CLEM7 and the Airport Link Tunnel.” Non-guaranteed toll 
roads are “likely to trade below the industry stock average, even as the 
infrastructure continues to survive.” “When you look at CLEM7, you get the 
feeling something just hasn’t worked right.”  
 
The director of PPP projects from the public sector, Respondent P1 (DPP) 
compared toll road success as non-immediate and provided an example stating: 
“A toll road might not be successful in the early years of operation,” 
He mentioned the Brisbane Gateway Bridge when it first opened to the public 
as an example. He then described motorists’ behaviour with toll charge 
imposition on Brisbane roads and how motorists avoided the road, even when 
the road was not a toll road and said: 
“With the Gateway Bridge, motorists were using alternative routes to commute 
back to Brisbane, even when the Gateway Bridge was not tolled at the time, 
and motorist’s patronage was low in the first five years of operation. The 
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tunnels traffic volumes might possibly improve in the future, when the Airport 
Link Tunnel or other connecting routes are linked together,”  
  
6.6.2 Traffic volume predictions 
All 8 respondents from the public sector agreed that traffic volume predictions 
were dependent on future events, and Respondent P7 (LG) from local government 
stated:  
“Traffic volumes are events of the future and predicting traffic volumes and 
vehicle numbers which could use a toll road into future years of 2020, 2025 is 
unwarranted.” 
He gave examples of European toll road companies that have closed as the 
result of fluctuations in traffic numbers (e.g. M1-M5 Hungary Motorway, A 22 
Tolls Portugal and A-10 Tauern Toll Autobahn Austria) and stated:  
 “Where traffic numbers predictions were based on incorrect assumptions, and 
traffic volume predictions should not be used for the purpose of infrastructure 
approvals, but they are dependent on the detailed analyses and investigation 
performed on the proposed infrastructure…traffic volumes can minutely be 
predicted by governments and through economic outlook growth projections, 
which the private investor is less qualified to perform accurately.”  
  
The Treasury respondents (P3, P4, and P5) alluded to the recent publication of 
the Infrastructure Partnership Australia (IPA) website that discussed traffic volume 
inaccuracies in relation to the question about traffic volume predictions. Respondent 
P5 (QIV) continued to say:  
“Traffic volume forecasts and the propensity of the private investor in 
predicting these volumes beyond economic realities (Bain 2009) are 
somehow designed to attract equity and private debt lenders to come on 
board. Traffic volume consultants and modellers are under pressure and tend 
to pick a number prior to commencing the analysis. One of the traffic 
consultants said, I was told to come up with the numbers before starting the 
project, so the prediction is somehow biased… [This]…is not in the best 
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interest of the private investor, but a conservative approach could be more 
appropriate. The government performs its own traffic volume predictions, 
and it depends on whose traffic modelling the proponents are willing to use in 
the end. In PPP environment, the modelling of the private investor’s traffic 
numbers were used, which is somehow inflated.”  
He stated that: 
“E-Com Pty Limited that performed the CLEM7 traffic modelling is 
currently being sued for A$ seven hundred million, because traffic volumes 
are difficult to predict one day ahead. The problem is, can a traffic modeller 
predict traffic numbers twenty-five years ahead of time, when economic and 
social changes affect these predictions?” 
 
Treasury respondents (P3, P4, and P5) and the economic strategist (P6) 
interviewee, all confirmed that the government had made improvements to the 
technical aspect of traffic modelling, although the traffic number assumptions were 
worsened. The traffic volume inaccuracies were based on assumptions legitimised by 
the predicted numbers of the private investor through guaranteeing of good 
investment returns to equity and private debt providers of something that was non-
existent (Silva, 2000).  
 
Respondent P6 (ES) continued to elaborate on PPP traffic volume predictions 
and assumptions:  
“Some traffic volume assumptions are excessive, more than the government’s 
contemplation. If you’re too conservative, probably it might in the fullness of 
time turn out that more motorists will use the tunnels and revenue from the 
tolls may be in excess of the predictions.” “The business case development 
inadequacies, together with limited data information were responsible for mis-
predicting these traffic volumes. Or, the failure of the business case to 
understand societal behaviour and its use of a particular infrastructure in 
terms of the economic benefits it offered were unconsidered. If 
there’s...whatever time savings, these tolls are supposed to be at a level the 
community is willing to place a value; a value that equates to the costs of the 
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time saved…I suppose…debts on these infrastructures are too high and setting 
the toll above what people are prepared to pay is overly optimistic and that’s 
the reason these infrastructures are collapsing.” 
 
6.6.3 Demand risk 
Almost all of the private sector interviewees (4 out of 5) confirmed that the 
private investor was somehow hesitant to assume demand risk of an economic 
infrastructure because it was unpredictable.  
A private sector international development manager, Respondent P11 (IDM) 
criticised the PPP collaborative concept as ineffective and stated: 
“As being unworkable in that it prohibits the establishment of legitimate 
structures for effective participation of partners based on equitable sharing of 
profits and risks.” 
 
The Treasury investor, Respondent P5 (QIV) provided an insight on the 
treatment of demand risk between the entities. In the words of the respondent:  
“The private investor is specifically asked to undertake the demand risk, 
because the volume analyses tend to contradict the government’s analyses and 
otherwise. Regardless of PPP contract outcomes, there are inbuilt flexibilities 
and….if the private investor is prepared to undertake the demand risk, it is 
good for the government…[and]…inbuilt flexibility is the risk sharing 
component, which is specifically stated in the contract of who is responsible for 
what. When the private investor chooses to be responsible for the entire 
infrastructure risk based on its projected traffic number analysis, the 
government accepts the offer.” 
  
Respondents (P3, P4, and P5) continued to elaborate on the Queensland 
Government’s action regarding associated demand risk with the Airport Link Tunnel 
and stated: 
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“The government was not prepared to share demand risk with 
BrisConnections of the Airport Link Tunnel project but they were unable to 
give the reasons, as these were ‘commercial in confidence’.” 
 
However, the Treasury respondents discussed the Commonwealth of Australia 
initiatives on risk sharing and opportunities as the result of PPP economic 
infrastructure collapse, because the present PPP model based on non-sharing of 
demand risks with the private investor had been largely unsuccessful with the 
Australia PPP market.  
Respondent P3 (QIV) remarked on demand risk sharing initiatives and 
provided the following example: 
“In Victoria (Australia) the State Government has adopted demand risk 
sharing with the private investor with the Peninsular Link Road, moving away 
from a revenue risk arrangement to an availability services payment with its 
economic infrastructures, which is only common with social infrastructures.”  
 
The major projects director, Respondent P2 (DMP) attributed the government’s 
lack of participation with PPP demand risk to PSC optimistic bias and stated: 
“The non-sharing of demand risk between the government and private investor 
is due to the over-optimistic PSC evaluations, rather than a traffic modelling 
analysis problem. The private investor being over-confident of the traffic 
numbers would be asked to be responsible based on their projected figures.” 
 
The comments of the major projects director were support by the private sector 
director of investments, Respondent P10 (DVM). He believed that demand risk 
problems were associated with PSC evaluation and traffic volume inaccuracies by 
stating:  
“PSC assessments and evaluations tend to influence traffic volume predictions, 
infrastructure success or failure.” “The consultants involved with the 
predictions of the traffic numbers that led to the collapse of these economic 
infrastructures and business case developments on behalf of the government 
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are not exonerated from these problems, because they want the business case 
to be approved without adjustments, including those optimistic assumptions to 
validate VfM identified.” 
 
He summarised that PPP was: 
“A bit of bravado of a complex public investment and hard to be successful, 
when certain risks and costs are ignored or unidentified.” 
 
Non-government organisation respondents P14 and P15 (NG) perceived that 
demand risk allocated to the private investor without the government sharing was 
strategically inappropriate.  
Respondent P14 (NG) perceived demand risk as having an effect on PPP 
performance and stated: 
“Demand risk allocated to the private investor has not helped PPP 
performance, because the government as the services purchaser and 
responsible for public investments should fund the entire infrastructure. 
Moreover, transportation services are core to the provision of public goods 
and services to society for which the government should be responsible.”  
 
Respondent P15’s (NG) perception of demand risk allocation to the private 
investor was: 
“Unfair to the private investor and equitable sharing of demand risk is more 
appropriate and would not waste public resources unnecessarily. Given the 
risks involved with public investments, the number of entities involved, 
contractors, sub-contractors, financial institutions and equity holders and 
stakeholders, relieving financial pressure on the investor by using either 
shadow tolling or availability payments could improve PPP toll road 
infrastructures.” 
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Respondent P14 (NG) described the payment options and benefits available to 
the government with public infrastructure demand risk, as well as to the private 
investor as follows: 
“The structure provides the investor (concessionaire) the comfort of revenue 
certainty, subject to operational KPIs being met.” “Also, the ratings agencies 
view more favourably the concessionaire’s ability to service its debt, compared 
to the more traditional user-pay model. The availability payment model is also 
attractive for government, as it gives greater certainty over the payments due 
to the concessionaire, allowing the government to better manage its annual 
budget appropriation and debt commitments.” 
Respondent P14 continued to provide an example of countries that are using 
different toll road payments models to improve PPP infrastructure performance. 
Table 6.2 is attached at the end of this chapter.  
 
Question 6: How effectively are PPP economic potentials (VfM, innovation, 
management expertise, risk allocation and transfers, cost efficiencies) translated 
into social benefits to society or improvements to human living standards? 
 
This question explored the economic and social effects and impacts of PPP. It 
was also used to understand what practitioners and investors considered to be a PPP 
social benefit because of the varying interpretations that have been attached to these 
aspects of PPP (Mishan, 1976; Watkins, 2005). 
6.7 PPP ECONOMIC POTENTIALS AND SOCIAL BENEFITS 
Six out of eight respondents from the public sector confirmed that PPP had not 
conferred any social or economic benefits. Another two stated that economic and 
social benefits of PPP were yet to be realised, as it takes a longer time to occur and 
when it does, the immediate impacts are not really known. According to Respondent 
P1 (DPP): 
“The benefit of PPP infrastructure to society, in particular road construction, 
is realised when the infrastructure reverts back to the public at the expiration 
of the contract, the ability for the public to immediately use the infrastructure 
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is an actual social benefit as well as the addition of the new infrastructure to 
the public sector asset pool. Other social benefits associated with road 
construction will depend on the potential to reduce congestion on arterial 
roads, thus improving travelling times and reducing pollution in the longer 
term.” 
Treasury respondent P3 (QIV) categorised PPP benefits into three groups; (i) 
social benefits that accrue to the government; (ii) society; and (iii) the private 
investor, using CLEM 7 as example that satisfied the criteria, even though it is 
considered a failed project.  
(i) Government: Respondent P3 stated that the Brisbane City Council as 
a local government authority: 
“Made strategic decisions to involve the private investor that 
financed and delivered the infrastructure at no cost to ratepayers, 
and there is an economic and social benefit from CLEM7, as 
motorists use the tunnel to travel unhindered and CLEM7 continues 
to generate revenue. The procurement of CLEM7 is the 
implementation of public policy by Brisbane City Council as part of 
its campaign promises to the electorate in 2004.” 
(ii) Society: The social benefit of CLEM7 to society: 
“Is the unhindered and logistical movement that allows business to 
flourish and gas emission reductions on other surface roads, which is 
a fundamental transport policy objective? Other benefits are the 
consolidation of services which enables the government to 
concentrate on customer services and output specification directed 
towards improving the human quality of life. The Canal Road 
rehabilitation by BrisConnections that runs across the shopping 
centre at no cost to taxpayers is the benefit of using the PPP 
procurement mode. At the end of the day, what you’ll get is a 
rehabilitated creek, bicycle paths, and recreational parks at no cost 
to the community.”  
(iii) Private investor:  
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The private investor loses financially when an infrastructure 
collapses, loss of future profit margin, shareholders loss of equity 
and financial institutions. The private investor’s benefit is the use of 
a collapsed infrastructure as part of its reference profile 
(BrisConnections and Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel). The private 
investor has achieved and completed structural and engineering 
sound infrastructure, as long as the collapsed infrastructure is in use 
by society, it has achieved both economic and social benefit 
objectives.” 
 
Respondent P5 (QIV) explained that social benefits of PPP infrastructure 
delivery cannot be guaranteed because of various demands in society and added: 
“When it comes to social benefits, these benefits cannot be guaranteed, 
because community’s interest and appetite varies greatly and it is impossible 
for one particular infrastructure to satisfy all demands effectively. The demand 
for social benefits inclusion with all PPP procurements is difficult to achieve.” 
“Additional benefits are included with PPP procurement which is not common 
with DCM or a fixed price contract. What you ask for is what you get and it is 
the contract’s nature DCM contract,” 
6.7.1 Social effects and impacts of PPP 
In considering PPP effects and impacts on society, Respondent P6 (ES) took 
the view of financial risk as the cause of these effects and impacts on society and 
stated: 
“Those in the community who purchased Airport Link Tunnel shares through 
BrisConnections and CLEM7 (RiverCity Motorway) would have completely 
lost their investments and livelihood savings, and the extent governments seek 
to transfer risks to the private investor is not feasible. A risk sharing option 
could have delivered greater benefits to all stakeholders.” 
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The director of major projects, Respondent P2’s (DMP) response on PPP social 
effects and impacts to society alluded that the government had a responsibility to 
make PPP successful and added: 
“The government has moral and social responsibilities and obligations to the 
electorates in delivering the PPP infrastructure successfully, regardless of the 
commercial consequences… [and]…if the government guarantee of a PPP 
infrastructure could reduce the overall costs of the infrastructure and lead to 
the attainment of unidentified infrastructure benefits, the government should 
consider undertaking the responsibility.” 
 
The view of Respondent P7 (LG) on PPP effects and impacts to society was 
that they were protracted, and: 
“Was that it alters human living conditions, forcing people to a new sense of 
being or relocating to a safer environment. The effects on society are 
protracted, beyond the construction phase, but the strain on residents is of 
several months, if not years.” 
The respondent asking a question to the interviewer said: 
“Are the benefits of a PPP infrastructure delivery equal to the effects and 
impacts on society? And the answer is far from a simple yes or no.”  
 
Respondent P1 (DPP), the director of PPP from the public sector stated that: 
“Government’s primary purpose with a proposed PPP delivery is to conduct a 
credible impact assessment on a project declared significant under Part 4 of 
the State Development and Public Work Organisation Act (1977).” 
 
The economic strategist, Respondent P6 (ES) had a different view on PPP 
effects and impacts on society as being identified by the government in many 
instances by stating:  
“The public sector infrastructure benefits and impacts of proposed 
infrastructure delivery are identified, except for those negatives which increase 
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the costs of services. With the Airport Link Tunnel, dust and pollution were not 
strongly emphasised as effects on society, but were considered natural 
occurrences with any public infrastructure delivery. For example, traffic 
volumes passing through suburbs, were considered a nuisance, but were down 
played… [And]… environmental incidence with longer term effects on society 
was skipped to my knowledge while the EIS assessed the social impacts and 
environmental effects on society.” “What was said then in consideration of 
effects on residents was, it is the project proponent’s responsibility to monitor 
the infrastructure effects and impacts progressively on society, but that didn’t 
go down well,” 
The respondent continued to explain how people reacted in various situations 
to the construction of a tunnel that passed through residential suburbs: 
“I suggest, infrastructure effects and impacts that are not commercially 
threatening be mitigated. Other effects and impacts which are not 
commercially viable and non-cost effective should be isolated.” 
 
The effects and impacts of PPP on society were compared by Respondent P1 
(DPP), director of PPP projects as: 
“PPP procurement is like a house mortgage of a life span of 30 years or more 
from which, transactional costs in the form of interests would accrue and the 
extent is unknown…both CLEM7 and the Airport Link Tunnel have residential 
and commercial properties on them, the likelihood of having future 
developments in those areas are limited… [And]…probability for 
compensatory claims is eminent and could be excessive to contain when these 
properties start to collapse in future.” “The immediate effects and impacts of 
PPP infrastructure delivery to society are the unrealised benefits to society, 
financial losses, and compensatory claims which are protracted and 
unknown.” 
 
6.7.2 The private sector response on PPP economic potentials and social 
benefits 
The private sector respondents (P9, and P12) stated differently that: 
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“PPP confers social benefits in various ways” and “part of such benefits 
benefit for an economic infrastructure was its potential as a self-funding 
project that used toll charges to recover capital costs.” 
Respondent P9 (IVM) continued to elaborate on PPP social effects and impacts 
to society as positives and stated:  
‘PPP social benefits are twofold, (i) the private participation with the 
execution of governments’ public policies and (ii) the private investor funding 
of a public infrastructure which governments lacks the resource to procure on 
its own right is a benefit to society and governments.” 
  
The cost planner, Respondent P12’s (CP) perception of PPP effects and 
impacts were directed to PPP infrastructure unidentified, unquantified and 
unmeasured economic benefits as part of the overall benefits to society and he added: 
“Infrastructure effects and impacts are a long lifetime consequence, which are 
capable of improving human living conditions that are excluded from public 
infrastructure analysis.” 
He continued and acknowledged PPP social benefits were noticeable (evident) 
with social infrastructures and difficult with economic infrastructures and 
stated: 
“When social benefits are included as part of the government PPP delivery 
priority, it does affect the infrastructure delivery structure and is expensive. 
Governments’ expectations with either social or economic infrastructures or 
social benefit requirements need to be defined and matched with adequate 
resources, which most governments are reluctant to pursue vigorously.” “A 
road transport that uses a toll charge to recoup capital cost fulfils the 
description of economic and social benefits to society, which improves 
productivity and human living standards.”  
 
The investment manager, Respondent P9 (IVM) on social effects and impacts 
believed that PPP had conferred accrued financial benefits to society and stated:   
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“Public sector infrastructure procurement through PPP provides financial 
benefits and accrued social benefits to society. PPP financial benefits to 
society arise due to the losses sustained by financial institutions and corporate 
investors’ investments of collapsed public infrastructure, which either reverts 
to the public sector or is acquired at discounted value.” 
 
Another PPP director from the private sector, Respondent P13 (PP) provided 
some explanations on PPP economic infrastructure collapses and financial losses by 
qualifying the losses as thus:  
“Those who actually entertained losses were the equity holders and sub-
contractors, and not necessarily the corporate investor and financial 
institutions that were debt lenders. Debt lenders are protected in the event of 
bankruptcy and continue to benefit from revenue generated from the use of the 
infrastructure until the lease expiration. In the event of cost overruns, the 
managing contractor would sustain these costs and neither would the 
government underwrite (guarantee) these risks as the infrastructure 
beneficiary, unless the operational phase fails which will force the government 
to intervene.”  
He continued:  
“PPP financial losses are diminution of corporate asset values, while 
infrastructure benefits remain with society. The economic and social benefits of 
inheriting a public infrastructure, which taxpayers did not pay for, outweigh 
the infrastructure effects to society… [And]…effects and impacts of economic 
developments tend to lean generally towards positives in the long run. Perhaps 
the community was not used to distractions or construction noises at night, 
which was understandable, and there was no convenient time for these 
developments to happen, which I consider a shared risk of all beneficiaries. 
PPP economic and social benefits have not been communicated effectively to 
society and potentially good investment with benefits and not necessarily 
effects on society. And improvements to the human quality of life must come 
with sacrifices for accrued social benefits and better living conditions.” 
 
 280 Chapter 6:Interview and Summary Data 
Question 7: Have governments included public interest protection with PPP 
public infrastructure deliveries; are the costs associated with public interest 
included with the market pricing system of PPP activities? 
 
This question explored how public interests were protected with the private 
investor delivery of public infrastructures and the impact of a PPP overall cost and 
financial institutions perception of public interest (APEC, 2006; Minnesota DOT, 
2011). 
6.8 PUBLIC INTEREST PROTECTION 
Diverse opinions were expressed about public interest protection as being 
expensive and loosely defined when included with PPP delivery. According to 
Respondent P1 (DPP): 
“The inclusion of public interest protection is important for public 
infrastructure delivery.”  
He acknowledged that public interest had no definite definition, and public 
interest interpretation varied and continued to dominate all aspects of the 
public sector business operations.  
“What is considered as a public interest might be different from one to another 
and managing public interest collectively is a problem. For example, there is 
public interest protection inclusion with the resumption of individual lands 
and, if your land is resumed unjustly, the possibility to seek justice from 
Tribunal is an option to the individual. The public interest protection with land 
resumptions is to obtain fair hearing and justice with the State Government. 
Whether the policy is effective to confer public protection on individuals or 
stop the State Government from compulsory resumption of individual lands, is 
yet to be tested.”  
 
Respondent P2’s (DMP) perception of public interest protection in a proposed 
PPP delivery was to highlight the infrastructure legacy and benefits to society as 
follows: 
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“The essence of public interest inclusion in a proposed infrastructure delivery 
is to capture wider and related issues of an infrastructure legacy, including the 
well-being of the community. The process involves the review of an existing 
regulatory policy and how efficient the policy is capable of conferring 
protection to the public at large.”  
 
On the contrary, Respondent P6 (ES) believed that public interest protection 
was included as part of PPP infrastructure performance measures, and stated: 
“Society might argue inappropriately because the government’s performance 
measure on public interest protection has not transferred all commercial risks 
of PPP deliveries to the private investor. However, public interest protection is 
expensive to the private investor, financial institutions and the government. It 
is capable of distorting budget figures, if inappropriately managed and is the 
reason governments are reluctant to pursue public interest protection as a core 
contract performance measure.” 
 
6.8.1 The private sector response on public interest protection 
An international development manager, Respondent P11 (IDM) perceived 
public interest protection was not addressed properly, because:  
“Public interest protection is loosely addressed by the proponents of PPP, 
either during negotiations or the developmental stage, and is the last thing on 
the entities minds. The problem with public interest protection and its inclusion 
with PPP delivery is the timeframe because of the parliamentary cycle in 
Australia.” 
She questioned the period public interest covers with the Australian 
parliamentary cycle and asked; 
“What period does the public interest protection cover? The parliamentary 
cycle is three years and infrastructure development takes more than three 
years or longer to develop a project. Will the new government with a different 
political ideology continue to respect an existing public interest brokered by 
the former government without major alterations or monitoring costs 
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associated with public interest protection and compliance by the private 
investor? Public interest instituted by the previous government might not be 
honoured by an incoming government, as the result of political party 
ideological differences and party policies.” 
“Other problems with public interest inclusion are the sustainability of the 
policy as society evolves and becomes enriched through other mechanisms or 
starts to decline.” 
 
She stated that the level of public interest instituted was:  
“The level of public interest instituted with PPP infrastructure delivery is 
unknown, because public interest protection is hardly stipulated in a PPP 
contract.” 
 
Respondent P12 (CP), the private sector cost planner perceived public interest 
protection as infeasible, but benefits politicians and stated:  
“Was it a policy that benefited politicians?” “The inclusion of public interest 
protection will lead to unsuccessful infrastructure implementation, whether 
conventional or PPP delivery and the London Underground project reinforced 
the argument that public interest protection is not feasible with a PPP delivery. 
The demand for public interest inclusion originates from fewer interest groups, 
an attitude that sets the society backwards. Public interest protection is already 
included with PPP road construction, which has led to death reduction on 
Queensland Motorways. PPP roads are safer, with reduced environmental 
pollution and gas emissions on society and public interest protection is present 
with all PPP infrastructures as part of safety standards.” 
 
On the contrary, investment manager Respondent P10 (DVM) doubted whether 
public interest protection was included with PPP delivery and stated: 
“Whatever that is included if any, is insufficient. If governments are serious 
about public interest protection, some projects will fail massively and 
governments are unwilling to undertake such risk. Governments as the 
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underwriter of PPP loans need to exercise caution, because investors are 
experiencing difficulties to secure loans beyond 25 years. PPP is overloaded 
with private debt and undesirable for the government. Public interest 
protection is an additional cost and unquantified risk, which could be 
expensive to both entities. Public interest protection inclusion with PPP 
delivery requires government support, through equity contributions towards 
the collaborative arrangement or monetary contributions directed in relieving 
financial pressure on the private investor.”  
 
 Question 8: What is your view on government incentive packages and 
guarantees to the private investor? 
 
This question was used to explore the extent of the purpose and importance of 
government financial packages to the private investor and whether the packages 
could be used to reduce the cost of PPP delivery.  
 
6.9 GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL PACKAGES AND GUARANTEES 
The public sector respondent stated that government financial guarantees were 
inappropriate and should not be provided to the private investor based on public 
perception and understanding of PPP being entirely funded by the private investor. 
Where financial guarantees are provided to the private investor, an exchange in value 
should be received by the public sector.   
A local government PPP advisor, Respondent P7’s (LG) opinion of 
government financial packages to the private investor affecting the public sector 
resource was stated as: 
“Financial incentive packages to the private investor tend to reduce the public 
sector resources and government’s ability to commit to other investments.” 
The view of Respondent P7 was supported by director of PPP procurement, by 
Respondent P1 (DPP) who stated: 
 “PPP projects funded through private finance need to be a stand-alone 
project, without government subsidy or support of any kind. Where financial 
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incentives are provided for the reasons of safety and certainty that could 
enable the procurement to progress further, and deemed fit by the government 
and society, is the only possible way the project implementation could happen, 
the provision of financial incentives to the private investor could be supported. 
The problem with incentive packages tends to include non-competitive clauses 
that prohibit the development of a similar infrastructure in close proximity by 
government agencies or other private investors for a specific period. 
And…..there is no financial incentive that doesn’t boomerang, for example, the 
Airport Rail Link where bus lines cannot be developed along the Rail Link 
corridor makes the whole system inefficient, and with the Airport Link Tunnel 
no buses could operate in the airport corridor.”  
 
Respondents P3, P4 and P5 (QIV) also stated that PPP was quite attractive to 
resist, and Respondent P3 continued: 
“PPP is quite attractive to resist, and only resourceful governments can 
acquire the services, and nothing is free with the private investor, and these 
financial incentive packages are expensive to sustain.”  
 
6.9.1 The private sector response on government financial packages and 
guarantees 
 
The private sector Respondent P11 (IDM) stated that the government 
guarantees were important to PPP delivery of public infrastructure and said that: 
“Government guarantees are bureaucratic and politicised, which diminishes 
the real value of a guarantee. In the lifecycle of delivering a public 
infrastructure, the private investor suffers some losses, which the government 
hardly compensates. What governments’ financial incentive packages are 
designed to accomplish is to reassure financial markets about governments’ 
commitment and support towards PPP infrastructure delivery? Whatever 
contributions the government makes to a PPP arrangement, should be used 
towards the reduction of infrastructure overall risks and costs to society.” 
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She continued saying; 
 “It is important to acknowledge any guarantee provided and received from the 
government by the private investor, because it has a diminution (financial) 
effect on society. One of those effects of incentive packages and guarantees on 
society is the restriction imposed on the public sector future developments. At 
the same time, if questions were asked why these incentive packages and 
guarantees are not provided in support of PPP delivery, probably, not much 
justification. The major problem with government incentive packages and 
guarantees are their undefined nature, the purposes and objectives for which 
they are provided. The purpose of providing financial incentives and 
guarantees to the private investor must be defined and analysed on the basis of 
their potential effects on other public sector activities, as well as direct impact 
on human living standards.” 
 
Respondent P12 (CP) believed that governments should continue to provide the 
financial guarantees to the private investor because: 
“Governments should provide incentive packages and guarantees to the 
private investor as a means of reducing the overall PPP cost. The private 
investor seeks the infrastructure funding with financial institutions, as well as 
registration of the initial public offer (IPO) with the stock exchange. If the 
investor also becomes the loan underwriter, the costs of guaranteeing the loan 
and insurance premium paid by the private investor will automatically be 
transferred to the end user. The primary objective of government incentive 
packages and guarantees is to provide confidence among PPP participants, 
particularly financial institutions.”  
 
The private sector investment director, Respondent P10 (DVM) provided an 
explanation as to why the government financial guarantee was important and the 
primary objective of the packages, and stated: 
“Government guarantees provided to the private investor tended to originate 
from the concept of anticipated reward as the result of the risks undertaken by 
the private investor from design, construction, financing, operating and 
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infrastructure maintenance for which there was no capital contribution from 
the government. The incentive packages and guarantees are designed to attract 
investors, if anything goes wrong, such as infrastructure collapse, there will be 
equity losses which will not be bailed out by the government. Therefore, people 
are motivated and incentivised to invest in projects in many ways, and where 
these incentives are not present; it is difficult to be involved. An equity investor 
would not consider investing into projects without being offered a good return 
and the same goes for the private investor. To achieve PPP public 
infrastructure objectives require governments’ financial incentives and 
guarantees, but must be measured against risks undertaken by the private 
investor and adequately priced, particularly, in the early stages of the project.”  
 
On the contrary, Respondent P9 (IVM) presented a different view on 
government financial guarantees to the private investor as unknown and insignificant 
and stated: 
“The public sector infrastructure delivery with PPP and financial incentive 
packages required from the government is determined by the level of risks and 
infrastructure value to society. It is not in the best interest of the government to 
assume an extreme position or refuse to act as a guarantor of a PPP loan and 
other liabilities associated with the public infrastructure delivery. If a 
proposed public sector infrastructure investment possesses commercial and 
economic gains, it is justifiable to provide these guarantees to the private 
investor? Governments are entirely safe in the PPP environment, however will 
get nothing from the private investor without committing something or 
exposing the private investor to incur liabilities, either cut or uncut without any 
input from the government is not possible,”  
  
The non-government organisation Respondents P14 and P15 (NG) stated that 
government guarantees and underwriting of financial risk with PPP infrastructure 
delivery and backed credit guarantee were to lift bond ratings, and Respondent P15 
NG) stated: 
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“The scheme provides financial institutions with a buffer and creates a 
contingent liability to governments that do not want an upfront funding of PPP 
public infrastructure delivery.” 
 
Respondent P14 (NG) stated that: 
“A capital contribution option by governments as part of capital cost towards 
public infrastructure delivery at financial close or capital contribution that is 
progressively drawn alongside the private debt and equity to reduce service 
payments is more effective than financial guarantees. However, this option has 
a balance sheet implication for the government, i.e., locking in a whole-of-life 
solution (payments) to the PPP funding problem. Financial packages are 
enormous when aggregated, and an inappropriate method of structuring a 
commercial contract.”   
According to Respondent P15 (NG): 
“The problem with projects relative to short-term (3 -5 years), governments’ 
assume the financial risk and beyond which, who is responsible? Financial 
institutions will not commit at the outset if there is no government support or 
when the existing support ends, and equity investors may have a similar view. 
The implication of governments not supporting the private investor’s public 
infrastructure loan application might be more devastating to the investor than 
governments. Because the private investor’s conversion from a partly 
government supported public infrastructure delivery to a full market risk is 
potentially difficult and initial debt lenders, if any, might want to be reassured 
of their investments. Therefore, government guarantees tend to stabilise the 
entities.”  
 
Question 9: Can you suggest other ways that public infrastructure procurement 
using PPP arrangements may be improved to ensure these projects confer 
positive impacts and social benefits to the community at large? 
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6.10 PPP PROCUREMENT IMPROVEMENT 
The public sector respondents stated the importance of governments devoting 
much time and effort in the review of PPP public infrastructure delivery or 
considering other delivery options which could lead to similar outcomes expected of 
PPP, which was presently impossible. 
Respondent P1 (DPP), a director of PPP procurement described the public 
private partnership as unworkable by stating: 
“A PPP collaborative arrangement was unworkable and transfer of skills 
between the entities has failed to embrace the fullness of the partnership. The 
entities tended to undermine one another’s potential based on cultural 
differences.” 
The economic strategist, Respondent P6 (ES) attributed the unworkable nature 
of PPP arrangements to cultural differences between the two sectors and stated:  
“Our systems and cultural differences in not sharing with PPP infrastructure 
risk, project assumptions and technical designs could apparently turn 
infrastructure success into failure and vice visa. There are other procurement 
options which are capable of producing the same outcome or better than 
PPP, which the government has ignored, because PPP offers a non-upfront 
payment system. With alliance delivery, several private investors are involved 
in partnership with the government, which should be encouraged. The 
alliance arrangement allows sharing of risks and benefits evenly, technical 
notes compared and expected outcomes closely monitored, which 
governments have not thoroughly explored.” 
 
Other improvements suggested by the public sector respondents were as 
follows: 
 “Improving PPP performance to effect changes to the current practices and 
government policies which could empower governments to assume an equal 
partnership role, rather than administrative,” (Respondent P7, LG). 
 “Realign PPP demand risk along the lines of an availability services 
payment, similar to the Peninsular Link Road (Melbourne) and HungaryM5 
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Toll Road, which had worked effectively for the entities,” (Respondent P2, 
DMP). 
 “Risk transfer to the private investor is not the solution to PPP performance, 
but a range of other options could be used such as risk sharing with equity 
contributions,” (Respondent P1, DPP). 
 
Respondent P6 (ES) suggested the implementation of the Norway and Sweden 
method for PPP demand risk sharing methods or use of an availability payment, and 
stated: 
“When the private investor is unable to attract the number of motorists 
expected on the road, the investor’s availability payment is secured. And when 
the infrastructure attracts sufficient motorists on the road, the availability 
payment is stopped. The flexibility co-opts into the arrangement removes the 
pressure on the private investor to inaccurately falsify the traffic numbers. 
Governments sharing the demand risk of PPP infrastructure have to look 
beyond the budget figures, if PPP overall performances are expected to 
improve.” 
 
6.10.1 The private sector response PPP procurement improvements 
The private sector investment director, Respondent P10 (DVM) suggested the 
education of PPP benefits to society could improve PPP performance and said: 
“There is lack of education about the economic benefits of PPP to society and 
the private investor’s financial arrangements with the government, which had 
inadvertently affected the public’s support for PPP infrastructures. In 
Queensland, PPP road infrastructures that would improve human quality of 
lives for years to come were virtually abandoned. There are projects which 
might look good on the drawing board for governments, but if the private 
investor is honest, such a project will not get off the ground. Economic 
infrastructure has its own challenges with risks, and governments should have 
self-conviction about the infrastructure long-term benefits to society before 
proceeding to the unknown. Also, PPP public infrastructure procurement is 
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overloaded with debt and needs balancing. With social infrastructures, the 
possibility of achieving economic benefits is high, which practically does not 
work with economic infrastructures in the same way because of the payment 
structure in place. PPP performance can hardly improve, unless governments 
are realistic about risk allocations, transfers and demand risk sharing 
arrangements.”  
 
The investment manager, Respondent P9 (IVM) believed that PPP procurement 
requires longer period of development and research, and blamed the government for 
not doing enough research before embarking of these projects by explaining:  
“Projects capable of improving human quality of life require years of 
development, and unfortunately government’s budgets do not fit well into a 
delay process. Achieving better infrastructure outcomes requires systematic 
consideration to avoid costly mistakes. So often, governments are in hurry to 
execute public infrastructure projects. PPP is not all about costs; there are 
also benefit components, which the government has not fully communicated to 
society and that is a gap government must close to improve PPP 
performance.”  
 
PPP long-term affordability and economic benefits analyses of public 
infrastructure investment must be thoroughly considered, being components of 
factors that affects PPP performance was raised by Respondent P11 (IDM). She 
suggested:    
“PPP analyses need to be detailed and rigorously tested to achieve an 
improved performance. The real benefits of PPP public infrastructure delivery 
must be demonstrable, including VfM and demand risks which are core to PPP 
proponents.” 
According to Respondent P13 (PP), Infrastructure analyses and evaluations of PPP 
procurement options are capable of producing economic benefits, when analysed by 
stating:  
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 “Both economic and social benefits would emerge, if infrastructure analyses 
were adequately performed. The lack of understanding and benefits of PPP to 
society stretched to government agencies on risk dynamics and when risk was 
unpredictable. How is it possible to allocate and transfer risks, when risks 
are not identified or quantified? The problem with PPP risk allocation and 
transfer is getting the risk portion right.”  
The concept of getting the risk portion right coincided with the statement made 
by  Respondent P12 (CP) that perceived the government as incapable of identifying 
resourceful investors, who could add value to PPP procurement and stated:      
“PPP collapse or performance problems were the result of governments’ 
inability to identify investors who could actually add value or intuitively 
produce ideas towards infrastructure problems, rather than those proposing 
the impossible.” 
He suggested there are other methods which could improve PPP performance 
through government’s equity contributions or subsidies which could provide a steady 
income stream and reduce financial pressure to the investor, especially road transport 
infrastructure and stated:   
 “Public infrastructure delivery with PPP arrangement was overloaded with 
debt, which led to the collapse of the infrastructure in the past 10 years. A 
public infrastructure with lower private debt attracts lower interest rates and 
provides confidence to the financial market and equity investors.” 
 The NGO respondent P14 perception of lower revenue streams with road 
transport infrastructure was summarised by the lack of appetite for toll roads, 
which could force Australia to consider other payment options, such 
availability payment and shadow prices, which the government (Australia) is 
hesitant to use, even considering the suggestion by stating:  
 “The lack of appetite in the current financial market for financing user pay 
toll roads in Australia is timely to look for alternative payment mechanisms 
such as the shadow tolling and availability payments. The overall risk for these 
alternative payment models is less complex than the user-pay model, as the 
private investor and lenders are less exposed to traffic and toll pricing risks.”  
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6.11 SUMMARY 
There is evidence that suggests PPP is the most effective procurement mode 
that manages its tracks effectively, and the effectiveness was at the level of structural 
engineering that consistently continued in delivering value for money. The non-
upfront payment is a VfM as it enables the transfer of resources from the private 
investor to the public sector. However, VfM definition and interpretation is imprecise 
and requires criteria of what constitutes VfM.   
Demand risk allocated to the private investor has not helped PPP performance; 
rather public infrastructure investments should be funded by governments as the 
services purchaser and core to the provision of public goods and services to society 
for which the government is responsible. PPP confers social benefits in various ways 
and part of such benefit for an economic infrastructure was its potential as a self-
funding project. A road transport that uses a toll charge to recoup capital cost fulfils 
the description of economic and social benefits to society that equally improves 
productivity and human living standards 
The next chapter of this thesis discusses the research findings and conclusions.
 Table 6.2: Types of payment options with toll road infrastructure. 
Country User-pay 
model
Shadow toll Availability 
payment 
Australia √ N/A N/A 
Belgium √ N/A N/A 
Canada √ √ √ 
China √ N/A N/A 
Chile √ N/A N/A 
Croatia √ N/A N/A 
Czech Republic N/A √ √ 
Finland N/A √ N/A 
France  √ N/A N/A 
Germany √ N/A N/A 
Greece √ N/A  
Hungary √ √ N/A 
India √ N/A √ 
Ireland √ N/A N/A 
Italy √ N/A N/A 
Malaysia √ N/A N/A 
Norway √ √ √ 
Philippines √ N/A N/A√ 
Poland √ √ √ 
Portugal √ √ N/A 
South Africa √ N/A N/A 
Spain √ √ N/A 
United Kingdom √ √ √ 
United States of 
America 
√ √ √ 
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Table 6.3: A summary of interview key terms and concepts is presented  
 Public Sector Private Sector Comments 
 
Public Private 
Partnership 
PPP has not transferred 
the expected early 
benefits to society 
PPP has delivered and 
managed complex 
public infrastructures 
effectively.
PPP is complex and 
structurally prohibitive 
to transfer economic 
benefits expected.
 
Public Sector 
Comparator 
Public sector 
comparator is a rough 
assumption of cost 
estimates.  
Public sector 
comparator is grossly 
manipulated; needs to 
be tested rigorously.  
Public sector 
comparator compares 
the incomparable. 
 
Value for money 
VfM with PPP public 
infrastructure delivery 
is vague; realisation 
based on future events 
(post-construction).  
PPP has delivered 
VfM, through capital 
transfer and delivery of 
major economic 
infrastructures to 
society. 
VfM is undefined and 
its interpretation is 
vague; specific criteria 
for VfM determination 
required. 
 
Infrastructure Risks 
Identify all risks, 
mitigation processes, 
and opportunities with 
risk sharing. 
Infrastructure 
affordability and 
demanding risks 
analyses are central to 
PPP success. 
Optimal risk sharing 
and underwriting of 
risks are fundamental 
to PPP success.   
 
Toll Road 
Infrastructure 
PPP self-funding 
infrastructures are 
risky and catastrophic. 
PPP toll road 
infrastructure is highly 
geared to debt.  
Toll road infrastructure 
success is dependent 
on future events, 
economic and social 
changes.  
 
Traffic Volume 
Predictions 
PPP traffic volume and 
patronage predictions 
are predetermined 
numbers. 
Traffic volumes are 
unrealistic and grossly 
manipulated by both 
entities.
PPP traffic volume 
predictions optimism is 
used to justify non-
existent VfM. 
 
PPP Performance 
Measures 
PPP performance 
measure is an 
additional cost to 
society; instead, 
enforce PPP contract 
obligations and rights. 
Performance measures 
are inappropriate for 
some PPP public 
infrastructure delivery 
Specify infrastructure 
services objectives and 
outcomes required.   
Public Interest 
Protection 
Public interest 
protection with PPP 
delivery is an 
additional cost and 
capable of distorting 
budget figures.
Public interest 
protection is expensive 
with unpredictable risk.  
Public interest 
protection is a political 
concept and undefined. 
PPP economic and 
Social benefits 
PPP economic and 
social benefits are yet 
to materialise. 
PPP has delivered 
value to society, but is 
difficult to quantify.  
PPP infrastructure 
delivery collapse is not 
conferment of either 
economic or social 
benefits to society.  
Regulatory Policy Adopt IPA Framework 
on risk sharing and 
allocation 
opportunities. 
Adopt AASB 112 and 
AASB 117 Accounting 
Standards. 
Develop standards and 
guidelines (acceptable 
across the board). 
Analysis of interview responses 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research has used two case studies from the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Queensland (Australia) that were based on completed PPP projects, which enabled 
some major key issues underlying PPP procurement to be identified and analysed. 
The research also leads to theoretical data interpretation using a qualitative approach 
that focuses on Traver’s (2001) investigation methods of phenomena observation, 
such as the CGR (2008) and part of the ALT contract documents. Through these case 
studies, the benefits and costs planned for, and subsequently provided to society, 
whether short-term or protracted, were identified and examined in terms of whether 
they actually satisfied the declared PPP objectives that promised enhancement of 
human quality of life. 
This research also adopted a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
participants as a major part of the data collection technique, with the aim of gathering 
and analysing the views of experienced PPP practitioners, selected using judgemental 
sampling, in order to provide a lucid real-world view and build up a valid set of 
perspectives about the efficacy of, and problems related to, the delivery of PPP-
procured public infrastructure. Interview questions were developed based on an 
extensive review of the extant literature and the outcomes of a preliminary pilot 
study, the latter of which confirmed the suitability and validity of the developed 
research questions for this study. The themes that emerged from the ‘open coding’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990) of the transcribed interview data produced 106 pages 
(52,869 words) of rich data, which were then manually assigned sub-titles and 
grouped into thematic ‘piles’. The data was later loaded into NVivo (QSR 
International Pty Ltd. Version 9, 2010) software in order to aid in the task of data 
analysis. 
As described in Chapter 1, and later reiterated in Chapter 3, the focus and 
major aim of this research was to critically assess and investigate the benefits and 
costs of PPP road transport procurement to society. The research questions that arose 
from these considerations and the problems identified in the literature review was: 
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 “Can PPP benefits and costs be effectively measured through assignment of 
monetary values?”  
“Are there other existing alternative measurements that are appropriate and 
socially acceptable to measure the benefits and costs of PPP to society”? 
Arising from the major research aim and the questions above, the objectives of 
the research were:   
 To investigate the full nature and scope of all PPP potential benefits and 
costs, including microeconomic, macroeconomic, financial, political 
and social, along with how these benefits and costs, either short-term or 
long-term arose from PPP; and  
 Assess the extent to which these benefits and costs were being 
effectively measured, along with scope/viability to improve 
measurement. 
This chapter discusses the findings of the case studies and analysed data from 
the interviews in fulfilment of the research aims and objectives.   
 
7.2 THE AIRPORT LINK TUNNEL PROJECT 
The Airport Link Tunnel (ALT) case study revealed that the risks associated 
with the road infrastructure tunnel construction were inadequately identified and the 
combination of three projects in one, (the ALT, Northern Busway Stage II, and the 
Airport Flyover Bridge) was, in the light of post-delivery experience, a weak public 
policy decision (TransApex, 2005). The ALT was one of the most capital-intensive 
projects in the SEQ region with a total cost of $4.8 billion and a 45-year period of 
lease concession service arrangements (CSA), using the constructed asset as a toll 
road to recoup capital investments.  
The expectation from both the local council and state government (BCC and 
QSG) was that the ALT would confer economic and social benefits to SEQ residents 
in terms of reduced travelling times, employment opportunities, and improved living 
standards, which was captioned as “building a better and more liveable city in the 
SEQ and transport for Brisbane” (BCC Transport for Brisbane, 2008; SEQ 
Transport 2008).  
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BrisConnections, as the consortium that won the Airport Link Tunnel contract, 
used the Sydney Lane Cove Tunnel (liquidated) as part of its engineering experience 
for PPP pre-qualification, but failed in its financial fortunes and although it achieved 
financial support from 10 foreign banks, could not raise enough equity and ended-up 
trapped in financial litigation with one of the executive unit holders (Mr Bolton). 
Furthermore, ALT cost recovery was dependent on toll charges based on 
optimistically predicted traffic volumes and motorists patronage, that demonstrated 
more motor vehicles than historically and currently operated in Queensland tunnels 
(Bain, 2010; Flyvbjerg et al., 2006), and risk analysis that failed to consider other 
operators on the same corridor, such as the Airport Train that provided alterative 
transport to the airport route. 
The case study has demonstrated the financial market rejection of the toll 
infrastructure risks analysis, which potentially affected ALT share prices and later 
played a major part in the infrastructure collapse. Despite several attempts to 
convince potential investors of the tunnel’s economic benefits and attractiveness to 
SEQ residents, the infrastructure failed to attract motorists’ patronage. The Royal 
Automobile Club of Queensland (RACQ) even encouraged motorists to use the 
tunnel during the free trial period of three months, but has still not achieved one third 
of its predicted traffic volume. In some quarters, the ALT was perceived as a 
‘political infrastructure’ imposed on society (TransApex, 2004; 2005), but in reality 
the tunnel lacked public support and thus went into administration only months after 
its completion.  
Other findings of the case study tend to demonstrate that PPP non-upfront 
payment concept is unsustainable for the private investor and does create financial 
pressure on both entities (government and private investors) in the longer-term. Also, 
the non-static risk analysis of the human nature was omitted in the traffic predictions, 
whose social appetite frequently changes, especially when affected by altering 
economic conditions.  The case study equally highlights reliance on user charges for 
full capital cost recovery has proven to be unsuccessful in many ways, particularly 
economic infrastructures where the private investor is responsible for demand risk. 
Rather, alternative payment options or combinations are encouraged, such as 
shadowing tolls or availability payments (Victoria, Norway, Sweden, Canada, UK, 
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and USA), which have been successful with other toll road infrastructures (Storr, 
2009). 
Further, this case study reveals that QSG made substantial financial 
contributions to the ALT procurement (Table 4.3, ALT financing and uses of funds), 
comprising of $1.5 billion initial capital layout (BrisConnections, 2008) that 
contradicts society’s perception of PPP infrastructures being entirely funded by the 
private investor. 
 
7.3 THE LONDON UNDERGROUND REHABILITATION AND 
RESTORATION PROJECT  
The London Underground case study reinforced some of the literature review 
findings, in particular those that questioned the economic benefits and VfM 
associated with PPP public infrastructure delivery (Edwards and Shaoul, 2004), 
when the actual asset condition limited the ability of proper risk analyses undertaken. 
The types of contracts entered into by each entity were in fact incomplete, as the 
information required for full risk assessment and evaluation of the tubelines was 
unavailable. 
The investigation by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(UKHCCPA, 2005) on the LU failure revealed that the complexity of the contract 
did not permit the transfer of risks to the consortia, and instances where risks were 
transferred, exclusion clauses were used to limit the level of risks borne by the 
consortia. The primary objective of PPP was not to transfer all risks to the private 
investor, but only those risks that the private investor was equipped to manage 
(design, construction, operation) (UKHCTC, 2010). For example, risks associated 
with the tunnel wall repairs (an unknown asset condition) were excluded from the 
consortia’s responsibility, because of the residual life or purchase price of the asset 
was unknown. However, this research has revealed that the private investor was 
capable of managing the engineering (structural) aspect of a Greenfield public 
infrastructure delivery successfully (UKNAO, 2009).  
The case study has highlighted the difficulties associated with the inclusion of 
performance measures with PPP public infrastructure delivery as being largely 
unfeasible, even when the private investor was adequately incentivised (Demirag and 
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Khadaroo, 2008), as the performance measures failed to define the level of work, or 
modifications required to the tubelines. These performance measures, although very 
clearly intangible risks (capability, availability, ambience), were largely unidentified, 
unquantified and unpriced, however, they were included on the assumption that the 
LU project was adequately incentivised by the government (UKHCCPA, 2009), 
when in fact they were additional risks and costs to the private investors.   
It is likewise possible to argue that the private investor’s knowledge on the 
public sector business operations is limited, as is the ability of the private investor to 
adequately analyse the risks of public sector services (Adams, 2008). However, 
performance measures are adequate, if not appropriate with ‘greenfield’ 
infrastructures, when linked to payment of services or completion of milestones, 
when agreed by the entities and thus, forms part of the overall contract performance 
agreement (Hodge and Greve, 2011; FHWA, 2011).   
Similar to most PPP procurements, the LU was supported by the raising of 
private debt to the tune of £3.8 billion (88.3 per cent) from the Metronet 
shareholders’ bank, Deutsche Bank and the European Investment Bank, as well as 
through shareholders’ equity of £350 million (11.7 per cent) (Williams, 2010) and a 
‘letter of comfort’ covering 98 per cent of the debt. The LU case study suggests that 
private sector participation and funding of public infrastructure is not a mechanism 
for PPP public infrastructure procurement success or even a guarantee of project 
completion, because in reality, the finances and future economic conditions are set 
by external entities that actually make PPP non-upfront payment unfeasible.   
The consortia’s own internal problems (Metronet’s unstable board of 
management and shareholders dominance of the supply chain) severely affected the 
LU performance, (UKNAO, 2009) that reflected poor governance. What actually led 
to Metronet bankruptcy was the inability of the consortia to demonstrate 
accountability of extra work performed economically and efficiently as part of the 
contract requirement. This lack of accountability demonstrates the corporate cultural 
differences and conflicting core values between the sectors due to their varying 
interests and objectives in a project environment (Reijniers, 1994). Metronet 
consortia pursued a self-interest agenda based on the intent of maximising immediate 
profits through exaggeration of services payment claims that portrays corporate 
culture.  
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The case study also reinforced some of the literature review findings, i.e., that 
the private sector, or investors’ ability and knowledge of the public sector core 
business operations are severely limited. Regardless of the individual government 
concern, or its generosity in providing financial incentives and guaranteeing the 
private investor’s debt; these are not sufficient to transform the investor’s innovative 
skills into success or a heightened knowledge of the public sector business operations 
(FHWA, 2007). The LU failure was due to heavy financial losses based on an 
incomplete contract and inadequate risk analyses that led to the assumption by each 
entity of the nature of contract acquired and signed. This ‘political project’ (i.e., one 
imposed by the Exchequer) perceived PPP as the best alternative to providing 
adequate funding for the deteriorated tubelines already starved of funding over the 
years, significantly contributed to the LU failure. The real beneficiaries of the LU 
project were not the public that received scattered train carriages, uncompleted rail 
tracks, and an unrealised dream of modernised railway stations with equipped safety 
devices. Rather, banks with 20 per cent and 98 per cent guaranteed with letter of 
comfort, and Metronet shareholders with 18 per cent return on their investment.   
 
7.4 INTERVIEW DATA SUMMARY 
The interviews supported many of these findings and additionally highlighted 
the need for a PPP collaborative effort with an equitable sharing of infrastructure 
risks among the entities. Despite considering PPP as alternative procurement mode to 
the conventional method, little education and understanding exists in society about 
PPP benefits, or methods of PPP public infrastructure delivery payments, either with 
a toll charge, tax revenues, or other public sector consolidated reserves.  
The success and performance of PPP requires undivided and collaborative 
efforts of all the entities and this has to embrace risk sharing (HM Treasury, 2006; 
Darvish et al., 2006; Zhang, 2007), not just risk allocation and transfer to the private 
investor (UKHCCPA, 2009), and has to be supported with government’s equity 
contributions. The non-upfront payment offer from the private investor increases the 
costs of infrastructure delivery with interest additions, or immune financial risks. 
Therefore, Respondent P9’s (IVM) statement that the private investor will not 
commit “either cut or uncut liability with the public sector resources made 
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available,” reinforced the results from both the Airport Link Tunnel project and the 
London Underground case studies.  
 Notwithstanding the complexities of PPP, both sectors (public and private) 
still generally recommended PPP as a good procurement concept that has enabled the 
immediate implementation of public policies, even when some of the investment 
policies have collapsed as the result of demand risk associated with capital cost 
recovery  (DoT, 2007). Other PPP projects have survived (Melbourne East Link, M5, 
M7, and the Hungarian M5 Toll Motorway) due to their financial arrangements, such 
as the combination of shadowing toll and availability payment options that removed 
financial pressure on the investor (European Commission, 2004). Many of the 
interviewees were concerned about the unprecedented proportion of the corporate 
sector and shareholders financial losses, which could affect other sectors of the 
economy. 
However, the economic and social benefits of PPP expected to be conferred on 
society in the immediate-term are difficult to see being realised, because these 
benefits are protracted and unnoticeable even when they are realised. Governments 
and the private investor are duty bound to detail the benefits, costs, effects, and 
impacts of a proposed PPP public infrastructure delivery and possible mitigation 
process of PPP effects and impacts on society. The interviews revealed that public 
infrastructure investments are executed in hurry, “a process not well developed.” PPP 
is the “elephant in the room” (Flyvbjerg, et al., 2006; De Rus, 2006), which cannot 
be ignored by society, but is rather accepted because ultimately, PPP delivers major 
projects within society.  
7.4.1 PPP success with the provision and delivery of public infrastructure 
The interviews revealed that PPP success is subjective and depends on the 
interpretation of what is considered as success. For example, an engineer perceived 
PPP structural quality as a measure of success, while infrastructure affordability and 
transfer of resources among the entities were considered measures of success by 
other interviewees. Notably, PPP success with economic infrastructure was not 
evident, but social infrastructures funded with availability or services payments were 
seen by respondents to be more successful relative to economic infrastructures that 
use a toll charge to recoup capital costs.  
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While PPP is generally perceived as a holistic procurement approach relative to 
conventional delivery, i.e., combining design, build, finance, and operate (DBFO) 
were considered as innovative procurement (Pakkala, 2002), also reservations were 
expressed by some interviewees. Adam, (2008); Dekker et al., (2003); UKNAO, 
(2009) stated that PPP success is obstructed by complexity and difficulty to 
determine its benefits to taxpayers. Another concern was the undefined nature of 
public sector infrastructure delivery services objectives and contract clauses, which 
were written in general terms without being specific for the services purpose. For 
example, the notion of PPP providing economic benefits without actually identifying 
the benefits, or the sources that contribute to those benefits is actually flawed 
(Banister and Berechman, 2000).  
Also, risks allocations and transfers to the private investor were seen to be 
inappropriate, unmatched with costs and remunerated on the basis of the risk profile 
undertaken by the investor (UKHCCPA, 2005). Risk retained and transferred 
between the entities was either overestimated or underestimated by both entities 
(Reilly et al., 2005; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; 2006). The cost of voluntary risk to 
society was unmentioned by the interviewees, which is strange as these costs are 
binding throughout the life-cycle of the project. As identified by the interviewees, 
VfM realisation through PPP is not immediate, but protracted within infrastructure’s 
life-cycle and its interpretation is subjective based on the assessor’s perception 
(Heald, 2003; UKNAO, 2003; Shaoul, 2005). What constituted VfM determination 
and its attributes if defined might be useful and appropriate for future policy 
developments. Perhaps for PPP to be a better concept it needs to work hard towards 
achieving greater clarity of its terminologies by differentiating infrastructure 
economic benefits from VfM and vice versa. 
The impression gained from the interviewees is that success depends on the 
interpretation (Arboleda and Abraham, 2006, Jamali 2004), as most PPP economic 
infrastructures in Australia have not completed their concessional lease arrangements 
to enable additional evaluation on the proviso of the original economic and VfM 
identified (Kristiansen, 2009). It is likely that economic infrastructures in Australia 
might be successful in the future, but societal expectations are of immediate benefits 
and improved living standards, which these infrastructures have yet to deliver. 
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7.4.2 Government feasibility study and business case development 
The public sector business case development and feasibility studies were 
perceived by most interviewees to be weak and grossly manipulated. The absence of 
a detailed trail of economic benefits being identified and the delivery of 
unsubstantiated reports tended to cast doubt over the authenticity of these reports 
(OECD, 2007). The international development manager’s definition of a business 
case development was “a process of detailing economic and social benefits of a 
proposed infrastructure, including processes and procedures of mitigating external 
effects and impacts on society.” The role of a feasibility study is to identify proposed 
infrastructure effects and impacts, not the economic benefits associated with the 
infrastructure, and thus, such studies have meticulously failed to identify those 
effects and impacts exhaustively (Cuttaree, 2008; FHWA, 2007). Both reports 
(business case development and feasibility study) are fundamental in determining 
whether a proposed infrastructure delivery is commercially viable or not, including 
associated risks. Howes and Robinson, (2005) and OECD, (2001) have both noted 
that a feasibility study of a proposed public infrastructure investment was a project of 
its own, separate from other phases or continuation of the project and irrelevant of 
future investment decisions after the project had been completed. And, quite 
inappropriate for governments to continue using the outcomes of feasibility studies to 
either identify VfM or economic benefits of a proposed public infrastructure 
delivery, when economic conditions are not static (UKNAO, 2004; 2009). A major 
critique of government’s business case development and feasibility study from a 
private sector interviewee stated “There are abnormalities and anomalies entrenched 
within the government’s business case development and feasibility studies that are 
persuasive to conclude those government analyses are predetermined. These reports 
are driven by political posturing of the government in power.” 
7.4.3 Public Sector comparator 
The public sector comparator is accepted as a reasonable benchmark used by 
government entities in identifying economic benefits and government’s risk profile 
for any proposed public infrastructure delivery (Pangeran and Wirahadiusumah, 
2010). The interviews revealed the need for demonstrating the economic benefits 
associated with the proposed public infrastructure without exception as required by 
financial institutions throughout the project’s life cycle (Quiggin, 2004). The method 
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of accepting the assessors’ attribution of values and assumptions of infrastructure 
economic benefits is no longer acceptable. Additionally, PSC is limited and 
incapable of predicting future events or economic changes that could influence 
infrastructure performance (Cruz and Marques, 2012), and limited to predict events 
beyond one year. However, PSC is still considered a reasonable benchmark to 
determine the government’s immediate risk exposure (Bain 2012; Heald, 2003; 
Shaoul, 2004).    
Despite the popularity of PSC and continued acceptance of its primary 
objectives are to determine costs and a government’s potential risks exposure (Cruz 
and Marques, 2012), what PSC uses to achieve these objectives is a designed 
prototype object (Pollack et al., 2003), which is miniature in size and less complex, if 
delivered through PPP (HM Treasury, 2003; 2006). The interviews revealed, “PSC is 
incapable of comparing objects of a non-comparable nature (Pollack et al., 2003), or 
identify the actual economic benefits and costs of a proposed infrastructure delivery 
based on assumptions as they are protracted throughout the infrastructure life-cycle 
(Kristiansen, 2009). 
7.4.4 Value for money 
The interviews identified that VfM was not clearly defined in terms of value 
actually received, or what real constitutes VfM. If these values and attributes are 
defined, and consistently applied in the process of identifying VfM, the meaning and 
understanding of VfM would be licit (English, 2006; Teal Consulting, 2008). The 
concept “VfM” is arbitrarily used by governments’ and remains vague (Shaoul 2004; 
2005). Whether VfM relates to investment returns or infrastructure economic 
benefits to society, which is a post-construction metric, is unknown. A classic 
distinction between an infrastructure’s economic desirability and VfM is that;  
infrastructure desirability satisfies the concept of a good project for which no 
resources have been committed, while VfM is the combination of variables, cost 
affordability, effectiveness, and service efficiency compared against infrastructure 
accrued benefits to society to determine VfM. A private sector interviewee said this 
about VfM “The VfM concept is subjective in relation to the assessor’s attributes, 
and ideally refers to allocation and transfer of risks between the entities…the 3Es 
(economy, effectiveness, efficiency) are hardly mentioned as these are post-feasibility 
studies and business case development.” 
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Regardless of the government description of PPP as being enriched with 
economic benefits and value for money to taxpayers (HM Treasury, 2006), it still 
requires categorisation in its application to specific infrastructure types. VfM is 
possible with social infrastructures, because of established client base in providing 
those services to society. Whether, it is right or wrong, economic infrastructures are 
considered as self-funding and that offers VfM to society, as PPP uses the same 
constructed asset towards capital cost recovery (Yescombe, 2007; Engel et al., 2010; 
Stefanova, 2006). An economic infrastructure is capable of producing VfM in the 
long-term, however, procurement of goods and services from the private investor or 
private sector should not simply be summarised as VfM, but such summary should 
be more closely aligned towards infrastructure’s ultimate potentials and benefits to 
society, as well as the satisfaction of the governments’ policy objectives (Erlendsson, 
2002).  
7.4.5 Toll road volume predictions 
Traffic volume predictions and estimation of motorists’ patronage needs to be 
conservative and without bias (Bain 2009; Poole, 2007), which in its analysis should 
give consideration to economic and social changes that influence traffic volume 
numbers (Cuttaree, 2008; Bain, 2010). Interviewees from both sectors doubted the 
analytical skills of these consultants engaged by the sponsors (entities) to perform 
these predictions, as the traffic numbers were unrealistic, manipulated (Hall, 1998; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2009), and designed to attract potential investors on the proviso of 
offering a good investment return. Motorists’ patronage and traffic numbers are 
related to future events, and thus, largely unpredictable because of the economic 
climate and consumer appetite, which change over time (Vassallo et al., 2010; 2012).  
Also, traffic volume prediction is associated with demand risk, and it is futile 
to use traffic volume prediction in order to gain infrastructure approval (Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2009; Reilly, 2004), when the toll road is not commercially viable and there may 
be other competitors along the same PPP toll corridor, as the case of the Airport Link 
Tunnel project (Brisbane).   
7.4.6 PPP social benefits 
The perception of PPP social benefits by the private sector interviewees 
(Watkins, 2005) was seen as being the transfer of resources (capital) from the private 
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investor to the public sector, that conferred benefits to the government of immediate 
public policy execution and improved living conditions to society (Mineta, 2006; 
CEE Bankwatch, 2008). The inclusions of town halls, swimming pools, and bicycle 
ways, were seen as secondary benefits to society at no extra cost to the government. 
Also, upon the collapse of a toll road infrastructure or any other public infrastructure 
under PPP arrangements, the public sector retains the constructed asset, or acquires 
the infrastructure outright at a discounted price, which is at the expense of corporate 
losses (shareholders, contractors) that tend to fulfil political electoral promises and 
government’s infrastructure obligations towards society (Katz, 2006).  
Macroeconomic effects of PPP to society (Banister and Berechman, 2000; 
OECD, 2001), as the result of these public investments (employment opportunities, 
travel time savings, skills transfer) were undiscussed. Based on the interviews, no 
apparent social benefits had been conferred to society by PPP, as capital transfer to 
the public sector was also guaranteed by the government and the underwriter of the 
private investor’s loan from financial institutions, which were cost additions to 
society (Armada et al., 2008, Mason and Baldwin, 1998). 
7.4.7 Government guarantees and financial incentives 
Government guarantees and financial incentives were an important aspect of 
PPP public infrastructure delivery, as confirmed by interviewees from both public 
and private sectors. While government guarantees and incentive packages were 
important to the success of PPP, the opportunity forgone not to pursue other public 
investments should be quantified and valued in monetary terms, which could 
substantially reduce the overall PPP cost to society (Cowan and Mohamed, 2002; 
Campbell and Rozsnyai 2007; Harvey and Green, 1993). The interviews revealed 
that government’s provision of financial guarantees and other incentive packages 
tend to stabilise the financial market confidence (UKNAO, 2009; Blaiklock, 2008; 
Polackova, 1989). However, the problems associated with the packages were the 
non-quantification of the values provided to the private investor relative to the risk 
profile undertaken (Irwin and Mokdad, 2009). In contrast to providing financial 
guarantees and incentive packages to the private investor without equivalent value in 
return, as suggested in the interviews that the sharing of demand risks among the 
entities was more appropriate (Akitoby et al., 2007; Cruz and Marques, 2002; IPA, 
2012), including equity contributions by the government would be a more effective 
 306 Chapter 7:Discussion 
measure to stimulate confidence with financial markets and society (Grad and 
Kenyon, 2013). 
7.4.8 Public interest protection 
Public interest protection was perceived as being largely unsustainable by 
interviewees from both sectors, particularly with economic infrastructures as an 
inclusion of public interest protection could lead to massive public investment 
failures. However, DoT (2011) stated that public interest inclusion within PPP public 
infrastructure delivery would lead to its success, if costs and risks are combined and 
managed simultaneously. Moreover, interpretation of what constitutes public interest 
is vague and could be misused by politicians (Boardman and Vining, 2007) with 
ultimate disregard for public interest at large. Public interest protection 
implementation is expensive and impossible to guarantee at all levels of public sector 
procurements and unsustainable over the passage of time (Partnership Victoria 
Guidelines, 2002).    
 Public interest protection is necessary (UKHLSCEA, 2010), but at what cost 
to society? Neither the financial institutions, nor the private investor are interested to 
include public interest protection as part of public infrastructure delivery. If included, 
possible future compensatory claims could be enormous. However, the public sector 
interviewees confirmed the IAS (2007) report had a component of public interest 
protection in its analyses, and whether the inclusion has persuaded the private 
investor to reconsider its position on public interest protection, is yet to be tested. 
Where public interest protection has been included within PPP delivery, some 
interviewees viewed this as being the result of political pressure in the form of 
performance measures in satisfaction of a particular interest group demand, which 
was supported in the literature (UKNAO, 2009).  
 
7.5 REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES AND INTERVIEW DATA 
There are significant issues raised in the interviews and also found in the case 
studies that require reconsideration of PPP current procurement practices. For 
example, benefits and costs of PPP procurements are mixed, the actual benefits of a 
public infrastructure investment using private investment need to be identified, and 
whether or not there is a real financial return to the investor obviating the need for 
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public borrowing, must be shown (Kristiansen, 2009; Banister and Berechman, 2000; 
Grennes and Strazds, 2012).  
The concept of VfM is seen in some of the literature and amongst some 
interviewees as possessing definitional problems that ignore certain costs (political 
cost) in preference to the illustration of PPP procurement benefits (Demirag, 2008; 
Erlendsson, 2002; Heald, 2003; HM Treasury, 2006; UKNAO, 2003), as there are 
various definitions of VfM without a consensus. In addition, the use of CBA and 
PSC in their present formats, as the major evaluation method for public infrastructure 
investments is inadequate, and at times, appears only useful to support or reconfirm 
government objectives (ADB, 2006, HM Treasury, The Green Book, 2003; NPPPG, 
2008, OECD, 2001). However, these evaluation tools are seen to be useful in 
providing a benchmark of basic information for investment decisions (Conway, 
2009; Gaffey, 2010). However, this research proposes additional evaluation layer as 
framework, which could supplement the basic PSC and CBA methods by including 
infrastructure effects and impacts to society.  
Government guarantees and other financial incentives are controversial, and do 
not guarantee infrastructure success (Blaiklock, 2008, UKNOA, 2009). The 
provision of guarantees to the private investor’s loan from financial institutions is 
additional costs to society, which needs to be quantified in monetary value and used 
against PPP cost reduction to society. However, the measurement of benefits and 
costs of PPP procurement to society is difficult (Bentz et al., 2004), as realisation of 
such benefits and costs are protracted, including their impacts and effects on the 
economy (Banister and Berechman, 2000). Risk analysis is weak (Shaoul, 2005, 
UKHLSCEA, 2010, Cuttaree, 2008), in particular, with road transport infrastructure 
(Bekefi et al., 2003; Weisbrod et al., 2001). The non-upfront payment of the PPP 
concept, is overloading the public investment with much debt, which has a balance 
sheet implication for the government and less than impressive public policy to tout, 
because the beneficiaries (financial institution, private investor) would prefer a 
longer term debt structure to maximise profit (Blaiklock, 2008; UKNAO, 2009). 
Demand risk allocated to the private investor has not helped the success of 
economic infrastructures; rather, it has led to the collapse of several PPP public 
infrastructure deliveries, especially road transport that uses traffic volume numbers 
for capital cost recovery. PPP collapse (road transport) is not engineering related 
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issue, rather financial. The government as the services purchaser, also responsible for 
public investments decisions, should rethink the strategy of allocating demand risk to 
the investor. The public sector investments are capital intensive projects and will be a 
huge waste of effort and resources if allowed by the government to collapse. Perhaps, 
the government should implore its moral responsibility to society as the basis of 
supporting PPP public infrastructure procurements, and being core government 
responsibility with the provision of public goods and services to society (Heald, 
2002; OECD, 2001). 
7.5.1 Other improved suggestions for PPP 
Other issues exposed by this research identified that the collaborative effort 
within the PPP environment, and current approaches to risk allocation and transfer, 
have inadequately served the purpose of partnership (Besley and Ghatak, 2001; IPA, 
2007). PPP public infrastructure delivery is presumed by society to be funded 
entirely by the private investor based on the concept of non-upfront payment, which 
are basically referred as PPP benefits to society are based on incomplete data (Irwin, 
2004; Vining and Boardman, 2008). 
What makes PPP interesting is the obscuring of costs that are paramount to the 
infrastructure survival (NPPPG, 2008); such as affordability and demand risk that 
depend on future events (Eurostat, 2004; Gaffey, 2010; PAEC, 2006).In Australia, 
PPP economic infrastructures (CLEM7, Airport Link Tunnel, Sydney Lane Cove, 
Melbourne M5, and M7) has in recent times, left a bad financial impression on 
society and many other stakeholders involved in these projects (Grad and Kenyon, 
2013), because their long-term financial affordability were inadequately considered.  
 
7.5.2 Alternative evaluation method 
The public sector comparator (PSC) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) used as 
evaluative tools are potentially limited in their capacity to include future related 
events, opportunities, effects and impacts of a proposed public infrastructure 
delivery. CBA’s fundamental evaluation (NPV, IRR, and DCF) and assessment of an 
investment decision is nevertheless appreciated, albeit using incomplete data that 
fails to capture future related benefits and costs to society as the result of public 
investments. This research suggests the introduction of other evaluation tools, the 
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multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM,) or multi-criteria analysis (MCA), social 
cost benefit analysis, and sensitivity analysis to strengthen and supplement current 
PSC and CBA analyses.   
As mentioned in the previous sections (literature review), using a combination 
of CBA and MDCM is a more appropriate and preferred assessment methodology for 
evaluating public investment decisions. For example, the UK, Italy, Germany, France 
and the USA are using the combination of CBA and MCDM for public investment 
analyses. The combination of CBA and MCDM is not intended to undermine the 
importance of the private investor return, or the social benefits that accrue to society, 
these are largely determined by infrastructure characteristics and the analytical tools 
used to identify the overall public investment benefits and costs to society (European 
Commission, 1996). Table 2.6 shows evaluation and assessment methods using 
combinations of CBA and MCDM simultaneously. For example, evaluation criteria 
relative to system capabilities and goals, both analytical tools (CBA, MCDM) could 
be used, what separates these analytical tools is their functions as CBA uses 
established benchmark to analyse infrastructure macroeconomic effects, while 
MCDM expands on macroeconomic analysis to include microeconomic analysis of 
quantifiable and unquantifiable nature (financial benefits and non-financial benefits).  
In other words, the findings of this research suggests the inclusion of MCDM 
with the analyses of benefits, costs, effects and impacts of a proposed public 
infrastructure investment, which framework for evaluation and measurement of 
public investments, either conventional or PPP delivery mode, which are difficult to 
evaluate and measure adequately with CBA pre-established benchmark. Table 7.1 
presents a summary of the case studies and interview key terms and concepts.  
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Table 7.1: Summary of case studies and interview data main issues 
Issues Case studies Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benefits  
Benefits identified through business case 
development and feasibility study are not 
immediate, but could diminish with the 
passage of time. 
 
Benefits and costs of PPP procurement are 
unidentified, quantified and measured 
inadequately, as these benefits and costs 
are protracted. 
 
Most benefits and costs are identified 
through CBA analysis based on the 
investment returns, which ignores social 
benefits returns to society.   
 
Benefits to the private investor 
(investment opportunities) are ignored.  
 
Political benefits and immediate public 
policy implementation are PPP benefits to 
the government and society. 
The immediate and long-term 
economic and social benefits of PPP 
to society are protracted.  
 
Governments’ reports through 
business case development and 
feasibility study are weak when 
identifying the economic benefits 
associated with the public sector 
investments.  
 
The non-upfront payment of a public 
infrastructure investment obviates the 
need for public’s borrowing, which is 
a benefit to the government and 
society.  
 
Capital transfer from the private 
investor to the public sector is a 
benefit, which enables the immediate 
execution of public policies.  
 
Voluntary PPP procurement 
inclusions are secondary benefits at 
no extra cost to the government and 
society.  
 
The bankruptcy of the private 
investor and collapse of the public 
investment are in favour of the 
society that retains the constructed 
asset at the expense of corporate 
losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs 
PPP procurement cost increases with 
additional risk undertaken by the investor. 
 
Initial capital outlays are expensive. 
 
Financial and non-financial incentive 
packages are a diminution of public 
resources. 
 
Government guarantees, contingent 
liabilities, and comfort letters are 
unquantified costs to society. 
 
PPP costs announced and unknown to the 
public are cost estimates based on 
construction, operations and maintenance. 
 
 
Government guarantees and financial 
incentives are an important aspect of 
PPP infrastructure successful 
delivery. 
 
These government guarantees and 
incentive packages are well received 
by financial markets and institutions.  
 
Quantifying government guarantees 
and other incentive packages in 
monetary value could be used to 
reduce PPP costs to society. 
 
Opportunity forgone to pursue other 
public sector investments is a cost 
and   effect on human living 
condition society.  
 
Political costs involuntarily assumed 
by governments needs to be 
quantified as costs to society that 
consumes an amount of resources. 
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Public Sector 
Comparator 
 
PSC analyses with public investments 
leads to VfM determination, no matter the 
conditions of the infrastructure.  
 
PSC is politically guided, and used to 
obtain project approval.  
 
PSC is a useful evaluation tool and 
reasonable benchmark that identifies 
economic benefits and costs which  accrue 
to society and government's risk profile 
 
PSC’s primary objective is to 
determine costs and government’s 
potential risks exposure.  
 
PSC uses a prototype object, a 
miniature in size and fewer 
complexes, incapable of identifying 
future events or unique 
characteristics of the infrastructure.  
 
PSC is limited in capacity to make 
project comparisons, which are 
incomparable. 
 
PSC identification of an 
infrastructure economic benefits and 
costs are based on assumptions. 
 
Protracted benefits, costs, effects and 
impacts, occurring at different times 
during the infrastructure life-cycle 
are ignored by PSC evaluation 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
PPP 
Complexity 
Public sector investments are complex in 
terms of projects size, resources and 
technology.  
 
Consortium internal organisational 
complexities add and prohibit 
transparency. 
 
Government oversight authority interest is 
at odds with the overall infrastructure 
interest. 
 
PPP procurement is complex and 
complicated, involving organisations 
and personnel of various professions 
and skills.  
 
PPP projects to be divided into sub-
projects to enable effective 
management of these activities. 
 
PPP bidding 
process 
PPP attracts fewer bidders, those with 
capacity to fund the investment (invitation 
only). 
 
Insufficient infrastructure to spread 
investor's overheads costs and risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
Measurement 
Measurements of PPP benefits, costs, 
effects and impacts are protracted.  
 
The immediate measurement of the effects 
and impacts on the economy and society is 
mixed and inconclusive. 
 
The interpretations of these variables are 
subjective that depends on the analyst or 
assessor assumptions. 
 
Appropriate benefits and costs 
identification, quantification and 
measurement in monetary value or other 
acceptable measures. 
Infrastructure benefits and costs are 
protracted and difficult to identify, 
quantify, and measure adequately. 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk analysis with PPP public investments 
are not rigorous. 
 
In-depth analyses of other variables 
external to the PPP environment are hardly 
Risk sharing between the entities as 
appropriate towards PPP 
infrastructure performance.  
 
PPP toll road traffic volume 
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The next chapter of this thesis discusses the research findings and conclusions 
 
Risk analysis considered. 
 
Construction, operational, and financial 
risks are predominantly risk analyses 
performed, which excludes the 
components of microeconomic risks 
(noise, dust, ambience, availability).  
 
Allocations and transfers of risks to the 
private investor are neither sufficient nor 
adequate towards risk management and 
mitigation as the result of future 
compensatory claims, which could be 
excessive.  
 
predictions to consider exogenous 
risks and economic changes. 
 
Demand risk to be supplemented 
with government’s equity 
contributions. 
Allocation of risks and transfer to the 
private investor is excessive. 
 
PPP infrastructure is over loaded 
with debt. 
 
 
Conflict of 
interest 
Conflict of interests in terms of 
infrastructure goals and objectives often 
seem to obstruct infrastructure 
performance in particular, when 
infrastructure service objectives are 
undefined or specified.   
 
Public sector infrastructure services 
objective are undefined. 
 
Governments’ attempt to use one 
particular investment to achieve all 
public policy objectives remains 
impossible.     
 
Contract 
clauses 
PPP contract clauses and interpretations 
are subject to litigations and resource 
consuming.  
 
Inclusions of performance  measures 
relative to services quality are contestable 
issues with additional risks  
 
Undefined contract clauses are 
subject to litigation, especially when 
the investor’s action is influence by 
financial institutions.  
 
Some contract clauses are not 
sustainable. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are various reasons for using PPP with the procurement of public 
infrastructures and services. Some of these reasons are attributed to reducing the 
public sector deficit, and utilising private sector innovation and management skills, 
however, the findings of this research suggest that governments’ use of PPP is 
primarily based on budget management prudence (FRA, 1980; NSW FRA, 2005).  
The non-upfront payment of a public infrastructure investment obviates the need for 
public borrowing, which is a benefit to the government and society. UKHLSCEA 
(2010) stated that governments needed to articulate the reasons for PPP, whether the 
use of PPP was associated with additional funding (Mineta, 2006; CEE, Bankwatch, 
2008) or non-upfront payment (Hodge and Greve, 2011). The research findings 
suggest that governments use PPP as means for capital resource transfer from the 
private sector to the public sector that enables immediate execution of public policies 
and alternative procurement mode (Daube et al., 2008; Yescombe, 2007) but is 
insufficient to address the public sector infrastructure challenges, even when 
supported through taxpayers’ financial incentive packages. 
8.1.1 Risk transfer VfM strategy  
PPP is capitally intensive and can therefore be unaffordable, except for a few 
developed economies (Shaoul, 2005), and requires an upfront payment from the 
government (EIB, 2010; BrisConnections, 2008). This was confirmed by an 
investment manager from the private sector who stated (Respondent P9) “the private 
investor is unwilling to commit either cut or uncut liability without the government’s 
finance,” (this refers to the government initial outlay needing to be present, prior to 
the project’s commencement). Demand risk transfer to the private investor is of 
concern to financial institutions, and has often lead to financial failures on the basis 
of capital cost recovery using the user-pay model as the only source for generating 
revenue.  
One of the VfM elements of PPP is the transfer of risk to the private investor 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2007), and as recognised in the case studies and reinforced in 
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the interviews for this research, demand risk transfer to the investor has not always 
been successful in relation to road transport infrastructure. One of the interviewees 
stated “there is no separate cost for transfer of risks to the private investor”, as risks 
needed to be identified before being allocated and transferred (Ng and Loosemore, 
2006; PAEC, 2006; UKHLSCEA, 2010). In other words, the complexity of public 
infrastructure investment inhibits the transfer of risks to the private investor (Adams, 
2008; Dekker et al., 2003; UKNAO, 2009), as certain risks are external and beyond 
the control of the entities (economic, social). As risks transferred to the private 
investor are considered VfM to the public sector, there are also un-transferrable risks 
assumed voluntarily by the public sector which often prove to be expensive and have 
a potential for unlimited future compensatory claims on society. The findings of this 
research suggest that risks transferred to the private investor are those related to 
infrastructure design, construction, operation and maintenance, where concessional 
lease contracts exist as revealed with the case studies and interviews, and where it 
was never intended by government to use PPP as an end itself to risk management, 
but only to transfer those risks which the private sector is better equipped to handle 
(UKHCTC, 2010).  
8.1.2 Economic infrastructure perception   
Often the choice to use PPP by governments globally relates to the provision of  
economic (infrastructure), which is regarded as self-funding with little imposition of 
user-pay-charges (Minnesota DoT, 2007) that focuses on economic benefits and 
provision of VfM, but with little consideration of other risks (PAEC, 2006). The 
business case development, PSC, and CBA, which are the government’s analytical 
tools, tend to concentrate on infrastructure economic benefits and investment returns 
(Quiggin, 2004; Cruz and Marques, 2012). Unfortunately, these tools are not fully 
adequate for replicating the values identified due to their limited capacity. In other 
words, economic benefits and values are based on the assumptions, perceptions, and 
speculations of the assessors and appear to be directed more at attracting potential 
investors than giving an accurate prediction of real costs and benefits (Baxandall, 
2009; Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). VfM is a controversial concept as identified in certain 
streams of the literature (Heald, 2003; Cruz and Marques, 2013; Demirag, 2008; 
English, 2006; UKNAO, 2003; HM Treasury, 2006) and by the interviewees, 
because as yet there are no universal criteria or established benchmarks to measure 
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the effects and impacts of VfM on society. The UK House of Lords investigation of 
PPP, in conjunction with the UK National Audit Office (UKHCTC, 2010, pp. 41), 
produced a report that raised doubts about the use of VfM financial assessment 
model and as noted by UKNAO, “we have yet to come across robust costs analysis 
between procurement routes, that tests the assumptions of costs efficiency set out in 
business cases.” Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) stated that VfM included an 
element of judgement on the part of the government, both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects. As such, there is no precise indicator to measure VfM, or VfM does not 
exist. Moreover, government’s definition of VfM is within the judgements of what is 
being considered as an optimal combination of quantity, quality, features, and price 
(i.e. costs) and expected outcomes, which is not always calculated over the whole-
life of a project (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011). VfM is an intangible object, 
which can only be measured through satisfaction derived from services quality (post-
construction), and not necessarily with monetary measurements such as expenditure 
and rate of returns.  
The interview findings grouped VfM into “value received” and “pure value for 
money”, which possibly provides a better comprehension of VfM. “Value for 
money” is the normal preconceived public idea of PPP, offering benefits (VfM) over 
other conventional methods of managing infrastructure procurement effectively. 
While “value received”, is supposed to represent infrastructure services quality in 
terms of satisfaction derived by the end user. But the fact is that both pure value for 
money and value received from PPP public infrastructure are yet to be experienced 
by society, as the concessional arrangement (30 to 40 years) has not yet expired and 
possibly this protracted consideration of costs and benefits from PPP is not well 
understood by the public.  
8.1.3 Evaluation and measurement of PPP benefits and costs   
PPP economic infrastructures such as toll roads are risk predisposed 
investments and easily affected by economic and social changes. The perception of 
PPP economic infrastructure ultimately confers VfM somehow negates the human 
factor or other intangibles that influence the outcomes of infrastructure performance. 
Whether VfM is identified through the use of CBA or PSC matters little, as although 
these analytical tools have been recognised for providing the fundamental 
information for an investment decision, assumptions and speculations based on the 
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data used to provide the basic or fundamental information may be inaccurate when 
producing VfM (Bentz et al., 2004; Gausch, 2002; Taylor and Chinowsky, 2010). 
Additionally, if the information used by CBA and PSC is incomplete, it can hardly 
be said to represent the size, complexity of, or the overall risks associated with, any 
particular infrastructure project. PSC can be manipulated, imaginative, and often 
project samples used in the cost estimates comparison are small and unrepresentative 
of the size of the proposed public investment (Heald, 2003; Pollack et al., 2003). 
CBA is commercially oriented and focuses on infrastructure benefits and investment 
returns by discounting future investment returns into the net present values (NPV), 
and could serve to the best interests of all entities, if combinations of analytical tools 
(such as CBA, SCBA, RBA, MCDM and Sensitivity Test) are used.  
One of the questions posed in this research was, “Are there other alternative 
measurements that are appropriate and socially acceptable to measure the benefits 
and costs of PPP to society”. The research findings suggest that there is an 
opportunity for a better measurement of benefits and costs of PPP procurement, but 
which are not monetary value related. For example, The Green book (2003) 
suggested the use of surveys, questionnaires and interviews where monetary value is 
unavailable to measure the benefits and costs associated with a particular program, 
such tools would ascertain measures such as affordability, improved services, travel 
time savings etc. As posited by other authors and supported in this research, MCDM 
as an analytical tool uses the CBA basic analysis that combines monetary and non-
monetary values, to produce alternative procurement options through allocation of 
weighted criteria to financial and non-financial benefits and public investment. But 
these have proven to be sophisticated and complex evaluations that consider future 
related infrastructure benefits and costs to society as MCDM methods (SAW, 
TOPSIS, and AHP) are specifically developed for multi-criteria decision problem 
solution (Janic and Reggiani, 2002; Yoon, 1981; Saaty, 1980; Zanakis et al., 1998).
  
8.1.4 Improvements to PPP procurement   
 Other findings of this research relate to the improvement of private sector 
participation in the delivery of public goods and services and would suggest a critical 
rethinking of the driving factors behind PPP procurement methodology. VfM as the 
driver for the use of PPP seems to be a limiting factor by concentrating on the basis 
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that the value is captured at the early stages of the evaluation, while the problem 
remains in identifying solutions for keeping those identified values sustainable in the 
longer term. Also, while risk transfer to the private investor is the primary objective 
of developmental projects, it has not been optimally, or in some cases, appropriately 
priced by the entities, and thus, often places a strain on PPP arrangements, especially 
on toll road infrastructures that are vulnerable to economic and social changes from 
future unknown events. Governments as the sponsor of PPP and underwriter of the 
private investors’ loans from financial institutions, have to support the success of 
these procurements as a moral responsibility to society. For example, public sector 
road infrastructure projects are based on a wider public planning and participation 
process, being part of the overall network integrated system (Baxandall, 2009), and 
are specific to a particular use. The complexity of these investments, with 
assessments and evaluations that produce economic benefits and VfM, are beyond 
the basic CBA analyses. What is required is an analytical tool with offers the 
potentials for capturing, continuously identifying, and monitoring future additions of 
benefits, costs, effects, and impacts of public investment to society.   
This research has introduced a new measurement framework with additional 
evaluative tools, in the process of identifying intangibles (financial and non-
financial) benefits, costs, and methods of quantifying their relative values and 
extending such analyses into multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) process that 
could lead to the selection of optimal project capable of conferring both economic 
and social benefits to society with attribution and allocation of weights, monetary 
value, and other human aspects of measurement (Mosley, 2001).  
 
Based on the evidence examined, this research proposes that PPP economic 
infrastructure failures, in particular for toll road projects should not be predominantly 
regarded as engineering or technology related, but rather they are due to financial 
failure. The non-upfront payments of PPP public infrastructure investments are 
funded with debt that ultimately exerts pressure on the investor. Governments as part 
of the partnership should consider equity contributions, or the delivery of progressive 
payments, towards the reduction of financial pressure on the private investor.  The 
conventional user-pay model of PPP toll road is rapidly changing, and governments’ 
should consider the combinations of shadowing toll and availability payments 
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coming more into play. For example, the Victoria Government (Australia) has 
adopted an availability payment system for its Peninsular Link Road project. The 
benefit of which is to reduce financial pressure on the private investor, as well as 
government reducing the unquantified financial incentives packages provision to the 
private investor. While the collapse of Brisbane ALT is basically one of financial 
failure and inadequate traffic forecast (that has attracted widespread public anger) 
(Grad and Kenyon, 2013), the comments of AG Hochtief, chairman of Leighton 
Holdings Group capture more directly the impact of the failure of the overall risk 
procurement strategy on the company’s financial fortune by stating; “It is unlikely 
for the subsidiary Leighton Holdings Group to be involved in Australia future toll 
projects, unless the risk is equally shared with the public sector,” (Grad and Kenyon, 
2013). Pronouncements such as this indicate that in future, the user-pay model of toll 
roads may no longer be so attractive to many private investors. 
   
8.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
This research focused on infrastructure risk allocation and transfer, PPP 
economic benefits and VfM, social effects of PPP to society, PSC assessment and 
evaluation methods, and PPP funding arrangements and ways to improve current 
PPP procurement practices. The notion of risks allocation and transfer to the private 
investor as perpetuated in PPP is identified as pertaining to those operational and 
construction risks that form part of the overall infrastructure risks that the private 
investor is equipped to manage successfully as assigned within the contract.  
The research findings have indicated that sharing of infrastructure risks among 
the entities is more appropriate and effective strategy to be applied than risk 
allocation and transfer to the private investor. This is particularly so in relation to 
those risks associated with demand and patronage, which are beyond the control of 
the entities, and to the provision of benefits, and the outcomes of effects and impacts 
of the investment, which may be protracted and also have a potential for 
compensatory claims. If risks associated with PPP public investment are identified 
and quantified appropriately, perhaps the unwarranted financial pressure on entities 
to report, or even falsify, unreasonable traffic volume numbers will be reduced.     
  
Chapter 8:Conclusions 319 
Additionally, the primary objectives of partnership based on the fundamental 
principles of sharing of profits (revenues, benefits) and losses (risks, costs) among 
the partners is yet to be implemented in PPP environment. For example, the fact that 
the government voluntarily assumes some risks (political, legal, regulatory, 
stakeholders) does not make it right, the fact that this remains unrecognised and 
unrewarded by the private investor happens to continually underestimate the cost of 
PPP to society. There remains a dichotomy of interests in the realm of PPP 
procurement preference, where the private investor acts based on the dictates of 
financial institutions and shareholders and governments strive to remain politically 
relevant, is seen not to be acting in the best interests of society. In other words, PPP 
is structured on the premise of conflicting interests with divisive objectives, entities 
being unable to agree on some of the contract clauses and terminologies or the rights 
and obligations of each entity as stated in the contract.   
This research suggests an even more proactive participation by governments 
within PPP procurement, with increased financial guarantees and packages, in line 
with the primary obligation to society of the provision of goods and services. 
Another implication of this research is the suggestion of rethinking the use of PPP as 
the solution for all public infrastructure challenges and promising delivery of 
economic benefits and VfM enriched in all projects. This research suggests that VfM 
is a combination of many other factors, measurable and intangible objects, and one 
which makes it difficult to establish when value is realised or how much is achieved. 
In addition, PPP economic benefits to society and VfM of public investment are a 
preconceived assumption within the early feasibility study and business case 
development, using PSC and CBA techniques. Therefore, the economic benefits and 
VfM identified with these analytical tools is questioned, in particular, when these 
benefits and VfM cannot be replicated, or the benefits accuracy guaranteed 
(underwritten) by any of the infrastructure proponents. Moreover, economic benefits 
and VfM are as the result of public investment, which should consider equally the 
effects, and impacts components of the procurement (future opportunities, benefits, 
costs, effects and impacts).   
There are some definitional deficiencies within the PPP methodology, such as 
VfM, availability, ambience, capability and self-funding. For example, the concept 
that non-upfront payment would be regarded as “upon project completion” is not 
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wholly true. This is one of those undefined and vague terminologies used by PPP that 
facilitates failure. The government is required to establish loan repayment schedules 
on the loan’s principal and interest (accrued), as the loan attracts an immediate 
payment from financial institution and reinforced by one of the private sector 
interviewees of unwillingness of the investor to commit financially without 
government available resources. In other words, the concept of non-upfront payment 
is misleading and perception held within society that PPP is whole funded by the 
private investor. Irwin (2004) argued that the fiscal effect on deferring government 
payments had a direct consequence and impact on the net worth of the government. 
Polackova (1989) argued that financial institutions did not require governments 
consolidated statements to determine their financial exposure; this would be achieved 
through a thorough examination of their various financial commitments. Government 
guaranteeing of the private investor’s loan from financial institutions and comfort 
letters actually represent financial exposures, or possibly even contingent liability. 
So, if the private investor declares bankruptcy, the debt lenders (banks) will be the 
beneficiaries of these government guarantees and comfort letters (UKNAO, 2009). 
This research suggests that services availability payments, which are common 
with social infrastructure payments (schools, hospitals, courts), are still desirable for 
economic infrastructures. The fact that Peninsular Link Road in Victoria (Australia) 
and the Hungary M5 Toll Road (European Commission, 2004) have used services 
payments combined with PPP payments, mean that this is a proven, feasible and 
innovative way to manage public debt. Government’s provision of guarantees to 
financial institutions on behalf of the private investor is seen as inappropriate in this 
research, a possible value in exchange (cost reduction) should be received, because 
the private investor is perfectly capable of protecting its commercial interest 
effectively in any case. In addition, a change should be made in PPP arrangements 
based on affordability of the services and provided through government’s budget 
appropriation to avoid obscuring public debt. The fact that PPP offerings appear 
attractive is a view that requires caution, in particular for those economic 
infrastructures branded as self-funding with little imposition of a user charge, as time 
and again these have not proven to be successful and are incapable of achieving the 
primary services objectives. However, it is suggested that government’s equity 
contributions could be appropriate in reducing PPP economic infrastructure 
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collapses, and would reinforce the fact that uncommercial and unviable infrastructure 
cannot be turned into a success.  
This research identified invisible influences not contemplated during 
assessment and evaluation of a proposed infrastructure, such as changes in human 
appetite (e.g., preference for other existing modes of transport), which are capable of 
influencing predicted traffic volume outcomes. Cuttaree (2008) stated that PPP toll 
roads have had issues with plummeting traffic volumes and patronage, which were 
not considered prior to the projects approval; examples provided are the Mexico Toll 
Road, Thailand Don Muang Tollway and Hungary’s M1-M15 Toll Motorway 
Project. In Queensland, the CLEM 7 and the Airport Link Tunnels are no different, 
surrounded by free arterial roads that pose an obvious threat to the patronage of these 
tunnels. Therefore, PPP toll road investment requires extensive research to identify 
potential impediments to investment success. In Queensland, self-funding 
infrastructure that uses toll charges to recover capital costs has not been effective, 
because of more anti-toll resistance by motorists in SEQ than any other state in 
Australia (TransApex, 2005).  
Apart from tax benefits and custom duties that are considered speculative in 
any case, monetary support provided to the private investor must be limited to a 
certain threshold, beyond which a project is no longer deemed beneficial to society. 
Government’s financial incentives i.e., the provision of taxpayer resources to the 
private investor, are flawed in that they are in fact given in exchange for nothing, but 
should be used to reducing PPP overall cost to society. These financial incentives 
could improve the public sector financial performance, if they are planned and 
managed more appropriately (Klein, 1997). The provision of financial incentive 
packages was regarded as compensation to the private investor for the risks 
undertaken, which government agencies were unwilling to consider, but as this 
research has shown, these are inappropriate if their values are undetermined.  
Other suggestions from this research are that the details and amount of 
economic benefits and VfM of PPP are better publicised in an accurate manner, 
because the concept is largely unknown (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011), or 
misunderstood by society. For example, a public infrastructure delivery is linked to 
outcomes in terms of quality of services obtained or satisfaction derived from using 
the infrastructure. A public infrastructure investment should be evaluated based on 
 322 Chapter 8:Conclusions 
its social benefits to society, rather than economic benefits and VfM. Besides, PPP 
procurements effects and impacts could be either immediate (insufficient revenue or 
collapse) or protracted, while economic benefits are investment returns or profits to 
the private investor and of immediate effect. Therefore, in order for PPP to really 
prove it-self to be a good procurement concept it requires effective communication to 
society, and not generalisation of the terms (economic benefits, VfM) without 
differentiating their meanings.    
8.2.1 Future research 
This research has used a literature review, case studies and interviews to 
investigate the benefits and costs of PPP to society. In so doing, this research has 
identified areas for further investigation as follows:  
 The reframing of PPP business case development and feasibility 
studies, with the possibility of including future benefits, costs, and 
opportunities associated with PPP public investments.  
 Risk sharing opportunities and government’s equity contribution in PPP 
procurements.  
 The public sector services payment affordability and long-term 
sustainability without using the non-upfront payment of PPP current 
practice. 
 Evaluating government financial incentive packages and guarantees to 
the private investor and their effects on society resources.  
 Evaluation and measurement of PPP public investments benefits, costs, 
effects and impacts to society, testing the framework proposed by this 
research (CBA, MCDM, SCBA, RBA). 
 
In addition, the possibility of further research on toll road traffic volume 
predictions and motorist patronage through posing questions such as, “what causes 
the collapse of PPP toll roads and motorists preference to use existing arterial 
roads?” and “Is motorists’ patronage influenced by economic changes and increases 
in household incomes, or purely, social changes in human appetite that analysts have 
ignored with traffic volume predictions?” Research in this area could possibly 
identify ways of reducing PPP preconceptions on self-funding infrastructures 
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(economic) with little imposition of toll charges, as their successes have been marred 
by controversies with varying interpretations.  
 
8.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This research investigation is primarily focused on PPP public infrastructure 
delivery, in particular, the transportation network (transport construction), which is 
referred to as economic infrastructure, or structures for economic activities 
(Jochimsen, 1996). The provision of road transport networks are primarily 
considered governments’ traditional role and part of its obligations to provide goods 
and services to society.     
This research has offered an evaluative perception on issues underlying the 
public sector infrastructure procurement by using the Airport Link Tunnel case study 
in Queensland, which was recently completed, and the London Underground 
Rehabilitation and Restoration program (United Kingdom) that were PPP related 
activities. In addition, PPP practitioners and investors from the public and private 
sectors were interviewed about PPP arrangements with the observation of some PPP 
contracts in parts, to authenticate the primary objectives of this research.  
There were some logistics problems with interviewees from inter states 
(Melbourne, Sydney) that could not be interviewed face-to-face, but through 
telephone was time consuming. Also, the Airport Link Tunnel was an on-going 
construction during the research and respondents on the project’s environmental 
effects were apathetic that limited the number of responses. The ALT financial 
arrangement from the services provider was concealed and undiscussed with the 
organisation. Access to the services provider documents were limited, no document 
was allowed to be photo-copied.  This limitation prohibited the opportunity to report 
the actual funding arrangements of PPP procurement between the entities. 
 
8.4 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
This research investigated the benefits and costs of PPP public infrastructure 
delivery to society and individuals that are of immediate and protracted consequence. 
The findings of the research tend to suggest that PPP is yet to confer economic 
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benefits or VfM to society as prescribed in published PPP objectives. While capital 
transfer from the private investor to the public sector is considered VfM that in turn 
enables the immediate execution of public policies, the public sector is also the 
guarantor and underwriter of the capital resources (loan) transferred by the private 
investor from financial institutions, which makes the public sector liable upon the 
private investor defaulting.  
In addition, using PSC and CBA as analytical tools leads to the determinations 
of VfM that are actually inappropriate, as data required to make such decision were 
either unavailable or incomplete, as the information sought needs to be related to 
future economic and social changes with potential to influence public investment 
outcomes.  PPP evaluation and measurement of economic benefits and VfM were 
attributed with monetary values that contradict the findings of this research, as these 
benefits, costs, effect, and impacts were immeasurable, protracted and sporadic when 
based on measurements from use of CBA or PSC. With proposed framework 
emanating from this research, which suggests the addition of MCDM to expand on 
CBA evaluations and measurements, at least, benefits and costs of monetary values 
and NFBs will be identified to their greatest possible extent, which could lead to a 
better understanding of infrastructure benefits and costs to society.    
PPP success depends on governments’ supporting schemes with equity 
contributions as a true ‘partner’. The provision of financial incentives packages and 
guarantee of the private investors’ loans from financial institutions has clearly from 
the evidence presented, been unsuccessful. Rather, governments’ support for PPP 
should be based on moral reasons, i.e., the responsibility that governments owe to 
society. Also, risk allocation and transfer to the private investor is not the ultimate 
objective of PPP, but only those risks that the private investor is equipped to manage 
effectively should be passed over. Clearly, there are always going to be risks beyond 
the control and external to the entities, which are voluntarily undertaken by the 
public sector and should be identified and quantified in monetary values or other 
acceptable metric measurement such as those that MCDM considers as being 
monetary, non-monetary, and identifies as other intangibles associated with the 
public sector investment.  
This research concludes that PPP collaborative arrangements based on current 
procurement practices are yet to confer proven economic benefits to society, 
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especially, PPP toll road infrastructures with long-term lease arrangements. PPP 
benefits, costs, effects, and impacts to society, on many recent and some longer 
completed projects are yet to occur, due to the fact that many of these attributes are 
sporadic and protracted and in many ways immeasurable.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of PPP failed projects in developed countries 
Project Name   Contrac
t 
Country  Comments/Reason 
Abbottsford 
Regional Hospital 
and Cancer Centre 
 
 35yrs British-
Colombia 
Canada 
Flawed: Cost overruns and 
delays. Construction costs 
increased from $210 million to 
$355 million; annual operating 
costs from $20 million to $41 
million. 
Accenture 
Ministry of Social 
Services Business 
Transformation 
Project 
PPP Ontario - 
Canada  
Flawed: Cost overruns, technical 
problems and inflexible. Project 
cost from $184 million to $284 
million. In 2004, 10 million was 
required to fix the technical 
problem and $7 million to test. 
Actual cost to taxpayers 
$500,000 million. 
BC Medical 
Services Plan and 
Pharm-Care   
PPP British-
Colombia  
Canada 
Flawed: Inadequate risk transfer, 
concerns over privacy of 
information. 
Bruce Nuclear P3, 
ON. Flawed. 
PPP Ontario - 
Canada 
Flawed: High costs and poor 
risk transfer. Bruce Power, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of 
British Energy, 
announced an agreement with 
Ontario Power Generation to 
lease 
and operate the Bruce “A” and 
“B” nuclear generating stations 
until 2018, with an option to 
lease for another 25 years. 
Waste management, disposal 
and decommission was $7.5 
billion; initial Bruce Power lease 
payment was $650 million and 
annual rent revenue of $150 
million. British Energy went 
bankrupt and sold its stake 
82.4% to Bruce Power. 
Calgary Southeast 
Hospital  Alta 
PPP Calgary - 
Canada 
Abandoned: “Much more 
complex than an office building. 
Calgary Court 
House Alta. 
 
PPP Calgary - 
Canada 
Failed: costs up by 66%; from 
300 million to 500 million, 
design flaws, filled the needs of 
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the developer, not the court. 
Charleswood 
Bridge Winnipeg 
. 
PPP Man - Canada Flawed: High costs. Contract 
totalling $11.6 million, the 
Bridge was found to have cost 
taxpayers $1.4 million more 
than if the bridge was built 
publicly. 
Coquihalla 
Highway  
 
PPP British-
Colombia  
Canada 
Abandoned: High costs and poor 
accountability. The provincial 
government cancelled the plans 
to privatize the interior toll 
highway under a 30 year 
contract after massive public 
opposition and concerns of 
increased costs and lack of 
accountability. 
Confederation 
Bridge. 
 
35 
years 
Canada Flawed: High costs. Canada’s 
Auditor General found the 
bridge cost $45 million more 
than to taxpayers than the bridge 
built publicly. Toll charge 
increased to $8.00 per car in the 
first of operation. 
Cranbrook Civic 
Arena 
PPP British-
Colombia  
Canada 
Failed: Delays, cost overruns, 
and legal disputes. The private 
sector operator paid the City of 
Cranbrook$1.7 million to 
resume ownership and operation 
of the facility. 
Duke Point Hydro 
Nanaimo, 
 
PPP British-
Colombia  
Canada 
Flawed: High costs and 
inflexible. The contract raises 
the possibility of high fuel costs 
and low power utilisation from 
the plant will make it 
horrendously expensive. 
Edmonton Grocery 
Store High 
School Alta 
 
PPP Calgary-
Canada  
Failed: disputes over regulation. 
The school board contributed 
$12.6 million it had received 
from the province and the 
grocery chain would contribute 
$3.2 million, leasing space in the 
building from the school board. 
The project developers violated 
a requirement to hand over 10 
per % of land with any new 
housing project for future 
schools and parks. 
Evergreen Park 
School, NB. 
 
25 
years 
Canada Flawed: High costs.  A long 
term care facility would cost $14 
million more than when the 
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facility is publicly built and 
$110,000 more per bed than 
when the facility is managed 
publicly.  
 Foyer Saint-
Charles Long 
Term 
Care Home. 
 
PPP  Quebec City  
  Canada 
Flawed: High cost and poor 
accountability. Primary concerns 
included the threat of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 State-Investor 
Clause trade suits. 
Greater Vancouver 
Regional District 
Seymour Water 
Filtration Plant 
 
PPP Vancouver 
Canada 
Abandoned: High costs and poor 
accountability. Primary concerns 
included the threat of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 State-Investor 
Clause trade suits. 
Greater Vancouver 
Transit Authority 
Rapid Transit  
 
PPP Vancouver 
Canada 
Flawed: High cost and 
inadequate risk transfer. The 
contract includes a guarantee to 
the consortium  to be paid on the 
basis of 100,000  riders per day, 
while the number of riders were 
40,000 on the three parallel bus 
routes serving Richmond-
Vancouver 
Hamilton 
Entertainment & 
Convention 
Facility Inc. 
PPP Ontario 
Canada  
Abandoned: inflexible, reduced 
community access 
 
Hamilton-
Wentworth Water 
& Wastewater 
Treatment  
 
10 
years 
Ontario 
Canada 
Abandoned: Maintenance 
problems, legal disputes, high 
costs, and poor risk transfer. 
Contract signed in 1994 for 
$187 million with Philip 
Utilities Management Corp. 
Ownership changed four; 
ultimately leaving Hamilton’s 
water in the hands of American 
Water Services Canada Corp. 
Project abandoned and the water 
and wastewater systems were re-
publicized. 
Halifax School 
NS.  
PPP  Flawed: High costs, legal 
disputes, and poor risk transfer. 
Arsenic found in school water, 
the school board and consortium 
were embroiled in legal 
wrangling for over a year to 
determine which would pay the 
costs of fixing the water system. 
Highway 407  99 
years 
Ontario-
Canada 
Flawed: High costs, legal 
disputes, and loss of public 
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control. Plagued with legal 
wrangling over toll hikes and 
control. Toll charge increased by 
35 % since 1997 for off-peak 
motorist and 50% for peak hour 
motorists. 
Long term care 
facilities, 13,000 
Private beds.  
 
20 
years 
Ontario-
Canada 
Flawed: High cost and public 
ownership lost. The Province 
will pay $10.35 per bed per day 
for 20 years for the capital 
portion of the costs. At the 
expiration of the contract $900 
million is paid for beds. In 2020 
at the expiration of the contract, 
Ontario is without beds for the 
facility, because the bed belongs 
to the consortium. 
Maple Ridge 
Downtown 
Redevelopment  
50 
years 
British 
Colombia 
Canada 
Abandoned: High costs and 
legal disputes. BC Supreme 
court ruled that the downtown 
redevelopment contract signed 
was illegal. 
Deliberately designed to favour 
PPP over traditional public 
procurement 
Nelson Recreation 
Complex  
PPP British 
Colombia 
Canada 
Abandoned: High costs. $19 
million project received three 
bidders from the private sector. 
The municipal rejected the offer.  
24. - 54. Nova 
Scotia Schools 
(30) 
20 – 35 
years 
 Cancelled: High costs, 
insufficient risk transfer, poorly 
negotiated, and public scandal. 
Complicated contract with no 
risk allocated (operating costs, 
capital improvements, 
technology upgrades). The 
private investor exempted from 
any financial penalty and faulty 
construction.  
 At the lease expiration, the 
public have to pay again and 
buy back the schools from the 
consortia. 
PEI Hospital  PPP  Abandoned: High costs and 
public outcry. A report showing 
the hospital privatization would 
cost more to taxpayers than 
when built conventionally.  
Port Alberni Civic 
Arena. 
PPP British 
Colombia 
Abandoned: high costs; project 
abandoned because the sponsors 
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Canada realised that taxpayers would 
achieve minimum benefits.  
Opted for a public procurement 
instead. 
Royal Ottawa 
Hospital  
 
PPP Ontario 
Canada 
Flawed: high costs, secrecy, bed 
cuts. Poor negotiation of the 
lease agreement, costs for the 
hospital increased from $100 - 
$120 million. Despite the costs, 
the new hospital will have fewer 
beds than the hospital it 
replaces.  The contract 
stipulating that public lands 
surrounding the hospital be 
managed by the private 
developer for 66 years. 
Swan Hills Waste 
Management 
Facility, Alta. 
 
12 
years 
Calgary 
Canada 
Abandoned: High costs, 
contamination, and poor risk 
transfer. The waste plant cost 
taxpayers $440 million to 
operate and will cost taxpayers 
millions more to clean up the 
contaminated site.  
St. Albert 
recreational 
facility Alta 
PPP Calgary 
Canada 
Abandoned: high costs. The 
project was found to be good 
and beneficial to the private 
investor and beyond the City 
Council’s budget.  
Timmins and 
District Dialysis 
Centre  
PPP Ontario 
Canada 
Failed: no bidders interested. 
The northern community is 
small and unattractive to the for-
profit companies (private 
investors). 
Vancouver Trade 
and Convention 
Centre  
PPP Vancouver 
Canada 
Failed: inadequate risk transfer. 
The private investor was unable 
to secure adequate protection 
(risk transfer’) for its 
investment. 
Victoria Arena & 
Entertainment 
Complex  
PPP British 
Colombia 
Canada 
Flawed: cost overruns, behind 
schedule Plans. The net cost to 
the City Council for six months 
delay was approximately 
$780,000. 
Welland 
Community Centre 
P3, 
 
PPP Ontario 
Canada 
Failed: Project deemed “not 
viable in the PPP format” and 
secrecy. Details of the project 
were secret; the project 
committee compelled to sign 
confidentiality agreements and 
to conduct negotiations entirely 
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in private. Attracted public 
outcry. 
William Osler 
Health Centre 
Brampton  
PPP Ontario 
Canada 
Flawed: Cost overruns, delays 
and secrecy. Hospital costs 
increased from $350 million to 
over $550 million during lease 
negotiation. The new hospital 
size reduced from the original 
plan and hospital opened. The 
private investor higher 
borrowing rate and premium, 
costing $174 million extra more 
than when the hospital is built 
publicly. 
International 
Countries 
   
Channel Tunnel 
Link  
PPP UK Failed. Cost overruns, 
government bailout. The link 
would have cost 1 billion 
pounds, if publicly procured. 
Instead, the private consortium 
was given 5.7 billion pounds 
worth of land and public money 
to cover costs. Later, the 
government bailed the 
consortium by underwriting a 
3.7 billion pound loan to the 
consortium as part of a 5.8 
billion pound re-financing deal. 
Cumberland 
Infirmary Carlisle, 
PPP Carlisle UK Flawed: Poor design, poor risk 
transfer, poorly negotiated deal, 
higher costs. 
Design problems and shoddy 
construction plagued the 
hospital; two ceilings collapsed 
because of cheap plastic joints in 
piping and plumbing faults. The 
sewage system inadequate to 
cope with the number of users 
and flooded the operating 
theatre.  
Dartford and 
Gravesham 
(Darent Valley 
Hospital)  
 
PPP Kent Uk Flawed: High costs, poor 
inspections and cuts to services: 
The private investor refinanced 
the hospital and made 33 million 
pounds in profit. The hospital 
failed inspections for basic 
standards in hygiene, trolley 
waits, cancelled operations and 
breast cancer referrals. Funding 
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for the provision of services 
shifted to the community - 
mental health and learning 
difficulties, and community 
nursing - was withdrawn. 
Edinburgh Royal 
Infirmary  
 
PPP Scotland UK Flawed: Design flaws, land deal 
scandal, poorly negotiated deal, 
high costs, poor value for money 
calculation, cuts to services: 
The hospital was built without 
operating theatre lights. Hospital 
lands in town were sold off in a 
scandal-ridden land deal and the 
hospital was moved to a green 
space outside of town. Capital 
costs as a proportion of total 
income rose from 7% to 14% 
under the PPP. Beds were 
reduced by 24% across the 
health district and Community 
services also reduced. Further 
reductions in community care 
and beds may be necessary to 
meet the financial deficit, 
primarily due to the high costs 
of the P3s in the health district. 
East London and 
City Mental Health 
Trust  
 
PPP East London 
Uk 
Failed: Long delays, serious 
design and construction 
problems, problems in 
relationship between public and 
private sector. The contract did 
not adequately specify the 
obligations of the private 
companies; the architects were 
not paid, did not inspect works 
or certify completion and there 
are no drawings of the final 
buildings; the original design 
provided no office space at all, a 
redesign to 
squeeze in offices is extremely 
poor; floor coverings are 
defective; alarm and call 
systems unreliable; 
emergency systems non-
functional; staff were ill-
informed and alienated; and the 
contractor was deemed 
uncooperative and adversarial. 
Fife Council PPP Scotland UK Failed: company went bankrupt. 
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Schools  
Glasgow Schools  PPP Scotland UK Flawed: High costs, design 
flaws. Worth 160 million 
pounds. The deal has resulted in 
the loss of six swimming pools, 
smaller and fewer 
classrooms, science laboratory 
benches facing walls instead of 
teachers and fewer game halls 
Hereford Hospital  PPP Hereford UK Flawed: High costs and cuts to 
services. Business case planned 
a reduction of 50% in acute beds 
and required increased funding 
and accommodation of 14,000 
bed days in community settings. 
However, the extra non-acute 
resources were not identified in 
the business case. 
La Trobe Hospital 
Victoria, 
 
PPP Victoria 
Australia 
Failed: company sued 
government for inadequate 
profits, government bought back 
the hospital. Under the terms of 
the contract, the consortia had to 
accept public Medicare patients 
without extra-billing. The 
consortia agreed to provide 
services at 96% of the cost for 
public hospitals. The 
government had to buy back the 
hospital from Australian 
Hospital Care in October 2000 
after the consortium lost $10 
million on the La Trobe Hospital 
and announced it was suing the 
government 
Lister Hospital in 
Stevenage 
PPP Lister UK Flawed: Legal disputes. 
“Patients are facing potentially 
dangerous delays in receiving 
test results following the end of 
a P3 in pathology. The problems 
follow the end of a private 
sector contract and return of 
pathology services at the Lister 
Hospital in Stevenage to the 
public sector 
London 
Underground  
 
PPP London UK Flawed: High costs and delays. 
The cost of private finance has 
added 455 million pounds to the 
cost of the project, to be 
financed by ratepayers and 
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London taxpayers. The UKNAO 
found that the costs for the 
contracts rose by 590 million 
pounds through the negotiation 
period. The government agreed 
to cover bidders’ costs 
amounting to 250 million 
pounds. The costs for the public 
side’s consultant fees were 109 
million pounds. 
Modbury Hospital  
 
PPP South 
Australia 
Flawed: Legal disputes. The 
South Australian government 
had to increase its payments 
above the contracted amount 
under threat of default by the 
consortium 
Network Rail  PPP UK Failed: fatal train crash, quality 
problems, high costs, service re-
publicized. 17.6 million pounds 
was paid to Carillion, when 
railway 
Maintenance was re-publicized 
following a spate of quality 
problems and high costs. Potters 
Bar rail crash in 2002 killed 
seven people and injured 76. A 
train derailed at 100 mph. The 
cause was a maintenance failure 
on the track for which P3 
company Jarvis was responsible 
Norfolk Schools 
P3, UK. Failed. 
PPP Norfolk UK Failed: Deal cancelled and risk. 
P3 contract for 6 schools in 
Norfolk collapsed as P3 
company Jarvis, facing financial 
difficulties, was 26 months 
behind schedule and was unable 
to find a local subcontractor 
Norwich and 
Norfolk University 
Hospital  
PPP UK Flawed: Legal disputes and high 
costs. Two “containment rooms” 
that should use a system of 
negative pressure to seal in 
lethal viruses were found to be 
defective. Inquiry launched and 
emerged the management was 
aware of the problem for more 
than two years. Octagon (made 
up of Innisfree, Laing and 
Serco) refinanced the project 
and received a 100 million 
pound windfall. It was intended 
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that the hospital would receive 
at least 30% of “refinancing” 
payouts but the companies 
demanded their 
profits in a lump sum, while the 
hospital trust was awarded a 
reduction in rental costs of 1 
million pounds per year for the 
next thirty years (this falls short 
of the 30%). 
Paddington Health 
Campus London 
PPP Paddington Uk Flawed: Cost overruns from 360 
million to 800 million pounds, 
delays. Costs escalated to 800 
million pounds and were 
expected to increase by another 
200 million. Critics note that the 
hospital costs four times that of 
Portsmouth hospital 
redevelopment which has 100 
more beds. 
Park Prison Wales. PPP Wales UK Flawed: riots, poor management, 
poor design, and labour relations 
problems. Prisoners had to be 
transferred to a publicly-run 
prison. Within a year of 
opening, the consortium 
Securicor was fined 105 
thousand pounds for a series of 
offenses. 
Port Macquarie 
Base  Hospital, 
New South Wales 
 
PPP NSW Australia Flawed: High costs. The State 
Auditor found that the new 
hospital would cost $143 million 
for capital alone- almost three 
times what it would have cost to 
procure in the public sector. 
After 20 years, the government 
would have paid for the hospital 
more than twice over - yet it 
wouldn’t own it. 
Princess Royal 
University 
Hospital Bromley, 
South London.  
 
PPP Bromley UK Flawed: design/construction 
problems, costs. Innisfree Group 
refinanced the hospital less than 
12 months after it opened. 
Innisfree and building group 
Taylor Woodrow, pocketed 43 
million in profits from the deal. 
The hospital has suffered several 
power blackouts and has 
problems with its telephone 
systems 
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Princess Margaret 
Hospital Swindon 
PPP Swindon UK Flawed: Design problems. 
Unnecessarily large deal to 
attract bidders, high costs, and 
poor land deal. Poor design 
means that the recovery room is 
located 80 metres from the 
operating theatre. In order to 
make the scheme more attractive 
for P3 bidders, the plan was 
transformed into an entirely new 
build on a greenfield site out of 
town, releasing the city centre 
site for development by the P3 
consortium. 
Royal Calderdale 
Hospital Halifax, 
West Yorkshire 
 
PPP Halifax UK Flawed: Financial problems, 
design/construction problems. 
Bovis and Lend Lease were the 
developers behind the P3. While 
the hospital is facing financial 
problems, the firms made a 12 
million pound profit from a 
refinancing deal. The hospital 
has been beset with problems 
including power cuts, exploding 
glass awnings and rodent 
infestations. 
Skye Bridge P3, 
Scotland,  
PPP Scotland UK Failed: Government bought back 
the bridge, cost overruns and 
scandal. After 9 of the 33 year 
contract, the private consortium 
had made a profit of 33 million 
pounds. In addition, before the 
bridge was built, the government 
paid 6 million to build approach 
roads, 3 million on consultants 
and land, and 4 million as 
compensation” for construction 
delays (risk supposed to be 
taken on by the private sector). 
The government paid a further 
7.6 million pounds to subsidize 
high tolls for island residents. 
The scheme cost the public 93.6 
million pounds, for abridge that 
cost the consortium 25 million 
pounds to build. 
Tower Hamlet’s 
schools project. 
 
PPP UK Failed: Company went bankrupt. 
Financiers Abbey National 
pulled out of the deal in June 
2004 following the failure of the 
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building company Ballast plc. 
Half-finished schools are now 
the public’s problem as parents 
scrambled to move their 
children to other school rolls. 
Queen Elizabeth 
Hospital P3 in 
Greenwich, South 
London. 
 
PPP Greenwich UK Flawed: High costs and financial 
problems. Four years after the 
93 million pound hospital was 
built, it had to close a ward to 
save money towards its 6 
million pound deficit, adding 
600 more patients to waiting 
lists. 
University 
Hospital North 
Durham.  
PPP Durham UK Flawed: High costs, design 
flaws and financial problems. A 
contract disagreement between 
the public hospital and the 
consortium. The consortium 
claiming that its contractual 
responsibilities did not include 
pottering. The hospital was built 
on a business case that was 
geared to making the P3 
affordable and cut beds. The 
new hospital faced a serious bed 
shortage within the first few 
weeks of opening – in the 
middle of summer. 
University College 
London Hospitals  
 
PPP London Uk Failed/Flawed: High costs, 
design flaws and financial 
problems. The higher cost of 
private finance added an average 
of 39% to the total capital costs 
of the projects in North Durham, 
Carlisle and Worcester. The PFI 
project as its stands fails the 
people of North Durham for the 
foreseeable future.” The 
consortium had failed to act on 
the government’s planning 
advice. The design was 
criticized for having too many 
rooms with no windows, the 
blocks appeared jumbled and ad 
hoc and patients would be 
confused by the complex layout. 
Walsgrave 
Hospital Coventry. 
 
PPP Coventry UK Flawed: High costs, poor land 
deal and service cuts. The town 
council opposed the plan which 
endangered plans to regenerate 
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the city centre. It offered 20 
million and nine acres of 
property to the hospital trust to 
change its mind. The offer was 
refused. A confidential report by 
economists and public health 
experts found that the 
affordability of the P3 project 
was based on a bed cut of 25% 
and a staff cut of 20%. Costs for 
the hospital increased from 174 
million pounds to 311 million 
over the negotiation of the deal. 
West Midland 
Hospital  
PPP West Midland 
UK 
Flawed: High costs. The hospital 
P3 is 22 million pounds more 
expensive than its public sector 
alternative. 
West Middlesex 
Hospital Isleworth, 
West London,  
PPP West London 
UK 
Flawed: Financial problems and 
service cuts. The financial 
model used, overstated the risk 
transfer to the private sector. 
Using the corrected rate, the P3 
was 22 million pounds more 
expensive than its public sector 
comparator. The hospital is 
closing a ward to save 2.5 
million towards its deficit 
Whittington 
Hospital   
PPP Whittington 
UK 
Flawed: Company in financial 
difficulties, delays, company 
paid no compensation. The 
hospital redevelopment was left 
half built when Jarvis ran into 
financial trouble. The company 
abandoned the project and will 
not pay any compensation for 
leaving the project incomplete. 
Worcestershire 
Infirmary 
Worcestershire. 
PPP Worcestershire 
UK 
Flawed: High costs, service cuts 
and poor risk transfer. The 
higher cost of private finance 
added an average of 39% to the 
total capital costs of the projects 
in North Durham, Carlisle and 
Worcestershire. The cost of the 
Worcestershire P3 increased by 
118% over the negotiations for 
the deal, leading to the closure 
of neighbouring Kidderminster 
Hospital’s intensive therapy and 
maternity wards and laminar-
flow theatre which had been 
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opened just three years prior. 
The hospital trust was forced to 
pay a penalty clause of 200,000 
pounds per year to the 
consortium Catalyst due to bed 
occupancy over 90%. 
Source: Author 
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Appendix 2 Case Study Interview Questions 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION for QUT RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
Benefits and effects of Public Private Partnership infrastructure delivery 
on society and individuals 
Research Team Contacts 
 
Charles Adighibe 
PhD Student (the Researcher) 
Phone: 0431 607 862  
Email: c.adighibe@student.qut.edu.au 
Dr Vaughan Coffey  
QUT Principal Supervisor 
Phone: (07) 3138 1002 
Email:v.coffey@qut.edu.au 
  
 
Description 
This interview is undertaken in part fulfilment of the requirements of PhD research 
by Charles Adighibe (the researcher).  
 
The purpose of this interview is to investigate public sector infrastructure 
procurement using public private partnership (PPP); in particular, the research will 
examine the potential social benefits to, and effects of transport motorway 
construction on, society. The researcher requests your valuable assistance in 
responding to the interview questions frankly and in detail where possible. 
Participation 
Your participation in this interview will involve answering face-to-face interview and/or mailed questions and 
is voluntary. If you do initially agree to participate and then subsequently change your 
mind, you can withdraw from participation at any time during the interview process.  
 
Expected benefits 
It is the expectation of the researcher that your assistance with the interview will benefit 
the public sector and the private investor in the future development of improved PPP 
arrangements. More importantly, it is the intended objective that this interview and 
subsequent research outcome will contribute enormously towards the extant literature 
on public sector infrastructure procurement and impact on and benefits to society. 
Confidentiality 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially. The 
names of individual persons are not required in any of the responses nor will any details 
of any individual or organisational respondents be named in the subsequent research 
outputs. 
 
Questions / further information about this research 
Please contact the researcher Charles Adighibe if you need any further explanation 
/information about the interview or the scope of the research. 
 364 Appendices 
 
Concerns / complaints regarding the conduct of the interview 
QUT is committed to research integrity and its ethical conduct towards research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the 
interview, you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Officer on +617 3138 5123 or 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Officer is not connected with the 
research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
 
Please, take a few minutes to read the questions as it will greatly assist you in 
providing responses that will facilitate the researcher in compiling information that 
can be analysed to meet the aims and objectives of the captioned research. 
 
Please, complete the questions as directed. 
Use numbers, tick marks or circles to complete the response where appropriate.  
A short answer expanding your response is required where spaces have been 
provided. 
 
Please, return this interview questions to the following address: 
Charles Adighibe 
School of Urban Development 
Faculty of Built Environment and Engineering 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane (QLD) 4000 
 
If you require additional information, contact details are as follows: 
Telephone:  3224 8419 (work) 
Mobile: 0431 607 862 
Email Address:  c.adighibe@student.qut.edu.au 
 charles.adighibe@ssa.qld.gov.au 
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Interview Questions 
 
Select the description from the following that most closely reflects your current 
position. 
 
Position Title Tick 
Private Sector  - Construction Manager  
Public Sector  - Project Manager  
Infrastructure Consultant/Advisor  
Major Projects Consultant (Public/Private)  
Director of Projects  
Other (please specify)  
 
1). Public-Private-Partnership 
PPP in the procurement of public infrastructure delivery and services is described as 
a ‘vehicle’ that enables governments’ to procure infrastructure without employing 
upfront payments, thus becoming an additional financial resource to the public 
treasury. PPP is defined as a contracting arrangement in which a private party takes 
the responsibility of financing, operation and long-term maintenance on the 
infrastructure, and uses the same infrastructure to provide long-term services to the 
public (Duffield, 2008). 
 
Question 1a:  How successful do you consider PPP to be related to the provision 
of public infrastructures and services to society? 
Question1b:  How effective is the decision of government to use PPP in the 
delivery of public infrastructure? 
 
 
2). Feasibility studies and business case development 
Governments’ consideration of VfM applicable to any infrastructure project at its 
feasibility studies stage, (i.e., before a business case is fully developed or without 
alternative delivery method comparison) creates doubt to how VfM is actually 
demonstrated. HM Treasury (2003) argues that the decision to invest in a particular 
infrastructure should be separated from the decision to undertake a particular 
procurement route, as each procurement route will produce a different outcome 
based on cost of resources, infrastructure complexity and government’s regulatory 
policy in existent.  
 
Question 2a:  How accurate are the government’s feasibility studies and 
business cases used to award PPP contracts; and  
Question 2b:  How efficient and robust are these studies to achieve prompt 
decisions on economic potentials of public infrastructure when considering a 
PPP arrangement 
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3). Value for Money (VfM) 
Value for money (VfM) is defined as the optimum combination of whole life cost 
and quality (fitness for purpose) that satisfies user requirements (HM Treasury, 
2006), and English (2006) defines VFM as achieving the best possible outcome at a 
lower possible price meaning; VfM realisation is dependent upon combinations of 
functions and efforts.  
 
Question: Has PPP delivered VfM to society, either economic or social benefits 
that outweigh the cost of PPP to society? 
 
 
4). Public sector comparator (PSC) 
A public sector comparator (PSC) is defined as a hypothetical estimate, whole-of-life 
costing of a public sector project if delivered by the government (NPPPG, 2008). It is 
a quantitative measurement of monetary value expected by accepting the private 
sector procurement proposal, and in comparison to delivering the same project 
through conventional method.  
 
 Question 4: How effective is the public sector comparator (PSC) as a 
quantitative and comparable measurement tool for the whole-life-costing of 
public sector projects based on monetary valuation (on the immediate and long-
term basis) of economic benefits and social impacts? 
 
 
5). Public Private Partnership as a market product 
One view of PPP as a market product is driven by demand and supply, which is 
offered to the highest bidder and within selective industries and sector in which it 
operates (Kuntton, 2005). The same market system often omits or ignores the 
inclusion of social benefits and effects of PPP activities by underestimating costs and 
values of public infrastructure delivery to society. 
 
Question: How accurate is the market system costing and pricing of public 
infrastructures, including external long-term effects and impacts of PPP 
delivery on society? 
 
 
6). Public Private Partnerships social benefits and costs 
Social benefit is defined as the sum of private and external benefits to individuals in 
society, regardless of who pays and produces these benefits, or whether the 
beneficiaries are involved in determining how much benefit will be produced. Social 
costs are the sum of the total costs to individuals in society, regardless of whether the 
costs are paid by the individual, or irrespective of who decides the social cost be 
incurred (Drexel, 2010; Hanley et al., 1993). 
 
How effectively are PPP economic potentials (VfM, innovation, management 
expertise, risks allocation and transfers and cost efficiencies) have translated 
into social benefits to society or improvements to human living standards? 
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7). Public interest 
The word “public interest” is recognised as a yardstick when mentioned in public 
policies, and may be defined as ‘the interest (stake) which a society has in public 
affairs that confer welfare” and are evidenced, through governments’ provision of 
public goods that confers values (accessibility, continuity, quality) to society 
(Edwards, 2007; Partnership Victoria, 2009). 
 
Have governments included public interest protection with PPP public 
infrastructure deliveries, and are the costs associated with public interest 
included with the market system pricing of PPP activities? 
 
 
8). Contingent liability and guarantees 
One of the primary reasons for Government providing guarantees to the private 
sector in PPP procurement is based on the premise of supporting project objectives 
and outcomes (Irwin, 2006). Governments’ assuming the role of a guarantor (insurer) 
becomes potentially liable to unlimited risk beyond its control and exogenous to its 
operations (Polackova, 1998; Irwin and Brixi, 2004), upon crystallisation of an event.  
 
 Question: What is your view on government incentive packages and guarantees 
to the private investor? 
 
Question: Can you suggest other ways that public infrastructure procurement 
using PPP arrangements may be improved to ensure these projects confer 
positive impacts and social benefits to the community at large? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you would like an Executive Summary of the results of the survey, please insert 
your name and address below. 
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Thank you for completing this interview questions and your time and effort is greatly 
appreciated. 
 
Charles Adighibe – PhD Researcher 
 
